

# BUILDING WALLS

**Fear and securitization  
in the European Union**

**Authors: Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto · Pere Brunet**



Published by:



**Stop  
Wapenhandel**

**Centre Delàs d'Estudis per la Pau**

Carrer Erasme de Janer 8, entresol, despatx 9  
08001 Barcelona  
T. 93 441 19 47  
[www.centredelas.org](http://www.centredelas.org)  
[info@centredelas.org](mailto:info@centredelas.org)

This research is part of Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto's doctoral thesis for the "Peace, Conflict and Development" programme at Jaume I University.

Researchers: Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, Pere Brunet

Acknowledgements: Guillem Mases, Edgar Vega, Julia Mestres, Teresa de Fortuny, Cinta Bolet, Gabriela Serra, Brian Rusell, Niamh Eastwood, Mark Akkerman.

Translator: María José Oliva Parada

Editors: Jordi Calvo Rufanges, Nick Buxton

Barcelona, September 2018

Design and layout: Esteva&Estêvão

Cover photo: Stockvault; p. 11: Ashley Gilbertson/VII/Redux; p. 5: blublu.org  
p. 9: [www.iamawake.co](http://www.iamawake.co); p. 21: Georgi Licovski/EPA

D.L.: B-19744-2010

ISSN: 2013-8032



## INDEX

<b>Executive summary .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Foreword .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>1. Building walls .....</b>	<b>12</b>
1.1 New security policies in the border area .....	12
1.2 European border policy: towards securitization and militarisation. ....	13
1.3 The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). ....	14
<b>2. Mental walls .....</b>	<b>16</b>
2.1 Concept and practice of fortress europe. ....	16
2.2 Mental walls in Europe: the rise of racism and xenophobia. ....	17
<b>3. Physical walls .....</b>	<b>23</b>
3.1 Walls surrounding Europe .....	23
3.2 Land walls .....	25
3.3 Maritime walls .....	30
<b>4. Virtual walls .....</b>	<b>34</b>
4.1 Virtual walls and surveillance systems .....	34
4.2 Systems for the control and storage of data on movements across borders. ....	34
4.3 Surveillance system for border areas: EUROSUR. ....	36
<b>Conclusions and recommendations .....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Annexes .....</b>	<b>51</b>

## Index of tables, graphs, maps and annexes

Table 1. Frontex's operational activities budget (2005–2017) .....	15
Table 2. Analysis of the ten European countries in which xenophobic parties obtained more than half a million votes in any of the elections between 2010–2018 .....	20
Table 3. Walls of the countries of European Union Member States, Schengen area and Macedonia (1990–2017) .....	23
Table 4. Main maritime operations to control migratory flows (2004–2017) .....	31
 Graph 1. Evolution of the Frontex Budget (2005–2017) .....	15
Graph 2. Evolution of walls built by European Union member states, Schengen area and Macedonia (1990–2017) .....	23
Graph 3. Evolution of controls in Schengen area countries .....	30
 Map 1: Results of the 2015 Eurobarometer on racism. Percentage of people who said they would feel comfortable if one of their sons or daughters had a relationship with a Muslim person. ....	19
Map 2: Walls built by European Union Member States (1990–2017) .....	24

## ANNEXES

Annex 1. Frontex Budget 2005–2017 .....	51
Annex 2. Internal controls within the Schengen area (2006–2017) .....	51
Annex 3. Frontex's Joint Operations by year (2005–2017) .....	54





## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 9<sup>th</sup> 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, marking what many hoped would be a new era of cooperation and openness across borders. German President Horst Koehler celebrating its demise years later spoke of an 'edifice of fear' replaced by a 'place of joy', opening up the possibility of a 'cooperative global governance which benefits everyone'. 30 years later, the opposite seems to have happened. Edifices of fear, both real and imaginary, are being constructed everywhere fuelling a rise in xenophobia and creating a far more dangerous walled world for refugees fleeing for safety.

This report reveals that member states of the European Union and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls, the equivalent of more than six times the total length of the Berlin Walls,<sup>1</sup> since the nineties to prevent displaced people migrating into Europe. These physical walls are accompanied by even longer 'maritime walls', naval operations patrolling the Mediterranean, as well as 'virtual walls', border control systems that seek to stop people entering or even travelling within Europe, and control movement of population. Europe has turned itself in the process into a fortress excluding those outside– and in the process also increased its use of surveillance and militarised technologies that has implications for its citizens within the walls.

1. The Berlin Wall was composed of a wall of 45 km at East Berlin plus 115 km at West Berlin.

This report seeks to study and analyse the scope of the fortification of Europe as well as the ideas and narratives upon which it is built. This report examines the walls of fear stoked by xenophobic parties that have grown in popularity and exercise an undue influence on European policy. It also examines how the European response has been shaped in the context of post-9/11 by an expanded security paradigm, based on the securitization of social issues. This has transformed Europe's policies from a more social agenda to one centred on security, in which migrations and the movements of people are considered as threats to state security. As a consequence, they are approached with the traditional security tools: militarism, control, and surveillance.

Europe's response is unfortunately not an isolated one. States around the world are answering the biggest global security problems through walls, militarisation, and isolation from other states and the rest of the world. This has created an increasingly hostile world for people fleeing from war and political prosecution.

The foundations of "Fortress Europe" go back to the Schengen Agreement in 1985, that while establishing freedom of movement within EU borders, demanded more control of its external borders. This model established the idea of a safe interior and an unsafe exterior.

Successive European security strategies after 2003, based on America's "Homeland Security" model, turned the border into an element that connects local and global security. As a result, the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became increasingly militarised, and migration was increasingly viewed as a threat.

Fortress Europe was further expanded with policy of externalization of the border management to third countries in which agreements have been signed with neighbouring countries to boost border control and accept deported migrants. The border has thus been transformed into a bigger and wider geographical concept.

## THE WALLS AND BARRIERS TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

- The investigation estimates that the member states of the European Union and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls on their borders since the nineties, to prevent the entrance of displaced people and migration into their territory.
- The practice of building walls has grown immensely, from 2 walls in the decade of the 1990s to 15 in 2017. 2015 saw the largest increase, the number of walls grew from 5 to 12.
- 10 out of 28 member states (Spain, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, the UK, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have built walls on their borders to prevent immigration, all of them belonging to the Schengen area except for Bulgaria and the United Kingdom.
- One country that is not a member of the European Union but belongs to the Schengen area has built a wall to prevent migration (Norway). Another (Slovakia) has built internal walls for racial segregation. A total of 13 walls have been built on EU borders or inside the Schengen area.<sup>2</sup>
- Two countries, both members of the European Union and the Schengen area, (Spain and Hungary) have built two walls on their borders to control migration. Another two (Austria and the United Kingdom) have built walls on their shared borders with Schengen countries (Slovenia and France respectively). A country outside of the European Union, but part of the so-called Balkan route (Macedonia), has built a wall to prevent migration.
- Internal controls of the Schengen area, regulated and normalized by the Schengen Borders Code of 2006, have been gone from being an exception to be the political norm, justified on the grounds of migration control and political events (such as political summit, large demonstrations or high profile visitors to a country). From only 3 internal controls in 2006, there were 20 in 2017, which indicates the expansion in restrictions and monitoring of peoples' movements.

2. The walls on Cyprus and Northern Ireland were built previous to the period under study.



- The maritime environment, particularly the Mediterranean, provides more barriers. The analysis shows that of the 8 main EU maritime operations (Mare Nostrum, Poseidon, Hera, Andale, Minerva, Hermes, Triton and Sophia) none have an exclusive mandate of rescuing people. All of them have had, or have, the general objective of fighting crime in border areas. Only one of them (Mare Nostrum) included humanitarian organisations in its fleet, but was replaced by Frontex's "Triton" Operation (2013-2015) which had an increased focus on prosecuting border-related crimes. Another operation (Sophia) included direct collaboration with a military organization (NATO) with a mandate focused on the persecution of persons that transport people on migratory routes. Analysis of these operations show that their treatment of crimes is sometimes similar to their treatment of refugees, framed as issues of security and treating refugees as threats.

- There are also growing numbers of 'virtual walls' which seek to control, monitor and surveil people's movements. This has resulted in the expansion, especially since 2013, of various programs to restrict people's movement (VIS, SIS II, RTP, ETIAS, SLTD and I-Checkit) and collect biometric data. The collected data of these systems are stored in the EURODAC database, which allows analysis to establish guidelines and patterns on our movements. EUROSUR is deployed as the surveillance system for border areas.

## FRONTEX: THE WALLS' BORDERGUARDS

- The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) plays an important role in this whole process of fortress expansion and also acts and establishes coordination with third countries by its joint operation Coordination Points. Its budgets have soared in this period, growing from 6.2 million in 2005 to 302 million in 2017.

- An analysis of Frontex budget data shows a growing involvement in deportation operations, whose budgets have grown from 80,000 euros in 2005 to 53 million euros in 2017.

