PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

Is it a war?
Jihadism and terrorism

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Introduction
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The cities of Barcelona and Cambrils suffered a serious jihadist attack in August 2017 that shook Catalan and Spanish society. Although attacks of this kind had already occurred in other parts of Europe, until then they had mainly struck in the Arab world, in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia. These terrorist attacks in Catalonia have prompted many analysts to reflect on the Jihadist phenomenon, and the **Delàs Centre for Peace Studies** has wanted to contribute to opening up a field of study, from the perspective of peace, on this new form of terrorism. The goal is to investigate the reasons for the global spread of this phenomenon, and understand how young Muslim residents integrated in the community of Ripoll could embrace a cause that would impel them to attack the society that had welcomed them.

Opening this field of study can be useful to understand not only the phenomenon of violent jihadist extremism, but also because "international terrorism" is, today, a main concern of Western states and appears prominently as the leading threat in the national defence strategies of both the United States and all its allies, including the Spanish state. But even for states who are not allies of the United States, such as Russia, it is a central concern.

Thus, we wanted to ascertain if this was merely an excuse to create new enemies to further justify the endless arms race of the USA and its loyal allies, or whether there was a connection with objective reality; indeed, whether the jihadist danger represents a critical obstacle to coexistence in our societies. So we decided to initiate a shared study among the members of the Centre and translate it into the publication that you have in your hands.

An initial concern was to question the very concept of "terrorism", a controversial topic in political science and among the international community, and to ask ourselves whether it is appropriate to apply the definition exclusively to people who threaten the order imposed by a state, or whether the same definition should also be applied to states themselves. We should also ask ourselves about the causes behind the concept of jihad and the radical current of jihadism, as well as its relationship with Islam and the stereotypes that have been created around the Muslim religion which have led to Islamophobia. Similarly, we could not avoid looking into the origins of the declaration made by the United States after 9-11 in 2001, when the United States initiated a global war on terror and the subsequent wars that were a result of that declaration. It is a strategy that could be in the interest of those motivated by continued US global hegemonic domination and the profits from the resulting dependence on weaponry.

This is the source of the "fears" that jihadism has awakened in Western countries, and it is worthwhile to question whether these are fully justified, or are the result of other motivations, particularly when the deaths produced by terrorism have been insignificant compared to those produced by other insecurities in people's lives. A reflection that led us to conclude that jihadism cannot be fought from the military sphere or by cutting back on rights and freedoms, but that it must be treated by acting on the underlying causes and by seeking an interdisciplinary combination to prevent it.

We are aware that there are gaps in this publication, and that important aspects of terrorism are not dealt with, and we intend to expand on them in future publications.

Debates on terrorism

Pere Ortega

Efforts to understand and define terrorism have always encountered both academic and political obstacles. So much so that it has not been possible, despite many attempts at the international level, to reach a consensus on the concept of terrorism. Some of the difficulties are listed below.

If violence is understood as an attack against the physical or moral integrity of a person in order to limit or nullify their capacity for freedom, when this violence is exercised through armed action, whether by a state, a group or an individual, if the action has a political purpose, it will be difficult to qualify it as a terrorism. This is due to a compelling reason. Under natural law, no one, neither persons nor states, has the right to assault a person's physical integrity unless in self-defence. But it is not an easy question to elucidate whether either party in a violent conflict can legitimately argue the right of self-defence. Self-defence can be exercised not only against personal violence, but also when the violence is structural or cultural. When a dominant group or state subjects people to shameful conditions that prevent them from meeting basic needs that allow them to live with dignity or allow them to exercise rights in accordance with their natural, religious or cultural environment to the extent of nullifying their identity (Galtung, 1996), then there can be legitimate arguments for self-defence.

This warning is appropriate because violence by oppressed peoples, on numerous occasions, is a reaction to the above-mentioned personal, structural or cultural violence exerted by power groups or states, in fact, often to all three types of violence. By way of example, the Palestinian population suffers all three forms of violence: personal, structural and cultural under

the oppression and apartheid to which it is subjected by the State of Israel. Reactive violence has been considered legitimate from an ethical point of view by different thinkers (Sartre, 1961). Considering this, when a violent attack is made against people with political ends, it will have to be clarified if it is a legitimate violence or not. If the action is justified from an ethical point of view, it will be difficult to describe it as terrorist. But despite this, several considerations will still have to be taken into account before violence can be justified.

One is when violence is used disproportionately against non-combatant populations. This is a crucial distinction, because an attack against innocent people is considered to be the antithesis of legitimate violence (González Calleja, 2017). Because the generation of terror among a population, ethnicity, ideology or followers of a religion can be qualified as terrorist when the attackers have acted without moral or humanitarian considerations and have dedicated themselves to attacking the civilian population, infringing as much evil as possible to obtain political advantages to try to subvert a government considered enemy. Then the attack can be described as terrorist.

Another point to observe is that terrorism is not a doctrine, but a strategy, a method of fighting that can be used by any ideology to achieve political objectives. It is an instrument that has been used both governments and political groups alike. It has been practiced by Nazism, Stalinism, Zionism, anarchism and multiple armed groups of different ideologies.

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According to Alex J. Bellamy, terrorism has five defining elements:

- Terrorism is politically motivated violence.
- It seeks to overthrow or subdue a state with a specific goal.
- It achieves its aims by creating fear in society.
- It is carried out by non-state actors.
- It targets non-combatants.

All states formulate terrorism using the same arguments as Bellamy: they exclude themselves from practicing terror by only considering terrorism to be violence used by non-state actors. This is totally inappropriate because, as has been pointed out, states, when it suits them, have used terrorism. Right-

wing and left-wing states, democratic, authoritarian or dictatorships, when interested, have used state or parastatal agents in a clandestine manner to carry out actions outside of the established laws granting the legitimate use of violence. They have done the same against external and internal enemies and have occasionally used torture, deprivation of liberty or even murder. Thus, state terrorism ignores the norms established in national or international human rights and acts in a manner that does not respect the courts of law, responsible for differentiating actors suspected of attempting to subvert the state from the innocent population.

Evidently, this is nothing new. In the past, many states gave permission (*carte blanche*) to pirates and corsairs to act outside the law, or to other armed groups to act as both mercenaries and bandits. These groups operated in the diffuse terrain between legality and illegality. More recently, paramilitaries, bodyguards, militia, guerrillas, jihadists, private police and the mafia also receive state support. The problem arises because violence perpetrated by these groups is described as terrorist by groups or states that suffer from it, while states that promote it deny the accusation of terrorism. Thus, paramilitary and parapolice groups have been known to illegitimately practice violence with the support of states when it suited them. The secret service agencies of the CIA, the Mossad, the GAL in Spain in the 1980s and many others, connected with parastatal groups, have practiced "dirty wars". Sometimes they have even been used to combat social movements and groups that represent a nuisance to state policy, such as, for example, when the French state sank the Rainbow Warrior in July 1985, a Greenpeace ship protesting French nuclear weapons tests in Mururoa in Polynesia.

Therefore, when we talk about the legitimate violence of states, if we don't speak with clarity, it can take us down the wrong path. Because the aforementioned illegal actions are outside of the rule of law, they enter into field of being qualified as terrorism. Similarly, authoritarian states and dictatorships have practiced indiscriminate terror using extreme violence against a sector of the nation's population. This was done by the Indonesian military dictatorship (1968), which killed hundreds of thousands or perhaps a million people accused of being communists; the regimes of the countries of "Real" socialism, such as the KGB in Russia, the Stasi in the GDR and many others. Similar atrocities were committed by parastatal groups under Fascism and Nazism, as in Mussolini's Italy with the Black Shirts; the SA in Hitler's Germany; the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance during the military dicta-

torship of 1970, and other cases in Latin America: Chile (1973-74), Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador or Colombia, where the goal was to eliminate social activists and trade unionists. In all such cases, it is appropriate to speak of "state terrorism".

But why not talk about state terrorism when armed attacks are launched with empty arguments? When the United States attacked and invaded Afghanistan for having hidden Bin Laden; or when the United States did the same in Iraq accusing Saddam Hussein's government of hiding weapons of mass destruction, which proved false. Also in the bombings by US forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia; or Turkish, Israeli, French, United States and Russian attacks in Syria; or Russia in Chechnya; or Israel in occupied and colonized Palestine; or the South African apartheid regime's mistreatment of the black population; or many others.

State violence has additional considerations. For example, if it is exercised by a non-democratic state, then violence can also be considered illegitimate since the government does not enjoy the consensus of its population. And, if it is democratic and the violent action does not have sufficient support among the citizens, it could also be considered illegitimate. This is the case of the excessive force used by the police in Catalonia on October 1, 2017, or that of Daniel Ortega's government in Nicaragua against massive protests by his opponents in April 2018.

Even when considered legitimate, violence even in democratic states can still violate the fundamental rights of the internal population and, in this sense, be questionable. For example, after the attack on the twin towers on 11 September 2001 in the United States, under the fear of the terrorist threat, the Government adopted the 2002 *Homeland Security Act*. The strategy combined police, military and security aspects in all national spheres, both public and private, and several new agencies were created to exercise strict surveillance over the civilian population in airports, ports, communications, Internet and financial transactions. Fear that the enemy was within the territory itself led to the passing of the *Patriot Act*, aimed at a surveillance of the general population aimed at violating citizens' rights and freedoms, such as arbitrary detention, a violation of *habeas corpus* rights, and even the reprehensible practice of torture.

This surveillance and control of the population control also expanded into Europe. In 2003, the European Union drafted the European Security Strategy (ESS), aimed at preventing external insecurities, including terrorism, violent

religious extremism and migration. To face these alleged threats, the FRON-TEX border control agency, was set up, with a worrisome militarisation of the missions of the agency, using heavy military equipment, aircraft, combat helicopters and armed maritime surveillance vessels. Equipment specially designed for the surveillance of Europe's southern border, the Mediterranean Sea. Reinforcement of border security in order to prevent the arrival of immigrants, with special attention to those arriving from Arab lands under the alleged danger that they will be jihadists arriving with the intention of carrying out attacks on European soil. So much so that the EU implemented major development aid and other special aid in a large part to countries of North Africa and the Sahel (Eritrea, Northern Sudan, and Libya) aimed at stopping the arrival of migrants in Europe. This aid, destined for the purchase of weapons, therefore, is providing a military response to a humanitarian problem. The real causes of migration have to do with wars, in which European countries also participate, and climate change, rising temperatures and desertification, for which the model of economic development of the enriched countries is in large part responsible, for an excessive consumption of nonrenewable energy (Font, 2016).

This obsession with security also is affecting Europe's indigenous population, particularly those with roots in the Middle East and North Africa who are already established in Europe.

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More examples of state terrorism can be found in most wars. Whether or not war is declared (few states continue to officially declare war), unjustifiable atrocities are committed in all of them. Cities are bombed, non-combatant civilians are massacred, women are raped, ethnic cleansing is practised, genocide, torture and crimes which, in many cases, can be described as crimes against humanity. Despite the existence of an international treaty regulating war and condemning the crimes – the Geneva Convention of 1948, in practice the Convention isn't effective, because the offending groups and states are not held accountable. If it were, many of these atrocities would be described as terrorism. But there are always those who downplay them and say that one cannot speak of terrorism because, in war, the main objective is to defeat the enemy and destroy any civilian structure that may have a strategic military value that can help win the war more quickly. It is argued

that it will save suffering and death on both sides. It is the reason maintained by the United States Government to justify the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An argument stretched to justify the practice of torture of detainees accused of terrorism after 9/11, as secrets obtained could supposedly prevent new attacks and the associated suffering and loss of human life.

This brings us back to the moral question. Proponents of the concept of "just wars" argue that if a war is just one cannot speak of terrorism (Walzer, 1977).

But entering into that debate is sterile, because those who start wars always argue that their cause is just. And those who defend themselves against aggression also argue that they have the right to defend themselves and, therefore, it is fair to use violence. This means it is impossible to claim that arbitrary and disproportionate acts are not committed against non-military personnel in wars.

