DEFENSE, SECURITY AND OCCUPATION AS A BUSINESS

Military, armaments and security trade relations between Spain and Israel

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<td>BMN</td>
<td>Banco Mare Nostrum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAT</td>
<td>Campaign Against Arms Trade</td>
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<td>CAN</td>
<td>Caja Navarra</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASA</td>
<td>Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Caja Castilla la Mancha</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEOE</td>
<td>Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESEI SL</td>
<td>Consultant for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>CSID</td>
<td>Advanced Center for Defense Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>National Intelligence Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGP</td>
<td>General Directorate of Police</td>
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<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic Defence and Space</td>
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<td>ENAAT</td>
<td>European Network Against Arms Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>FESEI</td>
<td>Foundation for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>GD-SBS</td>
<td>General Dynamics- Santa Barbara Systems</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>IAI</td>
<td>Israel Aerospace Industries</td>
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<td>ICEX</td>
<td>Spanish Institute of Foreign Trade</td>
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<td>ICTS</td>
<td>International Consultants on Targeted Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>R &amp; D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<td>INI</td>
<td>National Industrial Institute</td>
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<td>IMI</td>
<td>Israel Military Industries</td>
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<td>ISDS</td>
<td>International Security and Defense Systems</td>
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<td>IWI</td>
<td>Israel Weapon Industries</td>
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<td>MAEC</td>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness</td>
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<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBQ (CBN)</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological or Nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>PACI</td>
<td>Annual Plan for International Co-operation</td>
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<td>PESD</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Pro-Check International</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>People’s Party</td>
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<td>Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party</td>
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<td>SBS</td>
<td>Santa Barbara Systems</td>
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<td>SEPI</td>
<td>State Society of Industrial Participation</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>Special Weapons And Tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCJC</td>
<td>Camilo José Cela University</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAMTAC</td>
<td>High-Mobility Tactical Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Very Important Person</td>
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OBJECTIVE OF THE REPORT

This report analyzes the security and defense trade relations between Spain and Israel and is complementary to a previous report drafted in 2009. Then, the report approached the Spanish exports of defense material to Israel, its relevance, pertinence and adequation to the law. It also examined other types of military and security relations, which will be analyzed more in depth in this report, without attempting to provide an exhaustive study of such sectors, characterized by dynamism, lack of transparency and secrecy.

HIGHLIGHTS:

1/ Military and security relations between Spain and Israel are significant and on the rise. They are facilitated, promoted and protected by a series of formal agreements that stand out for their secrecy and lack of transparency, and are characterized by access to privileged information and conditions. Considering Europe and the NATO, to which Spain belongs: Israel obtains privileged access to funds and military and security research findings, it benefits from conditions of a de facto member of NATO, without being part of this organization, and has access to its interoperability standards, as well as benefiting from the Euro Space Program.

2/ Israel exports about three-quarters of its military production to more than one hundred countries. The defense and security apparatus is highly dependent on these exports, which significantly reduce the costs of procurement for the Israeli Security Forces, allowing to export surplus production and thus reduce the costs of production per unit. The exported military equipment and weapons are advertised as representing "combat-tested" cutting-edge technology, as they have been previously used in the frequent Israeli military operations. Indeed, certain military products have increased in sales after military campaigns in the region or in the Gaza Strip, which is viewed as a laboratory for the testing of weapons.

3/ By exporting defense equipment to Israel Spain is violating its own legislation. These exports flagrantly violate four of the eight criteria established by the Common Position of the European Union and the Spanish law that regulates them. In addition, they could also be in breach of three additional criteria set out in those provisions. Although the member countries of the EU have denied licenses to export defense equipment to Israel on at least 325 occasions between 2001 and 2011, it is known that none of these denials have come from Spain. Moreover, Spain has not exported defense equipment to the Palestinian Authority, but it did export riot material.

4/ The economic size of Spanish imports of Israeli defense equipment is far superior to that of Spanish exports to Israel. Imported products include Spike missiles from the Israeli company Rafael, RCWS Samson remote control weapons platforms, also produced by Rafael, Cardom mortar systems by Elbit Systems, and unmanned aircraft (drones) Searcher by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). The four companies are among the most lucrative for the occupation of the Palestinian territories and the tensions in the region, while the four products have been tested extensively in the Gaza Strip. After 2007, the volume of imports soared, exceeding 400 million euros.
Spain and its defense and security industry not only represent a business opportunity for their Israeli counterpart, but are also a gateway to the markets of Europe, North Africa, and especially Latin America. Israeli companies are taking advantage of partnerships and contacts with Spanish firms to access those third markets where Spain has a brand value. Spanish companies are also benefiting from these agreements, offering products which include cutting-edge Israeli technology and its proven experience in combat. The companies which are most are more favoured in this respect are Indra Systems Santa Barbara, Tecnobit and EADS-CASA, although Navantia also deserves to be mentioned.

Part of the defense and security relations take place through the introduction of direct Israeli subsidiaries in Spain. To be highlighted among the defense companies are Pap Tecnos (subsidiary of Rafael) and Aeronautics. Regarding security firms, there are many companies that claim to work in or for the Spanish sector. Trade relations are promoted by various lobbies in Spain, as well as contacts established during defense and security trade fairs.

An added value is provided by the Israeli security products and services due to their proven experience in combat, for the superior training conditions and facilities on Israeli territory, and for the made in Israel brand, the result of decades of expansion and promotion of its products. Among the clients of the Israeli security firms who advertise their experience as "battle tested" are: the Catalan police, the Guardia Civil, the GEO and the National Police, the Ertzaintza, local police in various cities, the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Family.

Spain is a growing business opportunity for the Israeli security and defense industry. The increasing trend towards the privatization of security services (especially in prisons) and expectations of greater facilities point to a golden era for those who are investing in security as a business. Several Israeli companies have benefited from contracts of Spanish public institutions and private companies.

The Israeli defense and security industry conveys its expertise and knowledge through different courses in Spain and Israel, which are also promoted by Spanish public institutions. Customers are mainly Spanish security and police forces, as well as private security guards. There are several schools that offer such training (including university graduate programs), such as the Camilo José Cela University.

Public and private universities, public institutions and Spanish military and technological companies develop research projects in the field of security with their Israeli counterparts. At least 31 projects of the European Union have the joint participation of the two countries. For example, contributing to the CAPER project, dedicated to the fight against organized crime through the massive extraction of data from the Internet, is the Catalan police, the Guardia Civil, the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the Israeli Ministry of Public Security, among others.
This report is the continuation of an earlier study conducted in 2008, and published in 2009. The main objective has been to present an analysis of Spanish arms exports to Israel. The thesis behind the report is that these exports represent an immoral behaviour that needs to be detailed. Two of the conclusions, among others, of the former study were: first, that the Spanish arms exports to Israel poses a controversy, as it violates Spanish and European legislation and is an unethical practice. This finding confirms the initial thesis, which focused specifically on this issue. The second conclusion, on the other hand, not included in the starting theory, is that Spanish arms exports to Israel is not the only type of dodgy relationship in the fields of security and defense, or even the most important. In fact, in terms of economic size, and focusing exclusively on these sectors in the two countries, the export of Spanish arms is the least significant component of relations between Spain and Israel.

This second report, drafted by a team of three people, draws from the previous one to explore specifically and more in depth, relationships which were formerly only superficially addressed and which represent the bulk of relations between Spain and Israel in terms of military, security and weapons material. As Spanish exports to Israel were the central theme of the previous report, they will only be addressed here to provide more recent data on the subject and as a reminder of the controversy that these exports have signified. Details concerning why the Spanish judicial system has never taken interest in (and, therefore, has never questioned) such themes, are provided in the 2009 report and its synthesis will be addressed in this second report with some additional elements.

This report contains ten different yet related types of military, armaments and security relations between Spain and Israel, as listed below:

1. Political complicity and cooperation, both at a bilateral level between countries and in related supranational structures such as the EU or NATO
2. Official security and defense agreements between Spain and/or its regions and Israel as a state
3. Spanish exports to Israel, of dual civil -military defense material and light weapons
4. Imports of Israeli defense equipment to Spain
5. Contracts in Spain for Israeli defense groups, often in partnership with the Spanish industry
6. Implementation of the Israeli defense industry on Spanish territory and its use as a global base
7. Israeli security products marketed in Spain
8. Made in Israel security services in Spain
9. Transfer of Israeli security and defense training and knowledge
10. Relations in Research and Development (R & D) between the two countries

The structure of the report will not follow exactly this order, as priority will be given to the development of the last six points, previously less investigated. The first two themes will be addressed together in the first chapter on the general framework of relations, whereas points three and four will be dealt with jointly in the third chapter. The other themes will be developed in separate and individual chapters.
It is to be noted that the structure of the report reflects the greater weight of Israeli interests in Spain than vice versa. This is symptomatic of a general reality: that Israel depends on Spain only in terms of connivance, political support, and as an outlet for its public and private sector companies, the country being viewed as a business or a basis for facilitating access to other markets. In Israel on the other hand we have not found, if not only occasionally, defense contracts with Spanish contractors, nor the marketing of Spanish security products or services, including training. Moreover, no Spanish defense industry is known to have a subsidiary in Israel. The reason for this is simply because Israel considers Spain solely from a market perspective.

The report aims to provide both a description of these relations and an evaluative analysis. It is clear that the latter is strongly conditioned by a negative perception of the fields of defense and security, as they are conceived today, i.e. for private interests based on profit. We personally believe that defense and security must not be bought or sold, nor focus on a certain group of people, or rely on instruments designed ultimately to kill or suppress people through violence. Thus, our first objective is to denounce these practices. The second focus of interest is to address Israel as the most militarized country in the world and to look at the reasons for this condition. We do not acknowledge Israel as an exclusively Jewish territory (it isn’t), nor is it in any way our intention to refer in this report to Jewish people that are not directly related to the fields of security and defense in Israel.
The Israeli filmmaker Yotam Feldman, regarding his documentary film *The Lab*, said in an interview that he thought the war in Gaza had become "something inherent in the Israeli political system, possibly a part of our system of governance" and cited as an example how politicians addressed the Operation Pillar of Defense, held in November 2012, during the election campaign:

"There are very close links between the military industries, on the one hand, and the army and the political system on the other. The most profitable military company is Elbit, owned by Mickey Federman, one of the confidants of Ehud Barak and a key player in his election campaigns. [...] Moreover, it represents a national economic interest. The Ministry of Defense plays a dual role as the supervision authority of the military system and as promoter of the Israeli military industry abroad. I think it’s not possible for Barak to separate the two things. I’m not saying they embark on military campaigns in Gaza in order to test the systems and make money, but it does play an important role. And, at the lower echelons, the Israeli military industries invest a lot of effort in order for the IDF officers to buy their products and use them to increase their export potential. They also do this through mass recruitment of retired senior officers, to work as sales promoters and project managers, selling to former colleagues in the IDF. A case in point is Elbit and General (Ret.) Yiftach Ron-Tal."

However, Feldman highlights the lack of internal criticism in Israel:

"The inconsistency is in the importance of this issue for the economy and society in general, and its scarce presence in the public discourse. Compared with other countries, few articles on weapons are published in Israel and the issue is not widely discussed, even though everyone has an uncle in Elbit or IAI. This shows that people feel that this is a problematic theme, that it isn’t something which should be discussed openly."

Since the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, the military sector has been a key component of the Israeli economy, despite cuts in military spending and on personnel of armament companies. Yaacov Lifshitz, of the Bar-Ilan University, claims that, from a macro-economic point of view, the defense industry only accounts for 3% of GDP, but he also adds that "it is important as a source of technologies that will later be applied in the civil high-tech industry", and others suggest that this is its most important contribution. The consequences of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the boom of the so-called homeland security also explain the rise in its relevance. Israel is dependent on its arms exports, since the domestic demand is insufficient to support the country’s military industry. Israel exports three quarters of the weapons its companies produce, and only 25 % is left to meet the needs of the Armed Forces, the police and other security services. While initially the Israeli industry sold mainly to the Armed Forces (IDF), Israel has now expanded its network of military products to customers in more than a hundred countries.
Israel has become one of the biggest arms exporters in the world. It is impossible to calculate exactly how much Israel exports nor the country’s position in the global ranking of arms exporters. The secrecy and lack of transparency, the increasingly blurred boundaries between what is considered “security” or “defense”, and the different ways to evaluate transfers cause mismatching results from different sources.9 SIBAT, the Israeli defense export agency, provides statistics of all contracts signed by defense and security companies, so these figures would imply a minimum threshold. The chart below shows the progression of the years10 following 2002, year which until then had represented the peak of military sales since the formation of the state in 1948, with over $ 4,000 million of sales.11

In 2006, the magazine Defense News ranked Israel as the fourth largest exporter, and claimed it was responsible for 10 % of global sales.12 In 2008, it was estimated that Israel would climb to the third position,13 in 2010 to the fourth14 and, in 2012, it would drop to the sixth position due to an increase of 30 % in world exports over the previous year.15 Shmaya Avieli, Director of SIBAT, said he preferred not to speculate on the exact position, but “could safely say that we are well within the top 10 exporters.”16

However, taking into account those who may be ahead of Israel in the weapons exports race (USA, UK, Russia, China and Germany) and considering the extremely small population of Israel compared to that of these countries, it can be claimed that Israel is without a doubt and by far, the main arms exporter in the world per capita. Moreover, in 2013 Israel seemed to have overcome the global recession and, in just six months, had reached almost $ 4,000 million in sales.17

The Israeli export market in 2012 was as follows: Asia represented 50 % of sales (or 3.700 million), with India as the main customer, Europe was in second place with 1,600 million dollars, a much higher figure than the previous year, due to a 1.000 million contract with Italy (with the company Israel Aerospace Industries, IAI, two aircrafts and an optical recognition satellite), and contracts for several hundred billion dollars with Germany (with Rafael, anti-tank Spike missiles). USA and Canada represent the third largest market for Israel (1,190 million in sales in 2012), while Latin America ranks fourth (604 million). Israel is pointing at Latin America to increase its relevance in the defense and
security exports. Missile technology and air defense systems account for 25% of Israel’s international sales. However, despite being the second largest exporter of drone technology, only behind the US, these products represent only 3% of the total exports of this country’s defense.\textsuperscript{18}

It should be noted that economic interests are often the main driver in relations between countries, and often weigh more than politics. In fact, at times these lead to the involvement of countries with which no diplomatic relations are held (although these cases are exceptions). Israel for example equips American and other foreign aircrafts and vehicles, and this is why most combat aircrafts in the world use Israeli technology, such as the F-15S Air Force in Saudi Arabia. Other examples are described later in this report.

\subsection{1.2// ISRAELI DEPENDENCE ON NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE}

Europe and North America account for a smaller part of the Israeli defense exports. However, it is these two regions which allow the Israeli defense and security industry to be what it is today. This is the result of privileges, trade protection and aids which are theoretically incompatible with neoliberal market laws, competition with the industries of the region, the classified and secret information that characterizes these sectors, and with ethics and legislation. There are at least five points of collaboration that are decisive:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a)] \textbf{US military aid.} The US is the godfather of Israel, and Tel Aviv is the largest recipient of US aid since 1976. It receives about 3,000 million dollars in aid each year, a sixth part of the US foreign aid budget and 2% of Israel’s GDP. In recent years, it is estimated that 75% of this aid has been military and amounts to about 500 dollars per year for each Israeli citizen in the mid first decade of this century (the second receiver, Egypt, received 20 dollars per citizen per year).\textsuperscript{20} However, these figures are highly undervalued and the total military aid is undoubtedly much higher. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt claim, in their book \textit{The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy}, that there are at least five reasons to support this estimate as lower,\textsuperscript{21} including and above all, pro-Israel diplomacy. Thus, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, if Egypt and Jordan are the second and third recipients of US aid, this is largely due to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in these countries.\textsuperscript{22} Generally speaking, the US act as a watchdog to Israel, ensuring it that international relations are not hostile to the country, whose political and economic impact, however large, can not be quantified. It is important also to underline that the dependence on US aid has brought to a progressive detriment of funds of the Israeli budget for the purchase of Israeli military products for the US, including those made in Israel, because they can be paid with the US Military Financing Fund (26.3% of these funds can be used to purchase weapons produced by Israeli companies).\textsuperscript{23} The result of this practice has been that Israel has not developed some products which, in the absence of US assistance, it could have produced (like a renowned Israeli fighter)\textsuperscript{24} and, at the same time, it has produced the control, limitation or blocking of some exports to certain countries (most notably China).\textsuperscript{25}

\item[b)] \textbf{Access to finance and research results.} The European Union’s \textit{Security Research Programme (ESRP)} has a duration of seven years (2007-2013) and costs € 1,400 million. It is part of \textit{Framework Programme 7 (FP7)}. Israel is the most active non-participating member state, and...
benefits in at least three ways: money (FP7 is the second largest funder of academic research in Israel); inclusion in contracts and facilitation of contacts in the fields of defense and safety; and, last but not least, access to research results produced in Europe.26

c) Access to standards. Today, military products incorporate high technology developed by many manufacturers from different countries. These products must comply with the interoperability standards required by the military structures. NATO is particularly important for Israel, who must maintain access to technology transfers, the same which is denied to non-allied states: “Without access to a relevant and widely protected trade, without access to standards, without access to trade opportunities, without access to research results, the arms industry of Israel would go out and die.”27 In 2006, Israel signed an agreement to adopt the NATO Codification System, which although it took a few years to implement, allows the country to meet their standards and facilitate trade relations.28

d) NATO: de facto member? Israel has a number of cooperation agreements with NATO and research, especially through an Individual Cooperation Program (ICP). The ICP signed by Israel was the NATO’s first and it was ratified in 2006, shortly after the war with Lebanon. The ICP’s objective is cooperation in areas such as “counter-terrorism, including the exchange of information and experience in security, increasing the number of joint NATO-Israel military exercises, expanding cooperation in the fight against nuclear proliferation, improving cooperation on weapons and logistics, electronically connecting Israel to the NATO system, etc.”29 We might also add to this, the lucrative supply of military equipment that benefits the military industry. Moreover, Israel provides access to the computer and intelligence systems of the NATO.30

On 27 March 2005, Israel and the NATO conducted their first joint naval exercise in the Red Sea, with the Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group 2 (SNMCMG2), and the participation of Spanish specialists.31 In June of the same year, Israel was observer in the submarine exercise “Sorbet Royal 2005” and in mid-2006, it participated for the first time in a naval exercise with an active role [not as an observer], the “Cooperative Mako 06”, in the Romanian Black Sea coast. Spain also participated in this exercise.32 Israel also joined the NATO naval control system in the Mediterranean and participates in the Active Endeavour operation patrol in this sea.33 Israel, in fact, is part of the mission Active Endeavour.34 Israel is a member of the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and participates in meetings such as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which was held in Valencia in November 2008. Israel also hosted eight NATO ships in Haifa in May 2006. In the words of Teodoro Lopez Calderon, commander of Group 2 of the Maritime Force, “it is an opportunity for the members of the Dialogue to expand their knowledge of the NATO and increase new partnership.”35

Israel is much more than a close partner. Many leaders in Europe and North America, including José María Aznar, suggest that the country join the NATO as a full member. Factors limiting this possibility include reluctance in Israel or the country’s permanent state of war which would force NATO [i.e., its members] to meet increasing domestic political cost, but also externally, to put their relationships with the Arab states at risk [i.e., its energy security, which is oil-dependent]. An Israeli attempt to open a NATO office was blocked by Turkey.36
The European Space Program is a major component of defense, although the participation of Israel is not significant. In fact, even though Israel provides components for the Galileo satellite system for the EU global civil navigation, it is not a member state of the European Space Agency (ESA). However, it was necessary to formalize relations and Israeli interests to participate in many other ESA projects. Thus, the negotiation process formally began in 2007 and ended, for now, with the signing of the cooperation agreement between ESA and Israel on January 30, 2011. Participation in the ESA is “vital for the growth of the industry and the Israeli space research.” Dan Blumberg, of the Ben-Gurion University, says that the lack of investment in spatial R & D render university researchers more dependent on the defense industry and satellite programs. However, military secrecy prevents the publication of the research or the presentation of the results at scientific conferences. Thus, “while a deeper partnership with ESA would allow Israeli rocket scientists to distance themselves from their own arms industry, it would also allow their arms companies more access to European research.” The cooperation agreement signed in 2011 will facilitate these claims.

1.3// MILITARY AND SECURITY RELATIONS WITH SPAIN AND POLITICAL COMPLICITY

We stated in the 2009 report that military relations between Spain and Israel have followed a parallel process to the development of diplomatic relations, which have not been without controversy. These diplomatic relations began on 16 January 1986, when the protocol agreement was signed in The Hague. However, José Antonio Lisbona claims that the Mossad and the secret service of Francisco Franco had already established relations in 1961. In 1986 Spain was, together with the Holy See, the only European country that had not recognized the Israeli state. There are different reasons for this, including preferences for the Arab states and anti-Jewish sentiments present during the Franco dictatorship and the subsequent years. With the advent of democracy in Spain, another argument, related to the occupation, was raised: Fernando Morán, former PSOE Foreign Minister, stated that “you should not reward the annexation of territories by force.” In the official statement on the establishment of relations between the two countries, Spain made it clear in writing that:

“(...) [The Spanish government] reiterates the non-recognition of any measures aimed at annexing the occupied Arab territories since 1967, or unilaterally alter the nature or status of the city of Jerusalem, to which access must be free for all. In this context, Spain rejects the policy of building settlements in the occupied territories and calls for its dismantling as a first step towards the return of the territories.”

“(...) Spain expresses its conviction that all implied parties should accept and comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council, which should form the basis for the search for a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.”

From a historical perspective, Spain is perceived by some sectors in Israel as one of the countries where hatred towards the Jew has been most significant. However, these same countries are also seeing Spain as a state which is progressively becoming closer and more allied. On the one hand,
Spain is against the military occupation of the Palestinian Territories and is in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state according to the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as a shared capital with Israel. Spain voted for the status of Palestine as observer at the UN, and also claims to defend the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. It is in favor of “a negotiated settlement between the parties,” and the Occupied Territories of Palestine are a priority area of Spanish cooperation.

On the other hand, Spain has provided strong political support through various mechanisms, both with the People’s Party and the Socialist Party. At the UN General Assembly in 2011, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trinidad Jimenez, declared for the first time in the history of Spain: a) commitment in recognizing Israel as the homeland of the Jewish population (and no other identity), and b) that the issue of the Palestinian refugees should be solved in a manner that does not compromise the demographic situation in Israel, of Jewish majority, nor its Jewish character. Israel welcomed the thought that the Spanish change in attitude towards a “pro-Israeli position” could encourage other countries to follow its steps. Spain has offered troops for the political process in Annapolis, and deployed them (up to 1100) in Lebanon in a nod to the interests of Israel.

The Spanish Government, like other countries, avoids condemning or criticizing the Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories to avoid harming bilateral relations. It is useful to analyze the political cost associated with each of the preceding two paragraphs. In the first case, concerning measures in favor of Palestinian rights, it should be noted that these are shared by the vast majority of countries, including States that are allies of Israel. Thus, the political cost of this positioning is very small. For example, the Minister of Interior, Jorge Fernandez Diaz, said that Spain’s vote in favor of the recognition of Palestine as an observer state in the UN, “will not damage in any way the bilateral relations with Israel”, and added “I believe that the political significance of this visit is that it has been maintained”, referring to the agreement on crime and terrorism signed between the two countries, a few days after the recognition.

Thus, Spain does not seem to exert any real pressure on Israel nor the Palestinians. Although on rare occasions, like the attacks on Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009, and Lebanon in 2006, the Spanish Government denounced the disproportionate use of force by Israel, these practices have produced no impact or change in bilateral relations, nor in military, arms or security related practices. Although Spain has stood out in its forcefulness with Hamas and other Palestinian groups (with some collusion with Fatah), in demanding some points that could facilitate the positive transformation of the conflict, its silence has been deafening in relation to Israel’s failure to respect UN resolutions and other agreements, or issues such as the separation wall or the settlement policy, among others. Two more examples of Spain’s collusion with Israel should be pointed out: the first has been the change in the legislation to prevent Spain from investigating war crimes in other countries if no Spanish citizens are involved, a decision largely motivated by the threat to prosecute Israelis regarding abuses in the Occupied Territories and with the intent to please the Israeli government. The second has been the recent halt to the opening of a Spanish consulate in Gaza after the interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, José Manuel García-Margallo, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the former’s statement that “perhaps we have not taken into account all considerations”.
Israeli Police throws a tear gas grenade in the village of Bil’in (Palestine)

Photo: Hamza Burnat
Commercial relations in the defense and security sectors

Israeli exports to Spain are exempt from customs duties since 1 January 1993, and the same applies to Spanish bilateral exports since the beginning of 1992. In 2012, bilateral trade between Spain and Israel totaled € 1856.22 million. The equation is at first glance balanced: 822, 77 million went from Israel to Spain and 1.033,45 million in the opposite direction, from Spain to Israel. However, the balance in terms of security and defense is more asymmetric: while Spain exports mainly vehicles to Israel, Israel provides technology and “know how”. Aware of this Israeli specificity, José Ranero, economic and commercial counselor of the Spanish Embassy, stated that he was looking for more joint projects between the two countries, “especially in technology.” Not all technology is related to the sectors that concern us. In fact, only 3.28% [or € 26.99 million], of what Israel imports corresponds formally to defense (by 0.25% or 2.53 million of Spanish exports). However, the high dependence on Israeli exports of technology, and specifically, on defense security products (see details below) is well known. It is also common knowledge that the boundaries between security and defense, and between components and the finished products [and their purpose] are blurred, so that the relative share of imports from Israel could be much higher.

The economic crisis has also had an impact on these relationships. Thus, General Shmaya Avieli, Director of SIBAT (Israel’s defense export and assistance agency), said that during a visit to Spain in November 2012, opportunities were identified in “a number of areas in which there is a common interest “. As he stated, “the ability to cooperate in each of these areas depends on the economic capacity of the two countries to finance projects and solutions. Because of budgetary constraints, the pace of implementation has been slower in 2013, but we expect this pace to accelerate in 2014 or 2015”. Thus, we could say that the crisis here has had some impact there. It is unknown to what extent this has been beneficial to the Palestinians.

1.4 Military and security cooperation agreements between Spain and Israel

Military relations between Spain and Israel have followed a parallel process to the development of its diplomatic relations, which have not been without controversy. Spy networks and their intelligence services, the Mossad, have signed with the Spanish services, CESID, a cooperation agreement on 4 December 1989. They signed with General Manglano, with whom the Antenna in Spain, of the Jewish services “Avshalom Megiddon”, maintains weekly interviews."

[...]

The Mossad will deal in part with the security of the Olympics and “develop controls and activities in hubs such as post offices and the postal service in communications with Spain”.

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Military agreements between Spain and Israel

- 1989 (23 October). Basic Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation
- 1993. Bilateral sectorial cooperation agreements on research, industrial development and technology
1997 [23 January]. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on industrial cooperation of defense.
1998 [15 June]. MoU to ensure the quality of defense products.
2004 [8 February]. MoU on cooperation in military and defense research and development (R & D).
2004 [8 February]. Implementation agreement [cooperation NBC - nuclear, biological, chemical], complement no. 1 to the previous MoU.
2006 [16 March]. Signing of a MoU between Spanish and Israeli Ministries of Defense on cooperation in the field of defense policy.67
2007 [19 April]. Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the State of Israel, on cooperation in the fight against crime.68
2009 [24 May]. Defense cooperation agreement.69
2009 [October]. Announcement of the signing of a military cooperation agreement that will provide a legal framework for the development of any project of bilateral cooperation in the field of defense. It is the most important military cooperation agreement between the two countries.
2010 [16 March]. MoU on military relations and cooperation in the defense sector.
2011 [7 February]. Agreement on the protection of classified information between the Kingdom of Spain and the Government of the State of Israel and the Israeli Ministry of Defense.70
2012 [3 December]. Agreement on policies to “fight terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, cyber crimes and criminal behavior in general”.71

It should be noted that Spain has not signed any agreement with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). According to the Spanish government, “agreements can only be concluded with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)”, which in International Law has the ‘ius contrahendi’ (right to negotiate or agree). Since 2004, Spain has signed a first Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Interior of the PNA, a second one for the establishment of political consultations between the two governments (Spain and the PNA) and a third in the tourism sector with the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities of the PNA.72

The last three agreements

2010. Memorandum of Understanding: Relations and military cooperation in the defense sector

On 16 March 2010, the most comprehensive military cooperation agreement was sealed between Spain and Israel. It was a “Memorandum of Understanding”, a formula which means that no rights and obligations are derived for both parties, it is not published in the BOE, and it is not subject to the prior authorization of the Parliament (as happens with international military treaties). However, the obstacles that accompanied the process [in October 2009 the immediate signing of the agreement was reported], raised doubts about its intentions. According to Eduardo Melero, a law professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid, the agreement might have been qualified as a MoU to avoid parliamentary scrutiny and public debate on its contents.73

According to the Government, “the signing of a cooperation agreement in the field of defense with Israel aims to provide a framework for relations between the two countries, the same way that similar cooperation agreements on defense have been signed with fifty other countries with which Spain has diplomatic relations.”74 Although Spain and Israel had previously signed several military cooperation agreements, none had had such scope. According to diplomatic sources, the agreement will provide
a legal framework for the development of any project of bilateral cooperation in the field of defense.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{2011. Agreement on the protection of classified information}

This agreement affects the Kingdom of Spain, the Government of the State of Israel and, separately, its Ministry of Defense. As pointed out in the Congress of Deputies, it was unprecedented to consider the Israeli Ministry of Defense almost like a differentiated state.\textsuperscript{76} The agreement had a very difficult course, and one year passed between the approval by the Council of Ministers and the adoption of the International Convention. The delay had to do with the fact that Israel wanted the agreement to be between the State of Israel and the Spanish State on the one hand and, in a differentiated manner, between the Spanish State and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The resolution was passed in Congress with the following results: 348 votes cast, 339 in favor, six against and three abstentions.\textsuperscript{77} The agreement in force until then had been the Security Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the State of Israel, of 1995.\textsuperscript{78} The “Safety Authority”, which oversees the agreement for each part, is the National Intelligence Center and the National Bureau of security for Spain, and, for Israel, The Directorate of Security for the Defense Establishment.\textsuperscript{79} What stands out are the protection measures put in place by both parties, specified in a text that did not appear in the earlier agreement of 1995.\textsuperscript{80} Article 11.4 of the text says that “it is agreed between the parties that any dispute and/or interpretation of this Agreement shall not be subjected to any national or international court or any national or international legislation” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{81}

Similarly to the previous text of 1995, in the first paragraph of Article 3 of the agreement it is detailed that:\textsuperscript{82} “this Agreement forms part of any contract that is held or subscribed in the future between the Parties or between any entity related with the security and secrecy of projects between the Parties and/or entities related with the Parties in the following matters:.

a) Cooperation between the Parties and/or entities related to the Parties on military or defense matters.
b) Cooperation and/or exchange of classified information in any field between the Parties and their respective institutions.
c) Co-operation, exchange of classified information, joint ventures, contracts or any other relationship between government, public and private entities of the Parties in military or defense affairs.
d) Sale by one party to the other of technical knowledge related to defense entities.
e) Classified Information transmitted between the Parties by any representative, employee or consultant (private or not) in military and defense issues.

To understand the logic of this agreement, it should be recalled that in 2010, Brazil signed a confidentiality agreement with Israel prohibiting it to transfer “classified technology” to third parties. It is now recognized that this “opened the doors to Israeli companies” \textsuperscript{83} “to offer products that were previously prohibited” [after the agreement confidentiality was supposedly guaranteed].\textsuperscript{83}

According to the socialist deputy Pedret i Grenzner, who cast an intervention in defense of this agreement and its interpretation, “without judging” who favored the deal.\textsuperscript{84}
"We believe that normal relations with all States, without judging the political activities of state governments, are absolutely necessary and normal in international relations, and more so in a matter as sensitive as that of classified information, in which of course Spain cannot give up having access to important data in the international intelligence community".