- The European Agency for the Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) deportations often violate the rights of asylum-seeking persons. Through Frontex's agreements with third countries, asylum-seekers end up in states that violate human rights, have weak democracies, or score badly in terms of human development (HDI).

## WALLS OF FEAR AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE FAR-RIGHT

- The far-right have manipulated public opinion to create irrational fears of refugees. This xenophobia sets up mental walls in people, who then demand physical walls. The analysed data shows a worrying rise in racist opinions in recent years, which has increased the percentage of votes to European parties with a xenophobic ideology, and facilitated their growing political influence.

- In 28 EU member states, there are 39 political parties classified as extreme right populists that at some point of their history have had at least one parliamentary seat (in the national Parliament or in the European Parliament). At the completion of this report (July 2018), 10 member states (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Sweden) have xenophobic parties with a strong presence, which have obtained more than half a million votes in elections since 2010. With the exception of Finland, these parties have increased their representation. In some cases, like those in Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden, there has been an alarming increase, such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) winning 94 seats in the 2017 elections (a party that did not have parliamentary representation in the 2013 elections), the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland winning 235 seats after the 2015 elections (an increase of 49%), and Lega Nord's (LN) strong growth in Italy, which went from 18 seats in 2013 to 124 seats in 2018.

- Our study concludes that, in 9 of these 10 states, extreme right-wing parties have a high degree of influence on the government's migration policies, even when they are a minority party. In 4 of them (Austria, Finland, Italy and Poland) these parties have ministers in the government. In 5 of the remaining 6 countries (Germany, Denmark, Holland, Hungary, and Sweden), there has been an increase of xenophobic discourse and influence. Even centrist parties seem happy to deploy the discourse of xenophobic parties to capture a sector of their voters rather than confront their ideology and advance an alternative discourse based on people's rights. In this way, the positions of the most radical and racist parties are amplified with hardly any effort. In short, our study confirms the rise and influence of the extreme-right in European migration policy which has resulted in the securitization and criminalization of migration and the movements of people.

The mental walls of fear are inextricably connected to the physical walls. Racism and xenophobia legitimise violence in the border area Europe. These ideas reinforce the collective imagination of a safe "interior" and an insecure "outside", going back to the medieval concept of the fortress. They also strengthen territorial power dynamics, where the origin of a person,

among other factors, determines her freedom of movement.

In this way, in Europe, structures and discourses of violence have been built up, diverting us from policies that defend human rights, coexistence and equality, or more equal relationships between territories.





## FOREWORD

*Building walls: fear and securitization policies in the European Union* is framed in a context in which, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 68.5<sup>3</sup> million people have been considered forcibly displaced due to armed conflict, persecution, or human rights violations in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017).

Some of them have arrived at the doors of the European Union seeking protection and asylum, but more and more often they have come up against barriers and walls of different kinds. These range from the migration policies deployed by the European Union, which from many human rights and peace activists have called "Fortress Europe" to the progressive rise of xenophobic parties in various countries.

The report aims to analyse the mental, physical and virtual walls that are being established and expanded in the European Union:

- The first chapter: "Building Walls" places the research in the global context of securitization policies and the construction of border walls and particularly in how this is beginning to be implemented in the European Union. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) will be examined in this section as it has been the agent in charge of managing European borders since 2005.
- "Mental Walls" analyses the narrative used by the European Union to criminalise and securitize the movement of people, and more specifically that of refugees and migrants. It charts the rise of extreme right-wing parties and their influence on the discourse and impact on the immigration policies of member states.
- "Physical Walls" focuses on the land-based walls, the fences and walls built on the borders of the European Union member states that have been built from the 1990s to 2017. In maritime walls, we examine the main operations carried out in the Mediterranean to control migratory flows.

3. UNHCR estimates that 25.4 million are refugees and some 40 million are internally displaced, that is, they remain in their countries but are displaced from their homes.

■ In “virtual walls”, we examine the systems developed by the European Union to control and monitor the movement of people.

The research collects data for the period since mass movements of people began and, consequently, followed by the construction of walls and fences by the European Union member states. In other words, from 1990 to 2017, this is the last year in which we have all the data available for Frontex's walls, operations and budgets. However, some chapters use different periods of analysis, an example being the data on Frontex, which was created in 2005, or the need to limit the analysis in order to identify current electoral trends, as in the case of the chapter on “Mental walls in Europe: the rise of racism and xenophobia”.

In Chapter 1, the analysis addresses the global context of border militarisation, new security paradigms, and the impact of a security discourse on policies that lead to the criminalisation of migration and the movement of people. It then focuses on how securitization policies are implemented and developed in the European Union, and how the concepts of borders, security and migration fit into the new security strategies. To do this, various academics have been consulted who have all studied the role and development of borders throughout the 20th and early 21st century.

This chapter also contains a brief analysis of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), for which the Agency's own sources and those European Union for the period 2005-2017 have been consulted together with budgets and annual activity reports. The study focuses on analysing trends in the budget and extracting the most significant items and resources for joint operations and deportation operations.

The second chapter of “mental walls” explores the narrative used by the European Union to deploy the policies that justify the securitization of the movement. The sources used come from official sources in the European Union. The proliferation of right-wing and extreme-right discourses and parties in the European Union member states is also examined. The analysis of the xenophobic narrative that ends up building mental walls has focused on the period 2010-2018, in order to be able to specifically study the political trends related to the increase in the number of refugees and migrants arriving at the doors of the European Union, and to be able to approximate the analysis to the last two electoral periods. The study was based on the analysis of three of the Eurobarometers on racism (corresponding to 1997, 2015 and 2017), on the compilation of Europe-

an electoral results by Wolfram Nordsieck, and on theoretical studies by Zygmunt Bauman, Emilio Lledó and Susi Meret.

Land walls are examined in the “physical walls” chapter. The sources used for research come mainly from Elisabeth Vallet, professor at the University of Quebec who has published several works on walls and fences built throughout the world (although the sources cover only until 2015). Also important is the work done by Reece Jones (2016), who has also published on border violence and militarisation. The chapter has been completed with the map of European Union walls and controls published by UNHCR in 2017.

The analysis covers walls built by European Union members and the Schengen area. However, the Macedonian wall has been added, although it is not a member of either, as it is a key country in the Balkan route. The fence on the island of Cyprus, which has separated the North from the South since 1974, and the walls erected in neighbourhoods of Northern Ireland since 1969, have been excluded because they were built in a timespan prior to the analysis (1990-2017).


The details on the characteristics of the walls have been difficult to present, since the information is diverse and few states publish the characteristics of the walls they build. That is why various sources have been consulted and compared: official sources as well as newspapers and press, although the information in them often varies. For this reason, the details in the catalogue of the walls built are just indicative.

Official sources from the European Union have been used for the analysis of internal controls carried out in the Schengen area. The period studied runs from 2006 to 2017, since 2006 was the year in which joint legislation and regulations were established, together with the *Schengen Borders Code*, on the internal controls of the Schengen area.

Official sources from the European Union, Frontex and some governments have been consulted for the section on maritime walls. The main maritime operations carried out over time have been introduced, most of them being Frontex joint operations. A full list of these joint operations is available in Annex 3.

The last chapter on “virtual walls”, has been written by consulting official European Union sources, and intends to be a brief analysis on the systems for control, surveillance and data storage, which have expanded the surveillance society during the period 1990-2017. The research and development projects carried out by the European Union in the field of border management have not been included, although we know that they





are numerous. Neither have the analyses of national systems implemented by member states such as the SIVE (Integral External Surveillance System) of the Spanish State been included.

We use the terminology of both refugees (those fleeing violence and persecution) and migrants (those who do so for other reasons) throughout this report. Although from institutional structures the threats are equal to all them, the latter are treated as subjects that have even less rights.

In short, with this investigation we want to answer the following questions:

- How is the movement of people, and more specifically that of forcibly displaced people, criminalised and securitized in European Union policies?
- What discourses and political parties are allowing this shift to extreme right policies? What is their influence?

- How do the European Union and its member states securitize and militarize borders?

- What is "Fortress Europe" and how is it built?

From the Centre Delàs d'Estudis per la Pau, the Transnational Institute and Stop Wapenhandel, we hope that this research can serve to provide evidence about the progressive militarisation and securitization applied in border areas by the European Union and its member states. The construction of walls, rise of the extreme right and repercussions of xenophobic discourses, expansion of a control and surveillance society, and criminalisation of the movement of people all contribute to creating a discourse of "the other person" as an enemy. It isolates us from international social reality and distances us from policies committed to human rights and the culture of peace..

# 1. BUILDING WALLS

## 1.1 NEW SECURITY POLICIES IN THE BORDER AREA

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the end of the Cold War and the growing globalisation process led to the belief that wall policies would end, giving way to flexibility of world movement. Mobility has increased in the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st: it is simpler and cheaper to travel, but only for some sectors of the population linked to a territory (Sparke, 2006: 152).