If we change the scenario and place ourselves in states with authoritarian regimes or dictatorships that harshly repress the slightest internal dissent, or in colonized countries under military occupation, there have been internal movements of rebellion that have pushed groups to use armed violence to try to free their country from unbearable oppression of occupation or dictatorship. It is true that they could have chosen non-violent methods, but it is not always easy, especially because of the harsh response that the oppressor can use. Armed groups like these have often resorted to sabotage and planted bombs that have resulted in the deaths of innocents. Acts of this kind have been carried out by partisans, maquis, guerrillas and national liberation groups against fascist or military dictatorships in Latin America and other continents. Should these groups be considered terrorist? Or the actions they committed terrorism? Different intellectuals have provided conflicting answers on these questions.

Among thinkers who have argued in favour of armed struggle as a liberating force for oppressed peoples, Frantz Fanon stands out. His ideas, widely discussed within the anti-colonial movement, fostered the use of violence in all its variants, including attacks against non-combatants in the metropolis of the colonizers (Fanon, 1961). Fanon himself became involved with the National Liberation Front (FLN) in the war for Algeria's independence (1954-1962).

For Fanon, Jean Paul Sartre and a good part of the political left, attacks of violent extremism could not be qualified as terrorism, because life under

military occupation was tyranny so unbearable that it justified the right to self-defence, and legitimated attacks upon the population as an accomplice to the unjust aggression they suffered. This is the case of so many guerrillas of the 1960s and 1970s who fought against colonial occupation or to overthrow dictatorial governments of great social injustice. A radical thought that justified violence in any of its variants. But those attacks, qualified as terrorism by the states, also received criticism from left-wing thinkers as well. A variety of voices argued against pragmatic violence. Albert Camus, using moral arguments, wrote multiple articles against violence upon civilians in the Algerian war (Camus, 2002). And, in an earlier essay, at the end of the Second World War, he plead for a stance of "neither victims nor executioners" (Camus, 2014), in which, although he justified the war against the "evil" represented by Nazism, he insisted that his people not take revenge on the German enemy. Another thinker, Hannah Arendt, observing the rise of the Black Panthers in several U.S. cities and their exaltation of violence, rejected the possibility that violence could generate political freedom or empower groups practicing it. For Arendt, power could only emerge from social consensus, never from the "tip of a gun" as "Che" Guevara claimed (Arendt, 1969). Throughout an extensive body of work, Gandhi also denied that violence could have any liberating or emancipating effect, arguing that violence only begets violence. Along with this phrase that has been countlessly repeated, Gandhi also added that which is achieved by violence alone can only be maintained with violence (Gandhi, 2001). A thought reaffirmed from moral philosophy by numerous authors (among them, Martínez Guzmán, 2001), who maintains that there has to be an "epistemological change" in the conventional idea that violence is inevitable to resolve conflicts, to one in which humanity has the means to overcome conflict by peaceful means and without doing harm. He added that it is utopian to think that violence can generate peace; its use results in continued conflict and war. Realism obliges us to search for other means to find solutions.

But there are cases where violent extremism is even more controversial. In the case of countries with formal democracy where social consensus has established rules of coexistence, some groups have used armed violence to change the political system and have attacked the civilian population with the intention of subverting the established order. Examples of groups that acted to overthrow systems with formal democracy by using violence against

civilians are ETA and the IRA, which fought for the national liberation of the Basque Country and Northern Ireland, and the Red Brigades and the Red Army (RAF), which sought to combat capitalism by attacking the state. Can these groups be described as terrorists? In these cases there is a more general consensus among political science scholars (Tilly, 2003), who affirm that if there is a social contract among the population to provide itself with a rule of law, those who try to subvert it using armed violence can be qualified as terrorists.

The extreme right has also used armed violence within democratic states. In the so-called "years of lead" in Italy, Argentina, Belgium; and in the Spanish State, during the decade of transition after Franco's death, several ultra-right groups, the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance and the Basque Spanish Battalion, among others, carried out multiple attacks and murders. But rather than try and overthrow the state, these groups sought to defend it and make it return to dictatorship or prevent the left from reaching power. The same occurred in Catalonia and Spain in the 1920s, when employers hired gunmen to kill trade unionists. These are forms of violence that groups of different ideologies have practiced against people or social groups. Other examples include the Ku Kux Klan, which terrorizes the black community in the United States; or the armed violence of isolated individuals killing indiscriminately in schools, universities or public spaces. Their crimes are treated as ordinary crimes and never as terrorist attacks.

Gender-based violence is also practiced indiscriminately against women in the form of rape. How do you qualify the planned and organized mass-rape against women of a nation or ethnic group? In 1945, following the occupation of Berlin by the Soviet army, in a retaliatory act against the German people, the Russian military command ordered the systematic rape of all the women in Berlin between the ages of 14 and 70. Or the mass rape of women carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1992-94 war by Croatian and Serbian military groups. This was violence with the goal of terrorizing the Bosnian population.

Anarchist thinkers have also argued in favour of armed action to attack the bourgeois state, considering it a legitimate enemy to fight and destroy. The movement has had pacifists (Proudhon, Domela Nieuwenhuis), but also radical advocates of violent direct action (Bakunin, Malatesta...) who did not hesitate to use indiscriminate violence to achieve their revolutionary objectives. Was the bomb dropped into the audience of the Liceu theatre in

Barcelona in November 1893 a terrorist attack? For pacifist anarchists, there can be no doubt. But other anarchists have justified violence to overthrow the state.

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In conclusion: as described above, if an action of self-defence against violent aggression is considered legitimate from an ethical point of view, to call it terrorism is arbitrary because it is very difficult to determine whether the action is legitimate or not. But, at the same time, social scientists who have studied violence as a political instrument do not hesitate to describe any action directed against non-combatant civilians as terrorism (Tilly, González Calleja, Bellamy and many others). Thus, violent extremism, whether practiced by a state, group or person of any political sign, can be qualified as terrorism when the actions are indiscriminately directed against civilian non-combatants.

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The causes of *jihadism*
Xavier Mojal

The concept of *jihad*, according to the original source, the Koran, refers in most cases to personal effort and faith in the face of challenges, while in others it has warlike connotations, although always defensive and accompanied by strict rules to avoid the deaths of Muslims or the innocent. However, in Western countries the word has acquired negative connotations to the point of being understood as 'holy war', as a result of the uncritical – or ill-intentioned – repetition by the mass-media, of the term as it is used by violent extremist Islamist groups. Totalitarian armed groups, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State, Al-Qaeda or Boko Haram, interpret the term *jihad* to justify the perverse use of violence. The qualification of these groups as jihadists has been popularized to the extent that even though we dislike the term, we will use it to refer to them.

Given this introduction, jihadist terrorism is currently (and has been for decades) considered to be one of the main threats to global security. At least, it is the most widely reported – compare the content generated in the mass media in comparison to climate change, for example – or in terms of efforts made by leaders to (supposedly) eliminate or avoid it. Of course, jihadism has not simply appeared out of the blue. And let us not forget, it *is* a threat to human security – particularly to Muslim women – whom Western governments do not welcome. So let us consider the inevitable debate on the causes for its appearance, which is so fashionable, especially in the western countries that have suffered from jihadist attacks.

First of all, it is important to avoid oversimplifying the phenomenon or following linear explanations. One must also bear in mind that jihadist

groups operate in very different contexts, from the most affluent European countries with great economic opportunities to countries at war with high levels of extreme poverty. Thus, it is necessary to propose dynamic hypotheses which can connect the diverse causes underlying jihadism. Furthermore, to understand all terrorism, not just jihadist, we will call upon two concepts which are still being developed; violent extremism and radicalisation. Although there is a lack of consensus on their definitions, as is the case with the term 'terrorism', we can try to define them here. Violent extremism involves the adoption of an inflexible and intolerant ideology and its implementation (or a willingness to do so) by violent means (OPEV, 2017); it is the phase leading up to terrorism and the subject of preventive measures against it (CVE policies, Countering Violent Extremism). Radicalisation – without entering into a debate about the positive connotations inherent in the term 'radical' – refers to the process by which an individual or group of people adopt such extreme ideologies. Thus, the contemporary study of the causes underlying terrorism focuses on the phenomenon of radicalization, a process influenced by a wide variety of factors in which a person adopts violent extremism and ends up being willing to commit terrorist acts.

The criminological interest in profiling the psychological and socio-economic factors of jihadists on Western soil, whether or not they have committed terrorist acts, is well known. the most likely profile (Hecker, 2018) is male, young, from a Muslim immigrant family, raised in a disadvantaged and marginal neighbourhood, without success in studies, and with a criminal record (and having served time in prison, in many cases a place of radicalisation and jihadism). However, even if these factors, largely socio-economic, might lead to a certain psychology that pushes one to embrace an extreme ideology and apply it violently, they do not by themselves explain why the vast majority of people who meet these or similar requirements do not become terrorists. Nor they do not clarify other profiles that do not fit these factors, such as people who are (apparently) socially integrated, middle class, educated (even in with university degrees), or converts, to mention some examples. The psychosocial perspective, therefore, is not definitive.

Jihadist Salafist Ideology, the Fuel of Jihadist Terrorism

A characteristic shared by all radical jihadists everywhere is the adoption of Salafist Jihadist ideology. As Moussa Bourekba (2018b) aptly explains, this ideology combines an (ultra-)orthodox religious component with geopolitics and eschatology, or apocalyptic beliefs. In terms of theology it seeks to establish a purist Islam based on the practice and rigorous reading of its sacred sources, while eradicating any interpretations or practices considered as deviant with excommunication and violence. In the geopolitical field it defends jihad (an aggressive and violent interpretation) against Western enemies everywhere. However, Jihadism is one current of common Salafism, an interpretation of Sunni Islam that is extremely conservative, rigorous, uncompromising, intolerant, patriarchal, but not necessarily violent or political. In other words, there are completely apolitical Salafist communities that do not call for violence to impose their doctrine. This orthodox and rigorous doctrine has been around for centuries. According to the Salafists, Salafism is as old as Islam, given that the term Salaf refers to the Prophet Mohammed, his environment and the next two generations of Muslims, who were considered to be practitioners of pure and original Islam, and thus worthy of imitation. However, as a doctrine, the origins of Salafism are in the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, today predominant in the Arabian peninsula. It was founded by Ibn Hanbal (780-855 AD), further developed by the medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) and resurrected by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703-1791). The latter, already at that time came to a pact with the Saud family, by which, in exchange for support for his religious movement he swore allegiance to the family and thus legitimized his political power. It is important to remember that the Saud family, founder of Saudi Arabia in the first decades of the twentieth century, took control of the entire territory of the present state from the Ottoman Empire, and reinforced its power, thanks to the support of the British. Later, in the middle of the century, Saudi Arabia's greatest ally and protector would become the United States of America, in exchange for the most valued resource of the contemporary economy, oil. As we all know, the petrodollars of the Wahhabite regime of the House of Saud have had an important role in the expansion of the most rigid, intolerant and backward Islam. They have been, to a certain extent, a factor pushing the faithful towards radicalization and violent extremism all over the world.

But if we don't want to delve that far back in history, we can fit jihadist Salafism (the political, activist and violent current) into the latest current of the history of political Islam (Islamism). Islamism – which refers to the set of ideological projects of a political nature for the implementation of sharia, or religious law (Gomez Garcia, 2009: 165) – finds its theoretical foundations in the works of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), and his follower, also Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), as well as the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, Abu A'la Maududi, and within Shi'a political Islam, in the writings of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Iraq) and Ruhollah Khomeini (Iran). The theology of war of Sayyid Qutb, a man who was imprisoned, tortured (and, as one would expect, increasingly radicalised over time) and finally executed in Egypt by the Nasser regime, is among the most influential works of Jihadist thought (Burgat, 2008).

Contemporary Islamism can be divided into three distinct historical periods, according to François Burgat (2017: 17-31). The first, starting in the second half of the 19th century, was an intellectual movement resisting colonisation using one's own cultural heritage (Islam) in the political space, with authors such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and later with the organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood founded by the aforementioned Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. In the second, following the independence of the Arab countries, Islamism focused its efforts on a more symbolic terrain, against the post-colonial indigenous political order, mostly Arab nationalist, secular and very popular, considered as continuist in the cultural field (using terminology and adopting ideas arising in the West – nationalism, socialism and secularism). Important actors in this period were the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and its branches throughout the Arab world, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, or the triumphant Islamic revolutionary movement in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini (1979). The third period is that which we are currently living in – though we are yet to explore the dynamics established after the Arab springs of 2011. Much of political Islam has been normalized into institutions and co-opted by power, renouncing original claims for pan-Islamism and an Islamic state. However, coinciding with the unilateral push for global control after the fall of the USSR, we also find the rise of Jihadist Salafism, our object of analysis.