**Agreement to combat terrorism and criminal behavior**

Signed in Madrid in 2012, on policies to “combat terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, cyber crime and criminal behavior in general.” The agreement includes the “collaboration and coordination between counterterrorism experts such as the EOD and GEOS units in Spain”.

Spanish Interior Minister, Jorge Fernandez Diaz, pointed out that “Spain has adopted a series of comprehensive measures in the fight against international terrorism, radicalization and the Jihad informative mediatic propaganda.” Perhaps this agreement has provided the strong presence of undercover agents of the Israeli secret services in Barcelona, in relation to the “jihadist” phenomenon that some associate to this city.

**Guarantees of confidentiality?**

One of the problems associated with the outsourcing of intelligence services is confidentiality and the ability to use the information for other purposes. Thus, in a 1989 interview, Moshe Lan, then executive vice president of ICTS security (see section 6.2), when asked if they would give the Israeli Government information they have access to, said: "We are all Israelis, but I am sure that the government does not need us to get information.” However, it recognized that to work abroad,

"We need permission, first to negotiate in each country, then to sign each contract, and we have to report during the execution of the contract. What we basically have to give the SIBAT is the know-how, the techniques that we will transmit and the name of the company we work for, but we do not have to give any other information about the company in question.”

**Other cooperation agreements on defense or security**

In the ICEX report on collaborations between Spain and Israel on science and technology, the following conclusions are highlighted: On the one hand, agreements with some regions seem to be more fruitful than at a state level. In particular, the agreements signed between MATIMOP (National Agency for cooperation in industrial R & D in Israel), Catalonia and Madrid. The Basque Country was listed as the third region of the state in terms of entrepreneurial, scientific and technological cooperation. On the other hand, the pro-activity of the Spain-Israel Chamber of Commerce was confirmed. Also, it was pointed out that the primary means of technological collaboration between the two countries was the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Union (see Chapter 8), managed by the MATIMOP and the Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI), and funded by the two States.

Eureka is an intergovernmental initiative to support cooperative R & D in Europe, to boost the
competitiveness of the “European” companies through technological projects (products, processes and/or services) “with clear commercial interest”. Eureka supports projects approved by a “seal of quality” which, besides being an element of promotion and recognition of the technological level of the promoter company, it allows it to receive public funding (each country is responsible for the financing of its associated entities). In Spain, projects are financed through the Centre for Industrial Technological Development (CDTI), a public institution under the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. While specifying that “results must have a civilian finality”, it also recognizes that “it is allowed for projects to make use of any technological area and are applicable to any market sector,”92 and it is well known that the boundaries between civilian and military, among and between security and defense products and components, are blurred both in Spain and Israel.93 In July 2013, the fifth joint Eureka call for proposals was held between Israeli and Spanish companies, in which national agencies (The Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor on behalf of Israel and the CDTI for Spain) commit to promote, support and fund joint technology projects of business entities, with the support of non-corporate entities (such as universities).94

It is also important to note that other types of military cooperation occasionally occurs between the two countries. For example, in response to the request of the Government of Israel, the Spanish Ministry of Defense sent to this country four firefighting planes of the Air Force to assist in extinguishing a fire declared in the vicinity of the city of Haifa. The fire caused at least 40 deaths and about fifty wounded, and forced the evacuation of about 15,000 people.95

Agreements with Catalonia

Although its relationship to security and defense is not demonstrated, a number of agreements have recently been signed between Catalonia and Israel in the field of technology and R & D, which are likely to include related initiatives. These agreements are:96

- Agreement between ACC1Ó (agency for the internationalization of Catalan companies, attached to the Department of Business and Employment of the Government of Catalonia) and MATIMOP (National Agency for Research and Development of Israel). ACC1Ó97 gives priority to promoting R & D through cooperation and collaboration between companies at a national, transnational and European level. In 2012, a bilateral cooperation agreement for the “promotion of research and industrial development between Catalonia and Israel” was established. The initiative aims to “promote the optimization of opportunities created by scientific and technical progress” and establishes a call for project grants for joint R & D (innovative technological applications and products) between Catalonia and Israeli companies. The maximum amount for this line of support is € 757,149.15, allocated to the budget line D/7025.770.0001/574 . However, not everyone can access these grants, since the candidates “must have a minimum of € 150,000 of eligible expenditure accepted.”98 In 2012 for example, calls for joint R & D projects took place, following the Eureka standards, between companies and non-business groups [such as universities or research centres] of Catalonia and Israel, in which each government contributed up to one million euros.99 In the 2013 call, Israel maintained this contribution, while Catalonia reduced it to a minimum of €100,000.100
- Agreement with the Weizmann Institute of Rehovot, with the Economics Department of the
Government of Catalonia [Generalitat]. This institute is famous worldwide. It envisages the exchange of researchers and PhD students (5 students in each direction) and collaborations in R & D, including the access of Israeli scientists to the Synchrotron of Sant Cugat. It is important to underline the ties between the Weizmann Institute and the defense sector. For example, Michael Federman, according to Forbes one of the world’s richest men, is contemporarily President of the Board of Elbit Systems and member of the Board of the Weizmann Institute (and also of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

- Agreement of the Department of Universities and Research with the University of Tel Aviv. This has not been the only agreement of this kind. Others have been signed, for example between the International University of Vic (UVic) and the Rambam Health Care Campus and the University of Haifa. According to Catalan groups, opposed to these relationships with universities, Israeli academic institutions are not alien to the system of occupation in Palestine. They are rather a necessary and essential part of this mechanism. Indeed, soldiers, ex soldiers and reservist students receive by law preferential treatment in all colleges. Moreover, no university has ever expressed any opposition – even symbolic – to Israeli policies toward Palestinians, and discrimination against this segment of the population is evident (for example in the low representation of Palestinians in all levels of education: although they compose 20% of the population of the State of Israel, they represent only 9.5 % of undergraduate students, 4.8 % of Master students, 3.2% of doctoral students and a revealing 1% of the academic staff. Opposition groups also claim that these universities are deeply involved in military and arms R & D. As an example, they point to the University of Tel Aviv, located on the lands of the former Palestinian village, Skeikh Muwanis, razed down in 1948. This university has participated in no less than 55 technological projects with the Israeli army, and welcomes different lines of research on weapons (eg, the Engineering Department investigates on electro-optical missiles with funding of Elbit Systems).

The CAPER project

In June 2011, the CAPER project (Collaborative information, Acquisition, Processing, Exploitation and Reporting for the prevention of Organised Crime) was launched at the Miramon Technological Park of San Sebastian. It was conducted by the Spanish company S21sec Information Security Labs SL, and co-financed by the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Union (see Chapter 8). The project’s main objective is to create an international software platform, to be used in the prevention of organized crime. By accessing to millions of data from the Internet and different international security agencies, the platform aims to perform the automated analysis of multilingual audiovisual content in a collaborative way, between different security agencies and police.

Participating in the project are 18 companies and institutions from 5 European countries (plus Israel). Conspicuous among these is the presence of the Spanish Civil Guard, the Department of Interior of the Generalitat of Catalonia [through the Catalan police Mossos d’ Esquadra] and the Autonomous University of Barcelona, as well the Center for Visual Interaction and Communications Technology -Vicomtech and the Spanish company Angel Iglesias SA- Ikusi. Israeli participation includes the Ministry of Public Security and Technion University [the Israel Institute of Technology].
The project is developed according to the requirements and needs explicit by the police and security institutions, who are beneficiaries of the resulting software platform. The company S21sec coordinates the project management, the design of the requirements of the platform, and the interoperability application and management. Ikusi on the other hand, is in charge of developing a data capture and extraction system, applying intelligent technologies to video analysis. Vicomtech provides its technology specialized in computer vision, multimedia and content analysis.108

The program, which ends in June 2014, has a funding of € 7.14 million, of which 5.58 are from the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Union. In the first version of the platform, presented at the IV International Exhibition of Security and Defense Technology (HOMSEC), held 12–15 March 2013 at IFEMA in Madrid, the system proved capable of obtaining, on a fictitious crime, all available data from different open sources and social networks. The platform thus aims to bring to light relevant information which allows to find suspects and their potential partners. Future updates will include the analysis of videos, images, audios and biometrics.109

1.5// PROMOTORS OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPAIN AND ISRAEL (AND ITS LOBBIES)

Sometimes it is not easy to separate the specific defense and security interests examined in this report, from the broader Spain-Israel interests. There are numerous organizations dedicated to these issues, such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Spain- Israel, the Sefarad-Israel Center, the Sefarad Library, the Don Juan de Borbon Spain-Israel Foundation, the Spain-Israel University Chair, the ASEI Spain-Israel Solidarity Association, and Friends of Israel, among others. There are also specific organizations who promote Israeli interests in certain regions in particular. Thus, in Catalonia, there are organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce Catalonia-Israel or the Catalan Association “Friends of Israel”, among others. These organizations usually focus on cultural and commercial matters. Some have only a casual relationship with security and defense, while others address these sectors in a specific way. In this chapter, we will focus on the latter cases, some of which we address below.

It should be clarified from the outset that the main promoters of defense and security relations, besides the companies which are directly involved, are the Spanish and Israeli governments. These promote and facilitate these relationships far beyond the needs identified in relation to the “threats” to security (economic interests are also important). That is, without denying the existence of these threats, these sectors represent primarily market opportunities. Both countries use public government structures and institutions to promote trade relations, and exploit the opportunities offered by diplomatic visits and memorial or celebration events. In the case of Israel, the Ministry of Defense has 22 missions around the world working to promote Israeli companies.110 To promote relations it can count on SIBAT, the Foreign Defense Assistance and Export Organization [see detail below], as well as the Defense attaché in many embassies, and numerous agreements which favour approaches. For example, the Israeli President Shimon Peres made a four-day visit to Spain in February 2011 to celebrate the 25th anniversary of relations between the two countries. The visit also sought to “strengthen and expand the strategic, economic, and diplomatic ties” between Spain
and Israel and between Israel and the EU, and concluded with the signing of a MoU between the Institute of Export and International Cooperation of Israel and the Spanish Foreign Trade Institute.

Peres, who met with the King, the Prime Minister and the President of the Congress of Deputies, among others, was accompanied by a delegation of 40 business leaders. Participating in the event were, among others, the following Israeli defense companies: Israeli Military Industries (IMI), Rafael, Aeronautics, IAT - Ilan Advanced Technologies Ltd and SILON Aviation. Participants of the security sector featured companies such as PSOS Professional School & Services of Security and ISDS Ltd, represented by Leo Gleser (see detail on these companies in chapter 4 - defense contracts - and 6 - security services). The meeting was organized by the CEOE, the Israeli Embassy, ICEX and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Spain- Israel (see below).

It should be noted that there are many Spanish and Israeli public institutions that have signed cooperation agreements on matters which may be related to the sectors which interest us. For example, the Cooperation Agreement between ICEX and the Israeli Export Institute, the Agreement between the CEOE and the Manufacturers Association of Israel (MAI), or the Agreement between CESCE and the Israeli Insurance Risk in Foreign Trade Company. Usually, SIBAT’s Spanish partner is the Directorate General of Armament and Material (DGAM), with which they have "launched a cooperation program that will allow both entities (DGAM and SIBAT) to conduct studies and examine areas that can benefit both countries."

Also noteworthy is the support of politicians, like e.g. Esperanza Aguirre, who as president of the Community of Madrid stated that "the best way of testing a society’s appreciation for freedom is its defense of the State of Israel "(...) to defend the State of Israel, is to defend our freedom, to defend the foundations of our Judeo-Christian civilization, and our Western civilization."

Or "to defend Israel is to defend human rights... Israel’s enemies are the enemies of Spain." We now briefly and specifically address some of these organizations: SIBAT, Friends of Israel, the Sefarad-Israel Center, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Spain-Israel and gun shows.

**SIBAT**

SIBAT, the Foreign Defense Assistance and Export Organization, is the Israeli defense export and cooperation agency, controlled by the Israeli Ministry of Defense. This agency "promotes the marketing and sales of Israeli products, services and military systems, and monitors and maintains exports in accordance with state policies." SIBAT explains on its website its functions and scope, and the services offered. Its functions include, according to the institution, “to cooperate and support the efforts of the Israeli defense industry; establish connections in target countries; identify and initiate business opportunities; study the market and provide relevant business information; sell material; sell excess material of the Israel Defense Forces, and direct the export efforts of the Israeli defense industry.”

SIBAT’s aim is “to participate in the growth of the Israeli defense industry; access international markets and new fields of activity; promote a culture of sharing and cooperation that benefits exports of the Israeli defense industry; fight for excellence, respond quickly and maintain the efficiency of
existing processes to improve learning while maintaining a strict integrity and the highest ethics; and try to place Israel as world leader in defense exports. Finally, SIBAT services include: “identify and initiate opportunities for the Israeli defense industry, organize and coordinate the visits of delegations and official representatives of foreign exchange, develop and conduct training seminars, establish linkages between governments, trade the excess material of the Israel Defense Forces; hold conventions and attend fairs and exhibitions; refer potential customers to the relevant Israeli defense industries, and implement all quality assurance standards.”

The priorities of SIBAT, according to its director, are focused in three areas: a) “obtaining intelligence information, data fusion, exploitation, analysis, target generation and dissemination of information”, b) “security against improvised explosive devices (detection, objective, interference and neutralization)” and c) “robotics and autonomous systems.” However, he acknowledges that “SIBAT operates in all sectors of defense services, such as aerial warfare, space (satellites, explosive charges), rockets and missiles, radars (defense of land, sea and air, and airborne early warning – AEW), electronic warfare, C4I systems, vehicle protection and AFV- armored fighting vehicles-, advanced equipment for soldiers and national security.”

FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

The Madrid-based organization “Friends of Israel” was founded and led by the former President of Spain, José María Aznar, and has the backing of celebrities such as Northern Ireland’s Nobel Peace Prize winner David Trimble - appointed observer in the Israeli inquiry commission on the recent assault on the “Freedom Flotilla” - former US Ambassador to the UN, John R. Bolton, former President of Peru Alejandro Toledo, Italian philosopher and Senator Marcello Pera, the American theologian George Weigel and former Spanish Minister Carlos Bustelo, among others. The seven key points of the organization are: 1) “Israel is a Western country” 2) “The right of Israel to exist should not be questioned” 3) “Israel, as a sovereign country, has the right to defend itself” 4) “Israel is on our side” 5) “We believe in peace, but peace in the Middle East is not just a matter between Israelis and Palestinians” 6) “We share the same threats and challenges” and 7) “reaffirm the value of morality and Judeo-Christian culture.”

An example of how this lobby group functions is explained by Rafael Bardaji, former national security adviser to the then Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, and former director of International Policy Studies at FAES: “At the beginning of December [2010] we learned of the Brazilian initiative aimed at the recognition of the Palestinian state by the Latin American bloc. We, the Friends of Israel Initiative, mobilized very quickly and visited many leaders of the continent, in the attempt to explain that recognizing the Palestinian state prematurely, would not help the peace process. That’s something you can do. You can go and explain to Colombia, Mexico, Chile, that that is the wrong way and that it makes the discussion more difficult.”

THE SEFARAD-ISRAEL CENTRE

The Sefarad-Israel Centre (not to be confused with the Casa de Sefarad of Córdoba) is an institutional consortium created on 18 December 2006 through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation and the then Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI, today AECID), the Community of Madrid and the city of Madrid. The initiative began with the commitment taken by the signatories to “deepen the study of the Sephardic culture legacy”, “foster greater knowledge of Jewish culture” and promote the “bands of friendship and cooperation” between the societies of both countries. It is an instrument of public diplomacy, and completes the institutional network of the House of America, the House of Asia, the Arab House and the House of Africa.125

The signatory institutions are involved in funding the center. The initial collaboration agreement established in 2006 distributed the budgets from 2006 to 2009 as follows:126 a maximum of €1,100,000 in 2006 [one million from the AECI and € 100,000 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. For the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, € 3 million per year [one million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, another from the AECI, € 500,000 from the Community of Madrid and another € 500,000 from the Madrid City Council]. Thus, between 2006 and 2009, the initial budget to put the Sefarad-Israel Centre in function amounted to € 10.1 million. Between 2010 and 2013 the state budget only (MAEC and AECID) was of 2.57 and 2.77 million, respectively.127 The Center also receives other institutional funding: in 2012 it was funded, in addition to the MAEC (€ 415,000) and AECID (€ 435,620), with €100,000 from the Community of Madrid, € 21,429 from the Council of Andalucía [a contribution of 50,000 €, the rest allocated for the year 2013], 9,000 € from the City of Jaen and € 5,555.56 from the European Union [a grant of € 100,000, the rest assigned for the years 2013 and 2014].128

The Center operates in several areas: cultural, scientific and technological (fellowships, conferences, student exchanges, etc.), artistic, social [immigration, women, human rights, journalism, etc.], education and training ["from the lessons arising from the tragedy of the Holocaust"] and economic. The economic activities consist in promoting exchanges between companies and business groups in Spain and Israel, through exhibitions, seminars and other activities. It is this latter sector which is directly related to security and defense.129

As an example of the promotion of trade between Spanish and Israeli security companies, it is worth noting the participation of the then general secretary of the Sefarad-Israel center, Michael Lucas, in the seminar “International Security and Advanced Israeli Technology”, held on 29 June 2011 in the Madrid Carabanchel Nursery Embark. During the seminar, organized jointly by the Spain-Israel Chamber of Commerce and Madrid Emprende, in collaboration with the Israeli Embassy in Spain, the Sefarad-Israel Center and the MIW and Sefarad Consulting,130 managers and entrepreneurs of nine Israeli companies presented their innovations in the field of security systems technology, including platforms, products and solutions. The event gave rise to a subsequent round of B2B meetings (Business to Business), between the said group of Israeli companies and Spanish firms, to seek new joint business opportunities.

Another example: the Sefarad-Israel Center and the Spanish Ministry of Defense invited Dan Meridor [former Israeli Minister of Intelligence] and Abraham Dichter [former defense minister and former head of Shin Bet, the Israeli secret service], to participate in November 2013, in the seminar “Culture of Defense in Spain and Israel: old challenges and new challenges in the XXI century”, funded by the Spanish government and the Community of Madrid.131 Dichter has been accused of planning and directing the launch of a one-ton bomb on a residential and populated neighborhood of Gaza
City on 22 July 2002. Although aimed at the targeted killing of Hamas leader, Salah Shehadeh, at least 15 people died in the attack, including eight children (six children under six years), and at least 150 were injured. Both Dichter and Meridor suspended their trips to the UK in 2007 and 2010, respectively, for fear of being arrested in case a British citizen decided to sue them for war crimes for the events of July 2002. In fact, the Government of Israel announced that it would send more delegations to British territory for this reason. In Spain, the High Court accepted a complaint against seven Israeli officials, including Dichter. It was then ruled that Israel was to prosecute the officials, but it never did. Shortly after, the PSOE government significantly restricted universal justice in Spain, in part as a response of the Spanish Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, to criticism from his Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni, as the latter declared.

THE SPAIN–ISRAEL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

This Chamber is a non-profit organization created in September 2005, which aims to promote collaboration between private companies and Spanish and Israeli public administrations in the commercial, technological, economic, scientific, industrial, touristic and socio-cultural areas. The chamber itself specifies that it covers “all sectors”. The main objectives are (verbatim):

- Promote and offer market proposals, products and services between Spain and Israel in all sectors.
- Create a meeting point to facilitate rapprochement between Spanish and Israeli companies and institutions.
- Provide support to member companies who wish to establish links, agreements, alliances and joint ventures.
- Support applied research.
- Promote bilateral agreements for the development of industrial and technological R & D.

The deputy Gaspar Llamazares held a parliamentary question in the House of Representatives where he appealed to “subsidies to entities that collaborate in the expansionist policy of the Government of Israel in the Occupied Territories.” Llamazares referred to a previous question in which he denounced that “Sheva”, a publication of the Spain–Israel Chamber of Commerce, an organization that has the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) and the Sefarad–Israel Center, in the newsletter no.21, of 7 November 2010, published an article entitled “Israel promotes wind energy to meet demand”. The mentioned wind farms are in the Occupied territories, in the Golan Heights [Syria], West Bank, in the colony of Har Gilo. Llamazares denounced that the Occupation was being presented as “a natural fact” by a Spanish entity which receives institutional support, something which is contrary to international law and the Spanish positioning. Meanwhile, the Government replied on 29 March 2011, that the editorial office of the newsletter Sheva had literally picked an Israeli article which did not reflect the foreign and European policy in the area, and that the newsletter editor had been instructed to correct the article and avoid making similar mistakes in the future. On the other hand, the Spain–Israel Chamber of Commerce and Industry has decided to stop publishing the newsletter Sheva, mainly “because of its low profitability”. 144
It is important to note the close relationship existing between the Sefarad-Israel Center and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Spain-Israel. In fact, Giacomo Ventura has chaired both organizations. The Chamber has its origins in the Catalonia-Israel Chamber of Commerce, whose creation had been commissioned by Samuel Hadas (who will later become the first Israeli ambassador to Spain) to Giacomo Ventura. This person and his environment had participated in the Olympic Games through a “cooperation project on security, which was later used in the creation process of the Mossos d’Esquadra”. [See section 6.3 with respect to details on the Olympics]

Defense and security exhibitions

According to General Shmaya Avieli, director of SIBAT, “at fairs, SIBAT tries to promote Israeli industries and their products to foreign governments and companies, in the hope of starting new cooperations in the future. Moreover, exhibitions are the ideal place to establish contact with international trade policy and procurement experts.” In fact, these fairs are an opportunity to meet, including for senior officials, as occurred recently between SIBAT and the Spanish Ministry of Defense during the Paris Air Show, held between 17 and 23 June 2013 in Le Bourget. Israel’s participation in these fairs is usually significant. At the LAAD (Latin America Aerospace and Defence) Exhibition, for example, the Israeli pavilion included 28 companies, “the largest pavilion to date.”

Spain has also served as a display for Israeli defense and security products, for both Spanish and foreign customers. For example, between 12 and 15 March 2013 the fourth edition of Technologies for Security and Defense, HOMSEC, was held in Madrid, with over 8,000 visitors from over 40 different nationalities. It congregated 89 companies, which represented 120 brands. Israel and its products had a strong presence. Namely, it exhibited the Spike antitank missile simulator (by Rafael) and the CARDOM mortar system (by Elbit Systems). Meanwhile, Revenga promoted its Israeli mini Bluebird UAV. It is to be noted that the fair was attended by major Spanish authorities in the field of security and defense, which enhanced its relevance. Spain also acts as an exhibitor of Israeli products in the UNVEX fair, the Spanish summit of unmanned systems, of great interest to Israel, the country being the second largest producer and marketer of drones [see details below]. During this fair, for example, Triedro (Revenga Group), which manufactures its own systems as well as systems of joint development with the Israeli companies Rafael and Blue Bird, introduced its Micro UAV aircraft B, the B Spylite and Boomerang. In a world where the borders between defense and security are so diffuse, security fairs also function as a showcase for Israeli companies. The SICUR fair in Madrid is one of these opportunities for the security sector.
2/ SPANISH EXPORTS TO ISRAEL

2.1/ OVERVIEW OF SPANISH EXPORTS TO ISRAEL

As mentioned in the introduction, analysing the Spanish arms exports to Israel was the main objective of the previous report. Most of the data of that report are still relevant today. Therefore, this chapter will include only a summary of what was discussed in the first report, and an update of its contents.

The conclusion presented in the first report continues in force: Tel Aviv is not a priority destination of Spanish weapons. In fact, in 2012 the percentage of defense material exports to Israel over the total number of Spanish transfers was only 0.03%, while dual-use material accounted for only 0.01%. It was then concluded that the relevance of exporting defense and dual-use equipment to Israel did not correspond to the economic volume that these transfers represented. The bulk is to be found in other types of business relationships, as discussed below. However, this conclusion did not intend to minimize the seriousness of the weapons export business, which also violates Spanish law. On the other hand, the economic volume of arms exports to a country does not always run parallel to the impact that this material may have on the domestic or regional stability of the recipient, in this case Israel. The following table shows the breakdown of Spanish exports to Israel between 1998 and 2012 (values in thousands of euros):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AUTHORIZATION (defense equipment)</th>
<th>DEFENSE MATERIAL</th>
<th>DUAL-USE MATERIAL</th>
<th>LIGHT WEAPON (TARIQ 93)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>4,497.30</td>
<td>131.39</td>
<td>56.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,533.71</td>
<td>128.03</td>
<td>223.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>4,909.68</td>
<td>822.73</td>
<td>226.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,314.19</td>
<td>487.97</td>
<td>99.20</td>
<td>165.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,530.86</td>
<td>1,597.10</td>
<td>152.56</td>
<td>298.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>734.48</td>
<td>1,005.80</td>
<td>244.29</td>
<td>283.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>175.54</td>
<td>35.26</td>
<td>1,515.84</td>
<td>106.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>953.12</td>
<td>273.73</td>
<td>41.32</td>
<td>173.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,109.57</td>
<td>441.34</td>
<td>1,587.32</td>
<td>247.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,365.31</td>
<td>1,515.93</td>
<td>576.81</td>
<td>214.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,572.0</td>
<td>2,358.99</td>
<td>801.57</td>
<td>1,093.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,805.95</td>
<td>790.64</td>
<td>622.28</td>
<td>3,062.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,766.80</td>
<td>1,429.04</td>
<td>214.33</td>
<td>5,141.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11,955.20</td>
<td>472.55</td>
<td>98.17</td>
<td>2,822.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,318.59</td>
<td>637.64</td>
<td>36.40</td>
<td>2,523.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>38,186.61</td>
<td>21,986.88</td>
<td>7,073.04</td>
<td>16,844.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Secretary of Commerce. Own elaboration.
According to official statistics taken from the table above, the value of export licenses for defense equipment granted to Israel during the last ten years (2003-2012) totaled over €32.34 million, of which have been carried out exports for €8.96 million. 5.74 millions euros were also exported in dual-use material, susceptible of having military application, and 15.67 millions euros in handguns to Israel during the same period.

According the reports published by UE, Spain declared a total of 202 granted export licenses to Israel during the period 2003-2012, while no denials or consultations were registered with other states on such licenses or exports. The total economic value of the granted licenses is significant, as it shows the trend of expected exports. Of the total number of licenses granted during the abovementioned period (€32.34 million), only a third (8.96 million, or 27.7% of the total) was exported, 13.4% of which over the last four years. This means that many more exports are to be expected in the coming years. Below are the extracts related to Spanish exports of defense material declared by the Spanish State.

**Evolution of Spanish exports of arms and dual-use equipment to Israel (1998-2012)**

![Graph showing evolution of exports]

Source: State Secretary of Commerce. Own elaboration

**Spanish exports of defense equipment to Israel (2010-2012)**

**2012.** €637,842 in sporting pistols components to be assembled and then re-exported to the USA, sporting guns, bullets for approval tests; missile components for the Spanish Army (Rafael); electronic cards of image processing to be incorporated into equipment bound for aircrafts of the Air Forces of EU countries; electro systems for vehicles and chemicals for satellite propulsion.

**2011.** €472,545 in components of sports pistols; gunfire caliber 30 x 173 mm to test functioning of a remote control turret by the Israeli manufacturer of turret vehicles, destined for the Spanish Army (Rafael); electronic cards of image processing to be incorporated in equipment for Air Force aircrafts from EU countries and chemical substances used in the pharmaceutical industry and in the manufacture of paints and varnishes.

**2010.** Components of sporting guns; gunfire caliber 30 x 173 mm to test functioning of a remote control turret by an Israeli company that manufactures them for vehicles of the Spanish Army (Rafael company); inert bomb bodies of aviation for technical flight tests, systems of missil launching of the Spanish Army for testing in Israel [probably of the company Soltam systems, of Elbit systems]; electronic cards of processing for Israeli; electronic cards of image processing to incorporate them in aircraft equipment of the Air Force of a European country, and structures, parts and pieces of a communications satellite.

Source: State Secretary of Commerce. Own elaboration
**Dual-use material**

Dual-use material is that which can be used both for civilian and military purposes, such as chemical substances. Under this category, Spain has exported a total of EUR 5.7 million to Israel in the last decade. Below are the extracts related to Spanish exports of dual-use material, declared by the Spanish State in its annual report: 155

**Spanish exports of dual-use equipment to Israel (2010-2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>€ 36,399</td>
<td>in SIM cards software for the telecommunications sector and chemicals for use in laboratory analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>€ 99,170</td>
<td>in microprocessor technology, SIM cards software and IC for the telecommunications sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>€ 0.2 million</td>
<td>in electronic cards of image processing to be incorporated to systems subsequently re-exported for aircrafts of the Air Force of a third country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Secretary of Commerce. Own elaboration

**Small and light weapons**

According to statistics from official exports, during the period 2008-2012, more than € 278,930 were exported in small arms, mainly cartridges. 156 As shown in the statistics of the Spanish foreign trade and customs, between 2003 and 2012, over € 15.67 million were exported to Israel (see details below), under Chapter 93 of the TARIC (Common Customs Tariff for Community Territories) code: “Weapons, ammunition and accessories.” Besides referring to different time periods (before 2008 official statistics did not include this heading), the significant difference in results is due to the use of different systems of classification categories, which makes it impossible to compare official data. In any case, data from customs allows us to identify which category of SALW has more weight in the arms exports to Israel: the “9306 - Bombs, grenades, torpedoes and missiles”, with around € 11.5 million in the last decade. 157

**Spanish exports of “weapons, ammunition and accessories” to Israel according to the TARIC code 93 (2003-2012) [values expressed in euros]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of code TARIC 93</th>
<th>Value of exports 2003-2012 (in Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9301 - War weapons</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9302 - Revolvers / pistols</td>
<td>24,010,66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9303 - Other firearms and artifacts</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9304 - Guns, rifles, spring pistols</td>
<td>104,985,17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9305 - Parts and accessories</td>
<td>4,089,785,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9306 - Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, missiles</td>
<td>11,453,854,88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9307 - Swords, bayonets, other</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,674,636,41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Secretary of Commerce. Own elaboration

**Spain in the European framework of exports to Israel**

According to data published in the annual reports of the European Union on arms exports of the Member States, during the period 2001-2011, a total of € 1.715,45 million in export licenses of defense material was declared (in agreement with the definition of the Common Military List of the European Union). These were granted by different European States to Israel, and exports were conducted for a total value of € 396.7 million. This means that only 23.13% of what had been authorized in this period was actually exported. One should bear in mind however that these reports do not always include all that is exported. 159 Among the European countries that export the most...
military equipment to Israel (by economic size), Spain ranks fifth, with France being the largest exporter, followed by Germany, Romania and the Czech Republic, as published in the annual reports of the European Union [see table below]. Particularly relevant in this ranking is the position of Romania, since its entry into the European Union occurred in 2007 and, therefore, the value of its exports to Israel is comparatively higher even to that of France or Germany.

**Exports of Defense Equipment of European countries to Israel (2001-2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>EUROS</th>
<th>No. LICENCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>170,276,278</td>
<td>1,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>116,492,818</td>
<td>2,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>53,003,823</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech rep</td>
<td>11,180,591</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10,408,338</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8,934,679</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,620,782</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5,525,555</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4,599,016</td>
<td>2,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>3,915,683</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL UE</td>
<td>396,683,888</td>
<td>7,610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the same period, as declared by each State to the European Union, a total of 7,610 licenses for arms exports to Israel were authorized, of which 325 were denied. While authorizations indicate large fluctuations during the period, denials show a declining trend, with 66 rejections in 2002 to 21 in 2011. The graph below shows the licenses granted and denied to Israel by the EU member countries.

**Export licenses granted and disclaimed by EU countries (2001-2011)**

Five different categories of products have totalled, in the same period, more than € 10 million: the export of ground vehicles (category 6 of the European Military List) represents the largest export, with more than 33.5 million; followed by aircrafts; equipment for image formation or countermeasure, bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive or related material, and electronic equipment.