Globalisation has fallen far short of bringing equality and connection between territories or full freedom of movement. Nor has it meant a total and egalitarian opening of borders, but rather an increase in territorial inequality (Shamir, 2016: 157): you can travel with more or less freedom and security depending on your nation of origin. Meanwhile, controls, surveillance and mass collection of data related to our movements are expanding and intensifying. While tourism is a source of economic wealth for the West, people forcibly displaced by the violence of wars and migrants fleeing from the great global inequalities have been converted into a security threat through securitization (Williams, 2016: 28).

The role of borders has changed over time; administrative barriers to migration were minimal in the 19th century. The First World War marked an important turning point in terms of border policy (Walters, 2002), and the role of borders as a space to control movement. According to Walters (2002), national defence concerns and the Great Depression brought in passports, visas, and other controls as requirements in many places, which expanded to other territories (Walters, 2002: 571).

In addition, border control made it possible to carry out the so-called "valve" effect, that is, the regulation of the border's porosity, which allowed more or less flow of people by closing and opening the border. This was in order to enable the entry of immigrant labour, which not having the same rights as the national population was more susceptible to becoming precarious and therefore this meant cheaper labour. The border is therefore an instrument at the service of the needs of the domestic labour market (Heyman, 2012: 270).

At the end of the 20th century, the border went from being a political-territorial delimitation in which the nation-state exercised its control, to also becoming, at the end of the 1990s, a tool for intercepting and regulating migratory movements, while being totally

open to goods, with the reduction or suppression of tariffs and absence of regulation of financial capitalism. In other words, borders are a geographical space where the domestic laws of the State and the integrity of the nation are strengthened based on the legality of people according to their origin.

It was only in the 21st century that the attacks of 11 September in the US changed Western security paradigms that were already under review and debate after the Cold War (Nuruzzaman, 2006: 228). Global and transnational terrorism at a level previously unknown to the West was accompanied by political rhetoric of fear and insecurity that unleashed a state of alarm. Where any attack was possible, anywhere and at any time, against any national subject.

This framework consolidated the *Homeland Security* paradigm, as it was called in the United States, with great influence from the ultra-conservative lobby "Project for a New American Century" (Sanahuja 2005: 33). This brought in the securitization dynamics of State practices present since the 1990s, but expanded and consolidated it (Menjívar, 2014: 356) after 11 September.

By securitization, we mean that certain State policies in the social sphere are integrated into a security agenda. Examples might include an economic, social, political model, infrastructures, epidemics, or borders and immigration, to name a few. In securitizing them, they are perceived as conventional threats, treated with methods and techniques specific to national defence and security arenas, which have traditionally used military or policing concepts and means (Salazar et al., 2011: 33)

The loss of territory and territorial integrity are aspects that the State has historically recorded as threats (Zacher, 2001: 261). Borders marked that security limit which could not be crossed. After the Cold War and the 11 September attacks, threats to most Western states diversified, territorial loss became more unlikely, and new threats arose from the securitization process and transnational terrorism.

Borders changed from being a simple delimiting element of territorial integrity and sovereignty to becoming geographical spaces where new threats appear, turning them into securitized spaces (Vallet, 2014: 144) The diversity of threats that appear in the border geographic area causes many states to apply militaristic measures, dealing with them via military means and techniques (Jones, 2016: 188).

In the context of a militarised border area, mobility is understood and treated as a suspicious activity

(Shamir, 2016: 201). Migratory flows and forcibly displaced persons must be controlled, monitored and recorded as a security threat that requires interception.

Rather than leaving aside the Cold War policy of walls, building walls today receives ever more political support. There are more than 70 walls in the world (Jones, 2016: 187), most built after the Cold War; Israel, Algeria, Calais (in France), Saudi Arabia, Hungary, Turkey, Spain, India, United States, Croatia, Bulgaria, among many others. More and more states are adopting the policy of walling themselves in as if they were medieval cities, as a security model, to establish control and restrict freedom of movement.

In short, the role of borders has mutated throughout the 20th century, most recently influenced by policies developed after the 11 September attacks, which have securitized borders and the movement of people. Borders are beginning to be treated as areas of war, even if there is no threat of territorial loss, where militarism is deployed and the policy of creating border walls is promoted. Therefore, those who move across borders become a threat that needs to be controlled and monitored, with ever more surveillance.

## 1.2 EUROPEAN BORDER POLICY: TOWARDS SECURITIZATION AND MILITARISATION

The European Union and its member states have also participated in this dynamic of constructing walls to build security. Policies towards European securitization go hand in hand with the construction of the so-called Fortress Europe, which began in the 1990s and has been consolidated with new means and tools from the 21st century onwards.

The Schengen agreement approved in 1985, as discussed below, had already introduced the strengthening of external borders as a condition for States to become part of the European Union's area of free movement. The securitization of borders advanced through the different security strategies of the European Union, was reinforced by the attacks of 11 September.

Following the attacks, the European Union did not perceive the threats in the same way as the United States (Stevenson, 2003: 87). Yet in spite of this, measures were introduced in less than a year and steps taken towards a European *Homeland Security* doctrine, based on the US model and the securitization paradigm. Borders appeared as spaces to be securitized through the different strategies and policies of the European Union.

The 2003 European Security Strategy, *A secure Europe in a Better World* (European Union, 2003), analysed the European security environment and identified the main security challenges. The text, although short, established a connection between global and local security, partly produced by the globalisation process, where borders are also included, although migratory flows are barely named. As provided for in the strategy of 2003:

"The post-Cold War environment is one with increasingly open borders, in which the internal and external aspects of security are inextricably linked." (European Union, 2003: 2)

*A secure Europe in a Better World* provided the conceptual framework for establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP is intended to be a definition of European defence, based mainly on the increase in its military capability and its deployment of military missions in third countries. The evolution of the CSDP approved the 2016 *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* (European Council, 2016), which mentions the need to strengthen the borders of third countries.

"While CSDP missions and operations are deployed outside the Union, the EU can contribute from a security and defence perspective to strengthen the protection and resilience of its networks and critical infrastructures; the security of its external borders and the creation of partner capabilities to manage its borders [...]" (European Council, 2016: 3)

In the framework of collaboration with third countries, the European Union is also reformulating the concept of border space through its border externalisation policies. The border is no longer just a delimitation of territory and state sovereignty. The geographical space expands to third countries through different types of agreements, some of which are carried out through the European Union, by Member States, in the form of bilateral agreements, or development aid funds, such as the *Emergency Trust Fund for Africa*, or through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).

The model of outsourcing the management of migratory flows and borders has been carried out by the European Union since 1992 and was reinforced in 2005. It accelerated in 2015, in the Valletta Summit, which increased the number of the African countries targeted for measures to externalise borders (Akkerman, 2018: 17).



The geographical space expanded to a total of 35 priority<sup>4</sup> countries with which the European Union has agreed a border externalisation policy to manage migratory flows (Akkerman, 2018: 31). This has led to a whole series of territorial power dynamics, where third countries must establish policies based on the needs and requirements of the European Union, such as accepting returns of migrants, tightening of border controls or training of their security forces and border officers, as explained by Akkerman (2018: 18).

In 2005, the European Union set up Frontex which would become the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for border management and control. Frontex plays an important role in the expansion process as it also acts and coordinates with third countries through joint operation *Coordination Points*.<sup>5</sup>

Frontex's main objectives are European security and intercepting those 'illegally' migrated people who move through border areas and territories to reach a specific country of their choice. In the words of the European Commission itself:

"(Frontex) will bring coherence and solidity to the external border, especially in times of high pressure, security being a key issue. A reformed Common European Asylum System will remedy the fact that the current system will not be able to effectively take care of people who ignore the rules and travel to their country of choice." (European Commission, 2016).

In short, the European Union's security policies are moving towards a securitization process and the construction of Fortress Europe, in which borders increasingly appear as a security concern. In addition, the sending of troops from European member countries to third countries is encouraged – the vulnerability of their borders is interpreted as a threat to Europe's security, linking global and local threats.

### 1.3 THE EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY (FRONTEx)

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) for border control was established in 2004 in Warsaw under Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 (European Council, 2004), although the Agency did not become operational until 2005. Its mandate is to

control the effectiveness of border systems and co-ordinate the authorities responsible for external border controls within European Union Member States and the Schengen area, and provide operational and technical support to countries that require it. It is also required to develop a strategy and assess effective border control and threats encountered by the Agency.

In 2016, its mandate was broadened and some of its activities were reinforced. A corps of border guards (1,500) were made available to it in addition to its own teams. However, Member States have yet to provide materials, equipment and personnel for operations.