Many factors explain the rise of popular support for political Islam throughout the Muslim world, but especially in the Arab world, including

the failure of authoritarian Arab regimes to maintain popular support, both due to their authoritarianism and because of their inability to provide for and develop the region. The failure of Arab nationalism and socialism, the two pillars of the political project of the regimes that emerged from independence, explains the rise of political Islam. In any case, what explains why the Jihadist Salafist minority has gained so much support that it is capable of destabilizing the region? The origin of Jihadist Salafism, as a violent revolutionary and transnational movement, was in the war in Afghanistan. The mujahedin fighters – many of them foreigners – received financial, military and logistical support mainly from Saudi Arabia and the USA, to fight Soviet troops on the behalf of the Afghan communist government. This was the embryo of Al-Qaeda – the 'base', in Arabic – installed in Peshawar, Pakistan, to channel many of the fighters willing to die to expel the 'infidel' USSR from the Muslim lands of Afghanistan, and led by Osama Bin Laden, a son of the prolific Laden family, multimillionaires and owners of the construction conglomerate, the Saudi Binladin Group. After the Soviet withdrawal, the fall of the communist regime and a long period of internal struggles and civil war, power was finally seized by the Taliban, a fundamentalist political-religious current that allowed the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the country. The foreign mujahedin fighters returned to their countries, or encouraged by the victory against their Russian atheist enemies, enlisted in new wars in defence of mistreated Muslim populations, such as in Bosnia or Chechnya.

As for Bin Laden and his colleague Ayman al-Zawahiri (originally from Egypt), following the success of the jihad in Afghanistan, they founded the so-called al-Qaeda in 1988, with the intention of carrying out a new logic of combat in the face of the failures of the Islamist struggles of recent decades (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, or the failure of the introduction of jihadism in Bosnia). This change refers to the internationalist approach that worked so well in Afghanistan, but instead of directing it only towards 'the enemy next door' (established power in Muslim states), the main target of attack would become 'the distant enemy' (the Western world) (Kepel, 2005: 94-95). Indiscriminate terrorism towards the West would act as a mobilizing resource for the population, thanks to the media coverage available with the globalization of communication, for the progressive achievement of the final objective – the overthrow of established power, the establishment of an Islamic society unified under an Islamic state. In the decade of the 90's there were attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and

Kenya, then the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, followed by the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001. The terrorist act on American soil triggered George W. Bush's call for a "War on Terror", and would justify the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq. Attacks on Western interests began to multiply, above all in countries of the Middle East and North Africa, but without changing the strategy of attacking the distant enemy – including the attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid and 7 July 2005 in London.

These wars initiated by the US and its allies would degenerate into chaotic internal conflicts with a multiplicity of armed groups with affiliations to different ethnic groups, confessions and interests, all fighting to fill the power vacuum. Conflicts that, without entering into the specificity of each of those that exist today in the Middle East and North Africa, have continued following the Arab springs of 2011 demanding the fall of the oppressive regimes, with an abundance of foreign military interventions (not only Western) and inconsistencies in Western foreign policy. The chaos and destruction which have affected the region in different intensities, as well as poverty and the lack of opportunities for a decent future, is the breeding ground for the penetration of jihadism. The project is nourished by the suffering and frustration of all the peoples of the Muslim world, and that uses every grievance – many of which are legitimate – to make the global Muslim community identify themselves as victims, and gains recruits by promising alternatives. Among these grievances, the Palestinian case is recurrent, a mirror of the frustrations of the Arab world, where the number one ally of the West in the region, Israel, applies a system of apartheid, occupation and colonization against the Palestinian population with complete impunity.

Given the violence and frustration generated in the Arab and Muslim world, the allure of the Jihadist discourse grows and allows the proliferation of numerous groups of Jihadist mentality. The Islamic State (EI) is the greatest example, having been able to consolidate a territory between Syria and Iraq where they installed their Caliphate. This infamous armed group is the result of the dismantling of the regular Iraqi army carried out during US occupation, and that has taken advantage of Sunni suffering, itself the result of the repressive policies of the pseudo-democratic Shi'a power established after the American invasion. An armed group that has come to have at its 'best' moment more than 30,000 military personnel, many of whom are foreigners (especially from the Maghreb) with no less than 10% of European

origin (ICG, 2017), and a monthly income of up to 80 million dollars from the sale on the black market of oil, antiques, extortion, ransom payments, confiscation of goods (including banks) and taxes from citizens in the territories under their control (P. Clark et. al., 2017). A group that has declared war on the West, asking its followers to join its ranks in Iraq and Syria, where they have committed real massacres – against confessional minorities, such as the Yazidi community, or against anyone considered to be an 'infidel' – and have committed indiscriminate attacks in Western countries. A group that, unlike Al-Qaeda, has successfully implemented a state, at least a project with many of its attributes (administration of the territory, measures of self-financing, provision of public services and a monopoly of violence), a state that supposedly represents Islam, and thanks also to a strong investment in communication (propaganda), has attracted many more people (and not just fighters) than Al-Qaeda. And finally, a group that, despite being practically defeated in terms of its territorial capacity, has remained to transform itself into a group of guerrilla tactics capable of committing attacks of such magnitude that they could destabilise countries where it has established itself.

Jihadist radicalisation: a multidimensional process with an infinite number of influential factors

After this review of the historical chronology of the Salafist Jihadist ideology, the two main groups claiming to represent it, and having dealt with how they attract a part of the Muslim population (tiny but very important), it is appropriate to ask the question: is ideology the cause of Jihadist terrorism? For Gilles Kepel (2016), the radicalisation of Islam (represented in Salafism) is undoubtedly a central factor in explaining Jihadist terrorism. Without any doubt, ideology is a very important factor, but, just as with socio-economic factors, it is not the only one. The ideology partially explains Jihadist terrorism, as well as why there has not been a similar phenomenon with other ethnic/religious/national communities living in Western countries. But one has to be careful to point to the Muslim community, since the Islamic religion is not the cause of jihadism; it is jihadism that seeks converts among the faithful. But, in most cases, jihadism is an ideology that convinces people with little training in the Islamic religion. As Olivier Roy (2017) shows, there are many profiles of radicalized people with a scant religious background.

The French author, despite acknowledging the growing radicalisation of Islam throughout the world, prefers to speak of an 'Islamisation of radicalisation', where radicalisation towards violent Jihadist extremism is not explained by religious radicalisation, but is rather a generational revolt where Islam represents the legitimisation of the violence employed. Thus, care must be taken with explanations centred on the cultural or religious dimension of radicalization, since they are insufficient and dangerous (Bourekba, 2018: 12).

Given the debate between French Islamologists Kepel and Roy, it is important to add the opinion of François Burgat. According to the latter, the way to combat jihadism is for the West to stop manufacturing it, since it links the popularity of global jihadism with the geopolitical context of the Middle East and North African regions. As we have anticipated in previous paragraphs, situations that enrich the discourse of jihadism, are wars provoked by Western powers, the inconsistency of Western foreign policy and interventionism (support for some dictatorial regimes, confrontation with others, and a lack of sensible intervention to stop massacres, for example, in the war in Syria), and the history of north-south domination (at least since the configuration of the borders of the region by France and the United Kingdom in the face of the fall of the Ottoman Empire). These realities give jihadism a legitimacy and that attracts Muslims. But the allure is not only for Muslim men, but also women, who have also been and are agents, in many cases violent, of jihadism, all over the world. In today's world, globalized in every sense, Western aggressions no longer go unpunished, and its population is vulnerable to the response, in this case, in the form of jihadist terrorism.

So, what reading can we use to explain the jihadist phenomenon? Do we give priority to ideology, the radicalization of Islam (Kepel), psychosocial processes, the Islamisation of radicalisation (Roy), the dynamics of globalization, the role of the West and the socio-political context of the Arab and Muslim world (Burgat), or other factors? Surely, all the readings are partly correct, but they make the mistake of competing with each other in seeking a central factor that stands out.

In the end, if we want to understand the radicalisation towards violent jihadist extremism, both in Western and Muslim countries, both in well-off societies and in depressed territories or in violent conflict, it needs to be approached in a non-linear manner. Multiple variables intervene in a multidimensional process affected by personal, socio-economic, political and religious dimensions (Bourekba, 2018b). In this sense, a new para-

digm is making its way into the debate on the prevention of terrorism, as demonstrated by the report 'Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism' by the United Nations Secretary-General (24 December 2015), presented at the General Assembly, which presents a combination of *push* and *pull* factors. *Push* factors are conditions conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges, and *pull* factors, understood as the individual motivations and processes, exploited by third parties, that play a key role in transforming these ideas and grievances into violent action (UNSG, 2016). Thus, according to the report, among the former are the lack of socio-economic opportunities, marginalization and discrimination, bad governance, human rights violations and the lack of functioning of the rule of law, prolonged and unresolved conflicts, and the role of prisons. The latter include personal motivations and experiences (a traumatic experience, failure in studies, or among others, a history linked to crime), the narratives of victimization and grievances of the collective itself (which are empowered and propagated by violent extremist groups), the misuse and distortion of religious beliefs, politics and ethnic and cultural differences (also a recurrent method among violent extremist groups); and finally, the existence of organized networks (physical or virtual), to recruit new radicals. Within this framework of *push* and *pull* factors we find the aforementioned dimensions (personal, socio-economic, political and religious), recognising the multidisciplinary task required to prevent the phenomenon of jihadism, and avoiding counterproductive confrontation between the different readings that have been generated. It is also a framework that applies to all violent extremisms, recalling, as we said earlier, that no ideology or religion is immune.

To conclude, jihadism is a phenomenon that, like other violent extremisms, has a great variety of profiles, influenced in a different way and intensity by a great variety of structural and personal factors, occurs in a framework of conflict, and where ideology plays a major role, but is not always the determining factor in the use of violence, and where human networks and the capacity to organize violent extremist groups is key. It should be noted that, contrary to popular misconceptions, psychopathology has a limited explanatory capacity, that is to say, most jihadists do not suffer from any mental illness (Moyano, 2018).

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The Vague Spectre of Terrorism

Joaquim Lleixà

Was September 11th a turning point in history? The passing of the years has somewhat diluted the media impact of the attacks on American soil and our attention focuses more and more upon the events of 1989-1991, the end point of the "short twentieth century", in the perspective developed by Hobsbawm. This juncture closing the curtains on the Cold War, with the rupture of the Berlin wall and the decomposition shortly after the USSR itself; and the rapid disintegration of the bipolar world that had emerged just decades prior. The United States emerged as the only superpower with the possibility, perhaps, of ordering international relations. This was the belief of a substantial part of the American elites, and they were preparing to act accordingly. In this context, September 11th certainly accelerated the process and was also an upsurge of forces, policies and expectations that were lying in wait. The foreign policy and wars immediately affected Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iran... Even today war fills the skies and directly affects these countries. September 11th was a crime against humanity and the nature and visibility of the crime contributed greatly to its impact, which accelerated the aggressive military orientations of the U.S., which continues to this day. As does the connection between war and terrorism, which was made at that time and which seems to have been consolidated, as it continues today. The political speech of President François Hollande, who immediately after the attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris, announced a state of emergency and the closure of all the country's borders and stated that the terrorist attacks were "an act of war by the Islamic State against France", is evidence of this. An act of war!

War on terror

From the moment immediately following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the US government declared a *war on terror*. Instead of adopting a renewed anti-terrorist policy capable of combining the usual methods in this respect – police, judiciary, foreign policy and, complementarily, military force – these leaders opted to place war in the foreground: a line of conduct of the use of military force, revenge, and preventive strikes. They saw in the attack not a crime but a sort of act of war, like that of Pearl Harbor. But here there was neither a state like the Japanese nor an army made up of soldiers – there was a terrorist organization, Al Qaeda. Nor was there a context like World War II.