**Defense materials exports from EU countries to Israel by product category (2001-2011).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DETAIL</th>
<th>EUROS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ML 6</td>
<td>Terrain vehicles and components</td>
<td>33,595,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML 10</td>
<td>Aircrafts and similar</td>
<td>20,001,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML 15</td>
<td>Equipment for image formation or countermeasure</td>
<td>13,880,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML 4</td>
<td>Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive or related material</td>
<td>11,663,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML 11</td>
<td>Electronic equipment</td>
<td>11,459,359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual reports of the EU and ENAAT. Own elaboration
Israeli riot police in a protest against the Prawer Plan in the Negev desert
Photo: Activestills
2.2 // IS IT RIGHT TO EXPORT ARMS TO ISRAEL?

The most important conclusion of the previous report was that the export of arms, defense and dual-use equipment, represent not only an ethics controversy, but also a violation of the Spanish law. This allegation however would be difficult to defend in front of a judge, for three reasons. First, the confusion between the literal text of the Law and its obligatoriness, since, although its essence is theoretically designed to control militarism (prevention), its text mostly “recommends” rather than prohibits. The second reason is the instrumental and interested use of concepts such as “human rights”, “terrorism”, “armed conflict” or “international law”, and their subordination to economic and commercial uses as well as private interests. Finally, the third factor is related to the deliberations that accompany export authorizations, contained in the minutes of the Joint Board of Defense and Dual-Use (JIMDDU), which are secret. No one can thus have access to the arguments used in the decision-taking process, nor judge its results. Indeed, if one of the main reasons for incorporating the Law was to subject these decisions to parliamentary scrutiny, this is still not the case. Secrecy and lack of transparency continue to characterize the export of arms, and the military and security sector.

Due to the controversy it has generated, arms exports to Israel have been the object of concern in the Congress of Deputies. However, the Government’s explanations have been minimal and absolutely contrary to the essence of Spanish law, and its need for transparency and submission to parliamentary control. Therefore, in June 2013, after having been interpellated by deputies in a very critical manner, the Secretary of State for Trade, García- Legaz Ponce, justified exports to Israel with this simplistic explanation: “In the case of Israel, which invokes some questions, I must emphasize, firstly, that Israel is a fully consolidated democracy, with its own control mechanisms. Thus, all exports to Israel are destined to a democratic government”. Nothing else. It is worth mentioning, first of all, that “democracy” does not correspond in Spanish Law to the main criterion to be considered (see detail below). Secondly, it is important to investigate what is the concept of democracy referred to by the Government, since, as criticized by the spokesman of the Joint Parliamentary Group, Joan Tardà, the Defense Minister Peter Morenés, justified the military relations with Saudi Arabia claiming that this country “tended towards democracy.”

Another common way to justify arms exports to Israel is, paradoxically, the denial of its use for repression or military attacks in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Thus, the then Prime Minister, Rodriguez Zapatero, when asked by a Granada television if he knew how many Palestinian civilians could have died by Spanish arms, replied, while Gaza was still smoking: “I am convinced that our components or the weapons we sell to Israel were not used for that.” The person who asked knew, justly so, that there is no way to control the use of these materials once they have been exported. Indeed, as pointed out by the professor of the Autonomous University of Madrid, Eduardo Melero: “Once the arms are exported, the Spanish legislation does not provide any mechanism to prevent that the buyer uses them to kill someone, in any way he sees appropriate. How could he?”. It is worth noting that Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, then spokesman of the PP in Congress, criticized Zapatero for lying in the program: “He wanted to show us that he had sold weapons that had caused no harm”, when her party has used similar messages once in government. Also, with regard to the Operation Cast Lead, the Secretary of State for Trade in 2009, Silvia Iranzo, claimed that Spain had not authorized exports of “weapons or equipment that could be lethal” to Tel Aviv since 2001.
It is not clear what kind of non-lethal weapons are being referred to, especially when one bears in mind some of the categories of the material exported, such as the first (firearms) or fourth (bombs, rockets, torpedoes, missiles). In any case, it must be underlined that all defense material which is exported, directly or as an integrated component, is capable of killing.

The number of denied authorizations is published in Spain since 1999 and, since 2001, very generic specifications are given as to type of export that is rejected and the criterion of the Code of Conduct which is appealed to for refusal. However, the destination country and other key details are not specified. Thus, there is no official record of denials of authorization of export of Spanish military equipment to Israel.

On the other hand, Spain does not use the mechanisms provided for in the Code of Conduct regarding queries. However, according to Sources of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, Spain consults the database of denials of European arms exports and, as reported by Ministry state officials, at least until 2008, it has never approved a request of export which was “essentially identical” to another one which had previously been denied by another Member State. According to the Code of Conduct, a Member state which receives a request for authorization to export a material that is “essentially identical” to another of which the export (to the same recipient country) was denied by another Member State, should consult that Member state before approving the authorization. These consultations are not public, but the total number of queries that have been made are.

Thus, it is useful to look back at the conclusions related in the previous report, updating the data for the period 2001-2011:

- The Member States of the EU have denied 325 export licenses for defense equipment to Israel (4.27% of a total of 7,610). The unauthorized products presumably belonged to very different categories.
- Spain has authorized at least 185 licenses for defense material to Israel, of at least eight different categories.
- Spain declares that it carries out consultations to other Member States in the event of having to authorize exports that are “essentially identical” to those that these countries have denied. Since 1998, Spain has made no inquiry about authorizations which are “essentially identical” to those of other countries, so it is assumed that these situations have not occurred, in accordance with the Spanish authorities (or have not been made public).
- It is therefore safe to conclude that Spain has not denied any export authorization of defense equipment to Israel or, if it did, the reason for this refusal was so obvious that it did not require a consultation (or was subject to secret).

What do other European states do?

In the European Parliament, many have spoken in favor of suspending military ties with Israel, but either the sanctions have not been considered or they have been agreed on (consider the non-binding character of the Parliament), but not approved by the Council. There have been blunt criticisms on these military relations but, at least in recent years, there have never been sanctions or suspension of military ties.

As regards to Member States, the usual practice is to criticize exports of defense material to Israel, but without actually giving way to sanctions or policies against exports. One of the best practices,
although external to the EU, is that of Norway, where, after having previously denied export licenses, the government agreed to stop all exports of military equipment to Israel, officially nonexistent since then. However, as highlighted by the Norwegian researcher Alexander Harang, there are many kinds of unofficial military relations between the two countries, such as imports of Israeli material, bilateral strategic cooperation, and in the framework of the NATO, the export of Norwegian military material to Israel from outside Norway (involving the Norwegian State in companies abroad ), re-exports in Israel (to not request re-export clause), relations on drones or the partnership of entities belonging to the two countries in R & D projects under the Seventh Framework Programme of the EU. It should be noted that we are talking about a country that boasts among the most responsible practices. Sweden has also been signalled as having few arms exports to Israel, however it has been one of Europe’s largest importers of Israeli military equipment. In April 2002, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Louis Michel, suspended sales of military equipment to Israel (Flanders, which has its own structures) and this region has often rejected exports destined to the Israeli army. However, a different and better treatment was given to parts to be assembled in Israel.

Germany, the Netherlands and the UK have been on the foreground for their denials of arms export licenses to Israel. With Jenin on fire, Germany declared on 9 April 2002 that it was suspending its arms sales to Israel (making it clear that it was not an embargo). Meanwhile, the UK has often questioned arms exports to Israel. In fact, this country is one of 21 territories included in the chapter “major countries of concern” in the British reports on arms exports. Between January 2008 and December 2012, it rejected 53 Israeli requests for the purchase of military or dual-use equipment. London appealed to its concern that such transfers could contribute to the Arab-Israeli conflict and damage regional stability. The “risk of use for internal repression” was also alluded to, as was the “risk of contributing to internal tensions in the host country ”, and the risk of diversion or reexport to undesirable end users. Finally, the Netherlands have the positive habit of detailing the criteria appealed to for refusals (often the criteria 2, 3 and 4, and sometimes 6 and 7). In recent years, sales to Israel have been limited for the Netherlands. However, the volumes exported by these countries have been significant, so these denials should not be viewed as “good practice”.

43
### 2.3// SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION OF THE SPANISH LEGISLATION CRITERIA IN THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Both the Spanish Law on arms exports and the Common Position of the European Union (which binds its member States) define the common rules concerning the control of exports of military and dual-use material. They include eight criteria to assess whether an export license must be approved or denied. Most of the 2009 report was devoted to deepen and analyze, criterion by criterion, the particularity of Israel in this legislation. We had then concluded that arms exports to Israel flagrantly violated the criteria 2, 3, 4 and 6; violated the 7 and possibly the same with the criteria 1 and 5. Only criterion eight seemed not to contradict the essence and the letter of the Law. In this section, we will recall the reasons for these findings, the details of which can be consulted in the 2009 report.

#### Legend:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No violation of the criterion</th>
<th>Criterion 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible violation of the criterion</td>
<td>Criteria 1 and 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of the criterion</td>
<td>Criterion 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flagrant violation of the criterion</td>
<td>Criteria 2, 3, 4 and 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Criterion Non-compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Non-compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Respect for the international commitments of the EU members</td>
<td>Israel has not ratified any of the eight agreements mentioned in the wording of items b), c) and d) of this criterion: Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Convention against Landmines. It is not part of the Wassenaar Agreement, the Australia Group, the Regime of Control of Missile Technology, nor the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Spain has Cooperation on chemical programs for military purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Respect for human rights in the country of final destination</td>
<td>Systematic annual sentences of the Commission / Human Rights Council of the UN. Systematic annual sentences of the European Union. Systematic annual sentences of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. Political Terror Scale (Amnesty International and US State Department) between levels 4 and 5, on a scale from 1 to 5 (maximum).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Internal situation of the country of final destination, existence of tensions or armed conflicts</td>
<td>Existence of armed conflict between 2003 and 2008 according to the main centers of conflict (SIPRI, University of Heidelberg, University of Maryland and School of Culture and Peace-UAB); external armed conflicts (Lebanon 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maintenance of peace, security and regional stability</td>
<td>Recent regional armed conflicts (Lebanon 2006). Permanent tension and mutual threat with Iran. Possibility of regional armed conflict. Israeli military incursions into Syria. Military occupations in Syria and Lebanon. Latent tensions with Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon [Hezbollah], Iran ... particularly after the Israeli military incursions in the Occupied Territories. Regional arms race, including weapons of mass destruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. National security of the Member States and of the territories under their responsibility, and the friends and allies</td>
<td>Some allies of the Member States of the European Union do not have diplomatic relations with Israel and are in constant tension with Tel Aviv. The Israel-Palestine conflict is at the center of the polarization between a part of the Islamic world and a part of the West, a fact that is exploited by extremist organizations. Israel has a potentially destabilizing effect both at a regional and, ultimately, global level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Behavior of the buyer country, especially regarding terrorism and International Law</td>
<td>Israel has violated numerous mandatory UN resolutions, conspicuously, resolution 242 (1967) and Resolution 338 (1973). US has vetoed a minimum of 42 resolutions that sought to condemn or castigate Israel. Israel has not ratified any of the three instruments expressly mentioned: the Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Severe and massive violations of international humanitarian law (especially in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008-2009). The establishment of permanent settlements in the occupied territories violates several articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The separation wall between Israel and the West Bank violates international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Risk of diversion or re-export under undesirable conditions</td>
<td>Israel has carried out re-exports to countries at war or that systematically violate human rights, and exports to countries whose very questionable regimes are well known. Spain exports military equipment and components which can then be re-exported to Israel [especially from the USA]. A large part of the Spanish exports to Israel are re-exported to third countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country</td>
<td>Israel is a rich country, and has economic capacity and military technique. Although Israeli military spending exceeds that of health and education, social spending is often higher than that of Spain. Although the social budget should perhaps increase, it is possible that arms exports to Israel do not violate the spirit of the text of this criterion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4// LARGE SPANISH DEFENSE COMPANIES WITH CLOSE CONNECTIONS TO ISRAEL

One way of dividing defense industries in Spain is to group them into four large blocks. According to this categorization, each block includes four companies, operating in a monopoly regime or in a situation of extreme advantage. These represent the largest Spanish defense companies, which were previously state-owned (two still are). Also, the four companies are probably related to the bulk, in economic terms, of military relations with Israel.

These four companies are Indra (technology sector), EADS-CASA (aircraft), General Dynamics European Land Systems - Santa Barbara Systems (armor, ammunition, weapons) and Navantia (naval sector). All four are in the ranking of the top one hundred defense companies in the world by turnover (General Dynamics was No. 5 in 2009, EADS No.7, Navantia No. 43 and Indra No.65).\(^{182}\) Navantia has much fewer relations with Israel than what it would like to have, although its business volume has been constant. In addition to these firms, there is also another important Spanish company that is known for its relations with the Israeli military sector: Tecnobit. Below is a table showing statistics of these five companies, which will be followed by the details and summary of the military relations of each one with Israel:\(^{183}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>DEFENSE SALES</th>
<th>TOTAL SALES</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>DEFENSE EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>TOTAL EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>EXPORTS. OF DEFENSE</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPORTS</th>
<th>% IN DEFENSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EADS-CASA</td>
<td>2,600,67</td>
<td>3,024,03</td>
<td>-192,79</td>
<td>8,317</td>
<td>9,671</td>
<td>1,658,60</td>
<td>1,928,60</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navantia</td>
<td>1,423,82</td>
<td>1,582,02</td>
<td>-82,66</td>
<td>4,966</td>
<td>5,518</td>
<td>829,84</td>
<td>829,84</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra</td>
<td>678,75</td>
<td>2,513,90</td>
<td>-195,60</td>
<td>7,067</td>
<td>26,175</td>
<td>325,69</td>
<td>904,70</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GD-SBS</td>
<td>385,47</td>
<td>385,47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tecnobit</td>
<td>53,30</td>
<td>59,22</td>
<td>6,01</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>13,00</td>
<td>15,64</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Avda. Bruselas, 35, 28108 Alcobendas Madrid. Telf.: (+34) 914 805 000

Its origins date back to a company called INISEL. It was founded in 1985 by initiative of the National Industrial Institute (IN), to group all the electronic and computer sector of the public industry. In 1992, it was merged by the government without compensation with the private firm CESELSA, giving way to Indra, with 66.09% of its shares held by the State and the rest by the private sector. In 1999, when it was profitable, the state share was sold to various shareholders for 92.526 million pesetas, while the Ministry of Defense commissioned the company the electronic development of most of its weapons: armored vehicles, aircrafts, warships and multiple projects of electronic warfare. In 2006 and 2007, Indra acquired two companies, Fixes and Azertia, and the number of workers shifted from 6,360 in 2000, to a total of 31,000, present in 30 countries.

In the last ten years, Indra has experienced a 344 % growth rate in sales. The company is divided into three main areas: information technology, simulation and automatic test systems, and electronic defense equipment. Between 28 and 32% of the company’s production is destined to the military sector, although the estimates of the Delàs Center are much higher. Indra controls 80 % of the Spanish Missile Society (INMIZE), which designs and develops various kinds of missiles, and is the
Spanish subsidiary of the European missile manufacturer MBDA, participated in the European group EADS, and run until December 2011 by the then Defense Minister, Peter Morenés. Between 2009 and 2010, Indra received over € 10 million in public grants and over 105 million in loans from the Ministry of Industry, the Industrial Technology Development Center and ENISA, at zero interest rate and return in twenty years. These grants indicate the preferential treatment granted by the Public Administration to a company which actually boasts yearly benefits.184

Participation of Indra in security and defense business with Israel (see section 4 for more detail):

- IAI drones for PASI platform and for use in Afghanistan
- Collaboration with Rafael on a “very interesting program in a Latin American country”, in the words of Israel Kogan, CEO of Spain, Portugal and Latin America.185
- Indra works in collaboration with MTI Wireless Edge, an Israeli company working on connectivity for military communications for over 35 years.186 Indra is its Spanish counterparty, but its products are marketed by a company called Landatel.187

Aeronautical Constructions SA (CASA) is specialized in military aviation. Until 1992, it had yearly significant losses. Therefore, in July 2000, the PP government decided to merge it with the European consortium “European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company” (EADS), formed by the French Aérospatiale-Matra (owned by Lagardère), the German Daimler Chrysler Aerospatiale (DASA) and Alenia (Italy). CASA was thus renamed EADS-CASA. The State Society of Industrial Participation (SEPI) obtained 5.5% of the stake in the consortium, the second European military company behind the British BAE Systems, and the second military aerospace company in the world after Boeing. It has 121,691 employees in 70 centers of 48 countries and manufacturing divisions such as Airbus Military (combat aircrafts and for military transport) and Eurocopter (combat helicopters and military transport), Astrium (satellites and space rockets) and missiles (second world leader through the 37.5% of MBDA), also nuclear. In Spain, EADS-CASA, of the aviation sector, is responsible for 85-95% of military production, depending on the year. In November 2009, EADS-CASA was renamed Airbus Military, and manufactured military aircrafts. EADS-CASA participates and controls 60% of stakes in CESA SA (Spanish Company of Aeronautical Systems). Other subsidiaries of EADS are Eurocopter, based in Albacete and dedicated to the manufacture of helicopters, military by 90%, EADS Astrium and EADS CASA Espacio, both specialized in space engineering, and EADS Defense (since 2010 Cassidian Systems) for defense engineering.

In 2008 and 2009, EADS-CASA received € 391 million in subsidies for the maintenance of its activity, employment and investment (over 391 million), besides other types of aid: “advances” [credits] of the public administration, mostly from the Ministry of Industry in the form of R & D, at zero interest and return in twenty years [according to the company, it had accumulated by 31 December 2009, € 191.60 million of credits]. Big failures and scandals of EADS are the aircrafts A-380 and A400M.188
Participation of EADS-CASA in security and defense business with Israel (see section 4 for more detail):

- Modernization of the F-5 through Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).
- Development of the C295 AEW radar through an agreement with IAI.
- IAI drones for PASI platform and for use in Afghanistan.
- Contract with the Elbit Systems subsidiary, El-Op. Also sells special helmets to a Spanish helicopter company.\textsuperscript{189}

Participation of SBS-GD in security and defense business with Israel (see point 4):

- Rafael Spike missiles for the Army.
- Rafael turrets for the Army tanks.
- Cardom mortar system of Elbit Systems for the Army.
- Provision of 120 mm ammunition of Israel Military Industries (IMI) for Leopard combat vehicles for the Army.\textsuperscript{191}
- In 2004, it formed part of an international consortium to access a contract in the US on small arms ammunition. The consortium also included another division of General Dynamics, Winchester (part of Olin, in the US), Canada’s SNC Technologies and Israel Military Industries (IMI).\textsuperscript{192}
As stated by the company, Tecnobit was founded in 1976 with the name “DOS Ingenieros in Madrid”, and in 1981, it moved to Valdepeñas and its name was changed to the present one. In 1992, it obtained its first big international program with the teams of the European Combat Aircraft EF-2000 “Eurofighter”. In March 2000, the Group Tecnobit was created through the merging of three companies engaged in defense electronics and information technology: Tecnobit, ELCO Systems and SIDOCOR, and focused on the aerospace and defense sectors. In 2003, the three major companies of the group were merged and Tecnobit SL was created. Tecnobit works with engineering technology in the fields of aerospace, defense, space, security, telecommunications and transportation. The company claims to have become the “top supplier of self-developed products in the domestic market,” and declares that the establishment of the subsidiary Tecnobit Brazil, located in Rio de Janeiro, was a very important milestone in the expansion process of the company in Latin America, as this subsidiary in Brazil is a launch pad to reinforce business contacts that are already underway in other nearby countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, etc.).

Participation of Tecnobit in security and defense business with Israel (see section 4 for more detail):

- Rafael Spike missiles for the Army.
- Rafael turrets for Army tanks.
- Has maintained with Rafael long lasting agreements during the time they collaborated on electro technology.

Navantia has its origins in the National Company Bazán Military Shipbuilding SA, founded in 1947 with the objective to produce all kinds of military weapons for naval ships and vessels of the Spanish armada. In 1998, due to heavy accumulated losses– Bazán launched a plan to improve the company and implemented a major downsizing. In December 2000, it merged with the also state-owned Astilleros Españoles SA (EASA), of civilian production, and was renamed IZAR. In 2005 it went back to separating the production between military and civilian, and the new company, devoted to military ships, was renamed Navantia, while the civilian ships mostly disappeared. Navantia has four lines of business (in order of economic volume): shipbuilding, ship repairs, turbines and engines, and weapons systems. For economic reasons, Navantia is specializing in higher value-added vessels such as aircraft carriers, submarines and frigates, with significant investments in R & D. It has also set up strategic alliances to compete on the global market. Navantia has always had negative results, borne both by INI, and its successor, SEPI. In the last ten years, losses for € 3,372 million have been accumulated, in spite of the fact that turnover has grown by 300 % and that Navantia received every year substantial subsidies from various agencies such as the Autonomous Community of Murcia or the European Union, and especially, the Ministry of Industry (almost € 26 million between 2008-2010). Furthermore, Navantia receives interest-free loans from the Ministry of Industry for
Development (R & D), as part of the special military programs of the Ministry of Defense. According to the company balance sheet, on 31 December 2010, it owed 2771.92 million to the Ministry of Industry for this item. These credits make of Navantia the most protected Spanish company of the military-industrial complex. 197

Navantia has attempted several unsuccessful operations in Israel. The head of SIBAT acknowledged the failure of the company in tenders in which Israel has participated, but added: “I think they have taken a good approach in integrating Israeli defense systems on the platforms they offer to third countries. If our cooperation has not been fruitful so far it is purely for commercial reasons. I’m sure it’s only a matter of time before its efforts are rewarded” [emphasis added].198

In the middle of the last decade, Israel and Spain were close to reaching an agreement for the sale of five missile frigate F-100, manufactured at the time by Izar [incorporated by Navantia] in a contract worth between 1,000 and 2,000 million dollars, which was to be financed by the US. The agreement was eventually canceled but the reasons are still unclear. While some blame a group of senators who pressured that the contract be awarded to American shipyards, others point to a sanction by President George W. Bush to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero for the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq in 2004.199

One of the last business opportunities for Navantia was the Israeli Navy’s interest in purchasing four ocean patrol vessels (OPV) in Spain, for the supervision of its new natural gas facilities. Because of their modular construction, OPV can incorporate their own electronic and attack systems, a formula that Israel usually applies in its major military contracts. In recent years, Israel has discovered large amounts of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has doubled from 28,000 to 44,000 km² its jurisdiction, and generated some urgency for the fear of an attack to these facilities, which Israel considers “casus belli”.200 If this operation goes through, it would represent the first major sale of Spanish military equipment to Israel. However, expectations are not high, as Israel is also considering other markets such as the US, Germany, UK, France, and other Western countries with naval tradition.201

Financing of arms export

Jordi Calvo Rufanges explains in his book Banca Armada vs Banca Ética,202 that there are different ways to finance arms companies and their operations: a) shareholding (be the owner); b) granting of funds and loans c) investment funds (offering and/or managing initiatives in which customers trust their savings in the hope that, through fluctuations of the shares that make up the fund, future economic benefits are achieved), d) the issuance of bonds and promissory notes, and e) financing of exports. We address the first three in relation to the five major companies covered in this section.203

A] Shareholding:

- **Navantia**: 100% owned by SEPI, which is under the Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations. Banks only provide 0.1% of its funding.
- **Tecnobit**: In 2007 it restructured its capital. Caja Castilla La Mancha (CCM), part of Liberbank, temporarily increased its share to 48%. At the end of 2007, CCM transferred all its shares in Tecnobit to the Group IT Deusto, now called Desia Networks, which since then owns 100%
of Tecnobit. Oesia Network is owned by CAN (38.2%); CDM Corporation (36.1%), BMN (9%) Banca Civica (6.2%); Bank Group Caja 3 (3.1%), Barin Iberia II (1.4%) and others (9%).

- **Indra**: It is owned by Bankia (20.12%, through the Banco Financiera y de Ahorros), Financiera Alba Corporation (10.31%), Alba Participaciones (10.02%), Liberbank (5.01%), CajAstur (5%), Banca March (3.61%), BBVA (1.91%), Renta4 (0.25%), Banco Santander (0.13%) and Banco Sabadell (0.11%).

### B) Credits and loans

- **Indra**: At the end of 2010, Indra had an open credit for €250 million. In 2008, Indra obtained a loan of one million euros from the Banco Sabadell. In June 2009, it was granted a loan of €36 million due in December 2012, to be used for general corporate purposes. The loan was managed by Caja Madrid and La Caixa. Indra total: €37 million.

- **Santa Bárbara**: At the end of 2010, it had a revolving credit line of €106 million, issued by an unknown number of banks. Until that date, the line had not been used. However, unused credit lines play an important role in the financial structure of a company for providing ancillary facilities. Santa Barbara total: €106 million.

- **Tecnobit**: At the end of 2010, it had outstanding bank loans for a total value of €25 million. At the end of 2008, Tecnobit had an outstanding debt of €4.5 million with the following banks: BSCH (Banco Santander), La Caixa (CaixaBank), Caixa Catalonia (Caixa Catalonia), and Caja Madrid (Bankia). It also had an outstanding short term line of credit. Tecnobit total: €29.5 million.

- **Navantia**: The majority of its funding (60%) is public, and consists of a loan with an interest rate of 0%, awarded by the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism for the development of military programs of the Ministry of Defense. In May 2007, Navantia obtained an installment loan of €65 million which expired in May 2011, but which was probably returned before this date. Société Générale coordinated the issuance of the loan. The banking consortium consisted of several banks, which included the Official Credit Institute (ICO), and Caixa de Catalonia (CataloniaCaixa). At the end of 2010, Navantia had a revolving line of credit of €25.1 million, issued by an unknown number of banks. Until then, only a short-term debt of €5 million was outstanding. Navantia total: €90.1 million.

### C) Investment funds

- **EADS**: Investment funds in 2011 for €11,197,896.71 and permanent shareholdings of €919,490,888.60 (corresponding to 5.5% of SEPI)

- **Santa Bárbara [General Dynamics]**: Investment funds in 2011 for €1,834,195.68

- **Indra**: Investment funds in 2011 for €218,843,273.83 and permanent shareholdings of €403,891,274.83 (shareholdings of Liberbank and Banco Financiero y de Ahorros - Bankia).

ING has managed, through CaixaBank, an investment fund in Indra called **ING Direct Fondo Naranja IBEX 35**, for $1,271,961.30 (884,043.16 €).

Insurance companies are also investing in weaponry. Mapfre, Catalana Occidente, Aviva, Allianz, all invested in Indra with their own funds. But these companies also participate indirectly. For example, Inverseguros Group [with Indra investment funds], an investment company whose shareholders are
both the above mentioned insurers, in addition to others like Axa or Zurich.

Financial institutions have also invested in weapons. For example, Renta 4, a private investment entity with funds in Indra. Ahorro Corporación, on the other hand, serves as a linker for a set of financial services whose shareholders are the CECA (Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks) and the Savings Bank of Spain. This company invested funds in EADS and Indra.

2.5// OTHER SPANISH COMPANIES EXPORTING TO ISRAEL

Centro de empresas Aerópolis
C/ Ingeniero Rafael Rubio Elola, 1, 41309, La Rinconada (Sevilla)
Teléf. (+34) 955 631 015

Aerosertec is a Spanish business engineering group created in 2002 from SerTec engineer, founded in 1995. It has worked for companies such as Astrium, Airbus Spain, Eurafighter and Dornier (and later for Indra and Tecnobit). Aerosertec includes among its clients the leading Israeli company IAI.

Explosivas Alaveses, S.A.
Av. del Parteron, 16, 5, Madrid

Extremeñas Fabrications Inc. (part of Expal, today part of Maxam Corp.). Expal is a military company with 71 workers and € 64.70 million in sales (in 2006: 558 workers and € 31.35 million in sales). Between 1991 and 1997, it exported pistols worth € 5.1 million; between 1997 and 2000 it sold Israel radar equipment for € 12.8 million; in 2001, projectiles for € 0.49 million, and in 2002, military technology for € 1.6 million. At present, the company continues to be an exporter to Israel. According to customs, in December 2008 and January 2009, dates in which the Operation Cast Lead was carried out in the Gaza Strip, Expal was one of the companies which imported weapons from Israel.

UTI Spain & Portugal
Parque Empresarial Las Mercedes, 28022 - Madrid
Tel.: +34 902 107 355;

EGrupo de Empresas SLI (now UTI Spain & Portugal) was founded in 1977 to perform international transient activities in Europe, as well as customs agent and related operations. The principal UTI company has a network of over 590 offices in 138 countries, including Israel. UTI-SLI Iberia was the “second supplier” of the US in the Gulf War, something of which they are "very proud", and they expect to obtain a lucrative profit in the armed conflict in Colombia, through the Spanish Ministry of Defense. The Spanish UTI-SLI Iberia subsidiary has obtained contracts in Israel.

Under Chapter 9306 of TARIC in Datacomex Database

Between 2009 and 2012, Spain has exported € 9.87 million in "Bombs, Grenades, Torpedoes, Mines, Missiles, Cartridges and other Ammunitions and Projectiles and parts thereof; including slugs,
buckshots and cartridge wads” (category 9306 of TARIC). There are four major enterprises that have exported to Israel, and which are, according to customs, still exporting these products: TYCO Electronics Logistics AG (in September 2012, it changed its name to TE Connectivity Solutions GmbH), Alaveses SA Explosives (Expal, see above), SA Electro Metal Pot (Ecrimesa) and Ibero American Commercial, Inc. However, details of these exports are not included in this report.
Israeli defense exports amount close to $7,000 million a year. However, the objective is apparently to reach 10,000 million in a few years. When asked how this could be achieved, the director of SIBAT replied: “Improving our competitive advantages, which are: the development of advanced technologies, creativity, flexibility and agility. We will also continue with our strategy of promoting strategic alliances with foreign industries”, underlining that the most promising sectors are those based on advanced electronic solutions: “unmanned vehicles, air defense, precision-guided munitions, and the command and control and robotics are just some of the examples of electronics-based solutions of which Israel is a world leader and that we hope will continue to grow in the coming years.”

3.1/ overview of israeli imports in spain

Ranking of countries supplying defense products to Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Defense Imports (Million €)</th>
<th>Weight over total defense imports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EEUU</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defense

The lack of transparency as a feature of arms imports

As in other countries, the Spanish arms imports are not subject to inspection by the Spanish arms trade legislation and no specific official report collects statistics on imports, although its impact may be reprehensible, especially in the case of Israel, perhaps the only state in the world that exports more security material than what it sells in its domestic market.

The Spanish arms exports to Israel are irrelevant compared to the potential volume of its imports. So, if we only look at the balance of customs statistics [according to the TARIC code 93] on small arms, exports only represent 12% of the total. In other words, during the period 2003-2012, 15.67 million euros were export for this concept, compared to 115,18 million in imports, the most relevant weapons category being the 9306 “bombs, grenades, torpedoes, missiles” with 11,45 million euros exports in the last decade (73% over the total of chapter 93), compared to over 114,07 million euros imported for the same category in the same period (99,1% over the total of chapter 93). The values
in the graph are in thousands of euros.

**Evolution of Spanish export and imports of arms to Israel according the TARIC code 93 (2003-2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORTS (£)</th>
<th>IMPORTS (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>289.940,42</td>
<td>55.953,28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>106.399,75</td>
<td>31.295,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>173.637,66</td>
<td>381,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>247.268,16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>214.265,32</td>
<td>354.033,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.093.699,21</td>
<td>11.038.704,24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3.062.647,50</td>
<td>20.879.998,46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.141.828,76</td>
<td>23.119.457,78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.622.366,80</td>
<td>32.755.953,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012*</td>
<td>2.523.160,81</td>
<td>26.946.560,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15.674.636,41</td>
<td>115.182.336,70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Secretary of Commerce. Own elaboration. 
* Provisional data. (Accessed on 20/05/2013)

The main increase in exports, but especially imports, begins in 2008, as exports shift from € 250,000 to over 5 million in 2010; and from importing almost negligible amounts until 2007, to nearly € 33 million in 2011. These data are a reflection of what the military relations between Spain and Israel have been in recent years, which have increased exponentially since 2006 and especially after 2008, due to the signed contracts and subsequent cooperation agreements and protection of classified information mentioned in the first chapter. The asymmetry in favor of imports reflected in the above table will be accentuated in the coming years. Indeed, although we know that Spanish exports for € 25 million have recently been approved, this figure is ridiculous compared to the € 324 million which represent exclusively the import of Spike missiles (one part is still to come) or other important imports which are detailed in chapter four, on defense contracts.