The Agency was created based on a border management model that accepts the structural framework in which people are categorised as legal or illegal. Its main function is to control crimes related to border areas, including intercepting refugees and migrants so that they do not arrive on the shores of Member States, so that no State has to manage the registration, possible asylum claim or deportation of the person. It also is charged with monitoring and controlling the movement of people across the internal and external borders of the European Union and the Schengen area. Therefore, it is not a rescue agency for people as it is often said to be, as its activity focuses on the detection and processing of border-related crimes, and surveillance and control of borders.

The Agency's budget has increased significantly since its creation, reaching a total of EUR 1,391 million spent,<sup>6</sup> between the time the Agency was created until 2017. There was a small decrease in the budget in 2012, but it has experienced immense growth from this date. As we shall see later, in 2012 the massive construction of walls by European Union member states also began. The budget significantly increased from 2015 onwards, a date that should be mentioned due to the massive construction of walls by member countries.


The operational activities that define the Frontex's activity, which is where most of its budget and resources go, are analysed in more detail here. Within the operational activities we find joint operations, which are those that the Agency carries out with other states and third countries based on its risk analysis that focus on detecting and intercepting border-related crimes and monitoring and controlling movements at the borders of third countries and member countries.

4. The report by the Transnational Institute *Expanding the Fortress*, notes that the European Union prioritised 35 countries for border externalisation policies and agreements. The countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Iran, Serbia and Tanzania.

5. See annex 3. Frontex Joint Operations by year (2005–2017).

6. See table of annexes: Annex 1. Frontex Budget 2005–2017.

**Graph 1. Evolution of the Frontex Budget (2005-2017)**



Compiled by the authors from Frontex's annual budgets (Frontex, 2005-2017)

Millions of current euros

The operational activities also include joint return operations. After the Agency was created, the item was renamed: "Cooperation operations for returns." In 2011, 2012, 2014 and 2015 these operations ceased to appear under this name in the budget reports, but the rate of joint return operations has nevertheless steadily increased from 2011 on (Akkerman 2018: 24).

From 2016, the functions of the Agency were extended, also in return operations, going from a facilitator role to a coordinator one. It is in 2016 when the item for "Support operations for return" appears, which shows a type of operation trend (coordination) and budget for this type of operations. 53 million was earmarked for return operations in 2017.

To conclude, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is the European Union's political commitment to the management of borders and migratory flows, as evidenced by its growing budget, which grew enormously from 2015 onwards. The Agency's involvement in return operations also increased, indicating that Member States have decided to boost Frontex's role in return operations. As the research shows below, there is a strong parallel between the years in which Frontex's budget increased and the accelerated construction of walls by European Union member states in 2012 and 2015.

**Table 1. Frontex's operational activities budget (2005-2017)**

Current euros

	OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES	JOINT OPERATIONS (Land, sea and air)	COOPERATION OPERATIONS FOR DEPORTATION	SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR DEPORTATION	TRAINING
2005	4,024,300	3,400,000	80,000,00		250,000
2006	19,166,300	10,764,300	325,000,00		1,060,000
2007	27,326,000	19,865,000	600,000,00		3,505,000
2008	70,432,000	38,450,000	560,000,00		6,410,000
2009	83,250,000	42,900,000	2,250,000,00		6,500,000
2010	61,611,843	34,770,843	9,341,000,00		7,200,000
2011	86,730,500	73,223,500			5,600,000
2012	58,951,000	46,993,000			4,000,000
2013	62,550,900	39,531,900	8,850,000,00		4,760,000
2014	60,348,700	46,330,700			4,050,000
2015	111,228,000	92,009,000			4,320,000
2016	188,897,000	121,977,000		39,585,000	5,000,000
2017	225,652,794	129,365,000		53 060 000	8,978,285

Compiled by the authors from Frontex's annual budgets (Frontex, 2005-2017)

## 2. MENTAL WALLS

### 2.1 CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF FORTRESS EUROPE

The foundations of Fortress Europe began with the Schengen agreement, signed in 1985, which established freedom of movement between signatory European countries and put an end to internal controls between these countries. It created a model that, in theory, promoted freedom of movement and mutual trust. However, it also meant strengthening external borders through stricter measures and increased border controls, helping to create what is known as Fortress Europe.

The Schengen agreement built a safe interior by assuming an insecure exterior from which one needed to protect oneself. From this point of view, border controls served to control crime and immigration.

Being part of Schengen requires complying with border control requirements, therefore, countries on the periphery of Europe that have more contact with the arrival of people forcibly fleeing their homes, have had to strengthen their borders and external controls to become part of Schengen. Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain were not allowed into the Schengen framework until they met the standards that indicated that their controls were sufficiently rigorous (Walters, 2002: 567). This similarly happened to Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia, as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia while awaiting accession. All these countries have had or are getting funding from the Schengen Facility (EU instrument) to strengthen border security.

The power to control what happens at external borders from within becomes effective with the deployment of surveillance technology and control of movements, 'virtual walls', as we shall see later. The SIS *Schengen Information System*, currently SIS II, which incorporates biometric data,<sup>7</sup> is a key piece in the Schengen agreement, designed to facilitate the exchange of information concerning movements at borders between national authorities; police, judicial and migration. This has resulted in a massive collection, storage, processing and exchange of data related to the movement of people.

However, the European Union denies this creates a "Fortress Europe" (European Union, 2014: 8), saying that external borders must remain open to peo-

ple fleeing war, something which, as we shall see throughout this report, does not correspond to the implementation of the policies subsequently developed by the European Union and its Member States.

It is important to mention the content of the security strategies developed by the European Union consistently contains this contradictory mix of humanitarian and security rhetoric, as is the case in its 2016 security strategy *A common vision, a joint action: a stronger Europe* (European Union, 2016). It includes a discourse that characterises external threats as internal threats, above all, regarding terrorism and the need to establish a European-style world order, to guarantee stability. This embraces defence-based cooperation, the intention of establishing common criteria among Member States, as well as the need to strengthen relations with military organisations such as NATO. Borders appear as part of the challenges and threats facing the European Union:

"This means living up to our commitments for mutual assistance and solidarity, and means tackling challenges that have both an external and internal dimension, such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cybersecurity and energy security, organised crime and the management of external borders" (European Union, 2016)

The Commissioner for Migration, Internal Affairs and Citizenship of the European Commission, Dimitris Avramopoulos, also echoed this approach, in his 2017 speech, where he established the relationship between terrorism and migration, establishing the latter as a security issue:

"Europe has had to deal with two parallel and simultaneous crises on migration and security." (European Commission, 2017: 15)

It should be pointed out that, in the same strategy, a new role is given to the military and security complex in addition to an assertion that the European Union must give support to industry as a priority strategy for its security:

"Member states remain sovereign in their defence decisions; however defence cooperation has to become the norm in order to acquire and maintain many of these capabilities. The EU will systematically promote defence cooperation and advocate the creation of a strong European defence industry, which is vital for Europe's autonomy of decision and action." (European Union, 2016 8-9)

7. Biometric data with the set of physical parameters of each person that allow to verify their identity, is based on fingerprints, iris scanner, face or voice features, among others that allow recognition of identity with greater precision.

Industry began to play an influential role in the EU with the creation of public-private forums starting in 2005, involving public bodies and private industry; GoP (*Group of Personalities*), ESRA (European Security Research Advisory Board) and ESRI (European Security Research and Innovation Forum) (European Commission, 2007). They are also active in the *High Security Roundtable*, which despite being defined neutral includes industry as a decision-making agent in the policies to be developed by the European Union<sup>8</sup> and where NATO also participates, a military organisation with its own security agenda. This can be seen in the report published by the *Group of Personalities* in 2016, where the influence of industry on the development of security policies in the European Union is clear:

"In 2015, the European Commission invited key personalities from European industry, governments, the European Parliament and academia to advise it on the establishment of a Preparatory Action on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016)

It is clear, therefore, that the military, security and technology industry have the capacity to have an impact on decision-making spaces on security and border policy matters (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013), eroding the public governance of the European Union.

The implementation of immigration and border control security policies can also be seen in programmes dedicated to financing research, such as the *Horizon 2020* (2014-2020) programme, a European research and innovation programme that includes "security" among its areas (European Commission, 2005), where border management appears as a frequent subject for research development.

To conclude, the European Union uses contradictory rhetoric and narratives when it comes to migratory movements. While it ostensibly rejects a policy of walls (Nielsen, 2017) and supports the humanitarian and development goals, in reality this coexists with discourse and security practices that criminalise the movement of people who migrate, conceiving them as a threat. In addition, the EU erodes its public governance with the creation of public-private spaces, where the military and security complex present their own interests in reinforcing control and surveillance technology in border areas.