For a moment, perhaps, some thought that the chosen path was a different one, since the UN Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1368 the day after the attacks, and a little later resolution 1373, in which it was considered that there had been a crime rather than an act of war, and States were urged to combat terrorism, a series of police and preventive measures were imposed on them (from the freezing of financial resources to the inter-state exchange of information) consistent with the non-war objective of... "maintaining international peace and security". But this wasn't the case. President Bush declared a global war on "evil", and NATO for the first time activated Article 5 of its founding Treaty of 1949: the adhering states considered the attack to have been a military attack on the whole and thus pooled their defence. This US military response immediately lead to what can be described as the Bush doctrine, which would be included with some systematisation in *The National Security Strategy for the United States* (from now on *NSS*), signed by the President on 17 September 2002, and in the subsequent 2006 update.[1] In the words of this 2002 text, the peculiarity of the new war was formulated as follows:

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1. V. Bush (2002). This document, *The National Security Strategy*, does not exactly contain either a military strategy or a defence strategy. However, it considers, among other things, various circumstances and scenarios in which the US is preparing to use its military power and sets out the doctrine in this respect.

"Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us."[2]

As a result

"The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."[3]

And here we have the central issue. In this *NSS* of 2002 – and more generally in the policy of the USA in the decades since – antiterrorist policies have been subsumed by policies for war. Instead of establishing, in the face of the difficult reality described in those words, a clear separation between a war response and an antiterrorist response – and the latter is the appropriate one –, antiterrorist policy is subordinated and articulated within a war policy. But, as Ferrajoli would write precisely a few years later in view of the subsequent disaster of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,

"War is by nature the disproportionate and uncontrolled use of force, aimed at the annihilation of the adversary and inevitably destined, in its present forms, to strike at the civilian population. The legitimate use of force is only that which is strictly necessary not for the purpose of victory but solely for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security (...)"[4]

From another approach, that of practical reason, the conclusion is the same. Indeed, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq themselves reveal an overwhelming ineffectiveness from the point of view of opposition to terrorism. This very argument was among the excuses used to justify both wars. However, the war in Afghanistan still continues seventeen years after the vengeful assault began on 7 October 2001; and the invasion of Iraq and the

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2. Bush (2002), pg. 202.
3. Bush (2002), pg. 207.
4. Ferrajoli (2009), pg. 20.

subsequent war that began in 2003 fostered the cradle of Daesh and also, together with the adjacent Syria, the site which allowed jihadism to develop into a real fighting force, with the resulting war lasting into the present. Jihadism has also spread to Africa, Asia and Europe. In short, war has not been able to eradicate international terrorism, which has spread and taken root in many countries, has been globalized, and which should be countered by coordinated police action and by police methods (and other policies). Even if it would make sense to use military force, only that force which could be used at disarming and bringing terrorists to justice as criminals. Something of the difficulties and ineffectiveness of an anti-terrorist war was perhaps suggested by the very authors of the *NSS* as early as 2002:

"The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—some seen, some unseen."[5]

Preventive Wars

From the beginning – and indeed even before 9-11 – the goal was to start preventive wars. In other words, it was based on a determination to resort to military action even before potential threats could take shape or begin to act. These threats were personified as terrorist groups, states harbouring these groups, or others simply considered to be "rogue" or "failed" states. Moreover, particular attention was given to a risk of possible use of weapons of mass destruction – not necessarily nuclear – by such groups or states. Preventive action is common, or even characteristic, of police practice and sometimes also of judicial practice. But military force is so highly destructive that to entrust it with preventive action is highly problematic and dangerous. Neoconservatives, numerous among the Bush administration, were satisfied that government policy effectively began to follow the preventive political strategy that they had been promoting for years. Indeed, in the early 1990s, when so many were overjoyed by the expectations in the post-Soviet "unipolar moment," Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Lilly had made a strategic proposal

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5. Bush (2002), pg.207.

aimed at ensuring the military dominance of the US and preventing the rise of competitors like China, by developing a line of preventative strikes against states suspected of aspiring to possess weapons of mass destruction (and Iraq at the time was already in their sights). They thought that this situation, in view of the renewed and indisputable US hegemony, offered an opportune situation to build, from the US foreign policy, a system of international relations without the limitations of the Cold War and in accordance with the new possibilities.[6] But they had to wait a few more years and, in the meantime, push from outside of the government. Upon the arrival of the Bush administration, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and deputy secretary Paul Wolfowitz they had the opportunity. And just when it was public that the evident that invasion of Iraq was on the table, the *NSS* of 2002 brought together the theory and purpose of the preventive military actions necessary to accelerate changes all throughout the world. All of this is based "on the responsibility of leading this great mission" and hand in hand with "a clear American internationalism that reflects the union between our values and our national interests".[7]

This preventive character of US war policy was associated, on the other hand, with a change in relations with allies and international public institutions. Indeed, which terrorist groups and which States should be hit with a preventive attack? Those unilaterally determined by the U.S. government. This unilateralism was seen in different ways. In terms of allies, it was almost immediate. Because depending on existing allies and then setting military objectives and guidelines could be quick (as in the invasion of Afghanistan); but it could also be somewhat limiting (as in the case of Iraqi). It was therefore decided to change the procedure in favour of a more unilateral approach: first, to determine military goals and procedures and then to bring together the allies that were currently available, as was done in the invasion of Iraq. Brzezinski, who had a good knowledge of the inner workings of American security policy for many years, would sum it up with these words:

6. A set of opinions shared in the 1990s by neoconservatives and other currents of Republican thought. Notable examples were The Project for the New American Century, created in 1997, and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Research.
7. Bush (2002), pgs. 204-205.

"In essence, the United States was arrogating the right to identify the enemy and to strike first without seeking international consensus on a shared definition of the threat."[8]

The unilateral approach, and not as a last resort, was also to be the new manner of interaction with international public institutions, especially the UN and its subsidiary bodies. The core of the question is that unilateralism in matters of warfare – in this case, pre-emptive strikes – was and is the negation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[9] After the experience of the First and Second World Wars, modern warfare – that which is waged between sovereign states – came to be simply considered as an international crime. All subsequent international law radically condemned warfare, and continues to condemn it – ever since the trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo; it has been considered a punishable crime. Precisely after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Charter of the United Nations came into force, which set out to eradicate war within the international community for the rest of human history. According to the Charter, the use of force would only be acceptable if authorized by the Security Council. Moreover, it would only be legitimate to guarantee peace and repress transgressions. Consequently, the pre-emptive and unilateral wars sought by the U.S. government and explicitly enshrined in the 2002 *NSS* was the explicit negation of Chapter VII of the Charter. The military intervention in Iraq was not only illegal; it was an assault on the existing legal order. Without doubt, the spirit of Chapter VII of the Charter is to prohibition unilateral or preventive attack by a state. Such an attack amounts to aggression, the most serious transgression of international order. In view of what had happened in Afghanistan and Iraq – wars that were initiated to face an imaginary threat or even to create one where none existed – Chomsky correctly observed: "preventive war falls within the category of war crimes".[10]

So the political ambitions of an imperial superpower manifested themselves not only in unilateralism but also in the ignorance and erosion of international law. Ferrajoli has rightly emphasized this aspect of the question and has noticed the influence of such a policy in the four wars that took place in those years: the first in the Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

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8. V. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership?*, New York, Basic Books, 2005, pg. 57.
9. V. Zolo (2006), pgs. 131-152.
10. Chomsky (2004), pg. 20.

The unilateral assertion was by no means a novelty in US policy. In fact, its foreign policy has always contained a notorious mix of unilateralism and multilateralism. But even Bill Clinton candidly acknowledged this when he stated that he preferred multilateralism, but that if vital American interests were at stake, he would choose unilateralism whenever necessary. In the two Bush presidencies, unilateralism would be more intense, explicitly formulated in documents such as the 2002 and 2006 *NSS* and, above all, focused on the military sphere, in a particularly aggressive manner.

Lastly, it s worth noting that the warmongers themselves often seem perplexed by one aspect of their policy: the duration of the *war on terror*. As the 2002 *NSS* warns, the globalised war on terror "global enterprise of uncertain duration". Or rather, it one that "will be fought…over an extended period of time". "It could last for decades," as Vice President Cheney stated. Modern wars, which are wars between states, have a time limit. But no limits are placed on this anti-terrorist bellicosity, perhaps because it is not really a war at all, or at least not a war between states.

Neither warfare nor global

Can terrorism really be considered to be a form of warfare? At the end of the 1980s American military analysts came up with new terms, including "asymmetric warfare", "fourth-generation war", and "hybrid war" to refer to terrorism, guerrilla warfare and, in general, to the diversity of situations of armed political violence in the global context. However, in all of these political and social conflicts, it is a state confronting diffuse, mobile, armed groups that shy away from stable fronts and avoid conventional military operations. The state, by using warfare, seeks to eliminate such groups, irrespective of the political and social causes that originally gave rise to the conflict. The particular type of armed violence that has proliferated in the decades following the Cold War – especially with globalization – is the result.[11] The conflict between the

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11. Mary Kaldor initiated the use of a new English lexicon – with notions like "new wars", in *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2012 – to describe the armed conflicts (the Gulf War, war in the Balkans,…) of the 1990s and to highlight the new characteristics and motivations, with the backdrop of globalization and the new era after the Cold War. On the other side of the Atlantic, and in particular by military analysts such as William Lind and others, they were described as "asymmetric wars".

Eastern and Western blocs of the Cold War is history, of course. And even violent and armed conflict – modern warfare in the proper sense, between sovereign and territorial States – has declined drastically. On the contrary, violent and armed intra-State conflicts have proliferated, contributing to a global landscape of disorder. In particular, terrorist jihadism has taken root, a form of transnational terrorism, which though it had existed since the 1980s, particularly against US military interests, which saw its greatest expression on September 11th, 2001.

Given the proliferation of situations of armed political violence, the interpretation made by the Bush administration and many others, reflected in the *NSS* of 2002 and also that of 2006, can be summed up in this statement: there is a global war against terrorism, and in particular against international terrorists or, better yet, transnational. From a series of "low-intensity conflicts – according to the concepts put forth by analysts in the 1990s – we have now moved on to a planetary and antiterrorist war. And they do not understand this in the manner of Carl Schmitt who, in response to Lenin and the revolution of 1917, and the revolutionary forces of the 20th century – in particular, in the interwar period – spoke of a "world civil war". This was a philosophical and historical metaphor[12] that wanted to account for a state of existential hostility or, if you will, an international class struggle between West and East, which ended with the victory of the West after the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of the Eastern bloc. It is clear that this existential hostility could have give way to war in the strict sense, but Schmitt's notion of "world civil war" is on another plane, a plane sustained by his philosophy of history, by his political theory of the State, tributary in this case of Hobbes' *Leviathan.*[13] On the contrary, the contemporary analysts I referred to earlier and the propagandists of the 2002 *NSS* move on one plane: armed conflicts (guerrilla, terrorism, insurgency, resistance) are a form of war, now of a global character; and the response, in the name of freedom,

12. On this metaphor, see Jürgen Habermas, *What does socialism mean today?* in New Left Review, no. 70, pg.88-116. For an uncritical use of the notion of "global civil war" in my opinion, see Donatella di Cesare (2017).
13. See Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Doctrine of Thomas Hobbes,* London, Greenwood Press, 1996 (1st German ed., 1938).

"infinite justice" or "future generations" – as if it were a medieval "just war"[14] – requiring a symmetrical armed response. And this from a superpower and its allies. In short, it was a military response to the political, social, ethnic or religious conflicts in the troubled world of recent years.