**Spanish imports of arms to Israel according to the TARIC 93 code for products:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9301 - Weapons of War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9302 - revolvers / pistols</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9303 - Other firearms and artifacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9304 - Guns, rifles, spring pistols</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9305 - Parts and accessories</td>
<td>344,33</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>30.22</td>
<td>408.75</td>
<td>138,24</td>
<td>48,92</td>
<td>1.033,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9306 - Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, missiles</td>
<td>11.019,34</td>
<td>20.844,32</td>
<td>22.709,79</td>
<td>32.699,24</td>
<td>26.897,95</td>
<td>114,073,80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9307 - Swords, bayonets, others</td>
<td>0,34</td>
<td>0,81</td>
<td>6,63</td>
<td>8,16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>354,03</td>
<td>11.038,70</td>
<td>20.880,00</td>
<td>23.119,46</td>
<td>32.755,85</td>
<td>26.946,56</td>
<td>115,182,94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Secretary of Commerce. Own elaboration

It can be inferred that part of the increase in imports is justified by the start of the Special Programme for Armaments (PEA). This programme was signed in 2006, and its objective is the purchase by the Israeli company Rafael of Spike missiles and their launchers, valued at over € 372 million (see details in 4.3). According to SIPRI, between 2010 and 2012, 1,750 antitank Spike-
MR/LR missiles were supposedly delivered, out of the 2630 rented in 2006 by the Spanish Army, whose delivery was scheduled for 2010-2012 and included 260 firing positions (a contract valued at € 328 million). Another 200 Spike-ER missiles, worth € 44 million and designed to combat AS-665 helicopters, were ordered in 2007 and delivered in 2009-2012. In addition to these missiles, one must count also cardom mortar systems which costed € 7,221,600 in a first contract in November 2011 and € 4,670,520 in a second contract in December 2012. In summary, only for ammunition and systems originating from the Israeli military industry, payments for over € 384 million are about to be concluded.

It is important to highlight that the rise in the arms trade between Spain and Israel has come at a time characterized by armed conflicts by the latter country. It was with the bombings in southern Lebanon in 2006 that Spain increased imports of Israeli arms, signing the largest arms contract with Israel for the purchase of Spike missiles, which began to be delivered from 2008 onwards. The year of the Cast Lead Operation in Gaza (December 2008 - January 2009), not only did not alter exchanges, but actually multiplied both exports and imports. It should also be noted that the Israel Defense Forces used the same type of ammunition against the Palestinian population. A report by Human Rights Watch claims that Spike could have been used by drones like Hermes (Elbit Systems) and Heron (IAI), during the Operation Cast Lead, killing some 87 civilians in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the cited cardom mortar systems (see detail in Section 4.5) were also used by the IDF in such attacks. According to information released by customs, during the abovementioned attacks on Gaza, Spain exported € 200,330 in ammunition to Israel. Also, in December 2008, it imported ammunition from Israel worth € 1.6 million, and in January 2009 it imported for € 67,000. Moreover, during the two months following the attack, Spain imported from Israel more than € 10 million in ammunition and projectiles (category 93069090).

In conclusion, many studies suggest that Israel has turned the Occupied Palestinian Territories into a huge military laboratory. The various military operations have served as a showcase for promoting its [public and private] domestic military industry. Similarly, it can be concluded that neither the bombing on the population of the Gaza Strip, nor the Spanish legislation on arms trade have given rise to any form of control over the arms trade between the two countries, a trade that is booming as never before.

3.2 WHY IS IT CONTROVERSIAL TO BUY ARMS AND USE MADE IN ISRAEL SERVICES?

To understand the relevance of imports of Israeli military equipment or the use of made in Israel security services, it is important to explain how this business works. Firstly, one of the main reasons why a country decides to export military equipment is to lower the cost of domestic production. The main customer is usually the Armed Forces, which place the orders. The cost per unit of a product (paid by the State) will vary if only the quantity demanded by the Government is produced, or if a larger number of equipment is manufactured and the surplus is exported. For this reason, Governments usually look favorably on arms exports, as they help reduce costs. Thus, it should be noted that the Israeli defense and security exports also have an impact on domestic militarization (in Israel). Indeed, the local market is simply “too small” to keep up such an important industry, or to maintain “reasonable” prices for their products. Contrary to what happens in other countries, Israel exports
75 % of its production of weapons and its military industry depends on these transfers. As warned by Moshe Arens, three times Minister of Defense and Foreign Minister in the 1980s and 1990s:

"Every country should do business with those products in which it has a comparative advantage ... Most of Israel's comparative advantage lies in military products, because these require advanced technology on the one hand, and military experience on the other. Today, we can say that no country in the world is so dependent on arms sales as Israel."

Second, it must be considered that Israel exports very developed military technology due to the experience accumulated by the long conflict with the Palestinians and the wars and tensions in the region. Itamar Graff, chief counsel of the Israeli Defense Delegation in Spain, acknowledged that Israel (referring also to the Occupied Territories) is "a 'laboratory' of means of warfare and new defense technologies, for one simple reason: the constant and increasingly sophisticated threats to which it has been subjected since its creation as a State and its ongoing struggle to survive."

One of the main features of the Israeli industry is the "velocity in the development of research and development and the capacity at which projects are made operational, to subsequently be exported." One explanation for this velocity in R & D programs are the frequent military operations of the Armed Forces of Israel. In the words of Itamar Graff: "Unlike other countries, in Israel the engineer who develops a technology, is at the same time serving in the army as a combatant or as the head of a unit while serving as a reservist, and can therefore know and understand the needs of the Israel Defense Forces. This daily interaction between the industry and the Army allows flexibility, improvisation, creativity and a considerable reduction in the project deadlines."

It is relevant here to cite the Israeli filmmaker Yotam Feldman, in relation to his documentary film The Lab, in which he analyses the Israeli military industry and its relationship with economic, military and political decisions. In an interview, Feldman drew two conclusions from his experience:

"People tend to focus on a political and military elite, while ignoring an economic elite that benefits from the use of military force and makes its existence possible. The separation line between the Israeli arms industry and the high-tech Israeli industry is very thin, and virtually non-existent. (...)

"States in which an overwhelming majority of citizens denounce the actions of the Israeli army in Gaza, actually make these actions possible by buying weapons tested there. This is essential for the security industry in Israel, the only kind of industry that exports more than it sells in the local market. Therefore, this purchase also goes to the IDF, who ensures that these industries develop new weapons to be used in the next war in Gaza."

Feldman assures that:

"Israel exports Rafael missiles used to kill in Gaza, IAI drones, combat methods of General Aviv Kochavi and Magal separation walls, but also lawyers, experts in population management in the manner of the civil administration in Israel on the West Bank, and even the ethics of war. Perhaps this is the reason why the left has a stronger presence these days in such a business. Yossi Beilin sells "security products", Shlomo Ben Ami held a high position in Global CST, which provided the Colombian government with weapons and training services, and Ehud..."
Barak entered in this line of business at its peak, after 11-S.

[...] "This approach pays off. A key player in the defense industry told me that the performance testing run in the Gaza Strip of the Elbit BMS (Battle Management System, a system similar to the Internet for ground forces), a large project estimated to be worth one billion dollars, has allowed Elbit to raise its price in an agreement signed a year later with Australia. The same goes for Rafael. The company openly declared that it would take advantage of the escalation that preceded the Pilar Defensive operation - with the first operational use of the Iron Dome - to raise about 500 million shekels (about $135 million) through the issuance of bonds. An IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries) seller said that the killings and operations in Gaza produce an increase of tens of points percentage in the sales of the company."

It should be noted that the three companies mentioned, Rafael, IAI and Elbit, sadly beneficiary of the violence in Gaza, are probably the three companies which have most benefited, as we shall see, from the business opportunity which Spain represents.
It is necessary to mention the influence of the so-called PEA (Programas Especiales de Armamento, from Spanish), or special weapons programs, in relation to the Spanish policy of promoting arms transfers. These programs were initiated in the early nineties, theoretically to modernize the weaponry of the Spanish Armed Forces and thus adapt to the standards set by the entry of Spain into NATO.

Among the "main programs", the Ministry of Defense includes at least four involving very significantly an Israeli defense firm: Spike missiles, mini-Samson turrets in RG-31 tanks, the modernization of F-5 aircrafts and the PASI drone program. These are the most expensive defense projects, but not the only ones in which are involved Israeli defense companies. However, at present only the Spike missiles are considered a PEA.

The PEA have generated much controversy due to their huge cost at a time of economic crisis, in which governments are drastically cutting down on social expenditure. In this context, the Ministry of Defense has contracted payment commitments with the military companies that develop these programs, which are valued between 29,429 and 36,800 million euros. There are several criticisms concerning these programs. On the one hand, they were planned on a very long term, which entails additional costs for technical innovations, reschedulings, etc. On the other hand, attempts have been made at trying to hide its funding and actual cost, spreading its cost between the ministries of Defense and Industry, for which a R & D credit mechanism was created, that allows companies to begin development of these programs without making a private investment, and repayment can be deferred up to 20 years at 0 % interest. Moreover, the transfer of these loans by companies is subject to the purchase of new weapons by the Ministry of Defense, so if it does not authorize the payment, the amount of credits approved by the Ministry of Industry to the companies would also not be returned. This funding mechanism intends to hide the real military spending and postpone it to future budgets. According to sources of Defense, the Ministry will face commitments amounting to "between 800 and 2,000 million euros per year", for at least 15 years. The Centre Delàs, from Barcelona, has spent years denouncing that the debts of these loans to armament companies will finally be forgiven, at the expense of public funds.

---

**Summary table of the Spanish arms purchases to Israel**

Source: Ministry of Defence, Infodefensa.com and Centre Delàs de Estudis per la Pau. Own elaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRODUCT</th>
<th>ISRAELI COMPANY</th>
<th>SPANISH COMPANIES INVOLVED</th>
<th>SPANISH CONTRACTOR</th>
<th>TURNOVER APPROX. (MILLION €)</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASI system/ drones</td>
<td>IAI &amp; Indra, EADS-CASA, Ares Ingeniería y Sistemas</td>
<td>Land Army</td>
<td>19.6 + another 18.2 [training] + 2.4 [maintenance]</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5 modernization</td>
<td>IAI &amp; EADS-CASA</td>
<td>Air Army</td>
<td>Over 31</td>
<td>2002-2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spike MR and ER missiles</td>
<td>Rafael &amp; Tecnobit GD-SBS</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>2006 and 2022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal camerass</td>
<td>Elbit Systems</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardom mortar systems</td>
<td>Soltam / Elbit Systems &amp; GD-SBS, GMV, Urovesa</td>
<td>Land Army</td>
<td>7.2 + 4.67</td>
<td>2011 and 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this section, public contracts will be considered those involving the import of products or components of defense from Israel, the manufacture in Spain of products or components with Israeli license, and business cooperation between Israeli and Spanish companies. Indeed, these three types of relationships often overlap and exist simultaneously.

4.2 SOME EXAMPLES OF CONTRACTS

Background until 2003

In the year 2000, a contract to improve the Air Force SF-5Bs was in place with IAI for $20 million. It was specifically aimed at 22 CASA-Northrop aircrafts, with the option of upgrading another 18 devices. The same year, another contract was also in place with Rafael for $14 million, to equip the Boeing EF-18 Hornets planes of the Spanish Air Force with long-range oblique photography systems (LOROP). The development of LOROP from the Litening system allows a dual purpose system of recognition and targeting. Moreover, two Litening-2 (airborne and innovative navigation and marksmanship system), were purchased for AV-8B fighter jets. They were acquired via the US, from the American production line and delivered in 2000 as part of a settlement of $25 million.

In 2001, Spain was the first client of the RecceLite tactical reconnaissance systems, manufactured by Rafael, and used by the Spanish fleet of Boeing fighters. Also purchased were 25 Litening-2, delivered in 2003-2004, for the F/A-18 aircraft fighters, probably of the American production line. These systems (similar versions) have also been installed in the AV-8B Harriers. Finally, the same year it was decided to modernize the F-5 and T-38 aircrafts, imports of communication systems and ground surveillance radars.

In 2003, the first Leopard 2E tanks were provided to the Spanish army, a hybrid between the German and Swedish models. The ammunition for these tanks would be provided by the Israeli IMI.

Thermal cameras contract for Elbit Systems

On 5 December 2007, the Ministry of Defense awarded a contract for the purchase of 11 thermal cameras to the Israeli company Elbit Systems Electro-Optics Elaps. The contract volume was of €1,034,000.

Modernization of the F-5 aircrafts

The main beneficiaries of the program are the companies EADS-CASA, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Derco Aerospace (from the US). The objective is to thoroughly update the tandem AE.9 (Northrop F-5) aircrafts, from the avionics and precision systems for navigation up to the design of the cabin, "so they can be similar to those used in the modern fighter planes C.15 (F-18) and C.16 (EF-2000), and its use for the advanced training of crews is more profitable." The Ministry of Defense claims that the training in flight of fighter pilots is guaranteed through the use of the AEPJT (Advanced European Jet Pilot Training) program. At the same time, a "structural modernization" of these planes is performed, to prolong its life beyond 2015. Completion of the program is expected for the year 2015.
The modernization of the Spanish F-5 is carried out by IAI, with EADS-CASA as the main subcontractor, in a contract of more than € 31 million. The contract affects 17 of the 18 F-5 in service, all two-seaters. The contract was signed in December 2002 between the Spanish Air Force and IAI (the latter had to supply equipment). The modernization works have been carried out in Getafe (Madrid).256

Probably a precedent for this contract is that previously signed with IAI, of $ 20 million, to improve the Air Force of SF-5Bs, specifically 22 CASA-Northrop aircrafts, with the option of upgrading another 18 devices (those which were probably included in the following contract).258

IAI Development in Seville

In 2011, Airbus Military presented the C295 AEW & C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) prototype at the Air Show Le Bourget (Paris). It also signed an agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), by which its subsidiary, Elta Systems, would supply an electronically scanned radar for the C295 AEW.259 The prototype is built in Airbus Military factory in Seville, Spain.260

Negotiations concerning the agreement lasted for over a year. The C295 is a cargo and naval reconnaissance plane which will be transformed to integrate sensors and Elta radars. It will include fourth-generation radars with integrated IFF (Identification of Friend or Foe). Experts at the Paris fair estimated that the sales potential of the C295 AEW & C could amount to billions of dollars in the next decade.261 According to the President of Elta, Nissim Hadas, “the global demand for AEW aircrafts like this is expected to grow in the coming years, due to threats of terrorism and the need to strengthen border and air control”.262
4.3 RAFAEL SPIKE MISSILES FOR THE LAND ARMY

Spike is a medium range antitank missile produced by the Israeli company Rafael. It is designed to destroy modern tanks, but also helicopters or armored vehicles, among others. In fact, according to the Spanish Ministry of Defense, “the design criterions have been to maximize the probability of destruction, survival, simplicity and ability against countermeasures, while achieving minimal cost and weight.”264 In 2002, General Dynamics European Land Systems - Santa Barbara Systems (GDELS -SBS), signed an agreement with Rafael on the Spike Program, one of the special armament programs of the Spanish Ministry of Defense. GD-SBS was intended to be the prime contractor for the Spike program with the Ministry of Defense. This cooperation was to be subsequently extended to other possible programs in Portugal and South America.265 The agreement established a distribution of initial work that has been updated as new subcontracts have been identified for the Spanish industry.266 Although the missiles have been developed by Raphael, they are manufactured and integrated in Spain by GDELD-SBS, through a technology transfer agreement. Export to South America was also programmed (between 50 % and 60 % of the cost of the program was expected to remain in Spanish territory).267 The Spanish company Tecnobit is in charge of providing and maintaining the Spike MR for Infantry and the Spike ER for Tiger helicopters under license from Rafael.268 See the above explanatory graphic on the distribution of tasks between the three mentioned companies.

Originally, the agreement included the acquisition of 260 launchers and 2,600 medium range (4 km) anti-tank missiles, to replace the Dragon System of the Marine Infantry and the Milan of the Land Army. Deliveries were initially foreseen for the years 2009-2014.269 Finally, the supply was reduced to a total of 236 shooting stations and 2,310 missiles, somewhat under the forecast number of 2,360 units due to the increase of the VAT from the signature date up to today.270 Originally, € 324 million were budgeted.271 In 2010, the estimated cost until 2024 was 364 million for the Ministry of Defense and 255 million for the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade (see below).

Given these figures, it should be underlined that the acquisition of Spike missiles, being one of the Special Weapons Programs undertaken by the Ministry of Defence, is subject to a complex financing system through R & D appropriations, which have been previously mentioned. Moreover, the State Budget in recent years has concealed spending on these programs, allocating minimal amounts in its proposed legislation, and approving extraordinary credits by Royal Decree during the current financial year. For example, in the summer 2013, the Government approved a special appropriation of 877 million, of which 34.58 million euros were for this program.

According to Human Rights Watch, this type of missile was used by the drones of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in 2009, during the attacks on Gaza in the Cast Lead Operation, killing at least 48 people.272
“In all the cases [covered by the report] the mark of the impact and the fragmentation pattern were consistent with the missile produced in Israel, Spike, which contains concentrated dynamite and disperses small cube-shaped fragments up to 20 meters away. Other frequently used weapons, like Hellfire anti-tank missiles and TDW fired from attack helicopters, do not exhibit this pattern. Human Rights Watch also found circuit platforms and other missile parts compatible with Spike. Some of the wounded civilians showed marks of cubic fragments, and in one case the X-rays showed metal cubes in the leg and chest of the victim.”

In 2012, the Land Army carried out the first launch with the new LR-Dual Spike missile (third-generation anti-tank missile System, man-portable and electro-optical). The launch exercise took place in the Training Center (CENAD) of San Gregorio, in Zaragoza, and those in charge of executing the test were a group of students from the Academy of Infantry.

**Elements of the contract of the Spike missile program and the company in charge:**

![Diagram of Spike missile components](image)

**Details of the payments for the Spike program (in euros):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MIN. OF DEFENSE</th>
<th>MIN. ITC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>12,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37,454,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,257,000</td>
<td>42,249,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>(Forecast)</td>
<td>6,598,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>(Forecast)</td>
<td>14,972,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>(Forecast)</td>
<td>23,620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>(Forecast)</td>
<td>28,424,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Total investments of Ministry of Defense: € 364,685,000
- Total investments of Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade: € 255,467,000
In September 2008, the Spanish Ministry of Defense purchased, for €75 million, 100 Mk5E RG31 armored vehicles of the MRAP (mine resistant attacks) type, from the South African firm BAE Land Systems. In 2010 and 2011, another thirty vehicles were requested. The RG-31, which can carry nine fighters, is equipped with a machine gun platform with Mini-Samson remote control (RCWS, Remote Controlled Weapon Station) by Rafael, with night vision system and remote control that prevents the exposure the shooter. In September 2008, ninety of these Mini Samson stabilized weapon stations were purchased and deliveries were made in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, another 18 stations were requested. BAE Land Systems disputed the contract with the Rafael Gold model. The renovation plan foresaw the purchase of 575 tanks for €321 million. PAP Tecnos is in charge of both the supply and maintenance of the RCWS of RG-31 tanks and Pizarro, licensed under Rafael. The main contractor and integrator is General Dynamics European Land Systems - Santa Barbara Systems (GDELS-SBS), and the integration is performed in the SBS factory in Seville. The weapons station is co-manufactured in Spain by Tecnobit.

The 18 Mini Samson RCWS, purchased in September 2011 by PAP Tecnos Innovation costed €3.6 million. The cost of the initial 90 stations acquired in 2008 is unknown, but it is estimated to have been around 18 million, totaling about 21 million. In addition, PAP Tecnos has been awarded the contract for the maintenance of the towers between 2011 and 2014, for €4.1 million.

Proven experience in the Gaza Strip

The SAMSON RCWS can be used both night and day and in motion. These platforms have been tested by the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip. The aim was to create an "area of automatic gunfire" for the remote control of the border between Gaza and Israel. Thus, these Sentinel towers (Sentry-Tech pillbox towers) are intended to control "all movement in the Gaza Strip, mainly at the perimeter near the border", 24 hours a day (those monitoring would be "mainly female soldiers"). If "hostile targets" are detected, the towers respond. Multiple stations can be controlled by a single operator and can respond to the same objective. The operator is the one who identifies and verifies the objectives. The system also allows for manual operation (not remote) if preferred. It is to be noted that these platforms optionally offer guided Spike missiles (such as those also acquired by Spain from the same Israeli company Rafael) and other laser-guided weapons.
Irregularities in the award of Israeli mortar systems for the Spanish Armed Forces in Afghanistan

In March 2010, the Army qualified as urgent the acquisition of new mortar systems on VAMTAC 4X4 vehicles (High Mobility Tactical Vehicle) of UROVESA (URO Special Vehicles SA) to provide mobility to weapon systems used in Afghanistan. This contract was put out to tender in December of the same year for a value of almost eight million euros. The contract was awarded to a consortium of companies formed by Soltam Systems (of the group Elbit Systems, Israel) and Santa Barbara Systems (General Dynamics European Land Systems, USA), after Expal and NTGS (New Technologies Global Systems) were excluded from the contest. According to news published in specialized press, Soltam and Santa Barbara spent years working in the consortium in order to allow the Israeli company to access and be present on the Spanish defense market. On the other hand, according to various questions asked in the House of Representatives, the process may have presented irregularities, some of which we describe below:

◆ Possible inside trading. David Marsiano, president of the Israeli company Soltam Systems, reported in an interview in May 2010 that this company supplied 81mm mortar systems to the Spanish Army, in accordance with its needs. Moreover, in the same interview, he claimed to have created a partnership with two other Spanish companies (GMV, responsible for the fire control, and UROVESA, manufacturer of the VAMTAC on which the mortar is installed, both companies benefit from the contract), which were assured part of the production of the systems.

◆ Possible favoritism of UROVESA over Soltam Systems. Companies had to have their own VAMTAC vehicle to carry out a test shooting, necessary to defend the presented project. However, these vehicles were not supplied by the Army on equal terms. Delivery of the vehicle was left in the hands of UROVESA, the manufacturing company. As already noted, this company had a previous cooperation agreement with one of the bidders to which delivery was favored, whereas it was delayed to one month before the competition for the other two candidate firms. The Cardom mortars were previously tested both in Spain and Israel. 

◆ Technical fault in the shooting test evaluation, described as a “minor incident”. The Israeli company carried out the test shooting at the military base of Viator (Almería). During the test, the technicians had to jump out of the vehicle and clear the area due to a technical malfunction in the mortar system. In spite of this, it was assessed that “such an incident did not involve a danger to anyone present” and was thus considered a “minor incident” that did not modify the bidding process.

◆ Technical characteristics of the proposals, from exclusionary to desirable. Two of the companies which participated in the contest were excluded for not adapting the technical characteristics of their projects to the requirements of the specifications features. According to one of the excluded companies, once only a single candidate remained, the technical requirements turned into desirable rather than exclusive, a fact that could also be considered a preferential treatment for the Israeli company.
Elbit Systems issued a statement announcing the acquisition of the contract at least fifteen days before an official judgment of the case became public.

The Chief of Defense reported on 4 December 2012 that these mortar systems purchased by the Spanish army were first used in Afghanistan in the “Goshawk” operation, to respond to the “fire of the insurgents.” The next day, a new contract worth €4.67 million was announced, awarded to Soltam by the Chief of Economic Affairs of the Logistics Support Command, who, once more, handled the tender for negotiated procedure without publication and on an urgent basis.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that these systems which Spain used in Afghanistan, were previously designed and used by the IDF during the Operation Cast Lead and by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan.

4.6// LAS VENTAS Y LA COPRODUCCIÓN DE UAVs ENTRE ESPAÑA E ISRAEL

The first known experiences of the Spanish Armed Forces with Israeli UAV technology date back to at least 2008. The military deployed their first models in Afghan territory during the month of April 2008, while the Civil Guard made its first test in Spanish territory in December of the same year. Both experiences were carried out by the Israeli company Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).

Deployment of UAVs in Afghanistan

In April 2007, the Spanish Ministry of Defense announced the award of the manufacture contract of the prototype of the Israeli UAV Searcher MK II-J to the temporary consortium Unión Temporal de Empresas (UTE), which includes the companies Indra Sistemas, EADS-CASA, Ares Ingeneering and Systems, and IAI (giving rise to a new version of the model, called Searcher MK III-J). The acquisition was aimed at supporting the Spanish troops in Afghanistan from the military base in Herat, in the west of the country. The contract represented, along with the manufacture of 4 devices, the deployment of four aerial platforms, a ground control station, a launching/deployment and landing system, a ground data terminal and a remote video terminal, with the corresponding logistics and training support.

The Searcher MK II-J model, referred to in Spain as Plataforma Autónoma Sensorizada de Inteligencia (PASI), (Sensorized Autonomous Intelligence Platform), has a range of 350 kilometers with a flight endurance of 15 hours at altitudes up to 20,000 feet (about 6,000 metres). Equipped with a high resolution camera and an infrared temperature sensor, it is designed to undertake surveillance missions, information gathering and recognition both day and night. Since they became operational in April 2008, the Searcher MK III-J models have been used in more than 500 missions, many of them in the provinces of Herat and Badghis, totalling over 2,500 hours of flight. All of the platforms have been operated by a team of 26 people led by one commander, most of them located
in the same military base in Herat [under the control of the headquarters of the ISAF Regional Command West].

The initial cost of the contract amounted to € 14.37 million, although the acquisition of a new model in 2009 to replace one that had been damaged the previous year [along with new acquisitions, including the purchase of two remote video terminals and further training courses], increased the cost to € 19.67 million. Two new aircrafts were also purchased in 2012, and a new and additional ground control system was placed in the base of Qala e Naw, the capital of Badghis province.

As regards training of operators, in October 2010 it was reported that the Army had acquired a PASI system from Indra for crew training in the area of operations for a total of € 11.9 million. In October 2011, it was announced that the UTE, formed by Indra Systems and EADS Aeronautical Constructions, had been awarded a contract from the Army for the provision of additional material for the PASI crew training system for a total of € 6.3 million. Both contracts were awarded by negotiated procedure without publication. The Herat base also served for the practical sessions of the course for UAV operators of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Area, within the training center of Army Airmobile Force (CEFAMET), during which students had the opportunity to pilot the UAV Searcher MK III- J in real missions.

Moreover, Indra also benefits from the maintenance and reparation business of the platform. The company has obtained two contracts [for a total amount of € 2.4 million] awarded by the Head of Economic Affairs of the Logistics Support Command, which has led the tenders by negotiated procedure without publication and ordinary process. One of these contracts, with record 209112012009700 regarded the maintenance of the system and the provision of spare parts (for a total of € 1.5 million). The other, with file number 209112012028300, was devoted to the repair of the PASI S / N 101 system (for € 902,000).

**The interest for UAVs by Civil Guard**

The interest of the Civil Guard of the Israeli UAV prototype Heron I, took place in the framework of the so-called Operation Minerva, aimed at the surveillance of Spanish coasts. Between 1 and 12 December 2008, the Civil Guard, with the support of the Air Army, studied the feasibility of the Heron I UAV system at the Gando Air Base (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria). The Spanish company Indra was in charge of enabling the operationability of the system with the Regional Control Centre of Canarias and to distribute the images of the UAV electro-optical sensor to the Directorate General of the Civil Guard in Madrid. The Israeli firm IAI, on the other hand, was responsible for providing personal means and materials necessary for testing, whereas the company ISDEFE, advised the Civil Guard on the technical and operational evaluation of the system.

The technical characteristics of the Heron I model allow it to reach a maximum speed of 120 kilometers per hour, at an altitude of up to 22,000 feet [about 6,700 meters], during 16 hours straight. Its missions could include the advanced recognition and surveillance of maritime borders, within the framework of the Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE), thus complementing the information already provided by the sensor stations deployed along the coast.
European Union Research Framework Programme

The sales and coproduction relationship between the two countries also occurs in the context of research projects at a European level. Within the European Programme of Research on Security, part of the VII Framework Programme for Research of the European Union for the period 2007-2013, collaborations between Spanish and Israeli companies and institutions are frequent. Three of the projects that exemplify these relations are in the field of joint research on new UAV technology, specifically the projects “Sea Border Surveillance” (SeaBILLA), “Transportable Autonomous Patrol for Land Border Surveillance” (TALOS), and “UAV Based Innovative Means for Land and Sea Non-Cooperative Vehicles Stop” (AEROCEPTOR).

The SeaBILLA project, implemented during 2010-2014, with a EU funding of € 9.8 million, aims to design the new architecture of a future European border surveillance system. One of its three specific objectives is to improve surveillance tools and sensors, including unmanned aircraft systems. The control of illegal immigration is its main task. This new surveillance system would be primarily deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands) and in the Black Sea, to then be extended to all the maritime borders of the Union European, with additional missions of fisheries control, maritime safety, environmental protection and strengthening of law enforcement measures. Twenty-seven companies from 8 European countries participated in the project (including Spain, with the companies INDRA Espacio, INDRA Sistemas, TTI Norte, Eurocopter Spain and the University of Murcia) and Israel (with the company Correlation Systems).

The TALOS project, also concerned with border control (although focusing this time on the new land borders of the EU with the former countries of the Soviet orbit), aims to develop a new system of surveillance of European borders based on ground and aerial drones. With almost € 12.9 million in EU funding, and running from 2008 until May 2012, it has been developed by 14 companies from 8 European countries (including Spain, with the participation of the company TTI Norte), plus Turkey and Israel (with the participation of Israel Aerospace Industries).

Finally, the AEROCEPTOR project aims to control and arrest sea and land vehicles through the use of UAV technology. To this end, it envisages to develop unmanned aircrafts supported by a ground control station and equipped with systems suitable for intercepting vehicles (either by reducing or slowing down its trajectory). Led by the National Institute for Aerospace Technology (INTA), it involves the participation of 15 institutions and companies from 6 European countries [plus Turkey and Israel], including the Spanish companies Systems Engineering for the Defense of Spain SA (ISDEFE), Zabala Innovation Consulting SA and GMV Aerospace and Defense SA Unipersonal, as well as the Israeli companies Rotem Technological Solutions LTD and Israel Aerospace Industries LTD. The project also includes the participation of the Ministry of Interior of Spain (which represents the National Police and Civil Guard) and the Israel Ministry of Public Security, which as the consortium points out, will be the end users of the systems developed.

Israel in the industry of unmaned aerial vehicles

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, are aircrafts which are remotely piloted or programmed to fly autonomously. Equipped with advanced technology and manufactured for
surveillance and/or attack missions, they are gaining prominence in many armies and police forces around the world. Their high-resolution cameras and electronic surveillance systems allow them to offer high-quality images in real time, while their weapons systems (which can host Hellfire type missiles and laser-guided bombs) confer them offensive capability. Some of the most recent innovations in the field of UAV technology are aimed at obtaining miniature Wasp III models, of just over 30 inches and 400 grams, or NanoHummingbird type models (still under development), of only 16 inches and 18 grams.

Since the 1980s, Israel has maintained an important role in the field of unmanned aviation, internationally. According to Jacques Chemla, chief engineer at MALAT (UAV department of Israel Aerospace Industries, IAI): “Israel is the leading exporter of drones in the world, with more than 1000 units sold to 42 countries.” According to Gili Cohen, Israel has made at least $4,600 million in eight years, as they account for almost 10% of all Israeli military exports: $150 million in 2008, $650 million in 2009, $979 million in 2010 (record year), $627 million in 2011 and $260 million in 2012 (to which we should add at least $100 million exported to India). Fifty percent of exports are sold in Europe, to seven countries: Georgia, Holland, Germany, France, Poland, UK and Spain. Thirty-four percent goes to Asia (Azerbaijan, India and Singapore), 11% to Latin America (Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador and Brazil), 3.9% to the USA and 1.5% to Africa (Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia).