## 2.2 MENTAL WALLS IN EUROPE: THE RISE OF RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA

### 2.2.1 THE ROOTS OF XENOPHOBIA IN EUROPE

There has been a huge leap in the total number of immigrants knocking on Europe's doors in recent years. It is, to a large extent, a "collateral damage" of the military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other countries, erroneous, nefarious and disastrous expeditions that led to the substitution of dictatorial regimes through a scenario of destabilisation and incessant frenetic violence. These interventions were instigated and fostered by a global arms trade that is out of control and strengthened by a greedy arms industry. These are phrases by Zygmunt Bauman (2016: 11) in one of his latest books. Evidence indeed shows that there is a correlation between the shipment of arms to countries in conflict and the degradation of their security situation, showing the disastrous effects of this arms trade (Calvo, Ruiz, Vega, 2017).

Philosopher Emilio Lledó (Luque, 2016) spoke recently of the superficiality that underlies current analyses of migratory flows. He said: "One of the things that surprise me is that people talk about refugees with such intensity, but no one explains to us why there are such wars. If a percentage were to be set, we would see that 95% of analysts talk about the refugee problem, but only 5% analyse why. We must insist, demand that they tell us the causes of people fleeing. Why is there a war?" Few analyses speak of the interests behind xenophobic discourse that ends up asking for the reinforcement of the fortresses that protect the countries of the global North while hiding all the actions (depredation of resources, anthropogenic warming, promotion of conflicts, military business, arms trade) of these same countries that destroy the conditions of human security in the countries of the global South.

Military interventions, corporate power, conflicts and destruction, forcibly displaced persons and refugees who want to come to Europe: The reality of the 21st century contradicts the nationalist myth based on nation-states inhabited by a population that is ethnically, linguistically and culturally homogeneous. This is because in less than two centuries, not only have a small number of nations occupied and colonised the entire planet, but we have become a connected and interrelated global tribe, terribly divided between privileged powerful people and those that are excluded. And now Europeans must choose between rejecting these so-called "strangers" who arrive, or welcoming them and learning to live together.

8. A detailed list of the High Security Roundtable's private industry partners is available online: <http://www.security-round-table.eu/esrt/partners/index.php>

The current challenge (Bauman, 2016) is to transform the human mind, formed over millennia in environments and villages in which its inhabitants interacted almost every day of their lives with the same people, to equip it with ideas and institutions that allow us to live together in diversity and in the awareness of our global interdependence. A challenge of life or death, because we are approaching, or perhaps we have already reached, as Zygmunt Bauman says, a fork in the road of our possible futures: to live together in a scenario of cooperative welfare, or collective extinction (Bauman, 2016).

## 2.2.2 FROM 1997 TO 2017: THE EUROPEAN CRISIS OF SOLIDARITY

In order to assess the evolution of racism in Europe, we first analysed the results of the 1997 and 2015 Eurobarometer on racism. In the first survey (Eurobarometer 113, 1997), the response in 1997 to the direct question as to whether the person interviewed considered themselves racist was understandably small (but definitely not insignificant). Nine per cent of those interviewed placed themselves at the top of the racist scale saying they were "very racist", a scale led by Belgium with 22 per cent of people openly declaring that they were "very racist". They were followed by France (16%) and Austria (14%). The countries with the lowest number of reported "very racist" were Spain and Ireland (4% each), Portugal (3%), Luxembourg and Sweden (2% each). However, the answer to the question of whether or not one agrees with the statement that "Our country has reached its limits; if there were more people belonging to these minority groups, we would have problems", showed a much more alarming result (Eurobarometer 113, 1997: 7): the percentage of respondents who tended to agree with this statement was 60% or more in 12 of the 15 countries analysed.

The results of the 2015 Eurobarometer on Racism (Eurobarometer 437, 2015), which analysed a total of 28 States, are unfortunately not directly comparable with those of 1997, because they are based on different questions. In any case, one of the significant questions in this Eurobarometer on racism was the following: People, regardless of whether they had sons or daughters, were asked how comfortable they would feel if one of their sons or daughters had a relationship with a person from a different ethnic group. Nearly nine out of ten respondents said they would be happy if their son or daughter had a relationship with a Christian person (89% comfortable or indifferent). However, the proportion is considerably lower for a relationship with a Muslim person (50%) (Eurobarometer 437, 2015: 36) Up to 30% of respondents say they would be uncomfortable with this relationship. The lowest percentages of comfortable or indifferent

persons in the case of a relationship with a Muslim person were in the Czech Republic (12%), Slovakia (16%), Cyprus (23%), Lithuania (25%), Bulgaria (27%) and Malta (31%). Less than half of the respondents would feel comfortable in the following countries: Estonia (33%), Poland (34%), Greece (36%), Latvia (37%), Italy (41%), Romania (42%), Germany (43%), Hungary (44%), Austria (44%) and Belgium (47%) as shown in Map 1.

These results of the Euro-barometer 2015 are shown graphically in map 1. In *How the Populist Right is Redrawing the Map of Europe*, André Tartar (2017) comments that, according to the 2017 Euro-barometer, the 5 countries at the top of the list in terms of negative feelings regarding immigration are the Czech Republic (82% of the population), Hungary (78%), Poland (71%), Romania (61%) and France (58%).

This wave of racism and xenophobia in the European Union States implies that the ideal of a Europe of human rights is far from being implemented and socialised. The advance of xenophobic party MPs in the member states shows that the problem in Europe is not only related to the economic crisis, but is also the result of a European crisis of solidarity and political will (Dede, 2011).

## 2.2.3 FROM 2010 TO 2018: RACISM, XENOPHOBIA, AND CONSTRUCTION OF MENTAL WALLS

The UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimination has been working for years on the preparation and updating of international instruments against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and specific forms of intolerance in all their aspects (*United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, 2006). This committee studies the situation in each country and develops early warning indicators.

A good indicator, which allows an analysis by country together with its temporal evolution, is the measuring the rise of extreme right-wing political parties with xenophobic programmes. But the first problem already arises when drawing up the list of these political parties and when trying to specify a definition that characterises them. According to Matthijs Rooduijn (2015), attitudes towards immigration in a social context of expanding job insecurity are the main motivation of people who vote for right-wing populist parties (PRR). Based on multiple scientific studies, Matthijs Rooduijn proposed, as does Andre Tartar (2017), a list of 39 political parties classified as extreme right-wing populist that at some point in their history have had at least one parliamentary seat (at




national level or in the European Parliament). Some countries, namely Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, have no party on the list. For the remaining 22 countries, the results (*The March of History* table in Andre Tartar's work) show a percentage of votes of more than 20% for extreme right-wing parties in 15 of these 22 countries, with more than 50% of the votes in the last elections in two of them: Poland and Hungary.

The following table analyses the electoral results of parties that have received more than half a million votes in a parliamentary or presidential election in the last five years (Worrall, 2017), (also incorporating data from Eurobarometer 437 and the work of Wolfram Nordsieck (n.d). Table 1 includes a total of 10 European countries, analysing the results of the most relevant xenophobic party in each country and considering the period between 2010 and 2018. It also includes an assessment of their influence on state power in each case.

The table indicates the percentage of votes obtained and the number of seats for each party and for each election year between 2010 and 2018. With the exception of Finland, parties from all other countries have increased their number of seats. In some cases, such as Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden, the increase is alarming. Besides this constant increase in the number of xenophobic MPs in European parliaments, there is a significant increase (last column of the table) in their political influence in the executive power. The only party in the opposition without demonstrated influence (in 2018) in the executive is the French National Front. In all other cases, however, xenophobic discourse has spread to other parties and has ended up influencing government policies. As the table shows, in four countries (Austria, Finland, Italy and Poland), xenophobic parties formed part of the government in 2018 (in Finland it was *Blue Reform*, a split from FINNS), while in the remaining five cases (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Hungary and Sweden) their discourse spread and influenced other parties.

### Map 1. Results of the 2015 Eurobarometer on racism.

Percentage of people who said they would feel comfortable if one of their sons or daughters had a relationship with a Muslim person



The cases of Poland and Hungary are particularly worrying, because of the social penetration of these parties. In Poland, the *Law and Justice* Party (PiS) have been in power since 2015. After three years, electoral polls in 2018 showed 43% of citizens favourable to the policies of the PiS party, a clear increase in relation to the 37.6% of voters who opted for this party in the 2015 elections. In addition, a large majority of citizens in Poland support the government's policies. A CBOS survey in May 2017, for example, indicated that 70% of Polish citizens were against accepting migrants from Muslim countries, while those in favour were only 25%. And a large majority opposed the EU's redistribution quotas for migrants (Szczerbiak, 2017).

In Hungary, the Orban government (FIDESZ) is constantly influenced by *Movement for a Better Hungary* (JOBBIK). According to journalist Lili Bayer, who quotes a senior FIDESZ official (Bayer, 2017), Orban feared being attacked from the right when the immigration crisis began. As a result, the Orban government built a fence along its southern border and refused to participate in the EU migration quota scheme. Their migration policies were to the right of JOBBIK, which, according to the official cited, was a smart decision.