Precisely here, in the equation between war and terrorism, lies the core of the question: warmongering. I will say it in the eloquent words of Alberto Piris, a professional military man linked to peace scholars, when he said, in view of the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine:

"The best known asymmetric warfare today is what has been defined as `Global War on Terror ´(GWT) by the U.S. government. Although the validity of the word war has to be greatly forced (just as when speaking of a war on drug trafficking, international prostitution, child exploitation or AIDS), the stubborn insistence of US foreign policy and the inertia of the media have given real meaning to the GWT, despite the fact that it is neither war, nor can it be global, nor can it put an end to terrorism (...)".[15]

The comparison between war and terrorism – in other words, the war response to the terrorist phenomenon – would otherwise be articulated in a project of broader domination, associated with a specific military context. In fact, the bellicosity of the US ruling forces and their project of consolidating the USA as a world hegemonic power must in fact to be directly related to the existence and configuration of their own gigantic military apparatus. Because here hegemony is understood in the main sense that this notion has had since its initial use in the Greek world: as a relationship of domination directly based on military preponderance. These pages are not the right place to examine now the relationship between the sponsored policy and the existing military apparatus, but I will make a brief allusion to one aspect of American defence policy in the years of the Bush presidency: the doctrine of "full spectrum dominance". This concept, which had been formulated over the years and has been in operation for decades (until the present day, with variations

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14. It is notorious the tendency in the official war discourse to handle this kind of justifications that evoke the world of *bellum justum*. But it is something that also occurs in the world of intellectuals. This is the case of Michael Walzer in *Just and Unfair Wars. A moral reasoning with historical examples*, Barcelona, Paidós, 2005, where the author argues that in the case of "supreme emergengy" and in the face of the danger represented by the "incarnation of evil", the moral and legal limits of an armed action that seeks to annihilate the enemy, even if he is a terrorist, fall. The Manifesto *Why We Fight. Charter of America*, signed in February 2002 by Etzioni, Fukuyama, Huntington, Walzer and others, goes in the same direction.

15. Piris (2008), P. 136-137.

in rigour) means that US armed forces, alone or with allies, should be able to fight any adversary anywhere in the world, in every situation, including the physical battlespace; air, surface and sub-surface, in outer space, within the electromagnetic spectrum, and via cyberwarfare. Such a military doctrine also benefitted from a reality that had been present for some years, the so-called "revolution in military affairs": that new technologies were already making it possible to improve cruise missiles and "smart" bombs, permanent information on the forces present in the theatres of operations... Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan would be fields of experimentation in this respect. As well, the advent of miniaturised nuclear weapons were available, though they were not exactly a novelty but now, unlike in the 1980s, they were offered as an even more operational weapon, i.e. as a more precise "tactical" weapon, as a "theatre weapon" in a local or regional conflict (Middle East, Europe). Vital to such a policy was the dominance of outer space; the Missile Defense System – in the latest version of that "Star Wars" postulated a few years earlier by Ronald Reagan – which was formally approved by President Bush on May 1, 2001. Finally, the pre-emptive wars sponsored within the framework of the Bush administration's policy were not exactly projects that revolved around themselves in a vacuum. They were part and parcel of the arsenal.

In short, there is a sharp contrast between the real dimension of the terrorist threat and the abrupt and disproportionate response, a declaration of all-out warfare. As a consequence of the Bush administration's policy that I have examined, the military dimension would have a notorious influence on the elaboration and development of US foreign policy. In fact, the summary of the years of the Bush presidency in terms of the subject we are dealing with could be this: preventive attacks and excessive military spending; although also, and among other aspects, a more accentuated unilateralist tendency and a the ideas of the army as the default: these should replace diplomacy as the main method of foreign policy of the era of globalization. In my opinion, a factor behind this disproportion between the terrorist threat and the war response, is an impulse that arises from the arms race, spurred on by the military industrial complex, a tendency to blatantly ignore the dimensions of real, existing threats. It is a tradition that began in the mid-19th century, and is best described as militarism. The various forms of militarism *stricto sensu*, both that which is directed towards the interior and that which is projected, and this is the case here, towards the exterior of the State, have a common denominator: the use of armies beyond the function of security

or defence, for offense and attack. The concepts that I have examined of the war response to terrorism can now be described as a militarist approach, and are approaches that, far beyond policy for security, seek to shape the order of international affairs mainly through the use of armies and war. That is the hidden reality behind the confusion between war and terrorism.

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The intentional promotion of fears of terrorism

Pere Brunet

It is clear that terrorist violence is one of the issues of greatest concern at the beginning of the 21st century. It is also clear that, if the current trend of increasing inequalities is maintained, global conflict will only grow. But one of the main problems is that there is currently no agreement at the international or academic level as to what terrorism is. And in fact, as Igarapé Institute director Robert Muggah (Muggah, 2016) rightly points out – governments, in an obviously interested way, often misconstrue insurgency as terrorism.

Terrorism seeks to generate terror on a population, an ethnic group, an ideology or on the followers of a religion, with a disproportionate violence directed at the non-combatant population, the very antithesis of legitimate violence (see the chapter by Pere Ortega in this same book, which analyzes the debates on terrorism). Obviously, with the goal of terrifying, terrorism generates fear. But fear can also be a trap and convenient distraction to cover up the hypocritical interests of leaders. To quote (Zizek, 2015; p. 38), the liberal system is inherently perverse and corrupt, because its normal functioning depends on the same vices that it publicly deplores. In fact, Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, 1999) insists that it is a serious mistake to say that terrorism is the weapon of the weak, because, like other forms of violence, it is first and foremost a weapon of the strong and the powerful. The main problem is that the powerful also control the "doctrinal systems" of the mass-media, so that their terror does not count as terror. This is what's happening everywhere now. Terrorist enemies are created, a state of opinion prone to fear is spread, the actions of others are amplified and, hypocritically, one's own actions are covered up.

According to Timothy Snyder (Snyder, 2017), the management of terror and the political use of terrorism form part of a set of practices of submission and domination that together make up the current authoritarianisms and, what he calls, modern tyranny. When a terrorist attack occurs, he says, it must be borne in mind that the authorities take advantage of it to consolidate their power. Terrorist actions are "opportunities" to put an end to systems of checks and balances, to limit or suspend freedom of expression, and to curtail the right to a fair trial. And the intentional promotion of fear is a very good tool to obtain a reasonable degree of social tolerance (even acceptance) of these measures. On the other hand, Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman, 2016) explains that demonstrating a firm intention after a terrorist attack is the manifest function of what politicians have to say, when they claim to be responding to people's fears. The latent function of what they say and do is quite the opposite: it is, he says, to encourage and facilitate the securitization process that diverts attention from people's many social and economic problems and concerns, which arise from their human insecurity. Responses to terrorism seek to create a sense of a state of emergency and fear of the existence of an enemy outside the walls, reinforcing the role of the divine protector that those in power play to their benefit.

The perception of indiscriminate terrorist attacks, as amplified by the media and social networks, result in irrational fears that call for more protection, more security, more armed securitization. The result, as we are seeing, is less human rights, less rule of law, and more state control. More weapons manufacturing and arms trade, an influx of weapons into unstable countries, and more terrorism. But who has manufactured the weapons used by terrorists? Who gets rich off of these fears? Can we manage our fears enough to break the circle of securitization?

As we shall see below, the intentional promotion of fear, often based on the myths around the risks of terrorism, facilitates militarized responses to terrorism, with a securitization approach that is highly profitable for some but that in turn leads to more violent extremism.

On security and terrorist risk

The concept of security (Calvo, 2015) has two aspects: Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective

sense, the absence of fear that such values will be destroyed. We could say that to be safe is to be free from fears and to have one's needs covered. Security, therefore, is intimately related to the concept of risk (threat to values and our current way of life) and to the absence of fear. However, while threats, such as terrorism, can be objective or subjective; fear is always subjective. Since security and fear (as opposed to risk) are not easily measurable, risk assessment can be one of the key elements in understanding and objectively assessing terrorist danger and the degree of security. Because fear is linked to the perception we have of the risk of being attacked or killed, and we know that this risk is objectively measurable. There is a scientific approach to the phenomenon of terrorism based on the analysis and quantitative assessment of this risk. The value of the terrorist risk can be deduced from the probabilistic analysis of what has happened so far, with factors weighted in terms of the degree of exposure and the study of the vulnerability of each person, group or geographical area. But one must be careful, because one of the problems is that in the mass-media there is a great confusion of concepts.

It is clear that risks are demystified when objectively counted and measured. But in order to do so, we have to step out of our usual tendency for subjectivity. As Chomsky says, when he pointing out that "there are those who make money by increasing people's perception of risk" there are those who are interested in promoting this subjective risk that we perceive. This is not too difficult, as the subjective (perceived) risk depends on possible factors that amplify it, such as social networks and political discourse. Kasperson (1988) explains that the social amplification of risk can appear in two stages: during the transfer of information (the media, cultural groups, interpersonal networks and others), and in the mechanisms of societal response, when its different groups end up presenting different analyses and conclusions from their own perceptions and social agenda. On the other hand, in terms of the objective risk, there are highly consolidated statistical techniques that allow its estimation on the basis of the probability of events and the magnitude of their consequences. Specifically, objective risk is defined (Kasperson, 1988) through the multiplication of two terms that measure the probability of appearance of the problem and the magnitude of its effects. The assumption is that society should be indifferent towards risks of little consequences even if there is a high probability and towards the risks of grave consequences if there is a low probability, and concerned about those risks that present grave consequences and a high probability. As we shall see below, the terrorist

risk, measured objectively and in the countries of the North, is of very low probability. Therefore, following Kasperson's method, our society should be indifferent to terrorist risk.

But on the other hand, the terrorist risk may be regional or personal. In national security approaches, almost every analyst speaks of terrorist risks on the national or continental (regional) level. For example, the personal risk of suffering an attack in a given year is negligible compared to the risk that the region where that person is from has of suffering an attack. The militarization of security is underpinned by an increase in fear based on regional risks. On the other hand, an analysis based on objective and personal risks make it possible to compare relative risks, opening the door to human security while at the same time avoiding militarised approaches. In any case, we must accept that risk is inevitable, and that zero risk is a chimera, because it has an infinite cost. Life is inherently risky: the probability of dying sometime during the next 100 years is 100%.

When we are shown European, state or regional risk figures we are being misled. Risk must be personalized, because fear is personal. By making a comparative analysis, for example, between the risk of being injured by a terrorist attack in a given year and the risk of dying by accident or illness during the same period we can understand which risks are important. Security studies on terrorism must be based on objective and personal risk.

The myth of the terrorist risk

The phenomenon of terrorism can be studied on the basis of quantitative and objective analysis and assessment of its risk. According to a study by John Mueller and Mark Stewart (Mueller, 2010), the risk of dying in a given year (for example, the year starting right now) from a given cause is considered unacceptable if it is greater than 1 in 10,000, acceptable if it is less than 1 in 1 million, and "tolerable" in the area between these two limits. On the other hand, the risk of dying during this year as a result of a terrorist action, which is no more than the probability of dying in an attack, can easily be calculated on the basis of extrapolation from the data we have from recent years. The data shows us a very different reality from what we see every day in the media. The tables provided by the Canadian Center for Globalization Research are very eloquent (WashingtonsBlog, 2014): based on 2008 data,

the annual risk of dying from a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom is less than one in 1,100,000, and in Canada it is 1 in 3,800,000. On the other hand, the annual risk of death from a traffic accident is 1 in 23,000 and 1 in 13,500 in the United Kingdom and Canada, respectively. The risk of dying from cancer in the United States is 1 in 540 (during this year, of every 540 people, one will probably die from cancer) and the risk of dying from war-related actions during World War II was 1 in 221. In the United States, therefore, it is 33,842 times more likely to die from cancer than from a terrorist attack, and 35,079 times more likely to die from heart disease than from a terrorist act. The data for Spain is in the same order of magnitude.

Even given this evidence, it could be argued that at any time there could be a resurgence with a significant and unforeseen increase in terrorist attacks in Western countries. Now, once again, the data shows us, as we will see below, that this is not very likely. Therefore, what we would need, now and here, is less militarism and less securitization.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, 2017) is based on the patterns and trends of multiple indicators since 2000, as well as on all the information available in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which has codified over of 170,000 incidents in 163 countries representing 99.7% of the world's population. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) scores each country on a scale of 0 to 10; where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the maximum measurable impact. This index, for a given country, is proportional to the number of deaths in unambiguous incidents of terrorism throughout the year. It should be borne in mind what the IEP means by "unambiguous terrorism". The IEP defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social objective through fear, coercion, or intimidation. It should be noted that the definition also excludes acts of state terrorism, and that incidents must be intentional – the result of a conscious decision on the part of the perpetrator. As for the characteristic of "unambiguous", in cases where there is not enough information to make a correct classification on whether it is a terrorist incident is within the limits of the definition, the database codes these incidents as "doubt terrorism proper" and they are not taken into account in the calculation of the GTI.