Companies such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems lead the Israeli drone market. The IAI prototypes range from the recent Heron TP, also called Eytan (“strong” in Hebrew), of 4.5 tonnes and over 26 meters in breadth, to the so-called Mosquito, of 35 inches and a load capacity of 150 grams. On the other hand, the basic models of the company Elbit Systems are the Skylark I-LE (derived from Skylark I, in service in many armies in the world), the Skylark II, and the models Hermes 900, 450 and 90. The Hermes 900 model, which includes electro-optic technology and electronic warfare systems, has recently been acquired, among others, by the Air Force of Chile and the National Police of Colombia, while it is in the process of expanding in the same Israeli armed forces.

Part of the comparative advantage of the Israeli drones in the world market has been their experimentation in real combats. The importance of such “combat tests”, was especially relevant during the 1980s, after the use of the Israeli UAV Scout, in the 1982 Lebanon war. As stated by Silberring Tommy, a retired Israeli colonel, now CEO of the UAVs division of the Israeli company IAI, “The US were not at war at the time [...] so much of the experience on conflicts came from here [Israel]. ” Currently, on the website of Elbit Systems, in the UAVs section, one can read the following: “Our UAVs are designed on the basis of decades of operational experience, and are used by numerous military and security forces around the world. They are [our unmanned models] the backbone of the UAVs of Israel’s Armed Forces.” More specifically, the propaganda leaflet for the model Hermes 450 states that “it is a mature system, tested in combat with more than 300,000 flight hours in operations.”

Part of these “combat tests” have been carried out during the various armed conflicts that Israel has waged in its neighboring countries and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. According to reports made by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Israeli drones actively participated in the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the recent Cast Lead Operation in the Gaza Strip between December 2008 and January 2009 (where, according to the organization, the Heron and Hermes 450 models were used, probably...
with Spike missiles manufactured by the Israeli company Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.). According to the organizations B’Tselem, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights and the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, the Gaza operation resulted in 42 drone attacks that caused 87 civilian deaths.\footnote{328}

Drone interventions in the Gaza Strip are not only limited to the Cast Lead Operation, but rather, have been part of a recurrent Israeli \textit{modus operandi}, at least since 2006. According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, in the period 2006 – 2011, there have been 825 deaths from UAVs attacks, most of them civilians. Just a few minutes of flight are what separate the air bases from the Israelis in the sky of Gaza, where, according to The \textit{Washington Post}, “tests, trainings and an increasing number of missions are performed.”\footnote{329}

Even operations to assassinate militants were allegedly recognized by General Avichai Mandelblit, in talks with former UN ambassador to Israel James Cunningham, according to diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks. \footnote{330}

4.7// SPAIN AS A GATEWAY TO LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE

Because Spain is the gateway to Central and South America, as well as to Europe and North Africa, it plays a role that goes beyond its borders. Spain’s relations with Israel go far beyond business in Spanish or Israeli territory. The companies of the two countries cooperate to have access to contracts and opportunities in third countries. One of the companies that stand out in this regard is Indra. Indra and Rafael, for example, work together on a “very interesting program in a Latin American country.” According to Rafael, “with Indra we hardly compete, hence our partnership to work jointly in international programs.”\footnote{331} In Latin America, Indra is present in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Peru.\footnote{332}

In an interview with \textit{Infodefensa}, General Shmaya Avieli, director of SIBAT, made it clear that in Spain there is an interest in creating Hispanic-Israeli joint ventures: “I think the current circumstances of Spain are favorable to the creation of joint ventures, perhaps even production lines. Spain, as a gateway to the Central and South American markets, is a valuable partner to cooperate with.”\footnote{333} Gil Gidron, president of the Spain-Israel Chamber of Commerce and Industry, claimed during the “International Seminar of IT and citizen security on Israeli Leading-Edge Technologies”, that Israel needs Spain “for its strength in the field of trade and its privileged relations with Latin America.”\footnote{334}

The Secretary of State for Defense, Pedro Argüelles, at the close of the Madrid HOMSEC 2013 Exhibition on Security and Defense, and the second Atenea International Conference “Collaboration and Association of the Ibero-American Defense Industries”, pointed out that “Latin America is a natural opening place for the Spanish industrial sector”, and added, in relation to the huge competition in the region that “we need a new model that is not that of the buyer - seller, but rather of technology partners, moving from purchasing products to acquisition of knowledge.”\footnote{335} This is where Israel has seized its opportunity, provided by and sought by Spain.
It is important to note that it is not Israel who instrumentalized Spain, but rather that the “gateway to South America” is also something that is promoted by Spain. Thus, Joseph Ranero, economic and commercial counselor at the Spanish embassy in Israel, underlined that “the best way to increase trade [between the two countries] is through joint projects, especially in technology, where we complement one another,” and added that “Spain can also serve as a base forward to do business with South America.” In a period in which the defense budgets of many countries are shrinking, the Israeli defense industry needs new markets to maintain its pace of exports. China is still not an option due to the US veto, and relations with Turkey have deteriorated. Thus, Latin America and other Asian markets have become an obsession.

In Latin America, Israel seeks to compensate the business reductions taking part elsewhere, such as Europe, largely due to the economic crisis. In fact, according to the SIPRI, this region is that which has most increased its military spending in 2010 (a 5.8 % increase, compared to 5.2 % in Africa, 2.8% in North America or 2.5 % in the Middle East). This is particularly true for Brazil and Chile, despite the fact that they are not involved in any armed conflict. In fact, for example, Elbit Systems was awarded a contract for 85 million dollars, to modernize eleven F-5 fighter-bombers of the Brazilian Air Force. In addition, its subsidiary AEL Sistemas has created a joint venture with the Brazilian company Embraer, to develop, build and market Israeli UAVs (e.g. the Hermes 450: drones that Israel had supplied to Brazil in 2010), that are expected to revolutionize the regional market. Moreover, in May 2010, IAI was awarded a contract for $ 350 million, to supply the Brazilian federal police with Heron UAVs. In 2007, IAI won another contract for $ 150 million, to modernize 24 Kfir fighters (manufactured by IAI) of the Colombian Air Force and provide additional aircrafts.

4.8// DEFENSE SUBSIDIARIES IN SPAIN: THE ISRAELI “COMBAT TESTED” EXPERIENCE

4.8.1/ RAFAEL IN SPAIN: PAP TECNOS

Contrary to what its name might suggest, Rafael is not a Spanish firm, but rather one of the most important Israeli military companies. Of the major Israeli defense companies, only Rafael and Aeronautics seem to have a Spanish subsidiary. However, it is important to note that the subsidiary is a Spanish, not Israeli company. Thus, most of Rafael’s transactions in Spain currently take place through a Spanish company, which in theory, does not belong to Rafael. However, PAP Tecnos functions as a technologist of Rafael, which finances it. PAP Tecnos was founded in 1994, as “PAP Logistics”, with the aim of providing solutions in the field of defense logistics and the adoption of international standards in the area of information technology. In mid-2010 it was acquired by Rafael.

One of Rafael’s objectives for its subsidiary, is to open a market in Spain, as well as the rest of Europe, Latin America and anywhere where Spanish connections are an added value. Also, it can serve as the basis for participation in NATO industrial programs. According to Rafael, the reason to integrate PAP Tecnos in its holding was that “it was already a supplier of the Ministry of Defense, we...
were searching for the platform, we will put in the infrastructure.” Before deciding to integrate PAP Tecnos, Rafael had chosen another Spanish company, with which it already had a close collaboration: Tecnobit. However, a year of negotiations proved to be unsuccessful. Another fruitless attempt was the acquisition of Instalaza, an idea which was finally discarded.343 The Israeli company has purchased at least 1,500 square metres of facilities, “at the moment, no commercial offices, just an industrial plant.”344

It must be stressed that PAP Tecnos uses, as a strategy to demonstrate the added value of its products, the label “combat proven”, which clearly appears on the homepage of its corporate website.345 Note in the attached screen printing that, the large photo shown as “combat-proven” is precisely the Samson tower which equips the Spanish tanks.

The production which Rafael wants to promote, in principle, are the tanks (passive, active, reactive), command and control systems (some special models that do not exist in Spain), gun turrets (in this area, the close relationship with Tecnobit will continue along with other additional capabilities) and electro-optical systems for image processing.346

PAP Tecnos application areas (according to the company):347

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<th>INTERNAL SECURITY</th>
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<td>-Weapon Systems</td>
<td>-Air-to-air missiles</td>
<td>-Maritime security</td>
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<td>-Shield and protection</td>
<td>-E-War</td>
<td>-Air-surface weapons</td>
<td>-Simulation and Training systems</td>
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<td>-C4ISR</td>
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<td>-Training and simulation</td>
<td>-War Submarine</td>
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Picture: presentation of the corporate website of PAP Tecnos //348
Aeronautics Enterprise Spain, Inc. (AEE) is the Spanish subsidiary of the Israeli holding Aeronautics Defense Systems, a leading company in the production of surveillance systems and homeland security. It is specialized in unmanned aviation systems, but also excels in the development, testing, manufacturing and marketing of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and security systems, as well as aircrafts, aerial vehicles, land and maritime unmanned vehicles, command and control devices; and the provision of all products related to the above services. Aeronautics Defense Systems is the third military industrial group in Israel. Its turnover amounts to more than € 100 million per year, and it manufactures, with its own technology, unmanned vehicles for military use. Its plant in Israel employs 600 workers, and it has offices in England and Greece. It has agreements with the USA and Austria and operates in many countries around the world.

AEE was founded in Valladolid on 2 June 2006. In June 2008, it bought a plot of 4,555 square meters in the Technology Park of Boecillo from the public company Gesturcal, to develop a R & D plant, a laboratory for the production and integration of public security systems, one for drone certifications (trials, software and testing) and a center of excellence for unmanned vehicles, which provides specialized education and training of personnel. It also develops communication and transmission technologies in the air and ground terminals of its subsidiary, Commtact.

In May 2011, the Spanish Government authorized the Israeli Aeronautics to invest € 45,150 in the Spanish company AEE. This amount corresponded to 75 % of the share capital of the company, specializing in the provision of goods and services related to “national defense”. Note that it is the Spanish government outsourcing “national defense” to a foreign private company. The remaining 25 % comes from Spanish capital. AEE claimed it would invest in these facilities € 30 million over five years, and that it would hire 100 people, 90% of whom technical engineers and licensed technicians. AEE has a plant for the development and production of defense systems and dual-use (civil and military) in the Technological Park of Boecillo (Valladolid), and has an operations center in the La Matilla airfield, near Tordesillas (Valladolid). It is reported that the Castile and León Council “strongly facilitated” Aeronautics’ establishment in that community. This apparently determined Aeronautics’ preference for this region over Catalonia, where a part of its business and security sector believes that it is the attitude of the Government (Generalitat), which produced this result. The pressure of social groups, opposed to the implementation of the aviation industry in Catalonia probably also had an influence on the final decision.

AEE’s plans are ambitious and it has at least two goals: On the one hand, to have access to Spanish contracts and grants. Rami Yaar, vice-president of Aeronautics Defense Systems and chairman of the Spanish subsidiary, recognized that access to subsidies in Castile and León was “one of the reasons why we have come to this region.” In Castile and León, AEE has signed agreements with the former Ministry of the Presidency and the Ministry of Interior and Justice for monitoring, capturing and transmitting images. The Official Bulletin of Castile and León of 23 June 2008 issued the “award of the contract to Aeronautics Defense Systems LTD, for the services of observation, remote sensing...
and support in planning the management of certain ministries, through a multi-sensory platform installed on unmanned airborne vehicles or piloted aircrafts”. The award was of a substantial total of three million euros.363

On the other hand, the second objective is to seek access to third markets. For Aeronautics, it is its first center in Europe, from which it aspires not only to access the old continent, but also Latin America and North Africa.364 It is not so much about manufacturing systems, but rather to develop from Boecillo an in-house, cutting edge technology, which enables the company to become a leader in the industry of surveillance and reconnaissance systems and in the so-called homeland security, and public security and critical communications systems.365 “Our base will be in Castile and León”, assured Yaar.366 In fact, AEE already “co-leads a Spanish consortium bidding in a national security system in Mexico, within the Bicentennial Program, a country in which Aeronautics already has, since the beginning of this year, for its UAV flying activities operated by the Federal Police”.367

It is important to note that the priority of Aeronautics is R & D. “Our goal is not to develop something that has already been done, but rather to start from a base which Israel has already been dominating for the last 30 years and develop new technologies, in cooperation with the universities of the region. We will create our own technology, Spanish technology.”368 Aeronautics aims to transform many of these military applications into systems and solutions for commercial customers (Civil Protection, as well as environmental and other rescue and emergency entities), trade (energy companies, telecommunications, transport and safety) and defense.

The Aeronautics Searcher MK-IIJ UAV aircraft, was acquired in 2007 by the Spanish Ministry of Defense and deployed in Afghanistan. These UAVs were purchased through a consortium led at that time by EADS and Indra. The Searcher UAV has been acquired by several NATO countries.370

In October 2006, Aeronautics presented its project in Valladolid, but various “administrative problems” delayed its start-up.271 Its ambitions were initially incompatible with the lack of European legislation in the field of UAVs. However, the fact that its UAVs could not fly in Spain or Europe for lack of regulation did not impede the company from signing a contract with Civil Protection for surveillance and image transmission for emergencies. Executives of Aeronautics claimed the Board was aware of the fact that it was impossible to carry out unmanned flights for lack of certification and regulation, but claimed that the system was installed on a piloted plane.372

In Spain, flight permits are processed by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), an agency.
of the Ministry of Development. Aeronautics requested the DGAC experimental flight permits, but did not obtain an answer. Interestingly, Aeronautics’ drones were at the time the only ones in the world that had FAA (the US agency) certificate. Rami Yaar said in this regard that they would like to “have more support, not only of the regional government, which we already have, but from the Ministry of Development, of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation. What we are going to develop in Spain and Castile and Leon is a pioneering activity in Europe.

4.8.3/ OTHER NON-AFFILIATED COMPANIES

Triedro is a Spanish company belonging to the Revenga Group, specializing in the development and marketing of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and thermography (infrared technology). It offers three types of unmanned aerial systems: Micro B, Spylite B and Boomerang, all are UAV light tactical, both for civil and military applications, and for visible as well as infrared range. Besides producing its own systems, Triedro also fabricates development systems together with the Israeli company Bluebird Aero Systems Ltd. The three proposed models have their origin in Bluebird, which clearly states on its website - as an added value - that its products have been tested in combat. Bluebird’s “combat tested” experience is determined by its “successful” participation in combat operations with the Israel Defense Forces, and for having been chosen for operational use by the Israeli Air Force. In the B Spylite model, Triedro has also benefited from the development of the Israeli company Rafael.

Both Triedro and Bluebird like to highlight that one of the most important added values for the Spylite B and the Boomerang models is the fact that they have been tested in combat by the Israeli Defense Forces. In the case of the Spylite B model it is underlined that the model has more than 250 operations in combat. The base model, SpyLite, also promoted by BlueBird as tested in combat, continues to be used in operations by the the Ministry of Defense and boasts “thousands of hours of operations and missions.” Meanwhile, the Boomerang model “integrates all of the new technologies tested in combat, thereby achieving a high degree of reliability in missions”, and a duration capacity of up to 10 hours per mission.

Revenga is a Spanish corporate group. Interestingly, it has subsidiaries or branches in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, countries which do not recognize Israel. Interestingly, in the field of security and defense, business is often not consistent with politics: a British report revealed how Israel has sought to export, through the UK, to countries with which it has no diplomatic relations and which do not recognize it, like Pakistan for example (Islamabad has denied having purchased from Israel).

The group Revenga follows “very closely” the Perseus program, aimed at the development of a surveillance system for European maritime border control, under the Seventh Framework Programme [see section 8.1], and is currently negotiating with some of the companies that are leading this project. According to Rafael Orbe, head of defense and security, “we are also in close contact with the Civil Guard to try to provide specific solutions to issues of border control and protection, in the framework of the SIVE” [Integrated System of External Surveillance]. Orbe holds relations with both the Ministry of Interior and of Defense. Although his company is normally subcontracted, the contract
“can sometimes be made directly, as a contractor. This is the case for prison perimeters, such as systems of intelligent video analysis, intercom, access control, etc”. The group also provides services related to telephone systems and video analysis to barracks and access control to the Land Army (called ScanID)."
5/ ISRAELI SECURITY PRODUCTS IN SPAIN

5.1// GUARDIAN–HOMELAND SECURITY: 100% MADE IN ISRAEL

Guardian Homeland Security is undoubtedly the most visible and well-known company based in Spain related to Israeli security. It offers three types of services: a) it is the leading supplier of security products manufactured in Israel b) it provides training courses for bodyguards, shooting, combat and military intelligence, which are famous for being imparted in Israel, where interesting sector incentives are offered, and c) it provides protection and security escort services in Spain, both to individuals and institutions of the country. This section will introduce the company and address its role as the main supplier of Israeli security products. In later chapters the other two facets of Guardian in Spain will be addressed.

Homeland Security Guardian SA, based in Spain, is parent company of Guardian Holdings LTD, which has an export license since March 2006 from the Israeli Ministry of Defense for products and services related to security and defense. The company was founded by former members of the Special Security Services of Israel: Ariel Mazoz, Ilan Arzooan and General (ret) Dr. Yam Tov Samia. It provides armed protection of people, armed protection of delegations, sensible facilities security services, security consultancy, security and defense products and comprehensive defense training courses.

In Spain, it is authorized since October 2006 by the Ministry of Interior [Police Headquarters] to conduct protection services. It is registered in NATO [NAMSA] since 4 February 2011, as provider of security and defense equipment. It is also registered in the Ministry of Defense [Directorate General of Ordinance] since December 2010, for the marketing of security and defense products. In Spain, Guardian is specialized in the following activities:

- Import and distribution of police and military tactical equipment
- Specialized training
- Protection of persons
- Security consultancy
- Development of special solutions for security forces

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San Sebastián de los Reyes, Madrid 28700
Telfs: (+34) 911 852 861 y (+34) 911 852 862
info@guardianspain.com,
www.guardianspain.com

Guardian Holdings LTD
29, Hacarmel Street Zur Igaal 44862 Israel
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ilan@guardianspain.com,
www.guardianspain.com
Guardian does not conceal its links with the Israeli security and defense. Quite the contrary, it uses them for publicity purposes. In fact, it is striking how much information the company includes in its website, an unusual practice in this sector, in particular for the Israeli industry. On the one hand, Guardian defends and uses the brand "Israel", promoting its products and services as "100 % made in Israel" [see attached picture taken from its website]. In its advertising for protection services, for example, it is stressed that all of the company's security agents have passed through "training courses, based on the methods of the Israeli security services". On the other hand, the company openly provides information on its services and even about its customers, which include a wide range of Spanish institutions. In the next picture, a screenshot of the Guardian website, several of these "customers" are shown. From left to right and from top to bottom, are the logos of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Tax Agency, the Spanish Army, the Royal Family, the Air Army, the Embassy of Israel, the Land Army, the Basque police, the Civil Guard, the Mossos d’ Esquadra, the Navarre Police and the National Police.

Guardian presents itself as the main supplier of Israeli manufactured defense and security products in Spain. On its website, one can also find a comprehensive list of companies which distribute such products in Spain. These companies are shown in the graph below.
5.2// MADE IN ISRAEL BRANDS AND PRODUCTS

Detailed below are the brands of made in Israel products which are offered and distributed in Spain. These products can be imported from Israel or manufactured in Spain with Israeli license. Many of them are "products which are already very well known by most professionals of the military and police sector."

**Rabintex Industries Ltd** is a leading company of the military and police sectors founded in 1950. It designs, manufactures and distributes ballistic and blast protection equipment, as well as solutions for mobility of combat vehicles. Its products are advertised as being combat tested: ballistic helmets, bulletproof vests, plates, shields, ballistic glasses, dry storage systems, etc. The company is publicly traded in Israel and the USA (RABN code). Its relevance for the Israeli market is notable. It is approved by the Israeli Ministry of Defense of Israel and supplies its products to more than 70 countries. Rabintex has been represented in Spain and Portugal by Guardian.

During the last six years, Rabintex has provided a variety of ballistic protection products in Spain, including flak jackets and helmets to the Civil Guard, bulletproof vests to the National Police, shatter-resistant vests to the Spanish Army and plenty of bulletproof jackets to local and autonomous police.

Rabintex Industries Ltd has supplied 12,324 external bulletproof vests by means of contract worth € 3.5 million to the Civil Guard. The level of protection of these vests is developed according to the requirements and technical specifications of the Weapons and Equipment Service of the Civil Guard.

Rabintex Industries Ltd también ha provided the Mossos d’Esquadra with “488 external bulletproof vests with IIIA protection level and Nomex III flame retardant outer sheath.” The intermediary company in the operation was Usis Guirao SL, authorized distributor of Guardian Ltd Israel.

**Meprolight** (thermal sight + signalling + optical products). This company is organized in three divisions: a) Tritium: it manufactures self-illuminated devices b) Optics - Scopes and optics, night vision and thermal imaging, and c) LED - signalling and marking devices. The company manufactures products for special operations.

www.meprolight.com

According to Guardian, SMART S is a life-size micro tactical training tool, which prepares and trains agents “for situations with high risk and stress, in a controlled environment, allowing for the assessment, analysis and monitoring of the agent’s training process. It is suitable for the different security forces, police, military and private security.” The system enables the projection of scenarios and videos with real life-size images and allows for the use of all types of handguns and rifles.
Source Military, founded 21 years ago, specializes in the production of professional equipment for defense and security forces and adventure sports. In Spain, it provides hydration backpacks, accessories, hydration systems, shared hydration systems (which allows soldiers to drink together). According to Guardian, its distributor in Spain, “Source hydration systems, designed and developed by former soldiers, are continuously tested on the battlefield.”

www.source-military.com

Israel Military Industries is a company which belonged until recently to the Israeli Ministry of Defense. It is a provider both to the Israeli security and defense forces and to other foreign armies, including the US, France and Spain. Established in 1933, IMI is a defense systems company specializing in the development, integration, manufacture and support of land, sea and air combat systems. Guardian, its distributor in Spain, stresses that IMI systems “are continually combat tested in the most extreme and harsh conditions, in areas in which the Israeli Army operates.”

In Spain, IMI offers, through Guardian, multi-purpose rifle systems and 40mm grenade launchers, in addition to ammunition for small arms. Among the features of the first, is the integration capacity “in any rifle that incorporates 40mm grenade launchers”, that they are “unique in their generation”, the significant increase in the probability of impact and the increased lethality using the “air-burst” mode. On the other hand, IMI’s light ammunition division, recognized as world leader in the sector, produces a variety of calibers of different versions such as 9mm, 5.56 mm., 7.62 and 12.70 mm (0.5”).

www.imi-israel.com

IMI Defense designs holsters for guns, pouches and shackles, in addition to other accessories. The holsters are developed in Israel to satisfy the elite units of the Israeli army, police forces and foreign armed forces. As highlighted, “IMI Defense combines knowledge from years of testing in combat experience.”

www.imidefense.com

Agilite is a company specialized in professional equipment products. It is based in Israel and was founded by members of the Israeli Special Forces and by veterans of the US Army, “with experience in advanced combat zones.” In fact, the products are “made in the US”, because although designed in Israel they are manufactured in the US. The company likes to emphasize the added value brought by the experience in combat of the Agilite design team. Of all the products manufactured by Agilite, the IPC (Injured Personnel Carrier) is considered a breakthrough as it allows to evacuate an injured person safely on the back by means of a harness, leaving both hands free to carry a weapon or even...
Agilite’s product catalogue is extensive.

In Spain, Agilite’s products are officially marketed by the Madrid-based company **Teyde Tecnología y Desarrollo**. Agilite offers harnesses, backpacks and plate carrier vests for different sectors. According to the company, the most sold product in Spain is the IPC (Injured Personnel Carrier), to the Spanish Armed Forces. It is stated that all material designed by Agilite forms part of the everyday equipment of the US and Israel armies.

**Dirección de Teyde. Tecnología y Desarrollo:**
Sofía de Grecia, 39, 28660 Boadilla del Monte (Madrid)
Telf: (+34) 91 351 90 99

**FAB-Defense** Tactical Equipment and Weapon Accessories is an Israeli company, known for supplying tactical equipment and accessories for weapons to the Israeli army and police. As stated on its corporate website, its R & D department works in collaboration with the Special Forces and SWAT teams worldwide to design products adapted to the “reality on the ground.”

FAB’s distributor in Spain is the company **SNV**, which distributes over 60 products of FAB Defense from Madrid. These products are well known in the military and police sectors. In fact, according to the representative of SNV, they always distribute their products to state security forces, and “in no case distribute to private security bodies.”

**Address of SNV:**
Jacinto Benavente, 12, Casa 20, 28230 Las Rozas - Madrid
Telf: (+34) 913 070 822; www.s-nv.es

It is an Israeli company founded to provide technological advances in ear protection, including both military and security sectors. The products are designed and manufactured in Israel, made of 100% silicone, meet the health and hygiene standards of the Israeli Ministry of Health and are authorized by the Spanish Ministry of Health. As stated by Guardian, its distributor in Spain, the products are “especially recommended for security staff, the military, the police, in shooting galleries, for hunters, etc.

www.heartech.co.il

Since 2000, Cupron has introduced products on the defense market aimed at improving the operability and comfort of agents, using copper oxide technology in items like socks. This anti-bacterial, thermal technology has beneficial properties for the skin. Since 2008, Cupron is the official supplier of socks for the Israeli army socks.

www.cupron.com
MTI Wireless Edge

In Israel:

**MTI Wireless Edge Ltd**
11 Hamelacha St, Afek Industrial Park
Rosh-Ha’Ayin, Israel 48091
Telf: (+972) (3) 9008900

MTI Wireless Edge is an Israeli company which has been working in military communications connectivity for over 35 years. It has operations in the US, Europe, Southeast Asia, Australia and, of course, Israel, and provides equipment and services to military forces, especially antenna systems.423

In Spain, its counterpart is Indra, but its products are marketed by a company called Landatel.424

In Spain:

**Landatel Comunicaciones**
Calle Aquisgrán, 2, 28232 Las Rozas (Madrid)
Telf: (+34) 911 461 700

Landatel Communications is a wholesaler specializing in professional Wireless solutions, with over 10 years of experience (the company was founded in 2002). Today, the company boasts over 15,000 users registered worldwide.425 It has an online B2B platform from which it markets its offer, including MTI products: 5 types of sectorial antennas, 2 types of omnidirectional antennas, 4 types of directional antennas and 3 types of enclosure antennas.426 The Landatel product catalogue “includes wireless solutions (internal and external), antennas and accessories, hotspots, advanced network solutions (routers, firewalls), video surveillance systems and IP telephony”.

5.3// OTHER DISTRIBUTOR COMPANIES IN SPAIN

**Nidec Defense Spain**
C/ Zamora, 68, 08018 Barcelona
(Zona 22@, Poble Nou)
Telf: (+34) 933 016 776

According to the company, Nidec vests are designed in Spain and manufactured in Israel by Hagor Industries, Ltd.429 They have a double certification: from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) of the US (issued by the HP White Laboratory, in Washington), and also from FMS Israel, a ballistic testing laboratory.430 The anti-stab tests in Spain are certified in the laboratory AITEX Alcoy (Alicante).431 Nidec vests are sold in Spain, Andorra, Italy, France, Germany, Switzerland and England.432

In Spain, the vests were officially acquired by the **Provincial Police of Navarra**, the **SICG (the Information Service of the Civil Guard)**, and various local police, such as that of **Lleida, Badalona** (Barcelona) or **Parla** (Madrid). Nidec claims to have more than 200 distributors, supplying its vest to “thousands” of local police, in addition to many other clients who acquire it “privately”. Nidec claims that it is no coincidence that “there are over 10,000 Nidec vests” on the Spanish market.433 Nidec vests are also used by the Moroccan Royal Guard.434 Although this state has better relations with Israel than other Arab states, the use of these vests is perceived by a significant part of its population as wrong.
Nidec Defense Group is also the distributor in Spain of the Israeli “Bul” guns. Bul is an Israeli company based in Tel Aviv, which has been on the market for only two decades and that has specialized in the design of 1911 type pistols. Despite originating in the sports sector, Bul has shifted toward the military and security sector. Both the Bul Cherokee (see photo) and the Bul M-5 (designed more for sports shooting435) are on sale at the Nidec armory.436

5.4// OTHER SECURITY EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTED IN (OR BY) SPAIN

Truck with water cannon for the Catalan anti-riot police

In June 2013, the Director General of the Catalan Police, Manel Prat, announced to the Catalan Parliament the commissioning of a truck with a water cannon to be used in demonstrations or other occasions, for example, “as a deterrent in celebrations at the [fountain of] Canaletes”.437 The truck, a 1750 Mercedes Unimog, weighing over six tons, has a water reservoir and a cannon for projecting water with pressure against groups of protesters. The truck had been bought from the Israeli army 19 years ago and had never been used. Prat acknowledged that the water cannon can be as harmful as other dispersion methods used by the Massos d’Esquadra, the Catalan police.438
Exports to the Palestinian National Authority

Spain has not officially exported defense equipment to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). However, its contribution with regards to security has been significant. In 2005, was documented a Spanish export to the PNA, of two anti-riot trucks equipped with water cannons. As detailed in the official report of exports of the Secretary of State of Commerce corresponding to 2005:

“As regards to the so-called “Other Material”, exports totaled € 1.4 million, taking into account as destinations only the PNA (1.1 million, 78.7 %) [...] That exported to the PNA consisted of two anti-riot trucks with water cannons for the Police” (p.9)

As stated in the same report on exports (p.42), treated with a single license to the PNA worth € 1,081,152, the trucks were authorized and exported in the year 2005.

However, J. Cierco claimed to ABC in 2005 that this was not the only Spanish transfer:

“Madrid has provided the police of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) 100 patrol vehicles, 50 motorcycles, a wide range of materials for the riot police, 4 buses, 8 vans, 2 trucks equipped with water cannons … All for a total of € 10 million. Spain is the country which has allocated the largest budget in the world to this issue.”
In keeping with the global privatization trends that characterize neoliberal capitalism, security has been transformed into a privilege which can be bought and sold, an object which follows the laws of supply and demand. It is a perverse business, because it bases its benefit precisely on insecurity.

Spain is turning into a sort of haven for private security. There are at least three examples which we can use to justify this statement: first, the “revolving door” between public and private structures allow some people to implement, during their time in the public sphere, some of the measures that will bring revenues in a future golden season in the private sector. In Spain, he who best represents this figure is probably the Defense Minister, Pedro Morenés. But there are also many personalities with strong links to the area of the Israeli defense and security sector which benefit from this influence. This is by no means a Spanish peculiarity. However, Spain cannot be said to be an example of best practices in the fields of security and defense.

A second aspect is the carte blanche given to the private security sector in Spain, something which has been widely supported by the institutions. There have been continuous attempts to privatize security components. A paradigmatic case is that of prisons (see section below). For example, the Ministry of Interior in Spain ordered the celebration of the “Private Security Day”, set for May 21 of each year. During this event, the Ministry pledged to develop “actions that contribute to recognizing the importance of private security in the Spanish society.”

Finally, it should be emphasized that Israeli companies are highly regarded in Spain, as in many other countries, with respect to the fields of security and defense. Israel’s reputation and prestige are based on its practical experience. For decades, it has been exporting this experience, obtained in the armed conflict in the occupied Palestinian Territories and the Middle East region. Many experts of this sector believe that no other country can teach you what Israel does. “Made in Israel” protection services have indeed been employed by some of the most important Spanish institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Prime Minister, the Tax Agency, the Spanish Navy, the Royal House, the Air Army, the Embassy of Israel, the Land Army, the Civil Guard, the Mossos d’ Esquadra, the Navarre Police and the National Police. It is conspicuous that private agents have been called to protect government and institutional representatives instead of public security state bodies.