**Table 2. Analysis of the ten European countries in which xenophobic parties obtained more than half a million votes in any of the elections between 2010 and 2018**

Country	Party		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Government/ influence
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	% of votes				4.7				12.6		AfD: influence on CSU
		Seats				---				94		
Austria	Freedom Party (FPÖ)	% of votes				20.5				26		Government
		Seats				40				51		
Denmark	People's Party (DF)	% of votes		12.3				21.1				DF: influence on S (socialdem.) and V (liberal)
		Seats		22				37				
Finland	True Finns (FINNS)	% of votes		19				17.6				Government (Blue reform)
		Seats		39				38				
France	National Front (FN)	% of votes			13.6			13.2				Opposition
		Seats			2			8				
The Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	% of votes			10.1					13		PVV: influence on VVD
		Seats			15					20		
Hungary	Movement for a better Hungary (JOBBIK)	% of votes	16.7				20.2				19.1	JOBBIK: influence on FIDESZ
		Seats	47				23				26	
Italy	Northern League (LN)	% of votes				4.1					17.4	Government
		Seats				18					124	
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)	% of votes		29.9				37.6				Government
		Seats		157				235				
Sweden	Swedish Democrats (SD)	% of votes	5.7				12.9					SD: Influence on Modelling
		Seats	20				49					

Compiled by the authors from the source (Parties and elections, n.d.)



In France, Marine Le Pen said she would protect France by suspending immigration and defending the country from the threat of wild globalisation. She proposed to mobilise thousands of reservists to protect French borders if she was elected, and said: "With the grave terrorist threat we face, we must be able to control who enters so that we can expel those who pose a danger" (Dearden, 2017). In Italy, the *Northern League* leader Matteo Salvini, deputy prime minister and interior minister in 2018, reiterated his government's goal of deporting illegal immigrants on a visit to Sicily. He insisted that his government's stance on migrants was common sense, and then said (Ellyatt, 2018) "It is not enough to reduce the number of people arriving. We need to increase deportations. It will not be easy to do, but in the next few weeks we shall

begin to act, reducing the time of detention of immigrants and therefore reducing costs". The message to the "illegal" immigrants was to get ready and pack their bags.

In the case of Finland, the FINNS party's electoral programme for the 2015 elections included proposals such as reducing the quota of refugees, opposition to the planned distribution mechanisms of the common European asylum policy, opposition to the use of public funds for multiculturalism policies and the tightening of conditions for family unification of immigrants.

The analysis of the influence and political spread of xenophobic discourse in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden shows great

similarities, indicating how terribly easy it is to shift to scenarios where racist platforms dominate. In Germany, for example the CDU and CSU agreed in July 2018 to set up border centres to return migrants to the countries of entry, even though the German population did not like it (69% of whom supported Merkel's position and wanted a European solution to the migration issue). 85% of the far-right AfD supporters, however, supported the CDU-CSU agreement (López, 2018: 6), which was in line with its own xenophobic theses. The reason was probably electoral: The CSU, concerned about state elections (in this case in Bavaria), decided to strengthen its own anti-refugee stance in an attempt to regain AfD voters (Schmidt, 2018). The Austrian reaction was immediate: the Austrian government agreed to close its southern borders with Italy and Slovenia if Germany implemented the CDU-CSU agreement. The Austrian Minister of the Interior, Herbert Kickl, and the Minister of Defence, Mario Kunasek, both of the extreme right wing FPÖ, created a "border protection force" with 600 police officers and 200 soldiers, named *Puma*, which can be mobilised in just 24 hours (Forès, 2018).

In Denmark, repressive proposals against immigration are not being spearheaded by the populist *Danish People's Party* (DF), which for a long time was the main racist and anti-immigration voice in Denmark. Rather, the fight against immigration is being led in 2018 by the two main established parties (the centre-left Social Democrats (S) and the centre-right Liberals (V)). According to Richard Milne (2015), "If you come to Denmark, you have to work," says a sign from the Social Democrats, while the Liberals have promised an immediate halt to the large influx of asylum seekers. According to a prominent Danish corporate executive director, the *Danish People's Party* has been overtaken by the centre in its extreme positions.

And if we go to the Netherlands, Prime Minister Mark Rutte made a shift to the right by publishing a full-page advertisement warning immigrants to "be normal or leave" during the bitter 2017 electoral struggle for national identity (Boztas, 2017). Mark Rutte, leader of the *Liberal Party* (VVD), did so to avoid the pressure and growing popularity of Geert Wilders of the far-right *Freedom Party* (PVV), which created his programme on the basis of anti-immigration.

Finally, in Sweden, the centre-right *Moderate* party (M) said in May 2018 that it would be willing to reach an agreement on immigration with the xenophobic

*Swedish Democrats* (SD) party which for a long time had been a pariah in Swedish politics due to its historical neo-Nazi ties. The offer was related to expectations that *Swedish Democrats* would significantly increase their percentage of votes, leaving the *Moderate* party in a difficult situation (Local, The, 2018).

In four of these five cases (we do not include Austria because FPÖ is part of the government), some classic political parties (the German CSU, the Danish Social Democrats and Liberals, the Dutch VVD and the Swedish *Moderate* party), far from maintaining a programmatic coherence, have moved towards the xenophobic stances of the parties listed in the table, with the basic objective of winning votes. They have all shown willingness to use xenophobic discourse as a dangerous strategy to win votes.

In short: certain non-xenophobic parties based on electoral calculations and concern at the rise in the number of votes of their racist competitors, use xenophobic discourse to try and capture a sector of their competitor's voters, instead of daring to develop their own discourse. In this way, the most radical and racist parties succeed in seeing their proposals amplified with hardly any effort of their own, as shown by the evolution of the electoral results in the table.

Newcomers may cause distress precisely because they are unknown, unlike the people we interact with every day. In this environment, the perverse reaction a good number of governments has consisted of using this fear of existential insecurity to launch racist and xenophobic messages that insist that there are "external" enemies. This is an easy way to win a certain social support but ends up imposing militarised "security" systems.

As the table we have just mentioned indicates, this strategy has proved successful and "promising" in terms of electoral expectations. In fact, the analysis of Susi Meret (2010), in her doctoral thesis on the three European racist parties LN, DF and FPÖ, indicates that support for these racist parties comes primarily from people who perceive immigration as a threat to their culture and identity, regardless of other factors such as their gender or social position. Perception of threats generates fear, which in turn is transformed into xenophobic and simplistic discourses against "the others", xenophobic discourses that build mental walls, and finally end up asking for physical walls and closed borders.

### 3. PHYSICAL WALLS


#### 3.1 WALLS SURROUNDING EUROPE

The construction of walls and fences became a political commitment from the 1990s, with the case of Spain (Ceuta and Melilla), but from 2012 and, above all, in 2015 the construction of walls and fences by member states of the European Union has accelerated. In 2017 there were now a total of 13 walls including Norway, which is not part of the European Union but part of the Schengen area, plus the one built by Macedonia, included in the research because it is an essential part of the Balkan route, reaching 14 walls built to close borders and stop migratory flows. There will be a total of 15 walls by 2017, if we include the one corresponding to Slovakia, which built internal urban walls, in some of its cities, in order to segregate the Roma population.

Migratory movements are the main reasons given by States for their construction, thus consolidating a political commitment to walling. There is a particular dynamic in the case of the Baltic republics, which also build walls because of migration issues, but also because of the tensions generated with the great neighbouring power Russia, a situation reminiscent of Cold War times.

In 2015, the Balkan route (Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Serbia) was closed with walls and the massive deployment of border controls and agents, which is why the Arctic route (AsktheEU, 2015) opened to Norway, which built a new fence in 2016.

**Graph 2. Evolution of walls built by European Union member states, Schengen area and Macedonia (1990-2017)**



Compiled by the authors from: Economist, The (2015), Herrera, Manuel (9-2-2017), JAKEŠEVIĆ, R. and TATALOVIĆ, S. (2016), ACNUR (2017), Jones (2017, 87)

**Table 3. Walls of the countries of European Union Member States, Schengen area and Macedonia (1990-2017)\***

BUILDING COUNTRY	COUNTRY AGAINST WHICH IT IS MADE	STARTING YEAR	REASONS
Spain (1)	Morocco (Ceuta)	1993	Immigration
Spain (2)	Morocco (Melilla)	1996	Immigration
Greece (3)	Turkey	2012	Immigration
Slovakia (4)	Internal cities: Kosice, Velka Ida, Ostrovany	2013- under construction	Segregation, security
Bulgaria (5)	Turkey	2013	Immigration
Hungary (6)	Croatia	2015	Immigration
Hungary (7)	Serbia	2015	Immigration
Macedonia (8)	Greece	2015	Immigration
Austria (9)	Slovenia	2015	Immigration
Slovenia (10)	Croatia	2015	Immigration
United Kingdom (11)	France (port of Calais)	2015	Immigration
Latvia (12)	Russia	2015	Security, territorial tension, smuggling, immigration
Norway (13)	Russia	2016	Security, Immigration
Estonia (14)	Russia	2016-2017	Security, territorial tension, immigration
Lithuania (15)	Russia	2017	Security, territorial tension, immigration

\*The Republic of Macedonia is included despite not being a member of the EU or Schengen area because it is an essential part of the Balkan Route through the EU countries. Compiled by the authors with data from the sources: (1) (2) (3) (5) (7) Economist, The (2015), (4) Herrera, Manuel (9-2-2017) (6) JAKEŠEVIĆ, R. and TATALOVIĆ, S. (2016), (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) ACNUR, 2017 (12) (14) (15) Jones, 2017, 87




By the date of this report (July 2018) some governments have expressed their intention to build new fences; Latvia, Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania against Belarus (Government of Belarus, 2017) and Belarus against Latvia (Government of Belarus, 2015). On the other hand, the Spanish State has announced that it will remove the concertinas (barbed wire fences or

coil-shaped blades) from the fences of Ceuta and Melilla (Amnesty International, 2018).