According to the report (IEP, 2017), since 2002, eight of the world's nine regions have experienced an increase in terrorism, and North America was

the only region to experience a reduction. During the last 15 years, South Asia experienced a great deal of terrorist activity, while Central and South America were less affected. As expected, the greatest increase in terrorism occurred in the region of the Middle East and North Africa. Globally, attacks on civilians increased by 17 per cent from 2015 to 2016. However, in 2016, OECD countries accounted for 1% of global deaths from terrorism. This is an increase of 0.1% compared to 2010.

The GTI shows an interesting relation between terrorism and conflicts. The increase in deaths from terrorism strongly correlates with the increase in war-related deaths. From 2006 to 2016, deaths from terrorism increased by 67 per cent, while deaths from armed conflict increased by 66 per cent. Terrorist attacks are most damaging in conflict-affected countries, where in 2016 there were an average of 2.4 deaths per attack, compared to 1.3 deaths per attack in non-conflict countries. During the past 17 years, 99% of all terrorist deaths occurred in countries that are in conflict or have high levels of political terrorism.

The 15 countries according to the Global Terrorism Index 2017 in the year 2016 that suffered most from terrorism were: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, India, Turkey, Libya, Egypt, the Philippines, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Cameroon. The value of the GTI ranges from 10 (Iraq) to 6.79 (Cameroon). Spain ranks 85th with an index of 1.7. As for the temporal evolution of the 10 countries with the most terrorism in 2016 (IEP, 2017, page 21), all of them except India now have a much higher rate of terrorism than they had. The large increases in countries such as Iraq or Libya appear as a consequence of the destabilisation resulting from military interventions in their territory. On the other hand, the trend analysis in each country is very informative. In the Southeast Asian region, Afghanistan, with an index of 9.44, the index has increased by 3.88 units in the period between 2002 and 2016, and Pakistan, with a current index of 8.4, has increased by 2.36 units. The situation in the Middle East and North Africa is very serious, with 13,512 killed in 4,732 attacks in 2016 and increases of 5 or more units in the GTI during this period in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Egypt. Iraq and Syria have suffered the highest number of casualties since 2002, with more than 60,000 and 8,000 deaths, respectively. Yemen has experienced the third highest number of victims, with more than 4,000 deaths recorded. The case of Sub-Saharan Africa is also alarming, with 15 countries in the top 45 and increases above

4 units during this period in Nigeria, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, Ethiopia, Mali, Chad, Mozambique and Burkina Faso. In South America there have been increases of between 2 and 3 units in Venezuela, Chile and Paraguay, and in Eurasia Ukraine (17th place and an increase of 4.96) and Kazakhstan (67th place but with an increase of 2,56). In contrast, the United States is ranked 32nd with an index of 5.42, Canada is ranked 66th with an index of 2.95, and Spain is ranked 85th in the list, with an index of 1.7 and a decrease of 3.31.

In 2002, the Middle East and North Africa had 1,651 deaths caused by 300 incidents of terrorism (IEP, 2017). Yet in 2016, these statistics increased to 13,512 deaths in 4,732 attacks. Iraq and Syria have suffered the highest death toll since 2002 with more than 60,000 and 8,000 dead, respectively, and Yemen ranks third in the number of deaths, with more than 4,000 recorded. The total number of people killed by terrorism in this Middle East and North Africa region between 2002 and 2016 was 83,532. On the other hand, South Asia had a major impact of terrorism in 2016, with three countries among the ten most affected worldwide: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. In regional terms, it is true that there has been a slight improvement over 2015, due to a decrease in the number of attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But this region recorded a remarkable increase in terrorist activity in the 15 years prior to 2016, with an increase from 883 deaths in 2002 to 53,229 deaths in 2016. The number of attacks also increased significantly, from 282 in 2002 to 3,137 in 2016.

On the other hand, if we look at the OECD countries, we see that the number of deaths between 1970 and 2016 is almost 10,000 (IEP, 2017), but that 58 percent of these deaths occurred before the year 2000 (therefore, before the "axis of evil" and the "war on terror"). In fact, the number of deaths from terrorism in 2016 was less than half the number of deaths in 1985. The majority of terrorist deaths in these OECD countries were in the United States, which accounts for more than one-third of all deaths since 1970. Still, 85 percent of these terrorist deaths in the United States occurred in the September 11 attacks, which killed 2,996 people. If the September 11 attacks are excluded from the analysis, the United States would account for only 8% of global deaths. The UK suffered a quarter of the deaths from terrorism among OECD countries with approximately 2,400 deaths between 1970 and 2016, and most of these deaths were due to attacks by Irish separatist groups. Spain, in turn, suffered more than 1,000 deaths from terrorism since 1970,

but ETA was responsible for 70% of those. The number of deaths from terrorism across Europe between 2002 and 2016 was 2,266.

In analyzing all of the data some clear conclusions can be drawn. The increase in terrorist attacks on civil society in the period between 2002 and 2016 is a fact, but not in Western countries. The at-risk countries are in the Global South, far from the comforts of the Western world. One only has to compare the figure of 83,532 deaths in the Middle East and North Africa or 53,229 deaths in South Asia with the 2,266 victims of terrorism in Europe.

Does it make sense to be afraid and be asking for more security with a terrorism rate of only 1.7, and on a downward trend, at that? In view of the data, to be living in fear and requesting more security is an immoral and shameful situation. The terrorist risk in Spain, in terms of objective and personal risk, is extraordinarily low and on the decline. According to (Kasperson, 1988), and given that the terrorist risk is of high consequences / low probability, our society should be indifferent towards this risk.

Now, if we objectively see that we are dealing with such a low-risk phenomenon, why is the terrorist threat so present in the political discourse and the mass-media? Chomsky (Chomsky, 1999) and Bauman (Bauman, 2016) propose the answer: terrorism is a useful idea, centering the discourse on terrorism is a convenient distraction that covers up at least four types of hidden interests:

- A militarized response to terrorist attacks justifies a steady increase in securitization and the arms trade.
- It allows attention to be diverted from people's many social and economic problems and concerns.
- It strengthens the role of the state as a defender of "our" interests vis-à-vis "others".
- It makes it possible to apply "extraordinary policies," which suspend or reduce democratic rights while benefiting the desires of large private corporations.

The data we have just presented confirms and validates the hypothesis that the "terrorist threat" in our society is a myth that powerful interest seek to create and maintain. Like other parallel truths that the public is "sold" on, it is nonetheless an artificial construction that breaks down with the analysis of objective data. Governments invent and amplify terrorist threats, just as they often end up creating enemies. And it all helps the security industry.

The business of fear

Threats generate fear. But fear does not just happen. Fear serves specific interests, and it is promoted because without fear there would be no market for security material. The intentional promotion of fear, often based on the myth of terrorist insecurity, facilitates militarized responses to terrorism. Unfortunately, an approach based on securitization may be highly profitable for a few, but at the same time it can lead to more violent extremism.

As Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman, 2016) explains very well, securitization is a calculated conjuring trick with the sole aim of to diverting anxiety away from problems that governments are unable or unwilling to address. But there is also another "latent" objective in this securitization. It is this business of fear, which today more than ever needs to be exposed. It is the arms business, which is profits off the promotion of fear and which grows with the increase of these securitization measures. It is a business that makes politicians and friends of first-world politicians rich, a business that ends up selling arms to countries in the most unstable and conflict-ridden parts of the planet.

This phenomenon of the self-interested promotion of fear is not far removed from the "shock doctrine" of Naomi Klein (Klein, 2017). It is a theory that she began to study in Iraq, but later realized that neoliberalists had been putting into practice for years. A practice of taking advantage of crises and moments of panic, the ideal time to declare a short period of "extraordinary policies" during which democratic rights can be suspended. Everything works, because people are much more tolerant of the imposition of measures that limit human rights and the rule of law when they are frightened. Naomi Klein says that any tumultuous situation can be useful if politicians wrap it up with a sufficient degree of hysteria; but obviously, terrorist acts are an ideal occasion for applying the shock doctrine. Klein explains that the staunch proponents of the free market gravitate towards moments of cataclysm because non-apocalyptic reality is an inhospitable terrain for their anti-democratic ambitions. Fearful situations, on the other hand, are good business opportunities for large transnational corporations (Hayes, 2015), for large financial institutions and for the military-industrial complex.

As we have seen, over the last 17 years, 99% of all terrorist deaths have occurred in countries that are in conflict or have high levels of political terrorism, and that the large increase in terrorism in countries such as Iraq or

Libya is nothing more than an obvious consequence of the destabilisation resulting from military interventions in their territories. But this has not changed the policy of the European states. In fact, according to Jordi Calvo (Calvo, 2017), European countries, between 2003 and 2014, have sold arms to 30 countries in permanent conflict (India, Turkey, Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Israel, Russia, Thailand, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria, Colombia, the Philippines, Yemen, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Chad, Sri Lanka, Mali, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Burundi, Moldova, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Nepal, South Sudan) and in none of them has the situation of insecurity disappeared. European arms sales have continued to take place even despite the security situation deteriorating in some of these countries, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Mali, Syria, Burundi, Central African Republic and Libya. All this despite the fact that all Member States are subject to the legislation on defence and dual use exports within the EU Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment 2008/944/CFSP which prohibits the export of arms to countries with (among other criteria) clear violations of human rights or respect for international humanitarian law or in which the security situation is one of armed conflict. States ignore their own regulations on military exports, a clear indicator that fuelling conflict is good business (for politicians and the military industries).

Fear serves specific interests, and it's profitable. The fear of many makes a few rich.

Can we rationalize fear?

One way to prevent the spiral of armed violence (terrorist and others) and the vicious cycle of securitization is to rationalize and manage fears. Because fear is irrational, and linked to the perception we have of the risk of dying or being attacked, but it diminishes when analyzed objectively.

Nick Buxton and Ben Hayes (Hayes, 2015) point out that fear is inescapable, but that we must not flee from action either, and that one of the most important political projects of the 21st century will be to understand fear and anguish. Because, they say, in order to develop and implement a progressive political agenda, it is necessary to unravel the dense mess of ideology, politics and economics entangled with our fears and the threats behind them.

Therefore, it is not enough to ask ourselves whether we can rationalize fear. If we aspire for progressive political action, with an anti-militarist, feminist vision, for overcoming neo-liberalism and peace, we must do so.

We have seen that in the United States, one is 33,842 times more likely to die of cancer than from a terrorist attack, and 35,079 times more likely to die of heart disease. Bearing in mind these facts, as a society we cannot allow ourselves to continue living in fear of terrorism. We have to accept our limits and know how to live with risk, which will never be zero but which we must view objectively. We have to stop being afraid, because the probability that we will die sometime over the next 100 years is 100%, and the greatest probable cause is that of our own body failing on us. In addition, we need to design new anti-terrorist mechanisms: new systems for condemning so-called anti-terrorist systems based on increasing armed securitization. Rationalization of fear and decision-making based on scientific estimation of risk is one such mechanism.

If every morning as leaving home we would concentrate for a moment, and think about the probability of dying from natural causes, accidents or terrorism and analyse the associated risks, we would certainly not consider asking for more security and we would end up having a keener sense for detecting myths and deceptions.

Indeed it is groundbreaking and revolutionary to clearly state "I'm not afraid". On one hand, it's a disheartening message to potential terrorists. But on the other hand, it is a clear message to governments and the military-industrial complex. Since we are not afraid, we can call for a reduction in armed security and a reduction in military expenditure. Since we are not afraid, we can see "the others" not as a danger, but as people we can care for and who need more human security even more than ourselves, as comfortable citizens of the countries of the North. By refusing to see others as a danger, we can firmly oppose the arms trade.