6.2 INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS ON TARGETED SECURITY (ICTS) 

Two decades ago, ICTS began applying the security system used in Israeli airports to analyze and determine the degree of risk for each passenger, based on a number of criterions such as age, name, origin and behavior during questioning. Thus, the company has developed a system called APS (Advanced Passenger Screening). As mentioned on the ICTS website, most major US airlines use this
ICTS is an Israeli company founded in 1982 by former members of the Shin Bet, the Israeli security agency, and by security agents of El Al, the main Israeli airline. The company is currently based in the Netherlands. It is listed on Wall Street, but is controlled by Menachem Atzmon, board chairman of the firm since 2004. Its services include aviation security, airport controls, X-ray detection, control of travel documents and so on. It is also active in the field of private and public transport. The group employs about 1,300 people. ICTS International or its subsidiaries I-SEC International Security BV (I-SEC) and Pro-Check International (PI), provide aviation security services to 11 countries: Germany, Belgium, France, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, UK, Romania, Russia and Spain. I-SEC was created in 2005 as a branch of ICTS International, responsible for security in the aviation sector. PI (Pro-Check International), on the other hand, provides consulting, education, training, inspection and monitoring to airports and is the “favorite” supplier of some of the most important airlines in the world, such as Air Canada, Delta/Northwest Airlines, KLM, United Airlines and US Airways. In addition, PI has provided security services outside the field of aviation, including the car rental sector, the Dutch government, the retail sector and public transport.

The framework of ICTS is complex and confusing. Despite the coincidence in names, not all of the ICTS operating today in Spain belongs to the same group, and not all of the network has Israeli interests, so that one part does not correspond to the scope of this study. In the scheme below, only the upper branch is of interest for this report:

The scheme shown below, only the upper branch of interest to this publication:
Summary of services provided in Spain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>RELATION WITH ISRAEL</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF SERVICES IN SPAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-SEC</td>
<td>Israeli company founded in 2005 by former members of the state defense and security apparatus. Present in 11 countries.</td>
<td>Security at the airport of El Prat (Barcelona) of various airlines, including Continental Airlines, PIA Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Qatar Airlines, and Emirates Airlines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Check Internation</td>
<td>Israeli company founded by former members of the state defense and security apparatus</td>
<td>Since 6 June 2009, I-SEC also provides security services in the Valencia airport to a large US airline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTS Hispania</td>
<td>Of Israeli origin, but without official connections to Israel since 2002</td>
<td>Wide range of services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chronology of ICTS in Spain**

ICTS operates in Spain since approximately 1987, initially without government permission and without complying with current legislation. Thus, ICTS used the legal cover provided by a company linked to the Jacques Hachuel financial group, founded in November 1987 with the name H Security.

In 1999, a request was forwarded to the Directorate General of Foreign Transactions, to authorize the purchase of 51% of the stock in H Security by the Israeli company ICTS. The Ministry of Finance granted the petition in 15 days, on 17 April 1989. It did however place limitations to foreign intervention in national defense related activities. ICTS supposedly considered these legal activities to be too restricted and did not use the permit for foreign investment. H Security continued to operate as if it were a completely Spanish company, although Israeli involvement was significant and included David Ronen, Amir and Moshe Lan Eshet, among others.

Police opened an investigation against ICTS for “several irregularities”, in order to control the actual operations of these firms. Police forces investigated ICTS Security and H, both for administrative and counterintelligence reasons. Orders for the research were issued by the general manager of the Police, apparently under government initiative. The financial battle fought around the fusion of Banesto [one of ICTS’ clients] and the Central Bank contributed to the tensions. By then, the contracts for which ICTS was competing in Spain reached “several million dollars”.

H Security had four people on its board of directors [since the company was founded on 5 November 1987]. Three of these people were the owners of the entire share capital, set at € 10 million, divided into 10,000 shares. These three legal owners were: the president, Ignacio Lopez de Hierro [who in 2009 married the General Secretary of the PP, María Dolores de Cospedal], Carlos Fanjul [vicepresident], and Luis Lizariturry [member of the board of directors]. All of them had held executive positions in the milieu of the Hachuel group. The fourth member of the board was the secretary, the lawyer Coloma Armero. All of the members of the Council resigned on 2 August 1989, and all of the shares of H Security were deposited in the law firm of Jorge Trias Sagnier, who acted as trustee while the problems were being dealt with. Trias Sagnier then worked as a lawyer for the
Embassy of Israel and ICTS, and was later known for his membership in the Popular Party (he was a deputy) and his alleged involvement in the “Gürtel case” and the illegal financing of the PP. Trias Sagnier processed a name change for H Security, which was renamed ICTS Hispania. At that time, ICTS had several branches in Europe, qualified in some cases of “semi-clandestine”, since many of its offices were simple mailboxes or mere contact addresses.

ICTS started its activities in the US in the field of aviation safety, with clients such as TWA, American Airlines or Pan Am. In Spain, it obtained very profitable contracts thanks to some notable clients: the Banco Español de Crédito (Banesto - Jacques Hachuel was the largest shareholder and owner of H Capital), and in particular, its president, Mario Conde (his personal protection was directly entrusted to the Israelis, who selected and trained the necessary personnel), the British real estate Heron (then owner of the Sherry towers, and Makro stores); and security services of the warehouses Celso Garcia and airline company Alfa Jet Charter (dedicated to the private transport of executives), while these companies were in the area of influence of Jacques Hachuel. The Israelis were also responsible for Hachuel’s security, both with regards to his companies and his personal protection. ICTS was one of the candidate companies to compete for the provision of security services at the Olympic Games in Barcelona and the Seville Expo, both in 1992.

Moshe Lan, executive vice president of ICTS, and founder of the company’s business in Spain, claimed in an interview that he considered “unfair” that is company be related to the Mossad. He acknowledged that ICTS began operating in Spain before H Security was created, and confessed that “it is true that we are all former security officials of the Israeli government, but everyone is ex in this country”, “in Israel, almost everyone has been an Army officer”. The list of employees, in addition to Lan (former head of security in New York), include David Ronen (former head of Israel’s security in the US and Israel’s official representative on the security committee of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles), and Bacharach (former member of the security team of the Israeli airline “El Al” in London), Bar Leuf (the Israeli chief of police) and Tarki (his deputy), were also involved with ICTS. As Lan puts it, “we search for the best”. Lan admitted to have met Prosegur, Processes and Falcon in Spain, among others, and denied, as it was rumored, that ICTS belonged to the arms dealer Jacob Nimrodi.

ICTS and H Security were not the only security companies investigated by the police at the time. Another closure of file was also opened on another Israeli security company called Mydas, chaired by the broker Mauricio Hatchwell. Mydas was created in 1985, and shortly thereafter was acquired by Hatchwell and the Israelis. The proposed closure was officially due to a lack of activity and means to accomplish the objectives that had been authorized.

ICTS International: an efficient company?

ICTS became famous as the security company which allowed the Nigerian citizen, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to board the plane bound for Detroit (Flight 253 of Northwest Airlines). Abdulmutallab allegedly tried, without success, to detonate a powerful explosive on Christmas day of 2009. Both ICTS and the security company G4S blamed one another for the failure, as did the Schiphol airport (Amsterdam), the Federal Aviation Authority and the US secret services. As far as ICTS is concerned, the companies involved in the accident were its subsidiaries I-SEC and PI (Pro-Check International).
ICTS used the aforementioned risk identification system, based on the passenger’s profile. According to the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*, the ICTS supervisor should have applied the protocol which would have prevented Abdulmutallab, on suspicion, to board the plane due to certain criteria such as age, name, illogical travel route, expensive ticket and purchased at the last minute, and no luggage. This meaning that: a young citizen of Nigeria flying to the USA with an expensive ticket and only one suitcase, for a trip via Amsterdam, decided at the last moment, is by definition (or probability), suspected of terrorism. Note that the last four criteria often apply, for example, to European entrepreneurs. The supervisor spoke of “many other clues”, but neither *Haaretz* nor other media consulted specified which. It was also mentioned that insufficient attention was given to the information provided by the secret services “on the ideological radicalization of the suspect”, although this is issue remains unclear.

**Subsidiaries of ICTS: Demco and Huntleigh**

Demco Group - Emergency and Security Solutions is a company specializing in systems development and security consulting, founded in 1982. It’s members are former military officers and Israeli security agents “who benefit from an experience in emergency preparedness, preparation of operating procedures and planning and execution of exercises at a national or local level”, to deal with situations such as “threats to national security, including conventional or unconventional terrorist attacks, low-intensity conflicts, natural disasters and crisis situations”. It also provides psychosocial support and stress management. It offers its services to government ministerial agencies, regional or local authorities, police and judicial bodies, private corporations and multinationals, civil protection and rescue forces, medical institutions and local communities.

In 1999, ICTS International N.V. acquired Huntleigh Corporation, then the fifth largest provider of airline passenger screening in the USA. Based in St. Louis, Huntleigh operates in 31 USA airports, including most of the international ones. Its services include: “security agents, monitoring the security of charter flights, airport porters and wheelchair services, baggage handling, aircraft cleaning, queues monitors, concierge services, guards, ramp agents, passenger service, luggage service, crew transport, X-ray scanning of luggage, aircraft search, security control of sellers, and more”. Huntleigh was in charge of security at the Logan International Airport in Boston on September 11, 2001, when the two planes crashed into the twin towers in New York.

**About ICTS Europe**

According to its website, ICTS Europe has its origins in ICTS International. In 1999, ICTS Europe was incorporated as a separate company, until it became one of the key aviation security companies. In 2002, ICTS Europe was acquired by Fraport, the owner and operator of Frankfurt Airport. Since then, although the company was allowed to retain its name, ICTS Europe is not a member of ICTS International N.V. and indeed, as emphasized on its website, the two companies have no business relation. ICTS Europe has expanded both in number of customers and geographical coverage (it is present in Europe, Africa, Asia and Middle East), while it has extended its services, to include maritime services, critical infrastructure, and corporate security. In 2008, ICTS Europe was acquired by Management and Deutsche Beteiligungs AG (DBAG), another leading Germany-based company. Today ICTS Europe has offices in over 80 locations across 22 countries. ICTS Europe operates in Spain through its 100% subsidiary ICTS Hispania SA, established in 1995 (when it was still Israeli).
ICTS Hispania is headquartered in Madrid, with additional operational centers in Barcelona, Malaga and Alicante. Some of the services provided by ICTS Hispania are: for airlines, improved passenger security, integrated check-in services, security interviews, verification of travel documents, aircraft inspection, passengers boarding control, catering security, cargo security and training. Some of the security services offered to private clients and government officials are: “VIP custody”, 24-hour access control, monitoring and caching of workers, video surveillance and closed TV and training circuits. The list of clients of ICTS Europe seems endless and includes the Israeli Embassy in Madrid and the Israeli airline “El Al”.479

6.3// INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DEFENSE SYSTEMS (ISDS) AND CATALONIA

ISDS is an Israeli security company, involved in “dirty war” operations in Central America, which has benefited from major contracts in Catalonia. It was founded by the Coronel in reserve Leo Gleser, of Argentinian and Israeli nationality.

A horror story in Central America

As reported by journalist Victor Cygielman, ISDS, specializing in protection, security guards and combat training, provided instructors to the Government of El Salvador, to create special units to fight against leftist guerrillas. Such activities were supposedly authorized by the competent Israeli authorities. In 1982-83, ISDS began training foreigners (including Spanish, Belgian and American citizens), in a special school near Caesarea, on the coast of Israel, about an hour away from Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, it also provided protection to some airlines and personalities in Latin America. During the time in which SDS worked with the Government of El Salvador, it had its offices at the Sheraton hotel in San Salvador. Moreover, in 1988 Israel supposedly sold significant quantities of military equipment to the Salvadoran government.480

In 1981, Gleser was hired by Gerard Lachtanian, an Armenian arms dealer, to work in Honduras. According to Lachtanian, between 1981 and 1984, ISDS trained in Honduras both the personal bodyguard of President Roberto Suazo Córdova, and the men of General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, chief of the Armed Forces and promoter of the dirty war against the leftist Honduran parties. During this war, at least 250 people were killed or disappeared. General Walter López Reyes, who succeeded Alvarez after the coup that overthrew Suazo in 1984, claimed that ISDS had trained the Nicaraguan Contras in the base of Tamara, near Tegucigalpa. ISDS did not operate only in Honduras and El Salvador. According to journalists Peru Egurbide and Ferran Sales, the company was active also in Mexico, Peru, Guatemala and Ecuador, during the last stage of León Febres Cordero’s presidency. In a program for "special forces units " distributed by ISDS in Latin America, the Israeli company offered courses in "selective terror", along with other “urban antiterror combat” or “intelligence and counterintelligence”.481

ISDS in Spain

According to journalists of El País, ISDS operated illegally in Spain from September 1986 to 28 July 1989, when the Ministry of Interior authorized its activities.482 The company was illegal both when it operated through Servicios Técnicos Bilan (the company’s first name) and during the first year of
ISDS Ibérica (a surrogate of Bilan, founded on 29 July 1988). One of the underlying problems was how to use a Spanish security company as an intermediary for another Israeli company that was not domiciled in Spain. However, the company managed to receive public and private contracts and operated illegally through other enterprises. Several irregularities were also noted during its start-up period, especially in the services provided to the Department of Agriculture of the Generalitat.483

In the beginning, ISDS Ltd. operated in Spain through Bilan Technical Services, a company created and run by persons close to Josep Maria Figueras.484 Bilan was a holding company, and did not have authorization from the Ministry to work in the security field. The Israeli citizen Abraham Arad, was the first representative of ISDS Ltd. in Bilan (empowered on September 30, 1986). Some months later the representation of ISDS Ltd. in Bilan went to the Argentinian Norberto Ricardo Guelman (empowered on September 30, 1987)485. Problems between Guelman and the Italian Giacomo Ventura Bassat, president of the Catalonia–Israel Chamber of Commerce and manager of Bilan Technical Services, led to the cessation of activities of ISDS Ltd. through this company.486 [See at the end of this section Giacomo Ventura’s involvement in the security of the Barcelona Games in 1992].

On July 29, 1988, people of the Folchi family milieu founded in Barcelona ISDS Ibérica, a company which Guelman joined from the outset, as representative of ISDS Ltd. for Spain (he was the first manager). They did it through General Investments SA, and ISDS Ibérica was founded with 15 million pesetas.487 The three brothers involved in this operation were Juan José,488 Inmaculada489 and Carlos490 Folchi Bonafonte.

On 8 April 1988, Juan José Folchi Bonafonte appointed, as sole director of General Investments SA, his sister Immaculada, who held this role until September 14, 1988. After only two months of ISDS Ibérica being founded, Immaculada was designated as Secretary General of the Department of Interior of the Generalitat. Her brother Carlos491 took over her position of sole administrator of General Investments. Since 2 December 1988, Carlos has been the only person in charge of ISDS Ibérica.492 After the Folchi family, management of the company went to Giacomo Ventura.493

Juan José Folchi personally managed from Israel the partnership of his security company, ISDI Ibérica, with ISDS Ltd. He traveled to Tel Aviv in July 1988, on the same date in which ISDS Ibérica was created in Barcelona, to learn about the characteristics of ISDS Ltd and meet its president, Leo Gleser. It is interesting to note how Folchi referred to the controversy provoked by Gleser: “We are not in the least interested in arms or armed training. What interests us is ISDS’s experience in the field of safety engineering, and Gleser himself showed me two jobs in his company”. Five months later, on 8 December 1988, Leo Gleser and Juan José Folchi signed a contract in Barcelona by which ISDS Ltd. handed over to ISDS Ibérica its exclusive representation in Spain for five years. Thus, ISDS Ibérica often called Israeli technicians to carry out the projects contracted in Spain (e.g. for the courses of ISDS Ibérica to the forest guards of the Generalitat—see below).494

**ISDS and its business with the Generalitat of Catalonia and the Pujol family**

The relationship of the Catalan government with ISDS goes back to 1986 and lasted at least until the mid 90s.406 During the period in which ISDS relied on Bilan, it drafted a security report for the Olympic Office Barcelona 92, which then represented the candidacy of the Catalan capital, and
established contacts with the Feria de Barcelona, whose executive committee was chaired at the time by Josep Maria Figueras. The conflict of interest is noteworthy and significant.

The departments of: Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries; Industry; Trade and Tourism; the General Directorate of Public Security and the Autonomous Entity for Gambling and Betting, are the departments of the Generalitat that are mentioned in a long list of customers which ISDS Ibérica presented before the security division of the Barcelona 92 Olympic Organizing Committee (COOB ‘92). ISDS Ibérica signed with the Generalitat an emergency plan for the Palau Robert (in the Paseo de Gràcia), which houses offices of the Departments of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce.

ISDS’ relations with the autonomous administration were channeled mainly through the Department of Agriculture, led the by Josep Miró i Ardèvol, who “stood out in the Generalitat for his relations with Israel.” It should be highlighted that his wife was Inmaculada Folchi, member of ISDS Ibérica, and Secretary General, i.e, the second most important person in the Department of the Generalitat. She was also senior officer of the Catalan Parliament, the highest senior management role of the institution. Once more, the conflict of interest is notable.

In 1989, ISDS Ibérica delivered a command course to the heads of regions of the Rural Agents Services (personally promoted by Miró i Ardèvol in the political program called Foc Verd) and requested the implementation of a comprehensive security plan for the Torreferrusa building, headquarters of the Directorate General of Forest Policy. It was a parapolice organization. ISDS Ibérica also offered security equipment, such as closed-circuit television surveillance and an access control system working with a proximity card, as well as alarm systems, for an estimated total value of 3,369,346 pesetas. The Department of Agriculture acquired from ISDS Ibérica satellite navigation equipment via Raytheon GPS and a Dark Invader night vision camera, which it paid for in September 1989 a total of 2,579,444 pesetas. There were at least three major irregularities in these contracts. Firstly, ISDS Ibérica performed all of these services without being legalized. Second, in awarding the security plan of the Torreferrusa building: on 24 February 1988, ISDS Ibérica presented the CEO of Forest Policy, Víctor Compte i Solé, an offer with a budget of 504,000 pesetas. On May 29, the Directorate General of Forest Policy convened a contest with a specification whose wording was identical to the ISDS Ibérica offer, but with a higher budget: 571,200 pesetas. Thirdly, Joan Saura, spokesman of Iniciativa per Catalunya, deemed “inconceivable” that the Generalitat violate the law which stated that the Police School of Catalonia was responsible for training the rural agents.

The relationship between a part of the Jordi Pujol family and the private Israeli security forces is well known. ISDS supposedly provided the Pujol family with espionage and counter-surveillance services. In 1992, Pujol and some of his children were investigated by the Spanish secret service (now CNI, then CESID). Josep Peris, then head of the Massos d’Esquadra and former commander of the Air Army, collected data concerning conversations between Jordi Pujol Ferrusola and Javier de la Rosa. ISDS installed the electronic systems that blocked the bugging of the telephone lines of the Palau de la Generalitat.

Contracts with Telefónica

In the case of the Palau Robert, seat of three departments of the Generalitat, ISDS Ibérica only
contracted that particular plan with the Catalan Government. However, ISDS subcontracted Tepesa to do the work, a company belonging to the Telefónica Group, which charged ISDS Ibérica 925,000 pesetas.508

Already in the Bilan period, Abraham Arad, the first Israeli that ISDS Ltd. placed in the company, had collaborated closely with Tepesa.509 then led by Luis Solana.510 The result of these contacts was the training of Solana’s three bodyguards, who were sent to Israel to follow, during several weeks, a training course organized by ISDS.511

ISDS Ltd. recognizes having as customers Repsol YPF, Banco Santander, the Port of Barcelona, Corte Inglés, Galerías Preciados, Telefónica and the Olympic Games of Barcelona 92. And exceedingly concerns that the Israeli know-how and experience have trained, according ISDS, the Special Operations Groups (GEO) and the elite unit of the Spanish National Police.512

As is highlighted in their web, ISDS was the private security company contracted for the visit of Barça to Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories in August 2013.

Statement by Giacomo Ventura, president of the Spain-Israel Chamber of Commerce, regarding his participation in the safety of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona.

J. Playà: “less known is his involvement in the 1992 Games”

Giacomo Ventura: “Since it was carried out with the utmost confidentiality and anonymity, we helped Barcelona win the nomination in a key meeting of the COI in New York. We achieved, with the collaboration of the Jewish community of this city, that the mayor Koch, also Jewish, support Barcelona. Later I held a meeting with the President of France, François Mitterand, to obtain his support regarding security. And finally I worked for two years with a team that drafted the preliminary safety plan, concerning prevention and counterterrorism. I collaborated with 38 Israeli elite technicians, security experts and military reservists. We spent nearly two years in an office in the attic of a known city building without anyone knowing. The security plan included everything from actions to avoid the placement a bomb on docks, to systems to prevent water pollution or a software to regulate traffic lights and in case of a disaster, create car-free spaces in which improvised helicopter landings could take place by means of heliports in the street. We even drafted, with the aid of psychologists, Maragall’s speech on security, with the questions that the COI could ask and the answers to be given. Twenty years later this can be told to the public.”513

6.4// BLUE SKY INTERNATIONAL (BSI): PRIVATE ISRAELI SECURITY FOR BARÇA

During Joan Laporta’s presidency, FC Barcelona supposedly commissioned some of its security services to the company Blue Sky International (BSI).514 Upon Laporta’s proposal, the Barça board decided that BSI conduct a safety audit and it become in charge of the security of the club and of its President. Laporta had formerly argued before the board that he was a “target of international terrorism” “objetivo del terrorismo internacional” como consecuencia de su cargo. Cuando fue requerido sobre la
terrorism”. When interrogated on such a statement, he confessed after some reluctance that it had been BSI who had warned him of this possibility. Camp Nou sources reported that “the corridors were suddenly filled with tall guys in suits and earpieces”. They spoke mostly in English and some had difficulty expressing themselves in Spanish.

BSI was founded by Arnon Milchan, a very influential Israeli and one of the most important Hollywood producers of the past two decades. Forbes magazine has ranked Milchan as the twenty-fourth richest man in the world. During the Six-Day War, he served as a contact person in Jerusalem and thereafter he acted as an intermediary between the defense industries in Israel and the US, including companies such as Raytheon and Hawker Beechcraft, and trading Hawk and Patriot missile systems. He was also involved in a scandal in South Africa, where a campaign that he had participated in diverted funds to suppress the political opposition in the country. In the early 80s, Milchan was involved in another scandal, when his firm, Heli Trading Company, signed an agreement with Milco International Incorporated for the purchase of kryptons, i.e. devices used as triggers for nuclear weapons. Milco was owned by Richard Kelly Smith, who was accused of espionage, as more than 800 of these devices ended up in the hands of the Israeli government. Shimon Peres, said about him: “I have refrained from recommending even a single individual due to our high honor in defense-related issues”, “but undoubtedly Milchan is worthy of this recognition.

At the end of 2008, after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Milchan founded the company BSI, which began serving Nusserwanji Jamsetji Tata, owner of the Indian automotive company and of the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, involved in the attacks. Operating in BSI are people related to the world of finances, to the office of the Prime Minister, the security agency and the Israeli army. Thus, the chief of operations of BSI is Fishbain Aviv, a former agent of the Operations Division of the Israeli Security Agency (AIS) and brigade commander. The senior vice president of business development is Mena Bacharach, National Security Director and vice president of the Public Committee of Aerospace Defense, or Itzhak Barlev, Deputy Commander of a special anti-terrorist unit and general manager of the DAT (Antiterrorism Defense) and consultant to various armies.

Laporta supposedly payed € 30,000 a month to a company based in Switzerland to ensure his safety and that of the club. Thus, the FC Barcelona payed this company € 360,000 per year (almost € 1,000 a day) to ensure the safety of Laporta and verify all aspects of the club’s safety. The club subsequently decided to guarantee Laporta’s security even when he had ceased to hold office. Until then, the security of the President of the club had been entrusted to Cybex, a Barcelona company of the group Intelligence Bureau, owned by Juan de la Torre. Threats against the President were related at the time, to the most radical factions of Boixos Nois, who Laporta had had a confrontation with. An informer related to Barça claimed that Cybex had a contract with the club and that he worked until 2008, shortly after the replacement of Frade Elijah by Xavier Martorell as head of security of the institution. Martorell had been CEO of the Massos d’ Esquadra in the governments of Jordi Pujol.
6.5// THE PRIVATIZATION OF PENITENTIARIES

In May 2012, the Congressional Interior Committee urged the Government to grant private-sector security personnel authorization to take over the functions of access control and surveillance through CCTV, also in the external security perimeter of penitentiaries (under the supervision of public security personnel). The initiative, put forward by Convergència i Unió (CiU), requested that this proposal be included in the reform of the Private Security Law. An agreement was reached between the PP deputy, Conrado Escobar, and Feliu Guillaume of CiU, who argued that cutbacks in expenditure required “making efforts to rationalize” public services. The PP and CiU voted in favor, while the PSOE against it, arguing that it was “obvious” that private security companies were being favoured “at the expense” of the public service. It also claimed that members of the private security sector were “not properly trained” and that inverting this situation would “cost money”. The PP and PSOE also agreed to reform the Private Security Law of 1992, to enhance coordination between public and private security sectors, and with the autonomous regions.520

These and other initiatives are already benefiting Israeli companies. Israel has made clear its interest in the Spanish prison system, especially women’s penitentiaries.521

**Pujol and the made in Israel companies for the Catalan penitentiaries**

Felix Martinez and Jordi Oliveres claim that the relationship between Jordi Pujol and private Israeli security companies is influenced by Moses David Tennembaum, a militant Zionist and “his father’s partner in most of his business adventures.”520 Moisés David Tennembaum and Ruth Kischner, a Polish couple living in Barcelona since 1940, were involved in various businesses with Florenci Pujol, including Banca Catalana. His son, Marcos David Tennembaum Kischner, was supposedly awarded several “handpicked” contracts by the Generalitat in the first half of the 90s, mostly from the Justice Ministry, but also from Presidency and Administration. These contracts were the subject of investigations by Carlos Jimenez Villarejo, chief prosecutor of the Court of Barcelona (1987-1995) and head of the Anti-Corruption prosecutor office (1995-2003), to verify if the relationship between Tennembaum Pujol could have been influential.523

Tennembaum and an Israeli partner, Sanson Batsri, founded Tenba TB in 1991, specializing in private security. The capital of the company was 500,000 pesetas. For three years, the company did not register any activities. Then, in 1994, the Justice Department awarded it three successive contracts, for over 500 million pesetas, for the installation of the new penitentiary security system of Lleida. Citing security reasons, the department did not call any tender nor request concurrence of bids, but rather awarded the project directly to Tennembaum. Also, this contract was not published in the Official Gazette of the Generalitat of Catalonia (DOCG), until two years later, on 1 March 1996, when the system was already installed and running. Subsequently, Tenba TB was outlawed by order of the Director General of Police because of the irregularities detected after the entry into force of Private Security Law. By then, Tennembaum had founded Vanuatu SL and, despite not having proper authorization as a security company, he allegedly billed the departments of Justice and Interior, and the Presidency of the Generalitat.524

Tenba TB has not been the only Israeli security company to have worked in Catalan prisons. The
Generalitat of Catalonia paid ten million pesetas in 1993 to the Israeli company Hancal System Engineering to conduct a study on safety deficiencies in the Ponent prison in Lleida. According to the statements of the then Minister of Justice, Antoni Isac, delivered in the sessions of the Catalan Parliament and collected in the official Gazette:

“Hancal divides the implementation phase in three steps: a preliminary draft, which is what has been evaluated by the Government of Catalonia; a second phase, which cost us ten thousand pesetas...and a development phase, which cost us fifteen million pesetas, and corresponds to the project, once it has been executed. At the moment, Hancal is working on the implementation of this project, which means that, in theory, this company will be in charge of executing on its behalf effective security measures for the Ponent penitentiary. This phase has a cost of fifteen million pesetas, and once it is finished, and it still isn’t... the company gives us twenty-four to execute the project, that is if we can reach an agreement with the Municipality of Lleida...which we can... the agreement is already negotiated with the mayor of Lleida, the actions that are needed to make the peripheral closures —I don’t know, a wall or a fence, to close all of the security mechanism, which involve these new measures of the Ponent penitentiary.”

Hancal System Engineering was established by the Israeli Ministry of Defense in 1963. It specializes in planning and implementation of multidisciplinary engineering projects, including: management, control and communication; security systems, research on military operations, war simulators, war systems analysis, project management or special electromechanical equipment. It has heavy ammunition divisions (involved in the manufacture process) and ground systems (specialized in development, integration and production of “combat tested systems”). Customers include the Israel Defense Forces, private companies, government authorities and other groups worldwide.  

IMI sold Hancal System Engineering to Orantech Management Systems for 3.8 million shekels (now about €800,000) in cash, undertaking the commitment to pay retirement benefits and worker’s pensions. Orantech manages projects in Israel and its clients include defense contractors.
Catalan Police (Mossos d’Esquadra) in a protest in Barcelona
Photo: Jordi Borras
TRAINING: ISRAEL TEACHES US

7.1 ISRAEL’S ADDED VALUE

When it comes to the defense and security sectors, Israel is a prestigious brand. In fact, Israel is considered to be the most militarized country in the world, which in terms of security has a lot more to offer Spain than the other way around. Israel provides and sells and Spain buys and uses. Spain has also organized trainings which have benefited Israel. An example is the first course of Cybercrime in the framework of public and private security, organized in Palencia in mid-2012 by the Spanish National Police, in coordination with the TEDAE association, in which Israeli policemen participated as students. However, normally it is Israel who is the teacher and this is considered to have an added value mainly because of three factors:

a) Combat tested experience. Courses are advertised as made in Israel and as having a strong practical focus. Many instructors have previously worked in the army, the police, intelligence agencies and the Israeli special services, something which is publicized as an added-value for the training.

b) The conditions and training facilities. Conditions in Israel are more permissive than in Spain (see table below).

c) Israel as a trademark. The Israeli brand is perceived in the security sector as synonymous of avantgarde and highly innovative in terms of the technology employed. Combat experience and intelligence operations are boasted rather than kept hidden.

Israel as a trademark

The governments of Israel and Spain agreed to work together in the application of Israeli port technology in Spain. The Spanish Minister for Public Works, Ana Pastor, visited the famous Israeli port of Ashdod in December 2012, after a similar visit to Spain of the Israeli Transportation Minister, Yisrael Katz. The security system to access this port is considered the most advanced in the world and includes several algorithms of container identification, in addition to biometric systems. Pastor expressed her intention to set up special teams to learn, and eventually implement, the Israeli security protocols and technologies. On the other hand, the President of the Board of Directors of the Port of Ashdod, Gideon Siterman, claimed that he hoped that “collaboration with the ports of Spain would promote the development of strategic projects that would help confirm the Port of Ashdod’s status as leader of ports in the Middle East.”

Comparative of the training conditions in Spain

Training conditions are very different in Spain and Israel, and the security sector usually views the latter as more appealing. Indeed, the Spanish equivalent would be training provided to the special units. Thus, in Israel anyone can benefit of conditions that in Spain are reserved for elite troops. In Spain, for security reasons, police and military forces can not shoot in a group, with several participants shooting at the same time. Shooters must remain in a static position, in front of a concrete wall or embankment, and they are placed in small concrete houses, all lined up and 2.5 m apart from one
another. The Civil Guard, in theory, can only shoot 25 shots every six months, while individuals may shoot one hundred cartridges per year and an unlimited number of shots with a type F license, but always in a shooting gallery. The Civil Guard can only use the service weapon (a HK G36 rifle or a Bereta pistol), while the legal weapons available on the Spanish market should not have burst capacity and the charger should be limited to 4 cartridges.

Special units can train in (almost) all kinds of scenarios and conditions (movement, group, etc.), and there are no limitations concerning the number of shots or the type of weapon used. Like in Israel, where there are no general restrictions and trainings are also carried out during the infamous night raids. In Israel, participants in courses “can shoot up to 2500 cartridges in 15 days. In Spain, by law, only 75 per year are permitted.” Tavor, the service weapon of the Israeli army, manufactured by IWI, can also be used. It is lighter and shorter and considered “ideal” for urban scenarios. The M-16 and Galil sniper rifle are also used.

In general, none of the State security bodies finances these trainings. They could do so in special cases, such as for NATO exercises (usually self-defense courses), and only for very few and highly selected students. The local police on the other hand can finance such courses.