Military maritime, land and air operations are also deployed to intercept and reduce migratory flows. As is the case with operations launched in the Mediterranean, one of the main entry routes to the European Union.

**Map 2. Walls built by European Union Member States (1990-2017)**



## 3.2 LAND WALLS

### A) THE BALKAN ROUTE: GREECE, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, MACEDONIA, AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA

The Balkan route has been the busiest route for people fleeing some of the conflicts in the Middle East such as Syria or Iraq, or from Asian countries such as Afghanistan (AsktheUE, 2015). Different countries on this route - Greece, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, Serbia and Slovakia - have taken steps to stop the entry of people into their territories, including the building of walls.

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>GREECE (1) (2) (3)</b>	<b>TURKEY</b>
<b>Separation</b>	Turkish and Greek States
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	206 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Length: 12 km (4)(5) Height: 4 m (6)
<b>Starting year</b>	2012 (1)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2012 (1)
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Immigration (1)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	National
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Wire and cement fence with barbed wire (7), electronic surveillance systems, border guards, drones, night vision cameras (6)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:

(1) The Economist (2015), (2) ACNUR (2017), (3) Jones, Reece (2016: 87), (4) Greece plans Turkey border fence to tackle migration (4-1-11), (5) Stroobants y Perrier (11-1-11), (6) Associated Press (6-1-12), (7) Kakissis, Joanna (7-1-11)

Greece is one of the first countries to receive refugees and migrants and a key territory for entry into the Schengen area and the European Union. In 2011 the Minister of Defence decided to build a fence with a surveillance system on its border with Turkey, in the Orestiada area in north eastern Greece, which began and was completed in 2012. The Greek wall had led to people diverting to Bulgaria, which is also a member of the European Union, but not yet a member of the Schengen area.

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>BULGARIA (1) (2) (3)</b>	<b>TURKEY</b>
<b>Separation</b>	States of Bulgaria with Turkey
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	260 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Length: 201 km (4) Height: 3 m (5)
<b>Starting year</b>	2013 (1)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2014 (1) extensions in 2017 (6)
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Immigration (1)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	National
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Barbed wire fence on the top of watchtowers, soldiers (7) and border guards, infra-red cameras and heat and motion sensitive cameras. (8)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:

(1) The Economist (2015), (2) ACNUR (2017), (3) Jones, Reece (2016: 87), (4) Construction of fence at Bulgaria-Turkey border completed: Tsvetan Tsvetanov (6-11-17) (5) Nenov, Stoyan (17-7-14), (6) The Interior Minister Declared the Fence on the Bulgaria-Turkey Border is 100% Finished (29-10-17), (7) Government of Bulgaria (21-9-13), (8) Mortimer, Caroline (4-8-15)

Bulgaria is one of the first European countries to build a fence on its border, in this case against Turkey in 2013. It has also sent the armed forces to assist the border police.

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>HUNGARY (1) (2) (3)</b>	<b>CROATIA</b>
<b>Separation</b>	States of Hungary with Croatia
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	329 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Length: 300 km (4)
<b>Starting year</b>	2015 (2)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2015 (5)
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Immigration (1)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	National, entry into Schengen area
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Electrified barbed wire fence, more than 3000 soldiers (10) and border guards between Croatia and Serbia barrier, heat sensors, thermal cameras (6) 100 off-road vehicles (11)

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
HUNGARY (1) (2) (3)	SERBIA
Separation	States of Hungary with Serbia
Total border between both areas	151 km
Physical barriers (distances)	Length: 151 km (6) Height: 4 m (7) Under the ground: 1.5 m (8)
Starting year	2015 (1)
Year of completion	2015 (9) Extensions in 2017 (7)
Reasons for its construction	Immigration (1)
Intended geographical delimitation	National, EU external borders, entry area, Schengen
State of militarisation	Electrified barbed wire fence, more than 3,000 soldiers (10) and border guards between Croatia and Serbia barrier, heat sensors, thermal cameras (6) 100 off-road vehicles (11)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:

(1) The Economist (2015), (2) Jones, Reece (2016: 87), (3) UNHCR (2017), (4) Government Of Hungary, Official Website (17-10-15), (5) AFP (15-10-15), (6) Dunai, Marton (2-2-17), (7) Kingsley, Patrick (22-6-15), (8) Government of Hungary, Official Website (22-7-15) (9) Jakešević, R., & Tatalović, S. (2016: 1255) (10) Government of Hungary, Official Website (9-11-15) (11) Government of Hungary, Official Website (8-1-17)

Hungary is one of the countries which shares borders with countries that are not part of the European Union or the Schengen area. The government of Viktor Orbán has promoted the policy of building walls on its borders, associating their construction with the protection of the entire European Union, saying: *"Anyone who attacks the technical border barrier is attacking the country's external border security, and accordingly is also attacking the security of the European people"* (Government of Hungary, 2017).

By the end of 2017 the country had built barriers against Croatia and Serbia. The government asked the European Union to pay half the cost estimated at 270 billion Hungarian forints (€813 million) (Government of Hungary, 2017). Although Hungary announced the construction of a fence against Romania in 2015, the government later changed its mind by committing to help Romania to strengthen its border with Bulgaria by encouraging the country to also build a wall (Government of Hungary, 2017).

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
MACEDONIA (1) (2) (3) (4)	GREECE
Separation	State of the FRY Macedonia with Greece
Total border between both areas	246 km
Physical barriers (distances)	Length: 33 km (5) Height: 2.5 m (6)
Starting year	2015 (1)
Year of completion	2015 (6)
Reasons for its construction	Immigration (1)
Intended geographical delimitation	National
State of militarisation	Two lines of barbed wire fences(7), border guards (8)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:

(1) The Economist (2015), (2) ACNUR (2017), (3) Jones, Reece (2016: 87), (4) Government of Macedonia, Official Website (23-11-15) (5) Racaj, M., & Janev, S. (2017), (6) Macedonia finishes fence at Greek border to stem flow of asylum seekers (29-11-15), (7) Galpin, Richard (12-2-16), (8) Taylor, Alan (2-3-16)

Macedonia submitted its application for membership of the European Union in February 2004 (European Council, 2018), although this is still under consideration. Macedonian citizens may travel within the Schengen area even if the country is not part of it. The country is included in the analysis as it is key to the Balkan route. Macedonia built a wall against Greece in 2015, and deployed the army on its border with Greece and Serbia in 2017 (Johns Hopkins School of Education, 2017). Frontex has supported Macedonia in the framework of cooperation with third countries (Frontex, 2009).

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
AUSTRIA (1) (2)	SLOVENIA
Separation	States of Austria and Slovenia
Total border between both areas	330 km
Physical barriers (distances)	Length: 3.7 km Height: 2 m (3)
Starting year	2015 (4)
Year of completion	2016 (5)
Reasons for its construction	Immigration (1)
Intended geographical delimitation	National
State of militarisation	Barbed wire fence (6)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:

(1) The Economist (2015), (2) UNHCR (2017), (3) Reuters (13-11-15), (4) Hall, Melanie (13-12-15), (5) Reynolds, James (11-12-15), (6) Austria streamlines Slovenia border to process refugees (22-1-16)

In October 2015 Austria announced the first construction of a fence against Slovenia at the Spielfeld border crossing, one of the points most used by refugees and migrants on their way through the Balkans. It will be the first among countries in the Schengen area.

In 2016 it also strengthened border controls against Hungary (European Parliament, 2016) and a fence on this border continues to be discussed (Government of Hungary, 2016).