Brief conclusion

The promotion of fear, based on the myth of terrorist risk, promotes and favours militarized responses to terrorism and securitization, which in turn generates more violent extremism. Aside from this, the intentional promotion of fear is big business. By thinking rationally about risks and clearly

stating "I am not afraid", on the other hand, we open doors to possibilities for healing and global human security. In this sense, understanding fear, anguish and their mechanisms will have to be central to the new political projects of the 21st century. If we are to develop and implement a progressive political agenda, it is necessary to unravel the deceptive tangle of ideology, politics and economics behind the fear.

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The war on terror in perspective

José Luis Gordillo

On March 2, 2007, U.S. General Wesley Clark was interviewed on the Internet TV program *Democracy Now!* by prestigious journalist Amy Goodman. In it, General Clark, who led NATO's attack on Yugoslavia in 1999, explained that shortly after September 11, 2001, he visited the Pentagon and spoke to a general he knew. He told Clark that the George W. Bush administration had made the decision to invade Iraq; "why?"asked Clark, "have you found any evidence of Iraq's involvement in the 9/11 attacks?", "no, no, no, not at all," his acquaintance replied, "so why do you want to attack Iraq?", "well, I don't know," concluded the general in question.

After a couple of weeks, when the U.S. had already begun the intervention against Afghanistan, Clark returned to the Pentagon and again interviewed the same person. "What, they still want to attack Iraq," he asked, "much worse than that: they want to attack seven countries in five years," his acquaintance said. And then he showed him a memo taken from the Secretary of Defense's desk setting out plans to attack Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Iran.

The war against terrorism in practice

Clark's testimony is much more than an anecdote because it corresponds, with almost total accuracy (aside from the timeline) with what happened in the years following 2001.

Let's go over the record: Iraq was invaded and occupied in 2003; Lebanon was attacked and partially occupied in 2006 by the Israeli army (*de facto,* the army of the 51st US state); Somalia was bombed by the US in 2007, and in

2008 the so-called *Operation Atalanta* began, with the aim, it was said, of combating piracy, but also of militarily controlling the Gulf of Aden, a very important crossroads for the transport of oil by sea; Libya was attacked by the US and its allies in 2011; as was Syria in 2014 (openly and explicitly, although it had been attacked covertly long before then); Sudan was subject to political rather than military intervention throughout the first decade of this century, which resulted in its partition into two new states: one under US tutelage and the other under Chinese tutelage. And as far as Iran was concerned, it is the only country on the list that has not yet been militarily attacked, although both the US and Israel have come quite close to doing so at various times over the last fifteen years; nevertheless, Iran was subject to harsh economic sanctions that Obama suspended and Trump has re-imposed. All these were imperialist interventions made under the ideological cover of the so-called war on terror (with the relative exception of Libya, since that intervention was justified on *humanitarian* grounds, though Gaddafi had been accused of financing and supporting terrorist groups for decades).

Anti-terrorist populism

Spaniards should not forget that these interventions affect us very intensely because the Spanish State has participated in them directly or indirectly, either by sending troops or by allowing the use of foreign military bases located in Spanish territory. And the Spanish *pro-NATO* political leaders (which includes their Catalan, Basque and Galician counterparts) have justified them by stating that they have taken these decisions *on our behalf*, because, according to them, they represented the will of the majority of the citizens governed by the Spanish state.

This was neither true overall nor in the majority of the cases regarding the major decisions on defence policy of the last seventeen years.

Since the transition, Spain has had a serious problem of social legitimacy of its foreign and defence policy. However, it is another matter if we speak in relative terms: in terms of large minorities. Apart from the invasion of Iraq, which provoked immense social opposition, the other military interventions have had support that cannot be described as marginal either: it has fluctuated between thirty, forty or nearly fifty percent depending on the war in question. Something less, anyway, than the public support that those wars

have received in the US and other Western countries which, in general, has been considerably higher.

This social support has been achieved by means of propaganda based on the idea that such interventions were necessary to put an end to Islamic-inspired terrorism, to which governments have attributed most of the attacks in Western metropolises. This propaganda has played a decisive role in the spectacular increase of Islamophobia and voter support for extreme right parties that have made it an important part of their electoral campaigns.

At the same time, and with equal or greater popular support, new anti-terrorist laws have been passed in the USA, Great Britain, France, Spain and other Western countries that have been applied largely to people of Islamic religion. They are legal norms that, in the name of security, expand the authoritarianism and impunity and injustice of the government and police by reducing the scope of what we might call *anti-repressive* rights (right to life, right to secrecy of communications, right to the presumption of innocence, right not to be arbitrarily detained by the police, right to *habeas corpus*, right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, right to a fair trial, etc.). This is the same ideological discourse that has traditionally legitimised extreme right-wing dictatorial regimes.

Anti-terrorism and *fake news*

This leads us to the third reflection suggested by Wesley Clark's account.

Popular support for political and military interventions and suppression of freedom from repression has been obtained by resorting to the manipulation and instrumentalization of public opinion, either by exaggerating the terrorist threat, or by blatant trickery, or by making an accusation about the authorship of an attacks without evidence to support it, or without waiting for the conclusions of police and judicial investigations, which often end up pointing in different directions from those initially pointed out by those in power.

Exaggeration of the terrorist threat is very pervasive. According to the best-selling author and historian Yuval Noah Harari, a European or American is far more likely to die from diabetes, heart attacks, pollution or traffic accidents than from a terrorist attack (in *21 lessons for the 21st century,* Jonathan Cape, London, 2018, pg. 133). Despite this, especially since 2001, terrorism is presented as the main threat to our lives.

Governments throughout history have misled the masses, but one of the most studied and well-known cases is the deception around the invasion and occupation of Iraq. From the autumn of 2001 to the spring of 2003, American leaders repeatedly declared that Saddam Hussein had been one of the conspirators of 9/11, and that he had for years established an alliance with Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The aim was to convince the public that it was necessary to invade and overthrow the Iraqi regime in revenge for 9/11 and to prevent further terrorist attacks on the US and Europe, particularly owing to the (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction that the Iraqi leader, they said, could place in the hands of al-Qaeda terrorists.

In this way, 58% of Americans gave their consent to the invasion of Iraq during the spring of 2003 (later this support decreased due to the disastrous nature of this political and military operation). This process of deceiving public opinion on a large scale has been thoroughly studied by Enrique Bocardo Crespo in *La política del negocio. Cómo la Administración Bush vendió la guerra de Irak* [The politics of business. How the Bush Administration sold the Iraq war] (Horsori, Barcelona, 2011).

Another obvious case of deception and manipulation was the October 2001 anthrax attacks. The Bush II administration, without investigating anything, accused Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and Iraq of being its authors. However, the FBI investigation concluded that Bruce Edward Ivins, a reputable microbiologist who had been working in a U.S. Army laboratory for 20 years, was responsible. But the FBI came to that conclusion six years later, because good investigations take time. However, Ivins could not be prosecuted because he was found dead at home on 29 July 2008 (see *El País,* 2 August 2008).

A third case of mass deception was that of the Spanish government of the Popular Party following the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004. Without having begun to investigate anything, the government headed by José Maria Aznar affirmed that it had been ETA and/or Al Qaeda. Three and four years later, respectively, both the Audiencia Nacional and the Supreme Court of Spain concluded that the attacks were the work of neither ETA nor Al Qaeda, but a local jihadist group with no direct connection to Bin Laden's.

Thus, neither ETA nor Al Qaeda were the perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid Bombings, neither Bin Laden nor Iraq organized or sponsored the 2001 anthrax attacks; in 2003 the Iraqi regime had no weapons of mass destruction to "put in the hands of terrorists," nor did Saddam Hussein have anything to do with 9/11.

In fact, none of the seven countries mentioned above had any connection whatsoever with the attacks of 11 September 2001 on behalf of which the war on terror was declared; nor did Afghanistan: there has never been any solid evidence of the alleged involvement of the Taliban regime in them.

In reality, it is difficult to empirically relate 9/11 to any organization or any country in the world, given that seventeen years later the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1368, adopted on 12 September 2001, still have to be met. It condemned the attacks and urged all UN member states to work together to "bring to justice" the "perpetrators, organizers and sponsors" of the 9/11 attacks. Almost two decades later, no one has been tried and convicted in a fair trial (and I stress this phrase because this aspect of the issue is very important) as the author, organizer or sponsor of the famous attacks. These are still literally no-fault crimes today.

What has the war on terror been, then?

All that has been done with the ideological coverage of the war on terror allows us to affirm that it has consisted fundamentally of a enormous campaign of political marketing, whose main objective has been to obtain popular support for diverse wars of aggression and to the suspension or reduction of the anti-repressive rights. Such popular support has often been achieved by resorting to real psychological warfare tactics directed against the people themselves.

In order to give a strong basis for the above statement, we must go back to the moment when the war on terror was declared. This one was made by George W. Bush on September 16, 2001. In it he characterized the warlike conflict that began as a war that would be very long, because – he said – it would last more than a generation; of planetary scope, because its battlefield would be the whole world; and directed not only against Al Qaeda, but against two abstract and indeterminate concepts: "international and/or world terrorism" and "the states that sponsored it". Bush himself made it very clear when he appeared before the Senate and Congress on September 20, 2001, and stated emphatically: "Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."

So, from the beginning, the goal was to end "global terrorism," but what was that, what were those groups and those states in particular? Regarding

the first, the Bush Administration responded by referring to its list of terrorist organizations. It had begun to be elaborated during the Clinton presidency and was characterized by its length, arbitrariness, fluctuating character (organizations went in and out of it for unclear reasons) and heterogeneity. The list of "state sponsors of terrorism" was even more uncertain because, in reality, they were doing it on the fly: one day they included Afghanistan, another Iraq and a third Syria, Iran, North Korea or Cuba.

The only thing that all these organizations and states had in common was, first, that they had little or nothing to do with 9/11 and, second, that they had been labelled "terrorists" or "sponsors of terrorists" because that was how the U.S. government felt like labelling them.

The war on terror has been used to justify the military interventions of the U.S. government and its allies wherever they have deemed it appropriate, alleging that they were pursuing terrorists, or sponsors of terrorists, defined as such by the U.S. itself.

If there is clear empirical evidence that allows us to speak of the war on terror as a great political marketing campaign of Western governments, it is the *Schmittian* decisionism (from Carl Schmitt, the *kronjurist* of the German Third Reich) of attributing to oneself the power to decide at every moment what was and what was not terrorism. Obviously, such a crude propaganda operation could be easily unmasked by the news media if they were less docile to power and had not chosen to repeat government propaganda like parrots.

What's behind the war on terror?

The perspective provided by the years since 2001 makes it possible to answer this question without much speculation. In reality, it is enough to forget the speeches and focus *on what* the US, Britain, France and their allies *have done*.

The political and military interventions have focused on two of the world's three main oil zones: the Middle East/North Africa and the Caspian Basin/Central Asia. That was done after several members of the Bush administration, starting with Vice President Richard Cheney, showed great concern about the consequences of oil depletion.

Dick Cheney, in his capacity as executive director of Halliburton and, therefore, before becoming vice-president, gave a lecture in November 1999 at the London Petroleum Institute in which he explained: "By some estimates

there will be an average of two per cent annual growth in global oil demand over the years ahead along with conservatively a three per cent natural decline in production from existing reserves. That means by 2010 we will need on the order of an additional fifty million barrels a day. So, where is the oil going to come from?" All this after remembering that: "Oil is unique in that it is so strategic in nature. We are not talking about soapflakes or leisurewear here. Energy is truly fundamental to the world's economy." To round off this reasoning he continued, adding the forceful statement: "[Oil] is the basic, fundamental building block of the world's economy." (the text of the conference can be read at: https://www.crisisenergetica.org/staticpages/pdf-rtf/Dick_Cheney's_speech-Traduccion.pdf).