### 7.2/ TRAINING OF SECURITY ESCORTS AND PROTECTION SERVICES

Spanish public institutions also encourage using the Israeli experience as a model in training courses in Spain. For example, the Interior Minister, Jorge Fernandez Diaz, during the signing of a security agreement between the two countries, proposed that training courses be organized in the police sector to share experiences in bomb disposal. Another example: the Ministry of Defense, between 2 July and 20 September 2007, sent to Israel 24 soldiers of the Land Army to be trained in the use of the four Searcher Mk II drones, acquired from the Israeli company IAI, and which Spain had deployed in Afghanistan. According to Israeli sources, the promoter of the initiative was general Romay, Chief of the Logistics Support Command. The possibility was also considered of sending IAI Israeli engineers to Afghanistan to help in the practical use of the equipment.

**Guardian Homeland Security**

> “Compared with the 25 quarterly shots allowed by the Spanish law, always in a static position and inside a gallery, the one week Guardian LTD Israel course equals to ... 20 years in the gallery.”

The TV channel “Cuatro”, of the Prisa group, addressed in a news interview on 6 July 6 2011, the issue of security training in Israel, in a kibbutz. The headline evocatively read “Israelis are teaching us”. It explained how participants of the course included military personnel, the national police, Mossos d’Esquadra and ertzaintzas. The channel expressed its conviction that “the Israelis are the best in urban guerrilla techniques and personal protection”. Because of this, people payed € 4000 for
2 weeks to learn how to raid a house or rescue hostages, all with live ammunition. David, a student and lieutenant of the Legion, linked the Israeli’s added value to “their conflict” and emphasized that that was the experience they sought: “very refined techniques, proven in combat. Things that we know actually work”. The company that provided the training was Guardian - Homeland Security, a parent company of Guardian Spain. One of the highlights of the course is the possibility to use Tavor, the star weapon of the Israeli army.

The courses offered by Guardian are well known in the social networks and forums on security. According to many experts of the sector, Guardian provides the best and most comprehensive security escort course in Spain, which are attended by both private and public security professionals. The company underlines that two factors make up its added value: the experience accumulated in Israel and the practical nature of the training: “The time spent on theory during the course is approximately 10%, as the experience in a country like Israel has shown that theory, in a real-life situation does not work.”

Guardian has been teaching courses in Spain since May 2006, specifically in the National School of Security Specialties (E.N.E). in Soria. Between then and April 2008, nine courses were completed in Spain, and four in Israel. Occasionally, institutional courses for special units were also provided. Students attending these courses are “members of the security forces (national and local police, Civil Guards, or military) or professional escorts and vigilantes.” That is, according to Guardian, “we only train professionals.” Attending the same course were: an officer of the Local Seville Police, a member of the Spanish Intelligence intended for counterintelligence and security operations, a security guard of the Barcelona Metro, Basque escorts and a legionary who had been in South Lebanon as a UN Blue Helmet. Members of the National Intelligence Center (CNI), the national police and anti-mine experts have all been trained in these courses, although most of the students seem to come from the private escorts sector. Upon completion of the escort or guard courses, students are given diplomas that are recognized both by Israel LTD Guardian and the Spanish Association of Escorts. Moreover, they are also provided with a magnetic card that allows them to work as security escorts in other countries and international companies. “In Spain, we only prepare students with handguns, usually with Glock pistols, while in the courses that we offer in Israel we also shoot with assault rifles and submachine guns [M16, UZI, etc.]. During target practice, we adopt the same advanced techniques used by the Israeli Special Forces.”

The Made in Israel courses usually include the self defense method used by the Israeli military, known as krav maga (see details below); body-to-body combat; defense tactics against white weapons and firearms; Israeli firing techniques, VIP protection; tactical training in urban areas, evacuation and rescue techniques, evasive and tactical driving; protection drills; lectures on face recognition and real attacks; surprise scenarios and tracking techniques, both on foot and with a vehicle.

“We security professionals have heard a lot about Israel: its methods, techniques and effectiveness in real situations. Unfortunately, Israeli security methods are not sufficiently widespread in Spain. Guardian Spain offers us, through its courses, the possibility to have access to this knowledge that we all admire and aspire to learn.”
Example of a course(I): Shooting and combat in high risk areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES IN SPAIN</th>
<th>COURSES IN ISRAEL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firing techniques with gun (live fire)</td>
<td>Combat and firing techniques, short, medium and long distance, instinctive shooting, night shooting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Change of emergency /DS charger</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Night shooting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firing techniques with long weapon (live fire)</td>
<td>Firing techniques with M16, Micro Uzi and sniper rifle</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Experimentation with different weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat in urban areas (live fire)</td>
<td>Combat techniques in urban areas Corners / doors / identification / priorities / line feed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surprise scenarios</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monomial/binomial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mock combat (Simunition FX)</td>
<td>Mock combat with Simunition FX</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>390€ (VAT not included) – Does not include accommodation and meals, 2 full days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Escuela Nacional de Especialidades en Seguridad (E.N.E), Almazán (Soria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of cartridges per student</td>
<td>100 (in different exercises and situations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted at</td>
<td>&quot;Members of the State security forces (Civil Guard, National Police, local police, military etc.), and authorized security personnel. Limited to 15 participants&quot;.</td>
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[All of the photos have been taken from the Guardian webpage]
Example of a course(II): Protection of people, tracking and counter-surveillance

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES IN SPAIN</th>
<th>COURSES IN ISRAEL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firing techniques with gun (live fire) [in Israel also with long weapons]</td>
<td>Técnicas de tiro Israelí Disparo desde dentro del vehículo Simulador de Tiro SMART S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat and short, medium and long distance riring techniques, instinctive shooting, night shooting Firing techniques with M16, Micro Uzi and sniper rifle Experimentation with different weapons SMART S mock firing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of people</td>
<td>Shooting techniques with VIPs Protection, evacuation, escape and rescue techniques Protection drills in different areas of risk Drills in real public events</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evasive, tactical and defensive driving Shooting from inside a moving vehicle with live fire Tactical positioning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection drills in different areas of risk Drills in real public events</td>
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<tr>
<td>Krav maga [personal defense]</td>
<td>Krav maga techniques Body-to-body combat techniques Defense tactics against white weapons and firearms Dislocations</td>
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<td>Evasive, tactical and defensive driving</td>
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<td>Evasive, tactical and defensive driving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical training in urban area Corners /doors/identification/priorities /line feed Monomial/binomial Assault maneuver exercise Surprise scenarios Mock combat with Simunition FX 360º shooting gallery with live fire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking and counter-surveillance Tracking and surveillance methods Tracking and counter-surveillance training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>1.800 € + TAV, 5 days, full board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.970€ (VAT not included) + flight + touring– all included</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escuela Nacional de Especialidades security (E.N.E), Almazán (Soria)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quesaria</td>
<td>Quesaria (Israel),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of cartridges per student</td>
<td>50 [in different exercises and situations]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.000 [9mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm, Simunition]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other courses offered in Spanish by Guardian Quesaria (Israel), and priced at € 3,970 (VAT and flight not included):

- **Specialization in combat techniques in urban areas**: The course focuses on techniques of "combat in urban areas and entrance into property". It is eminently practical, and applies the latest methods and techniques in high-risk areas. It is targeted at members of the State security forces and private security personnel. It is limited to 12 participants and 2,500 cartridges (9mm, 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, Simunition) are used per student during training.554

- **Advanced Intelligence Course, intervention and protection - two weeks**, eminently practical, uses the latest techniques and procedures in high-risk areas”. It is aimed at members of the State security forces and private security personnel. Limited to 12 participants and 2,000 cartridges (9mm, 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, Simunition) are used per student during training (9mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm, Simunition).555
In the following courses, we are unsure whether the experts involved are members of the aforementioned Israeli organizations or whether they have received training by these organizations. Either way, it is the Israeli experience being transmitted which is perceived as the added value.

Course for contractors specializing in maritime safety: It was created due to the notoriety of the piracy phenomenon and is targeted to both private and public security staff, with previous experience. Fifteen places, five days, € 950. The advertisement mentions training by the three instructors. The Israeli International Security Academy (ISA), is responsible for training private escorts.556 It is worth highlighting that piracy has represented a formidable business opportunity for Israeli private security companies. In an ISA course organized in Haifa in 2009, where the largest group of participants was Spanish, were simultaneously participating the head of the escort group of the Kenian prime minister, Owade Lumumba; a Basque who was doing a security course in Israel for the third time; and another Basque, who was a private guard and former sergeant of the Spanish army.557

Advanced course for security escorts: Noteworthy for supplying “real training, with weapons, intercom equipment, anti-bullet vests, etc.” As stressed by the company: “the Nidec Club is absolutely restricted to security professionals [public or private] and civilians with a weapons license.” A 10-hour course costs € 175. In the curriculum vitae provided by the two instructors (their names are omitted for “privacy reasons”), are highlighted, in one case, skills in handling Uzi and Mini-Uzi weapons, and in the other, experience in the Israeli International Security Academy (ISA) and PSOS (see below).558

Probably, the Israeli International Security Academy (ISA) and the International Security School (ISS) are the same organization, and the former is the continuation of the latter, which is no longer operative. The logos of the two organizations are nearly identical and the managers and founders are the same, notably, David Mirza (founder and CEO, and strongly involved in the fields of defense and security), and Zafrir Pazi (chief instructor of ISS and ISA, he is a former senior manager and chief instructor of the Israeli secret services and head of a VIP protection unit), among many others.559

ISS was a private security company created and run by a group of former Israeli Special Forces officers. Since 1993, ISS has trained in Israeli techniques American and Nigerian policemen, and over 5,000 professionals across Europe.560 ISS believes that Spain is rather controversial because of two fundamental phenomena: ETA and mafias specialized in kidnappings. Thus, it created a subsidiary, ISS Ibérica, which has its training center in Casinos, 20 kilometers from Valencia. The first escort training course provided by ISS Iberian dates back to April 2002. The company received 89 applications, of which 15 to 20 participants were selected, who paid € 2,825, although the price later rose to € 4,860. ISS Ibérica earned € 800,000 that year. Meanwhile, ISS’ turnover in 2001 was of € 4.5 million, from
the courses in the US and Israel. Mirza David was the founder of ISS Ibérica with 50% ownership, while Carlos Peralta was president and owner of the other 50% with David (Peralta is also head of security of the Ruber Hospital Ruber). Andrés Valea and Delfín Fernández were respectively director and commercial director of ISS Ibérica. Iberian ISS was based in Madrid.

As acknowledged by its director, Andrés Valea, ISS Iberian acted as an intermediary in Spain and was in charge of sending at least twelve bodyguards formed by ISS to serve in Iraq and to work in at least three companies operating in the country (a Spanish, an Italian and an American). He negotiated wages of € 9,000 per month plus allowances and expenses, for initial six-month contracts. Some were commissioned to protect oil installations.

Integrated Protection Teams (IPT) is a multinational network of protection specialists established in 1987 by Mirza David, founder and CEO of ISA-Israel. The network is composed of individuals and firms trained and certified as “Head of protection group and counterterrorism” for ISA-Israel. This course costs between € 6,999 (four weeks) and € 9,999 (six weeks). In the list of the course participants there are at least 34 people in the chapter on Spain.

Both based in Herzliya (Israel), PSOS and MIP Security are part of the MIPSOS Group. MIP Security is dedicated to the protection of persons and property. PSOS offers intensive security courses since 1987, in Israel and elsewhere, both for the public and private sectors. Both organizations were founded and are run by veterans of different Israeli security services (intelligence, security, army and police).

PSOS Security offers security courses to members of the Spanish security forces. Courses (security management, physical security and proximity protection), last eight days and cost $ 3,700 all inclusive (except Israel transfers). Spanish customers that the MIPSOS group claims to have served include Iberdrola, Gas Natural and Banesto.

A paradigmatic case is that of Manuel Conde, head of security certified from PSOS in Israel, former member of the Municipal Police of Madrid and president of the group Shoko which, as indicated on its website, includes in its group the company wholesale “Shot Madrid, SL” and “Police Boutique”, for sales in a specialized shop, only to professionals of the sector.

**7.3 THE KRAV MAGA IN SPAIN**

The Krav maga is the Israeli martial art used by the Israeli army and police forces. There are many companies that use and teach krav maga in Spain, including Nidec Group Defense and Homeland Security Guardian. According to Ilan Arzoan, one of the managers of Guardian, the technique “is based on body-to-body combat and empty-handed defense against an opponent armed with a knife.”
For Arzooan, “this technique is very popular in Spain, as it responds perfectly to the Spanish legislation, which penalizes he who uses a firearm against an opponent armed with a knife.” 572 Guardian distinguishes the two forms of krav maga currently taught in Spain: In the first case, the technique is exclusively aimed self defense; in the second case, body-to-body combat, with no rules or limits. The body-to-body combat is usually taught to public and private security forces who participate in the different training courses.573 Because it is devoid of rules, and is designed for real combat situations, the krav maga, unlike other martial arts, can not be classified as a sport or a competition between wrestlers. The use of any part of the body and any object that can serve as a weapon is allowed. The objective of the krav maga is the use of defense maneuvers that guarantee threat neutralization. Withdrawal is thus not accepted.574

The International Federation of krav maga (IKMF) was created in the 1990s, when its techniques began to expand beyond Israel. One of the four directors of the IKMF, Gabi Noah, aimed at a self-defense system “adapted to real scenarios, with safe and effective solutions to different problems of everyday life, targeted both at citizens/civilians and professionals”, including the police and the military. This led him to leave the IKMF and found, in 2009, his own “school”, the “Gabi Noah International Krav maga ”. In 2010, the krav maga IKM Spain was created (based in Barcelona). “The IKM Combat Training Division is a branch of the IKM Gabi Noah International Krav Maga which provides combat training to Police units, Military forces, VIP Protection teams, Security services and IKM instructors and students who wish to gain skills in these fields of activity.”575

The Director of IKM Combat Training Division, Shahar (Sean) Or, has ” a vast experience in training combat and Special Forces units in both the public and the private sectors” and was qualified by the IDF. He supposedly trained the self defense instructors of the Italian Police Academy, The DT instructors of Westchester County Police, SWAT units, the New York police and the presidential Secret Service agents, among others.576

In Barcelona, courses are offered both for public safety (Mossos d’ Esquadra, the Municipal police, the local police , the Civil Guard, the National Police, the port police, prison officials, military professionals”) and private security (“security guards, private escorts, private detectives , porters - gatekeepers”), among others. Two specific courses are “Police and security forces Instructor” and “military instructor ”. The Israeli trademark is not only in the brand but also in the training: IKM Krav-Maga Spain provides training at international headquarters in Netanya, Israel.578
7.4// ISRAEL ALSO TEACHES US...IN UNIVERSITY

The Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (CESEI SL Consultant for Strategic and International Studies), the Camilo José Cela579 (UCJC) University and the University of Haifa, jointly organize a Master degree in various security-related issues. The Master includes the participation of members of the Israel Defense Forces, including senior officials, Israeli university professors and scholars.

**Master in Leadership, Diplomacy and Intelligence.**Title provided by the University Camilo José Cela (UCJC). As specified in the information of the master, it is designed by the UCJC, “along with experts from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and Intelligence experts.” The master is a double degree: “Diplomacy and Intelligence Officer”, and “Preparation for diplomatic career”,581 and includes both theory and practice, provided by Israeli experts.”582 In charge of the course are Mario Hernández Sánchez-Barba, professor of the Diplomatic School, Angel Ponce de León, dean of the Faculty of Legal and Economic Sciences of the UCJC, and Miguel Alvarez de Eulate y Moreno, technical director of the Master.

**Training course in Israel in counterterrorism. Intelligence analyst, level 3.**583 The course includes “geostategic tours” in the “border areas of Israel”, as well as “Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Golan Heights, PA [Palestinian Authority], Jerusalem ...”. The contents of the program are: geopolitical situation in the Middle East, Islam, international terrorism, “bioterrorism-cyberterrorism”, media communication, use of “special weapons”, simulation cases and martial arts. Mr. Alvarez is in charge of the course.

**Workshop in technological intelligence. Economic and financial prospective intelligence. Intelligence Analyst, Level 1, promotion.** According to the information on the seminar, “at the end of the course, the student will obtain the participation certificate-diploma in "High Level Seminar”, detailing the contents of the Master “Leadership, Diplomacy and Intelligence”, given by the UCJC and the University of Haifa, Israel. It is organized by the CESEI, Intellisec-Israel, and the Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, FESEI.584 The course has a duration of eight hours, and is imparted in one day.

**Course of Expert Analyst in Islamic Terrorism.**585 This course includes seven seminars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Lecturer</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Islamic tenets and characteristics</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. World Islamic riots</td>
<td>Dr. M. Nissan</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Islam: historical perspective</td>
<td>Dr. M. Nissan</td>
<td>€400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Islam in Europe – Spain</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Islam and minorities in the Middle East</td>
<td>Dr. M. Nissan</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lebanon as a microcosm to Islamic other religions relations</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Middle East and the Arab Spring</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Middle East political culture: regimes and leadership</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Islam and the world</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Myth and fallacies about Islam</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad and da’wah</td>
<td>Dr. D. Bukay</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab-Israeli conflict: the Palestinians and religious perspective: Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Dr. M. Kedar</td>
<td>€200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops in leadership, terror &amp; International Relations</td>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>€1,990*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The price includes all of the seminars and grants a specialization in "Expert Analyst in Islamic Terrorism".
What does it teach us exactly?

Courses include training by members of the IDF reservists, including a Brigadier General (Brig. Gen. N. Nuriel) and a Colonel (Col. (Res.) U. Amikam). Nuriel, in reserve, joined the IDF in 1977 in the Golani Brigade, the number 1, which has participated in all of the Israeli wars and in almost all of the major military operations. In 1994, he was a commander in the territorial brigade in the West Bank, and in 1997, deputy commander of the division of the Gaza Strip.586

However, an eminently important role is played by David Bukay, the “Academic Program Manager”, and key lecturer of the Master and postgraduate courses, accused of racism in numerous articles and websites.587 Bukay is a professor at the University of Haifa, specialized in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, terrorism and Islam, and a strong supporter of Samuel P. Huntington’s theory on the “clash of civilizations”. Bukay is also a “research fellow” of the Ariel Center for Policy Research, located in the Occupied Palestinian Territories [in the belt of the Israeli settlements of Ariel], which the Ariel Center calls “Israel”.588 In one of his article we can appreciate some of his ideas about Islam: 589

◆ “In Western political culture it is neither perceived nor understood that the phenomenon of suicide bombers is Islamic in nature, that it is culturally deep-rooted in the hearts.”
◆ “Islam and democracy are totally incompatible, and are mutually inconclusive. The same applies to Modernity, which is perceived as a threat to Islamic civilization.”
◆ “In contrast [to Christian-Judaism], Arab Islamic political culture externalizes the guilt: Do I have a problem? You are guilty! The Arab-Muslims have no guilt remorse towards the outsiders, certainly not to share the guilt with them. They don’t feel any shame towards the infidels. They don’t blame themselves. They are always right.”
◆ “Western political culture needs to internalize how a peaceful Muslim community, even in the West, becomes a politically fanatic and violent. All that is needed are three ingredients: a central active mosque among the Islamic community; the preaching of an influential charismatic religious leader; and a monetary activity and religious volunteering for Islamic case (da’wah) - and the community is stirred up with extremism and pathos.”
◆ “We need to internalize that fighting terrorism is a must. The terrorists have no basic human morality and no human values. They will not stop their atrocious deeds; they will not stop being terrorists. They are not soldiers; they are not freedom-fighters; and they do not deserve to be protected by the laws of nations. They should be eliminated; they deserve to be liquidated without hesitation, without concessions, and without provisions.”

It must be emphasized how no distinction is made throughout the article between the terms “Arab”, “Muslim” and “terrorist”.

In his controversial book Arab-Islamic Political Culture,590 Bukay wrote: “This is a culture where rumors are an integral part of the social activity, and quickly become an absolute truth that can not be questioned. They have to do with the hype, the flights of imagination and, above all, with a society that believes in conspiracies, that remembers everything and forgives nothing. This is a society in which lies are an essential component of behavioral patterns, and lying is endorsed by religious scholars.”591 And he adds: “There is no condemnation, no regret, no problem of conscience among Arabs
and Muslims, everywhere, in all strata of society.”592

The University Rey Juan Carlos has signed an agreement on security and terrorism investigation with the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) of Herzliya (Israel), and two framework agreements, one with the Ben Gurion University of Negev and another with the University of Haifa.593 However, “it appears that the university professors do not have much knowledge of the research activity in Israel, nor of its research centers.”594 Since 2000, every month of September, a counterterrorism conference is organized in Herzliya. Its founder, Boaz Ganor, executive director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)595 and member of the IDC Herzliya, refers to this conference as the “Davos of counterterrorism”, for bringing together experts in the field, “mainly academics and diplomats, but also some on-the-field professionals”.596 Professors of the University Rey Juan Carlos and of Spanish institutions have acted as lecturers at these conferences.597 The ICT was founded in 1996 within the IDC Herzliya, as a counterterrorism research institute that “combines academic knowledge with the practical experience of experts from the field”.598

On 16 March 2012, the Spain-Israel chair was established from a cooperation agreement between the Institute of Public Law of the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos of Madrid and the Israeli Embassy in Spain.599 The objectives of the chair, aimed at “developing science and literature” are manifold, and usually not related to the field of security and defense. However, it also wishes to “share technological advances” so that “the small and medium Spanish enterprises can benefit from the Israeli expertise in this sector”,600 and some of the participants are members of the security sector.601
The European Union’s Security Research Programme (ESRP) has a duration of seven years (2007-2013) and a cost of € 1,400 million. It forms part of the Seventh Framework Programme for R & D (FP7, Framework Programme 7, with a budget of € 50,500 million), and one of its principal objectives is the promotion and growth of the internal security industry in Europe, in which public and private entities of the defense and technology sector participate.602

The ESRP also funds dual use civilian and military technology. Security research projects until 2010 focused on: “security and protection of networked systems, protection against terrorism, crisis management, interoperability and integrated systems for information and communication”. According to Ben Hayes, most projects have an important involvement of the military industry and some have the explicit intention of developing technology which is widely criticized for its deadly effects in conflict areas, such as the drones used in wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Gaza Strip. 603

The Quaker Council for European Affairs, 604 reports that the ESRP was decided in an informal manner in 2003, by the Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, without any legal act, proposal or consultation process in the European nor national parliaments, as is usually done when new budgets are approved. It was decided instead to select a “Group of Personalities” (GoP) to determine the objectives in 2004. Of the 28 members of the GoP, eleven were direct representatives of the defense industry and seven were indirectly connected with it. This “non-democratic” process and the program itself have been criticized by various organizations and individuals, due to its link with the defense industry. In 2004, the list of GoP included at least three from Spain: Javier Solana (then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), Javier Monzón (Chairman and CEO of Indra) and Victor Aguado [then Director General of Eurocontrol],605 the three closely related with the security and defense industry.

The European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) was established in 2007 by the Commission. This is another informal advisory group aimed at “strengthening the EU’s security market and the competitiveness of the industry and other providers of technology and solutions.” It develops policies and allocates resources in the ESRP, and depends for this purpose on 65 members and 11 work groups with 660 consultants working on research on security (413 of them, or 66%, come from defense and security contractors). Another 200 (30%) represent European institutions and agencies (the Commission’s Enterprise Directorate-General, the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security, the European Defense Agency, Europol and Frontex). ESRIF is also open to non-Europeans, and in 2007 and 2008, assessors of third countries mainly came from Israel and Turkey.
Israel in the FP7

Israel is an associated state of the EU, which benefits from the program and its experts evaluate these projects. It also funds the program and has contributed with € 440 million. The EU’s FP7 was in 2010 the second largest funder of Israeli academic research, just behind the Israel Science Foundation. The Israel-Europe Research and Development Directorate (ISERD) acts as a promoter of Israeli projects and as an official representative of Israel in the FP7. Israel must engage across platforms for cooperation with other firms or institutions of EU member countries.606

The Quaker Council retrieves a campaign of the ISERD in which it is pointed out that Israel earns much more than what it gives.607

"Israeli researchers not only benefit from an introduction to European business and research culture, they also gain access to projects and knowledge through consortia, which are much larger than the actual Israel investments or payments in the form of grants. Networking with European universities and companies is another advantage that should not be ignored."

The report provides three recommendations for European research funding: a) separate military, dual-use and security research from other areas and deny access to companies working in the military sector, b) deny access to companies benefiting from the occupation in the Palestinian territories, given the relationship between the control of these territories, military supremacy and the security sector c) cut funding for drones, banned in Europe, namely to prevent subsidies for Israeli drones, given this country has used them against civilians in the Gaza Strip.608 These recommendations are based on concrete practices of contracts of the European Commission with Israeli military companies that profit from the occupation, conspicuously Israel Aerospace Industries (manufacturer of drones), Motorola Israel (produces virtual fences around the settlements), and Elbit Systems (involved in the construction of the separation wall).

Of the 87 ESRP projects listed in the EU’s website (until September 2010) in which non-EU member states participated, Israel is the country which is most frequently listed (17).609 followed by Norway (15), Switzerland (11), Turkey (7) and the USA (2). It is to be noted that the Al Quds University in the West Bank is also involved in one of these projects. Israel is also the non-member state which has more access to the economic volume of the projects in general and to those subsidized by the EU in particular, with about 25%, double the amount of Norway. In addition, there are only two non-EU members in charge of ESRP projects, Israel and Norway. Israel manages six projects, surpassed only (including Member States) by France, UK, Sweden, Italy and Germany, in that order. Spain is only in charge of three.610

At the end of 2009, 13 Israeli public or private entities were collaborating in 13 Spanish framework projects, and at least five of these projects were managed by an Israeli organization. In 2013, the number of projects soared to 31. Listed below are some of the research projects funded by the European Union in the field of integrated security, in which participated both Spanish and Israeli organizations.612
### 8.1 SUMMARY OF PROJECTS WITH JOINT SPANISH AND ISRAELI PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name / Start and finish date of project</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Final cost (funded)</th>
<th>Spanish companies and institutions</th>
<th>Israeli companies and institutions</th>
<th>Number of participating companies and institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FP-7 Security Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEROCEPTOR 2013-01-01 2015-12-31</td>
<td>Control and arrest of marine and terrestrial vehicles using uAV technology [able to locate and intercept the vehicles]. The project has the participation of the Ministry of Interior of Spain (representing the National Police and the Civil Guard) and the Israeli Ministry of Public Security, who will be the end users of the developed systems.</td>
<td>4,839,873 (3,468,859)</td>
<td>National Institute for Aerospace Technology [coordinator], Systems Engineering for the Defense of Spain SA –ISDEFE, Zabaia Innovation Consulting SA, Ministry of Interior, GMV Aerospace and Defence SA Unipersonal</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Security, Retem Technological Solutions LTD, Israel Aerospace industries LTD</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESURBS 2011-01-01 2014-12-31</td>
<td>Analysis and design of tools for detecting security threats in urban areas. The cities of Jerusalem (Israel), Nottingham (United Kingdom) and Barcelona (Spain) serve as reference case studies.</td>
<td>4,161,929 (3,208,549)</td>
<td>International Center for Numerical Methods in Engineering</td>
<td>The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENCOUNTER 2012-09-01 2015-08-31</td>
<td>Identification, examination and validation techniques to mitigate and neutralize homemade explosives [improved explosive device] in civil and urban environments.</td>
<td>4,412,123 (3,313,123)</td>
<td>Engineering Systems for the Defence of Spain A-ISDEFE</td>
<td>Tamar Israeli Advanced Quarrying Co LTD</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS 2009-06-01 2013-05-31</td>
<td>Improve information technology to facilitate decision making in times of crisis [such as the evacuation of stadiums or management of accidents with toxic waste], and coordination of intervention forces on the ground (police, rescue forces, firefighters, etc.).</td>
<td>14,025,624 (9,192,126)</td>
<td>Grupo Mecánica del Vuelo Sistemas SA</td>
<td>Verint Systems LTD [coordinadora], Ernest &amp; Young LTD, Aeronautics Defense Systems LTD, Maden David Adom in Israel</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROSUR 2010-06-01 2014-02-28</strong></td>
<td>Design of a new European maritime border surveillance system that integrates the control of space, air, land and sea. The project aims to create an effective cooperation between the various Member States in the fight against drug trafficking in the English Channel, illegal immigration in the southern Mediterranean and illegal activities in Atlantic waters from the Canary Islands to the Azores.</td>
<td>15,558,125 (9,891,603)</td>
<td>University of Murcia, TTI Norte SL, Indra Sistemas SA, Eurocopter España SA</td>
<td>Correlation Systems LTD</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESECON 2009-03-01 2012-02-29</td>
<td>Identification of new research areas in the field of European security. In particular, the detection of causes, dynamics and consequences of major security threats and the respective European security policy.</td>
<td>3,009,546 (2,357,188)</td>
<td>University of the Basque Country, Systems Engineering for Defence of Spain SA-ISDEFE</td>
<td>The Hebrew University of Jerusalem</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIDUCS</strong> 2011-04-01 2013-03-31</td>
<td>Design of a research strategy in the field of European security. The main objective is to analyze the role of the EU in the new challenges arising from the risks and threats of a globalized world (such as attacks on European citizens or on potentially critical infrastructures).</td>
<td>4,520,649 (3,407,075)</td>
<td>National Institute of Aerospace Technology, Atos Spain SA, Systems Engineering for Defence of Spain SA-ISDEFE</td>
<td>University of Haifa</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE, SECURITY AND OCCUPATION AS A BUSINESS</td>
<td>Military, armaments and security trade relations between Spain and Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACT 2012-02-01 2015-01-31</td>
<td>Analysis of the perception of European citizens on the new surveillance technologies and their implications in terms of privacy.</td>
<td>3,237,736 (2,675,107)</td>
<td>Atos Spain SA, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ministry of Public Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECUR-ED 2011-04-01 2014-09-30</td>
<td>Development of a package of solutions to improve the security of public transport in medium and large cities. Provision of technology and services that cover all aspects of transportation security, from risk assessment to training packages. The cities of Madrid, Paris, Milan and Berlin will be used to demonstrate the potential results of the project.</td>
<td>40,188,876 (25,468,072)</td>
<td>Ingeniería y Economía del Transporte, Regional Transport Consortium of Madrid, Empresa Municipal de Transporte de Madrid SA, Ingeniería y Consultoría para el Control Automático SL, Athenas G3-Security Performer Integration Ltd (coordinadora), Halevi Dweck &amp; CO Arttic Israel Company LTD, Arttic Israel International Management Services 2009 LTD, Ogip Optronics Industries LTD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFENZ 2011-04-01 2013-03-31</td>
<td>Promotion of cooperation between members of the European community in security-related research issues. Promote participation in FP7 programs (continuation of the SAFENZ program started in February 2008).</td>
<td>1,801,696 (1,499,546)</td>
<td>National Institute of Aerospace Technology, Centre for Industrial Technological Development, MATIMOP Israel Industry Center for Research &amp; Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICS 2012-09-01 2015-08-31</td>
<td>Development of a prevention tool against possible terrorist attacks. The project aims to analyze the human behavior of potential terrorists in order to support security forces in prevention tasks and management of threats to cities.</td>
<td>4,528,623 (3,478,464)</td>
<td>Polytechnic University of Valencia, International Security and Counter-Terrorism Academy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VALUESEC 2011-02-01 2014-01-31</td>
<td>Development of a program to analyze the economic and social effects of the measures taken in the security area, as well as their potential added value.</td>
<td>4,473,809 (3,443,210)</td>
<td>Municipality of Valencia, Atos Spain SA, White Cyber Knight LTD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other non FP-7 security projects:

| BEMOSA 2009-09-01 2012-11-30   | Development of a training system to improve airport security by using simulations of human social behavior in emergency situations. | 4,235,967 (3,399,934)                                              | Cartif Foundation, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology (coordinadora) |

| DPARUS 2010-09-01 2012-05-31   | Development of strategic and technological solutions for border surveillance operations carried out by European UAVs. | 1,405,309 (1,188,312)                                              | EADS-Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA, Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial, Systems Engineering for Defence of Spain SA – ISDEFE |
|