Consistent with this concern, the first thing Richard Cheney did when he became vice president in January 2001 was to order the formation of a study group on U.S. energy security. For the same reason, the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report,* published on September 30, 2001, three weeks after the 9/11 attacks, states very clearly that the main strategic objective of the U.S. was and is to control the "crucial areas of the planet" that make it possible "access to key markets and strategic resources". The same idea, by the way, would be repeated in the 2006, 2010 and 2014 reports, as well as in the 2002 and 2008 *National Defence Strategy.*

In addition, the Bush Administration shortly thereafter commissioned Robert L. Hirsch, a renowned physicist, to produce a report that was released in 2005. The title of the report says a great deal about the fears and anxieties of a government headed up by former oil company managers and employees: *Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation and Risk Management*

They had so many fears and anxieties about the issue that on May 9, 2007, President George W. Bush issued *National Security Presidential Directive No. 51,* in which it was established that the president of the United States would "coordinate" the three powers of the state in the event of a "catastrophic emergency," this being "an incident, regardless of its geographic location, that produces extraordinary levels of massive disaster, damage or disruption that severely affects the U.S. population, its infrastructure, environment, economy or government functions. According to the same directive, the authority that must decide when one is faced with a "catastrophic emergency" is the president of the United States himself. The directive also has secret annexes. It is worth adding that the directive came into force one year before Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and the price of a barrel of oil reached a staggering

150 dollars. This directive clearly sets out, in my view, the underlying reason for the war on terror.

With the foregoing, we can now complete the answer to the question posed in the top of this section: the war against terrorism allows Western governments to intervene militarily wherever they deem it convenient to guarantee, among other things, their energy security, alleging that they are pursuing terrorists which they themselves have defined as such.

But let's not end there. As has been said above, the war on terror also allows for an increase the authoritarianism and complete freedom to deploy the police and armies against any opponent. The hope is to use them to face social unrest caused by the many crises generated at the end of the era of abundant oil. But will it work?

Measures to combat Jihadist extremism
Pere Ortega

As a result of attacks that have happened on European soil, terrorism has filled both the population and the states with concern. So much so that states have taken actions and measures of all kinds to try to eradicate it. Measures that, in general, have been aimed at seeking security with the same methods that have always been used by states: hardening of legal protocols, police and military directives for control and surveillance of public spaces, producing undesirable consequences, such as cuts in the rights and freedoms of citizens. Measures specifically directed against the Muslim population as the supposed bearers of the violent radicalism that is being persecuted. Ways of combating extremism which, instead of appeasing it, may have quite the opposite effect, because if the measures are directed against the Muslim migrant population, causing restrictions and aggression to their rights, they may give rise to reactions favour that very extremism instead of suppressing it.

There are several causes that generate frustration among the Muslim population (see Xavier Mojal's chapter for an overview) resident in Europe, especially among young people, as young people are the sector of society that have the greatest aspirations for improvements in their lives. These illusions and expectations are often frustrated, sometimes for structural reasons and sometimes for cultural reasons.

The structural ones, for example, may occur when young people, having finished their studies or having dropped out of formal schooling, find themselves unemployed and with great difficulties to find work, which means that their hopes for the future turn into frustration. Unemployment might also be affecting other members of their family. Young people may belong to

dysfunctional families, or live in depressed neighbourhoods on the outskirts, with few social spaces or facilities. Bedroom communities that look more like ghettos where the youth spend hours on the street, solely dependent upon mutual aid. Young people that are unprotected, not integrated and, due to personal or psychological conditions, can easily be influenced by friends and imams from mosques and websites that proselytize violent jihadism. These young people who may end up blaming the society where they live for their marginal state And that same marginalism that can push him to commit small crimes and enter prison, a place that in many cases becomes a school of radicalization where they find every reason to undertake a path of violent extremism.

Cultural reasons are not insignificant. These become visible when Muslim migrants see how their identity is not recognized in the host countries. These are countries where cultural discrimination is frequent, as evidenced by the banning of the use of the veil by Muslim women or the difficulty of opening mosques to practice their religion. A youth that feels humiliated, if not rejected, by the cultural prejudices of the host countries, while seeing Europeans enjoy better living conditions. That makes them feel 'abnormal' or second-class citizens, while Europeans are the 'normal', the genuine, the real citizens. A youth that sees the grievances suffered by its compatriots in their countries of origin, subjected to dictatorships where human rights are not respected, at the same time that they are governed by corrupt elites, with the support of Western countries. Then, the humiliation mixed with the marginalization provokes an uprooting that makes them feel strange and unwelcome until it generates rejection or hatred towards the society where they live.

Muslim youth see war being declared after a jihadist attack on European soil. As happened in France after the attacks on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris (13/11/2015), where the government responded by launching bombardments on cities held by Daesh, in Raqqa, Syria. They see non-combatant, innocent civilians suffering the consequences of the bombings; military support or attacks upon one of the factions in wars in Muslim countries; wherever they live, a states of emergency being declared, with the army patrolling the streets, and surveillance measures that reduce fundamental rights and freedoms, especially directed at Arabs and Muslims; they see anti-terrorist laws being enacted that generate repression and stigmatization for the people of their community; or they see reporting in much of the media that equates terrorism with Islam.

European youth of Muslim religion, of African or Middle Eastern origin have seen their living conditions worsen since the crisis of 2008, and are unemployed, living in marginal conditions and being rejected by the host society/state. Given these hardships, it is easily understood that some of them choose the millenarianist or nihilist options offered by jihadism that assures them a "paradise" at the very least, in the beyond.

In other words, there is no religious or cultural determinism: it is not Islam, nor the Muslim religion, but radicalisation that pushes European youth of a Muslim background to join jihadism, a phenomenon that is related to non-integration into the host society. Non-integration that is defined in terms of a lack of access to some of the essential basics of modern life:

- access to a permit for legal residency;
- a lack of recognition for their culture and religion;
- difficulties in the labour market;
- the degradation of the spaces and neighbourhoods where they live with a lack of community facilities for social and cultural needs;
- a lack of political rights, for example, exclusion from the vote or access to other institutions.

This mix of political, social, labour, cultural and personal conditions, which added to the lack of equality with the rest of the population makes these young people grow up with the feeling that there is an anti-Islamic feeling, of discrimination, xenophobia and racism. Feelings that are exploited by radicals and jihadist extremists to justify violence against Westerners.

* * *

A very widespread issue in Western society is the loss of the sense of "responsibility" of living in social cohesion. No one feels responsible for what happens in their environment, in their society, not to mention in more distant cultures. Thus, what happens in the rest of the world is diffuse, inhospitable, foreign, whether they are catastrophes, conflicts, wars, or even violent extremism, no responsibility is admitted, because it is always the fault of others. The reality is that in all conflicts the responsibility is always distributed to a greater or lesser degree between both opposing parties.

There is no doubt that the European Muslim community has a key role to play in eradicating the ideas that push some of its members to violence. But, at the same time, it is also the host society that must develop policies

aimed at bringing together and integrating newly arriving migrants from other cultures in order to avoid the problems arising from being uprooted, and the marginalisation that sometimes leads to radicalisation.

Thus, instead of seeking security through police or military means or only worrying about prosecuting and eradicating crime, government policies should be geared towards caring for the population, paying special attention to the most vulnerable sectors where social inequalities have the greatest impact. Providing assistance in the search for work, housing, social and cultural benefits that facilitate integration and coexistence within diversity, avoiding "securitization", and the fear of strangers, and difference. Beware that goes by combating the misleading advertising of some media that emit messages of insecurity towards the different. Lies about insecurity that generate "fears" and are taken advantage of by those who want to profit from arms and security infrastructures. For example, by erecting barriers, walls and surveillance equipment in both public and private spaces; building neighbourhoods, cities or nations that are fortresses, with private and public security forces to protect themselves from others, from strangers, from those coming from other places. Judging anything strange or unknown as dangerous or harmful to the society. Measures in search of a total security that cannot exist.

And so, instead of waging continuous war against diffuse enemies such as jihadism or terrorism, we must work for the inclusion, integration and social cohesion of migrants from other countries and cultures, with special attention to Muslims living in Europe. It is also necessary to go to the roots of the conflict that has given rise to jihadism, the multiple factors causing violent extremism. Europe and the Western world are not exempt from responsibility. On the contrary, it requires more effective measures of integration that ensure the freedom of the cultural practices of migrants in Europe and, above all, put an end to the conflicts and wars ravaging in the countries of the Middle East.

Preventing terrorist actions and, if they occur, reducing their impact

The following are recommendations for the prevention of possible terrorist attacks and/or the transformation of conflict:

- Combat islamophobic discourse through government observatories that monitor the discourse of social, religious and political actors.
- Establish mechanisms to prevent the media from becoming disseminators of false news reports, creators of myths that encourage confrontation or incite hatred, division and polarization.
- Prevent the emergence of ghetto neighbourhoods that favour marginalisation.
- Involve social organizations in the elaboration of answers or solutions to the different problems generated by diversity so that they facilitate coexistence.
- Use the methodologies of mediation, participation and reconciliation in social work.
- Incorporate values of respect for diversity and against any discrimination on grounds of origin, culture, religion, gender, sexual choice or belief.
- Promote the ethical use of social networks.
- Support the activities of local groups and develop a programme of awareness-raising activities to promote the values of a culture of peace and nonviolence.
- Create security coordination teams among police, health, fire and social organizations.
- Avoid legislative changes, both of hardening the penal code and of curtailing civil rights under the influence of the pain and horror produced by terrorist attacks.
- Do not bet on the repression or violation of human or civil rights in plans of action against terrorism.
- Establish a very restrictive regulation on the possession of weapons by civilian personnel.
- Establish a protocol for the media on how to deal with terrorist acts, what images and messages to use to avoid fears and the stigmatization of particular groups.
- Promote the participation of local civil society organizations in the post-attack reconstruction of spaces affected by terrorism.
- Promote organizations and programs that favour the restoration of social coexistence, reconciliation and the clarification of truth.
- Create interdisciplinary teams that work to prevent the radicalization of future violent extremists.

- Take care to prevent jihadist proselytism in prisons.
- Take care to prevent risk factors in religious practices in mosques.
- Implement training measures in the education system on risk factors in order to avoid radicalisation among young people.
- Implement legal and surveillance measures to detect the promotion of violent extremism on social networks.
- Create bodies for collaboration and exchange of information between local, regional, state and international administrations.

In the field of foreign policy and the international relations, it will also be necessary to apply:

- Diplomatic measures to assist democratisation and respect for human rights in Muslim countries.
- Reduction of unequal trade relations that favour Europe at the expense of countries with a Muslim religion.
- Diplomatic measures for the transformation of armed conflicts in the Middle East through negotiation.
- Support for the United Nations as the body responsible to find solutions to existing conflicts and not to support unilateral policies of states or military bodies.

* * *

Humanity shares a common home, the planet Earth. A world that, in the twenty-first century, due to the effects of globalization, has become interdependent. Despite this new situation violent conflicts persist, ones that we have inherited from a troubled past: colonialism, World Wars, the Cold War, neoliberal globalization, wars against terrorism. Conflicts from which we have inherited violent Jihadist extremism. In order to transform conflict, there is no choice but to opt for policies that can promote sharing between cultures, social cohesion, mutual respect and coexistence in the common home that is our world. To fail to do so will only bring more violent extremism and more wars.

At the demonstrations in Barcelona on August 26th, 2017, organised after the August 17th attacks, one of the most repeated cries was "Your wars, our dead". Another plea for an end to the wars in the Middle East was the

resounding "No to war". Other proclamations included: "We are not afraid", "No to xenophobia", or "No to the sale of arms", and it was also repeated that people did not want their freedoms restricted by the Spanish state. All of which demonstrates that citizens condemn the Spanish Government's military support for the attacks and bombardments and the sale of arms to the countries involved in the wars in the Middle East. It was a condemnation of European governments for being complicit in wars that were the cause of the attacks in Barcelona and other cities in Europe. These demands can be summed up in one message: dialogue is needed to make peace possible.

PŸD

The cities of Barcelona and Cambrils suffered a serious jihadist attack in August 2017 that shook Catalan and Spanish society. Although attacks of this kind had already occurred in other parts of Europe, until then they had mainly struck in the Arab world, in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia. These terrorist attacks in Catalonia have prompted many analysts to reflect on the violent extremism and transnational terrorism phenomenon. The Delàs Centre for Peace Studies aims to contribute to opening up a field of study, from the perspective of peace, on this new form of terrorism. The goal is to understand the reasons for the global spread of this phenomenon.

Opening this field of study can be useful to understand not only the phenomenon of violent extremism, but also because "transnational terrorism" is, today, a main concern of Western states and appears prominently as the leading threat in the national defence strategies of both the United States and all its allies, including the Spanish state.

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