<p>| (coordinator) | <strong>Verint Systems SA</strong> (coordinadora), <strong>Ernest G Young LTD</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Halevi Dweck &amp; CO Arttic Israel Company LTD, C.A.L. Cargo Airlines, Motorola Israel LTD, Arttic Israel International Management Services 2009 LTD, Azimuth Technologies Limited</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Athena G3-Security Performer Integration Ltd</strong> (coordinadora), <strong>Halevi Dweck &amp; CO Arttic Israel Company LTD, Arttic Israel International Management Services 2009 LTD, Ogip Optronics Industries LTD</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Israel Aerospace Industries LTD</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ministry of Public Security</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Bar Ilan University [coordinator]</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Nice Systems LTD, MTRS3 Solutions and Services LTD, G. Team Security LTD</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>MATIMOP Israel Industry Center for Research &amp; Development</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>International Security and Counter-Terrorism Academy</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Israel Aerospace Industries LTD</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Verint Systems LTD (coordinadora), Ernest G Young LTD, Elbit Security Systems LTD</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Municipality of Valencia, Atos Spain SA, White Cyber Knight LTD</strong> |
| (coordinator) | <strong>Cartif Foundation, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology (coordinadora)</strong> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost (€)</th>
<th>Coordinator</th>
<th>Current Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIOSEC</td>
<td>2003-12-01</td>
<td>2005-11-30</td>
<td>Improve face, audio and fingerprints verification methods, with special emphasis on multimodal biometrics.</td>
<td>9,676,213 [5,549,955]</td>
<td>Telefónica Investigación y Desarrollo SA Unipersonal [coordinator]. Eta Investigación y Desarrollo SA, Carlos III University, Ibermatics SA, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Polytechnic University of Valencia</td>
<td>Vcon Telecommunicaciones LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLASTWALL</td>
<td>2006-08-01</td>
<td>2009-12-31</td>
<td>Development of a new protection system for buildings in case of explosions due, among other things, to terrorist attacks. The protection applied to walls and windows aims to absorb the blast and minimize damage to the structure of the building.</td>
<td>1,435,228 [791,909]</td>
<td>Riojalex SA</td>
<td>Vídisco Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEG-RISK</td>
<td>2008-12-01</td>
<td>2013-05-31</td>
<td>Development of a new technology to identify existing risks and minimize response time. Included among the various hazards analyzed by the project are cyber attacks, security of energy provision, &quot;collateral&quot; damage of drone attacks, and social movements such as &quot;Occupy Wall Street&quot; or the recent London riots.</td>
<td>19,073,380 [13,629,108]</td>
<td>Enegas SA, Iberdrola SA, Tecnalia Research &amp; Innovation Foundation, Sarriá Chemical Institute, Atos Spain SA</td>
<td>Ekon Modeling Software Systems LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFECITY</td>
<td>2011-04-01</td>
<td>2013-03-31</td>
<td>Design of Internet applications to improve safety in European urban areas. The presentation of project results will take place in Madrid and Stockholm, the two main cities participating in the project.</td>
<td>5,144,721 [3,719,000]</td>
<td>Systems Engineering for the Defense of Spain SA –ISDEFE, Municipality of Madrid, HI Iberia Ingeniería y Proyectos SL, Tecnalia Research &amp; Innovation Foundation, Eversis Spain SL</td>
<td>Athena GS3-Global Security Implementations LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFE</td>
<td>2004-02-01</td>
<td>2008-04-30</td>
<td>Design of a new system of air safety to detect potential in flight terrorist attacks. The detection system is based on the control of passengers, monitoring &quot;suspicious&quot;personal behavior, and the detection of hazardous materials detection. Protection during flight includes responses to violent behavior and an automatic piloting system for the aircraft.</td>
<td>35,839,375 [19,450,976]</td>
<td>Systems Engineering for the Defense of Spain SA</td>
<td>GS-3-Global Security Services Solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURE-FORCE</td>
<td>2006-01-01</td>
<td>2009-02-28</td>
<td>Promote the participation of SMEs in European R &amp; D projects in the field of security. Special attention to cyber crime and terrorism, as well as crisis management.</td>
<td>2,045,095 [1,637,705]</td>
<td>Econet SL, Consen EEIG Euro-Group AEIE, Andalusian Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Alma Consulting Group LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURESTATION</td>
<td>2011-06-01</td>
<td>2014-05-31</td>
<td>Improve the ability to respond to terrorist attacks on passenger stations by designing handsets that reduce the impact of explosions, fire, and toxic agents, both in people and in infrastructure.</td>
<td>3,119,919 [2,287,712]</td>
<td>Systems Engineering for the Defense of Spain SA –ISDEFE [coordinator], Regional Transport Consortium of Madrid, Tecnalia Foundation Research &amp; Innovation</td>
<td>MTR3 Solutions and Services LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>2008-01-15</td>
<td>2011-01-14</td>
<td>Improve the range of technological solutions dedicated to the exploration of interior and exterior areas. Among other uses, the project provides new resources for information systems in their own field.</td>
<td>3,643,782 [2,750,000]</td>
<td>Universidad Pompeu Fabra [coordinador], Consorcio Instituto de Investigaciones Biomédicas August Pi i Sunyer</td>
<td>Tel Aviv University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military, armaments and security trade relations between Spain and Israel


10. The data on arms exports is calculated through contracts (or potential changes); it does not include small arms; it calculates data through contracts (not through customs records, without recognized institutions in the field, experienced in previous years.


Carles Casajuana, the adviser on security and foreign issues to then Prime Minister, Rodríguez Zapatero, stated in a visit to Israel in November 2007: “If Spain is asked to contribute with troops in the region – as part of the Israeli–Palestinian agreement – without a doubt it will respond in a positive way”: Adam Primor [2007]: “Aide to Spanish PM: Spain wants to improve relations with Israel”, Haaretz, 9 November.

Right after the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, Spain joined UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) and deployed 1,100 soldiers. UNIFIL replaced the old military operation created in 1978 to “restore peace and security after the Israeli withdrawal from the country”. In 2013, half of the troops were withdrawn, an operation that Defense Minister Pedro Morenés justified with economic restrictions in Spain and the “rationalization” of the costs of defense. DPA (2012): “Spain to withdraw half its troops from UNIFIL in Lebanon”, Haaretz, 17 July.

Fernández Díaz also claimed that “everything that could be interpreted or represent in itself an obstacle to unlocking these peace negotiations would not be positive, for example trying to prosecute the conflict, in the sense of bringing Israel before the International Criminal Court [ICC] for certain actions or initiatives. See “El Gobierno de Rajoy amonestó y se abraza a Israel el mismo día”, Público.es, 3 December 2012, available at: http://www.publico.es/ internacional/446802/el-gobierno-de-rajoy-amonesta-y-se-abraza-a-israel-el-mismo-dia [Accessed: 30 September 2013].


Carmen del Riego (2013): “Spain freezes the opening of a consulate in Gaza after meeting with Netanyahu”, La Vanguardia, 23 April.


According to ICEX’s database [Last accessed 26 October 2013].

Juan de la Roca (2011): “Economic, commercial ties with Spain continue to shine”, The Jerusalem Post, 11 April.


According to ICEX’s database [Last accessed 26 October 2013].


Response of 18 May 2011 to the written question to Congress 184/099337, of Macarena Montesinos de Miguel (Popular Party), of 15 February 2011.


Response of 18 May 2011 to the written question to Congress184/099337, of Macarena Montesinos de Miguel (Popular Party), of 15 February 2011.

Response of 11 May 2011 to the written question to Congress184/099335, of Macarena Montesinos de Miguel (Popular Party), of 15 February 2011.

The agreement was published in the Official Gazette, no. 39, of 14 February 2008. Response of 11 May 2011 to the written question to Congress184/099335, of Macarena Montesinos de Miguel (Popular Party).

According to the Ministry of Defense (2010): “Framework of Signed Bilateral Agreements”, Op. Cit. However, the Ministry does not detail anything else on this agreement, nor has additional related information been found.

Response of 11 May 2011 to the written question to Congress 184/099335, of Macarena Montesinos de Miguel (Popular Party).

Spanish and Israeli Home Affairs Ministers express full cooperation on combating terrorism and organised crime”, La Moncloa, 5 March 2012, http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/1DIMAS/Gobierno/News201220120305Reun%C3%B3NministrosInterior.htm [Accessed: 12 September 2013].

Response of 8 May 2011 to the written question to Congress 184/099336, of Macarena Montesinos de Miguel
DEFENSE, SECURITY AND OCCUPATION AS A BUSINESS

Military, Armaments and security trade relations between Spain and Israel


90. “Mas firma en Israel tres acuerdos de cooperación en I+D”, La Vanguardia, 10 November 2013.


"El proyecto CAPER presenta la primera versión de su plataforma de prevención de la delincuencia organizada", news of S21sec, 12 March, available at: http://www.s21sec.com/es/sobre-s21sec/news-a-events/noticias/951-el-proyecto-caper-presenta-la-primer-versi%C3%B3n-de-su-plataforma-de-prevenci%C3%B3n-de-la-delincuencia-organizada [Accessed: 29 September 2013].


See the program and details of the meeting at: http://asagua.es/descargas-privadas/1298545392_encuentro_empresarial_esp-masa-israel.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2013].

Response of 18 May 2011 to the written question to Congress184/095337, of Macarena Montesinos de Miguel [Popular Party], 15 February 2011.


"Defender a Israel es defender las bases de nuestra civilización", La Razón, 20 December 2011.


The confusion on the initial name of the Center [Israel-Sefarad House] supposed a plaint of the Cordobes Center Sefarad House in October 2007 which resolution, after legal action, obligated to change the name in 2012 from “Sefarad-Israel House” to Sefarad-Israel Center”. Nevertheless, still the website remains as www.casasefarad-israel.es. See Official State Gazette, August 14th 2013, num. 194, sec.III, p.59415


According to the general state budget approved for each year.

See the financial statements for 2012 of the Sefarad–Israel Center in the Official Gazette, 14 August 2013, sec.:III, p.59405.


Sefarad Consulting is Israeli consultant funded in 2003 and aimed to transfer knowledge and technological products from Israel to Iberoamerican. Among the offered products, highlights the "homeland security HLS" and the "IT security". The first one, consists in a intelligent video, in real time, connected and proactive local and remote surveillance, at three security levels: perimetral, access and the same site. See the website www.sefarad.com.es [Visited: 10 October 19th of 2013].

Josep Playà Maset (2013): "Un proyecto Catalunya-Israel", La Vanguardia, 6 November.


Giaco Ventura (2013): "Israel puede ayudar a nuestros jóvenes a salir de la crisis", ABC, 8 November.


Giaco Ventura (2013): "Israel puede ayudar a nuestros jóvenes a salir de la crisis", ABC, 8 November.

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Giaco Ventura (2013): "Israel puede ayudar a nuestros jóvenes a salir de la crisis", ABC, 8 November.


"General Shmaya Avieli, director of SIBAT: ‘Las soluciones basadas en la electrónica avanzada son el futuro de la industria de defensa’", Infodefensa.
Among those attending were: the Secretary of State for Security, the Secretary of State Director of CNI, the Directors General of the National Police and Civil Guard, the Director General of the Civil Protection and Emergencies, the chief of the Military Emergency Unit, the chief of Defense, the Heads of State of Land, Sea and Air and the Secretary of State for Defense. See “HOMSEC 2013. Seguridad y Defensa en Madrid”, Op. Cit., p.49.


Spanish export statistics of defense material, of other material and of products and dual-use technologies, conducted by the Secretary of State for Trade of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MEC). For information on previous years, see Alejandro Pozo (2009): Op. Cit., and official statistics of the Secretary of State for Trade.

Spanish export statistics of defense material, of other material and of products and dual-use technologies, conducted by the Secretary of State for Trade of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MEC). For information on previous years, see Alejandro Pozo (2009): Op. Cit., and official statistics of the Secretary of State for Trade.

According to information provided by CAAT, although all countries publish the granted export licenses, not all publish full details of their exports. This is the case for example of the UK and Germany.


Own calculations based on data of the ENAAT and the annual EU reports.


Daily record of the Congress of Deputies, Commissions, No. 335, 5 June 2013, p.12.


Interview with the coordinator of the Arms Trade and Disarmament section of the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS) in Stockholm, 22 December 2008.


Aluf Benn (2013): “Britain refused Israel military equipment for fear it would add to ‘internal repression’ “, Haaretz, 12 June.

Examples of materials of which the export license was denied are: *engines and other items for patrol; components for artillery shells; military communications equipment; aircraft engines; combat helicopter parts; military air navigation systems and war electronic; components for explosives; protective clothing and demolition equipment; detonators and other equipment for explosive; software for aircraft protection against missiles; cryptographic equipment; airborne radar parts; chemical products and special metals*. See Aluf Benn (2013): Op. Cit.

DEFENSE, SECURITY AND OCCUPATION AS A BUSINESS
MILITARY, ARMAMENTS AND SECURITY TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND ISRAEL


Among those attending were: the Secretary of State for Security, the Secretary of State Director of CNI, the Directors General of the National Police and Civil Guard, the Director General of the Civil Protection and Emergencies, the chief of the Military Emergency Unit, the chief of Defense, the Heads of State of Land, Sea and Air and the Secretary of State for Defense. See “HOMSEC 2013. Seguridad y Defensa en Madrid”, Op. Cit., p.49.


Spanish export statistics of defense material, of other material and of products and dual-use technologies, conducted by the Secretary of State for Trade of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MEC). For information on previous years, see Alejandro Pozo (2009): Op. Cit., and official statistics of the Secretary of State for Trade.

Spanish export statistics of defense material, of other material and of products and dual-use technologies, conducted by the Secretary of State for Trade of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MEC). For information on previous years, see Alejandro Pozo (2009): Op. Cit., and official statistics of the Secretary of State for Trade.
181 In 2010, the Netherlands rejected a request for purchase of night vision systems for Israel Prisons Service and the police rescue unit. In 2009, it refused to sell thermal imaging components for a launching missile system to Rafael and night vision components to Elbit. It also rejected IMI aluminium parts for a missile system to be re-exported to Rwanda and Azerbaijan. Finally, it rejected camouflage paint for UAV Aluf Benn [2013]: Op. Cit.

182 Alejandro Pozo [2009] Op Cit, Chapters 4 and 5. Table copied from p.44.


186 "La compañía israelí Rafael se instala en España con la compra de la empresa LAP Tecnos", Infodefensa.com, 14 June 2010.

187 MTI Wireless Edge has operations in the US, Europe, Southeast Asia, Australia and, of course, Israel, and supplies equipment and services to military forces, among which, antenna systems.

188 Data taken from http://www.epicos.com/Porta...les/adjunts/905_informe12_cas.pdf

189 According to estimates, the protection plan, yet to be approved, would require about $800 million of initial investment funds and $100 million annual budget. "Israel muestra interés por cuatro patrulleros oceánicos españoles", Op. Cit.

190 Data from the article "Israel muestra interés por cuatro patrulleros oceánicos españoles", El País, 5 July 2013.

191 All data and analysis contained in this sub-paragaph on funding are taken from Jordi Calvo Rufanges [2013]: Banca Armada vs Banco Ético, Editorial Olharana, Madrid.

192 Jordi Calvo Rufanges [2013]: Banca Armada vs Banco Ético, Editorial Olharana, Madrid.

193 This Company is domiciled in Av. Dharana, Madrid.


195 This Company is domiciled in C. Muntaner, 249, 5, 08021 Barcelona.


202 This Company is domiciled in Av. Parayas, Santander, tel. 94 233 45 11.


206 This Company is domiciled in Av. Dharana, Madrid.


212 This Company is domiciled in C. Muntaner, 249, 5, 08021 Barcelona.

213 This Company is domiciled in Av. Parayas, Santander, tel. 94 233 45 11.


215 This Company is domiciled in Av. Parayas, Santander, tel. 94 233 45 11.


219 "Entrevistamos a Yitzhak Soroka, consejero-jefe de la delegación del Ministerio de Defensa de Israel en España", Defensa. Revista Internacional de Ejercitos, Arma...
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237. Yossi Beilin, leader of the political party Meretz, was an MP in the Israeli parliament and Minister of Justice.

238. Shlomo Ben Ami, political and diplomatic member of the Labour Party, was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel and ambassador in Spain. In the past years, he has been vice president of the Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITPax).

239. Ehud Barak was Prime Minister of Israel from 1999 to 2001 and later Defense Minister.


242. On 23 December 2009 the maximum ceiling of 26.692 million euros was set until 2025. In December 2010, it was upgraded to 31.631 million euros. In September 2011, the former Secretary of Defense, Constantino Méndez, warned that because of “deviations in the programs cost,” these could vary between 31.600 and 36.800 million euros. After the last payment, the last reset fixed payment commitments were of over 29,429,000. See daily records of the Congress of Deputies, Defense Committee, 21 September 2011, p.838. See also Pere Ortega, John Doe and Xavier Bohigas [2013]: “La cara oculta del gasto militar. El presupuesto militar de 2014”, Centre Delàs de Estudios para la Paz, report no.19, November, p.20, available at: http://centredelas.org/images/stories/informes/informe19 casos.pdf


267. “El Ejército de Tierra realiza el primer tiro con el nuevo misil Spike LR-Dual”, Infodefensa.com, 9 November 2012.


270. According to the army’s website, a shooting had already been executed during the acceptance tests conducted by the Weapons Systems Division (DISA) in January 2010, but the number of missiles launched then was much smaller. “El Ejército de Tierra realiza el primer tiro con el nuevo misil Spike LR-Dual”, Infodefensa.com, 9 November 2012.


273. See “Defensa adjudica a la filial española de Rafael el mantenimiento de las torres del RG-31 por 4,1 millones”, Op. Cit.


397. See the video of the accident at: “Evaluacion sistema Israelita Cardom, Ejercito Espanol” [sic], 25 September 2011, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xeTkSPQoQg [last accessed: 22 September 2013].


403. The Searcher MK II-J is an advanced variant of the Searcher. It can take off and land automatically, and it is controlled from ground stations via satellite radio without direct vision. In the case of loss of contact with the ground station [the same for all drones produced by the division Malat of IA], the Searcher-J2 can automatically return to base. These drones are used by the armies of Ecuador, South Korea, India, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Russia and Spain. Arie Egozi (2012): “The Israeli UAV in Afghanistan”, Israel Defense, 9 February, available at: http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=1617; the Ministry of Defence claims that the purchase of these devices occurred “at the end of 2007”, see: “Plataforma Autónoma Sensorizada de Inteligencia [PASI]”, Ministerio de Defensa, October 2012, available at: http://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/politica/armamento-material/ficheros/DOM-PASI.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2013].

404. The second highest ranked aircraft in the competition was also the Israeli Hermes 450 of Elbit Systems. See Miguel Gonzalez (2007): “El Ejército equipará con aviones espía de origen israeli a las tropas de Afganistán”, El Piso, 25 April.


415. “ يمكن” The Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE), developed by the Civil Guard from 2002, aims to improve surveillance of the southern border [essentially in relation to drug trafficking and illegal immigration]. The basic system information can be found on the website of the Civil Guard, http://www.guardiacivil.es/es/prensa/especiales/sive/funciones.html [Accessed: 15 September 2013].


418. Relations between Spain and Israel in the framework of European research projects will be the theme of future investigation within the campaign “Negocios ocultos. Todo lo que no quieras que sepa sobre las relaciones militares entre España y Israel”. See also Miguel Aguilar (2011): “La seguridad europea, de la mano de las instituciones israelíes”, Diagonalperiodico.net, 2 June, available at: https://www.diagonalperiodico.net/la-seguridad-europea-de-la-mano-instituciones-israelíes.html [Accessed: 14 September 2013].


116 See project information on the website of the consortium http://www.aeroceptor.eu [Last accessed: 13 September 2013].

117 The most common UAV are the so-called MALE [medium altitude, long duration], that can remain in flight between 24 and 48 hours at altitudes between 18,000 and 45,000 ft (5,400 to 13,700 meters).


121 See the webpage of Elbit Systems http:// www.elbitsystems.com/elbitmain/ uas [Accessed: 15 September 2013].

122 See http://62.0.44.103/Elbitmain/files/ Hermes_450_[2012].pdf. Part of this “combat testing” was executed in the various armed conflicts that Israel has fought in neighboring countries and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. According to reports produced by the organization Human Right Watch, Israeli drones actively participated in the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the recent Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip between December 2008 and January 2009 (where, according to the organization, the Heron and Hermes 450 models were used, probably with Spike missiles manufactured by the Israeli company Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.). According to the organizations B’Tselem, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights and the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, the operation in Gaza resulted in 42 drone attacks that caused 87 civilian deaths. See HRW (2009): “Precisely Wrong. Gaza civilians killed by the Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles”, Human Rights Watch, New York, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ opt0609webvocs0_0.pdf [Accessed: 15 September 2013].

123 In the six cases reviewed by HRW, researchers have found no evidence that Palestinian militants were present in the area at the time of attack. The death of civilians during the operation is particularly serious given the quality of the images provided by the apparatus used, and by the cameras incorporated in the missile and the ability to vary its path if an error is noted in the launching. See HRW (2009): Op. Cit. The ability to distinguish between combatants and civilians appears supported by the statement of the Chief of the Border Guard of Tucson, David Aguilar, according to whom drones make it possible to determine “when a person or group of people are armed”. See “Unmanned aerial vehicles support border security”, CPB.org, July-August 2004, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustumsToday/2004/Aug/other/ aerial_vehicles.xml [Accessed: 14 September 2013].


126 “La compañía israelí Rafael se instala en España con la compra de la empresa local PAP Tecnos”, infodefensa.com, 14 June 2010.


129 “La industria israelí busca complementar a la española en materia de innovación de sistemas de seguridad”, infodefensa.com.


320 “General Aviel, SIBAT: ‘Es cuestión de tiempo que los esfuerzos de Navantia en Israel se vean recompensados’”. Infodefensa.com, 7 January 2013.


322 “La compañía israelí Rafael se instala en España con la compra de la empresa local PAP Tecnos”. Infodefensa.com, 14 June 2010. Instalaza was notorious for having sold MAT-120 cluster munitions in 2008 to the Libyan dictator Muamar el Gadaﬁ, used against the civilian population of the city of Misratah. On that year, the then Minister of Defence, Pedro Morenés, was a member of the Board of Directors. See Jordi Calvo [2012]: “Un ministro de armas tomar”, Diario de un Altermundista, 9 January, available at: http://blogs.publico.es/alternundista/643/un-ministro-de-armas-tomar/ [Accessed: 15 September 2013].

323 “La compañía israelí Rafael se instala en España con la compra de la empresa local PAP Tecnos”, Op. Cit.


326 See its corporate website at: http://www.aeronautics-sys.com/


343 Ibid.


346 Ibid.


348 See the corporative web: www.triedro.es


380. The SPLYLite has a wingspan of 240X300 cm, is 125 cm long, weighs 8 kg, a cruising speed of 50Km/h, a flight duration of more than three hours and a range of over 30 Km. “Triedro estará presente en UNVEX 2012 con sus UAS MICRO B, SPLYLITE B Y BOOMERANG”, press release of Triedro/Revenga Group, 18 2011, available at: http://www. unvex12.com/docs/TRIEDRO-nota-prensa.pdf [Accessed: 13 July 2013].


385. According to the report, in 2011 it tried to buy British components to export to Pakistan. Radar systems, electronic warfare systems, Head-up Cockpit Displays (HUDs), engine parts for fighter jets and aircrafts, spy optics, components of military electronic systems and of training aircrafts. In 2010, Israel requested permission to export electronic warfare systems and HUDs with components from the UK to Pakistan. Aluf Benn (2012): “Britain refused Israel military equipment for fear it would add to “internal repression””, Haaretz, 12 June.


390. The image “100% made in Israel” with the Star of David is taken from the Guardian’s webpage. See http://www. guardianspain.com [Accessed: 3 May 2013].


394. In most cases the products are supplied by Guardian Homeland Security and distributed by other companies. In the case of AGILITE, the official distributor is “Teyde Tecnología y Desarrollo”, whereas for FAB Defense, it is SNV. See http://www. guardianespa.com [Accessed: 3 May 2013].


401. This company is located in the Polygon Can Roca,C/ Can Fenosa, 20, 08107, Martorells, Barcelona, and its telephone no. is 902 11 13 66.


411. Ibid.
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427. Ibid.


425. Ibid.

424. According to a telephone interview of 5 December 2013 with Ángela Biancorosso, manager of Agilite.


419. Telephone interview of 5 December, with the manager of SNV.


416. Ibid.


404. Pedro Morenés has held important managing positions in the Shipbuilding division of the National Industry Institute. During José María Aznar’s government, he was appointed Secretary of State, first for Defence, and then for Security. He then became secretary of State for Scientific and Technological Policy in the Ministry of Science and Technology and, under Mariano Rajoy, Minister of Defence. In the private sector, Morenés has served as chairman and other senior positions in at least twelve occasions, always in companies related to arms and security. He was chairman of MBDA Spain, a missile systems firm, which in 2010 sold more than 20,000 missiles to countries like Brunei, India, Lebanon, Indonesia, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. He was adviser and representative of Instalaza, a company headquartered in Zaragoza, which produced cluster bombs until July 2008, when they were finally banned. MAT-120 cluster bombs produced by this company were launched by Gaddafi on Misratah [Libya]. Morenés was serving as counselor or representative of Instalaza when the operation was decided and when the company claimed 40 million euros from the Spanish Government in compensation for damages and lost profits following the ban on cluster bombs. Morenés has also chaired Segur Ibérica, a private security firm, which used public money and weapons supplied by Defence, to provide protection to tuna vessels operating in waters near Somalia. Jordi Calvo (2012): “Un tecnocrata de les armes”, Ar2, 9 January, available at: http://www.centredelas.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8383&Itemid=6 [Accessed: 18 May 2013].


399. While there does not seem to be a direct relationship with Israel, and as an example of the importance of these analysis systems, the University of Barcelona offers a postgraduate programme called: “Management Models and Planning tools for Different Risk Profiles”, as well as the postgraduate degree “Risk Management: Detection of Risk Profiles “ which includes a “Master in Private Security”, a degree recognized not only by the University of Barcelona, but also by the Ministry of Interior of Spain. See http://www.ub.edu/criminologia/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/TRIPTICO_SEGURIDAD.pdf [Accessed: 20 June 2013].


454 The headquarters of this trade enterprise in Spain coincided with the company H Capital, the most important investment entity of the Hachuel group, located in paseo de la Castellana, Madrid. In addition, the executive center of H Seguridad, located in a building in Génova street, is the same which ICTS referred to in all its documents as the Spanish headquarters."Una compañía israelí de seguridad opera ilegalmente en España", Op. Cit.

455 Amir Eshet attended the congress Security 89 on 20 June, representing simultaneously two companies. Ferran Sales and Joaquín Prieto [1989b]: "La policía ha investigado durante nueve meses la estructura de seguridad montada por el grupo Hachuel", El País, 2 November. On the other hand, on Eshet's visit card it clearly stated:"ICTS [España]", and below that, the address Eshet's visit card it clearly stated:"ICTS [España]", and below that, the address..."H Seguridad, located in a building in Génova street, is the same which ICTS referred to in all its documents as the Spanish headquarters."Una compañía israelí de seguridad opera ilegalmente en España", Op. Cit.


458 López del Hierro was civil governor of the province of Toledo. Since contracting marriage with De Cospedal, he has chaired eleven companies. See http://www.elpural.com/2012/10/02/el-esposo-de-cospedal-ha-estado-en-la-direccion-de-once-empresas-desde-que-ella-es-secretaria-general-del-pp/ [Accessed: 9 June 2013].


462 Una compañía israelí de seguridad opera ilegalmente en España", El País, 20 November.


464 It is well known that Europa Press mentioned this point from information taken from the newspaper Haaretz which, however, claimed that no previous intelligence information existed. Compare Europa Press (2010): "Una empresa de seguridad israelí permitió a Abdulmutallab subir al avión en Ámsterdam saltándose su normativa", 10 January, con Yossi Melman (2010): Op. Cit.


469 In 2008, Fraport AG sold to Deutsche Beteiligungs AG, ICTS Europe Holdings B.V. [100% subsidiary since 2002], and one of its shared investment funds. According to Fraport AG, it was sold for 100 million euros. At the moment of selling, ICTS Europe was operating in 81 locations in 24 countries, with a staff of about 10.100 people. According to Fraport, in 2007, ICTS reported close to 320 million euros in revenues. "Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide is selling its subsidiary ICTS", press release in fecha de Fraport, available at: http://www.fraport.com/content/fraport/en/misc/binair/investor-relations-/ad_hoc_releases/ad_hoc_release_fraportagissellingitssubsidiaryicts/jcr:content/file/file.pdf [Accessed: 21 July 2013].


477 See www.demco.co.il
The license of the Ministry of Interior was solely for operating on “advice and planning security systems”. However, ISDS also marketed safety equipment, despite the lack of proper administrative permission. Ferran Sales and Peru Egurbide (1989c): “Un ex ‘conseller’ de la Generalitat gestionó en Israel la asociación de su empresa de seguridad con ISDS Ltd.”, El País, 16 November.


Data from the article by Ferran Sales and Peru Egurbide (1989c): Op. Cit.


Luis Solana has served as a military, politician and businessman. He has been a Socialist deputy, the Deputy General Manager of Banco Urquijo, the President of Telefónica and the General Manager of Radiotelevisión Española. While a military, he was in close contact with the Ministry of Defense and chaired the European Observatory on Security and Defence. He is the brother of Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO High Representative of the Council for Foreign Policy and Security Policy of the European Union and Commander of EUFOR.


See the website of ISDS: http://www.isds.co.il/clientele.htm


See for example: “Israel-España: Firman acuerdo contra terrorismo y delincuencia”, El Mundo.es, 4


533 Ibid.


540 Interview with a Civil Guard officer, 25 May 2013.

541 Like the Special Intervention Unit (UEI) or the General Intervention Unit (UIE), the police now require “a course in antigang and anti-terrorism and protection of civilians”. Interview with Ilan Arzooan, founder of the security company Guardian LTD Israel”, Armoxes, printed edition, April-May 2008, pp.8-9.


547 See also the course on the website http://www.guardianspain.com/cursos-de-especializacion-en-combate-zona-urbana-y-entrada-inmuebles/ [Accessed: 21 July 2013].


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Military, arms and security trade relations between Spain and Israel


Guillermo de Miguel Ruano (2012): “Informe sobre el estado de los proyectos de colaboración entre empresas y organismos de Israel y España”, Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of Spain in Tel Aviv, ICEX, June, p.25.


http://www.ict.org.il


For example, in the 2011 edition, one of the lecturers was Fernando Reinares, professor of Political Science at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and former advisor to the Minister of Interior. Another lecturer was José Sanmartín, professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Administration. In 2012, participation was on the working group on synergies between illegal immigration and terrorism of the Minister of the Interior of the Embassy of Spain in Israel, the inspector of the CNP, Álvaro Lossada. See Julio Laguardia (2012): Op. Cit.


See www.catedraespanaisrael.co [Accessed: 15 September 2013].


For example, Francisco Bragulat Parrilla, director de Recursos Humanos de Securitas Transport Aviation Security, See http://catedraespanaisrael.co/4. html [Accessed: 30 September 2013].


Of the Israeli groups, Elbit Systems and Verint Systems were involved in three projects; Halevi Dweck B Co, Ernest and Young [Israel] Ltd, Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd and Tel Aviv University participated in two; whereas the rest only participated in one project [Arttic Israel International Management Services, Azimuth Technologies Ltd, C.A.L> Argo Airlines Ltd, Motorola Israel Ltd, Arttic Israel Company Ltd, Opgal Optronics Industries Ltd, Israeli Airports Authority, Matimop, Israeli Industry Centre for Research and Development, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, International Security and Counter-Terrorism Academy, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Correlations Systems Ltd, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Bar Ilan University, Aeronautics Defense Systems, Maden David Adom in Israel]


Details on all the above projects can be found in the CORDIS database of the European Union.

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