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>ESLOVENIA (1) (2)</b>	<b>CROATIA</b>
<b>Separation</b>	States of Slovenia and Croatia
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	670 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Several sections (3)(4); Length: 200 km (5)
<b>Starting year</b>	2015 (1)(6)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2015
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Immigration (1)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	National, entry into Schengen area
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Barbed wire fence, border guards and soldiers (3)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:  
(1) The Economist (2015), (2) ACNUR (2017), (3) Malešič, M. (2017: 958),  
(4) AP (11-11-15) (5) Malešič, M. (2017, 953), (6) Stroobants and Perrier (11-11-15)

Slovenia also built a wall against Croatia in 2015 and in the same year approved the deployment of the army on the same border (Malešič, 2017).

## B) ENCLAVES IN NORTH AFRICA: SPAIN

The Spanish State is the paradigmatic example of the management of migratory flows. It is the first Member State of the European Union to build fences for the management of migratory flows in the 1990s. In addition, it was also a pioneer in terms of the state of militarisation of the fences and the development of technology for border control such as SIVE (Integrated External Surveillance System).

SIVE is an integrated operating system of the Guardia Civil, which was approved in 1999 as part of a plan for the surveillance of the southern border. It includes sensors, cameras and radars that transmit information in real time of what is happening at the borders and of any vessel that approaches the Spanish coasts in order to intercept them. It consists of the deployment of a series of stations installed along the coast, some of which are mobile, especially on the Andalusian coast and the Canary Islands archipelago, which transmit information to the command centre, which analyses it and gives orders according to the situation. SIVE has served as a model for the EUROSUR of the European Union and to implement a similar model in some Baltic republics.

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>SPAIN (1) (2) (3)</b>	<b>MOROCCO CEUTA</b>
<b>Separation</b>	States of Spain and Morocco (border not recognised by Morocco)
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	6.3 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Length: 8.3 km (4) Height: 6 m (4)
<b>Starting year</b>	1993 (1)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2005 (1)
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Immigration, smuggling (1)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	National, European Union-Africa, entry into the EU, entry into the Schengen area
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Two wire fences (4). Motion detectors, video and infrared cameras and 17 control towers (4) and video cameras (SIVE surveillance system) (5).

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:  
(1) The Economist, (2015), (2) ACNUR (2017), (3) Jones, Reece (2016: 87),  
(4) Alscher, Stefan (2005: 11), (5) Alscher, Stefan (2005: 12), (6) Picazo, Belén (20-11-13)

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>SPAIN (1) (2) (3)</b>	<b>MOROCCO MELILLA</b>
<b>Separation</b>	States of Spain and Morocco
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	9.6 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Length: 10 km (5) Height: 6 m (4)
<b>Starting year</b>	1996 (1) (3)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2007 (6)
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Immigration, smuggling (1)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	National, European Union-Africa, entry into the EU, entry into the Schengen area
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Triple fence, wire fences, coiled barbed wire, three-dimensional cable (3 meters high added in 2007) (6), alarms and two-metre deep earth trench (6). Surveillance cameras (SIVE surveillance system) (5), motion detectors, optical and acoustic sensors, control towers and more than 70 surveillance cameras (5).

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:  
(1) Economist, The (2015), (2) ACNUR (2017), (3) Jones, Reece (2016: 87),  
(4) Alscher, Stefan (2005: 11), (5) Alscher, Stefan (2005: 12), (6) Picazo, Belén (20-11-13)

### C) WALLS ON THE INSIDE: UNITED KINGDOM

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
UNITED KINGDOM (1) (2) (3)	FRANCE (PORT OF CALAIS)
Separation	Port of Calais (Coquelles) from the rest of the port (4)
Total border between both areas	
Physical barriers (distances)	Both sides of the road: Length: 1 Km per side (5) Height: 4 m (5)
Starting year	2015 (1)
Year of completion	2015 (1) (6) extensions in 2016 (7)
Reasons for its construction	Immigration (1)
Intended geographical delimitation	Cut access to the English Channel
State of militarisation	Concrete and wire wall and barbed wire on top, border guards (5) (with riot control equipment), checkpoints with passport reading, Carbon dioxide detectors for trucks (detection of hidden persons) (6)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources: (1) The Economist (2015), (2) UNHCR (2017), (3) UK Government, Official website (3-3-16), (4) UK Government, Official website (31-7-15), (5) Calais migrants: Work to start on UK-funded wall (7-9-16), (6) UK Government, Official website (31-7-15), (7) Calais migrants: How is the UK-France border policed? (3-3-16)

The United Kingdom put pressure on France to build walls around the port of Calais on the Eurotunnel route connecting France and the United Kingdom. It is the only wall built within a Member State. The United Kingdom invested millions of pounds (*Calais Research*, n.d.) on notable occasions to strengthen surveillance and control of the port of Calais.

### D) ARCTIC ROUTE: NORWAY

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
NORWAY (1) (2) (3)	RUSSIA
Separation	States of Norway with Russia
Total border between both areas	196 km
Physical barriers (distances)	Length: 200 m (4) Height: 4 m (4)
Starting year	2016 (4)
Year of completion	2016 (5)
Reasons for its construction	Security, immigration (5)
Intended geographical delimitation	EU-Russia, NATO-Russia, borders outside the EU, entry into Schengen area
State of militarisation	Wire fence, surveillance cameras (5)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources: (1) UNHCR (2017), (2) Government of Norway, Official website (n.d) (3) Johnson, Howard (6-10-16), (4) Reuters (24-8-16), (5) Johnson, Howard (7-10-16)

After the walls and operations carried out in many countries on the Balkan route practically closed the route, refugees and migrants in 2015 diverted, opening the Arctic route (Frontex, 2017). So the migratory flow increased to the northern countries, and in particular to the border station of Storskog in Norway with Russia. Most of the people who arrived at the gates of Norway were asylum seekers from Syria and Afghanistan (Frontex, 2017). Norway built a fence in 2016 at the Storskog border crossing.

### E) BALTIC REPUBLICS AND THE BORDER WITH RUSSIA: LATVIA, ESTONIA, LITHUANIA

The Baltic republics are also beginning to build walls and fences on their borders because of the possible arrival of refugees, in order to control border smuggling and because of territorial tensions with Russia with which they share a border. In fact, the governments of the three republics announced the intention to build walls in 2015 (*Economist*, 2015) when the closure of the Balkan route began. The already complicated relations between these republics and Russia became tenser as a result of the conflict with Ukraine, although the migration issue is also one of the reasons for building a fence on their border. They all impact entry into the European Union and the Schengen area.

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
LATVIA (1) (2) (3)	RUSSIA
Separation	States of Latvia and Russia
Total border between both areas	276 km
Physical barriers (distances)	Various sections: (4) Length: 23 km in 2017 (5) (8), 90 km (planned) (4) Height: 2 m (6)
Starting year	2015 (7)
Year of completion	2017 (5) with extensions until 2019 planned (5) (6)
Reasons for its construction	Security, territorial tension, immigration smuggling (1) (6)
Intended geographical delimitation	EU-Russia, NATO-Russia, borders outside the EU, entry into Schengen area
State of militarisation	Wire fence (4), 200 border guards (6), surveillance cameras and sensors (4)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources: (1) The Economist (2015), (2) ACNUR (2017), (3) Jones, Reece (2016: 87), (4) 'Great Estonian Wall: Country decides to cut itself off from Russia ... with 2.5-meter fence (17-3-16), (5) Latvia completes 23km of 'anti-migrant wall' on Russian border (5-1-17), (6) Smagare, Silvija (1-11-17), (7) Latvia began building a fence on the border with Russia (14-12-15), (8) Jegelevicius, Linas (12-5-17)



Latvia started building a fence in 2015 and extended it until 2017.

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>ESTONIA (1) (2) (3)</b>	<b>RUSSIA</b>
<b>Separation</b>	States of Estonia and Russia
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	294 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Length 1.6 km in 2018(4)(8), 110 km planned(5) Height: 2.5 m (5)
<b>Starting year</b>	2016/17-2018 (3) (4) (6) (8)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2018 with extensions until 2018-2019 planned (3)
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Security, territorial tension, immigration, smuggling (1) (6)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	EU-Russia, NATO-Russia, borders outside the EU, entry into Schengen area
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Barbed wire, surveillance systems (3), drones (7)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:

(1) The Economist (2015), (2) UNHCR (2017), (3) Government of Estonia, Official website (2-6-16), (4) Estonia mulls applying for EU co-financing of border fence construction (16-02-2018), (5) Estonia 'plans Russia border fence' amid Ukraine tensions (28-8-16), (6) Sytas and Mardiste(8-3-16), (7) Latvia completes 23km of 'anti-migrant wall' on Russian border (5-1-17) (8) Jegelevicius, Linas (12-5-17)

Like Hungary, Estonia is proposing that the European Union finance its fence on the basis it will protect external borders and NATO allies. Its cost is estimated at 197 million euros (Financial Observer, 2018).

BUILDING COUNTRY	BORDERING COUNTRY
<b>LITHUANIA (1) (2) (3) (4)</b>	<b>RUSSIA (KALININGRAD)</b>
<b>Separation</b>	States of Lithuania and Russian (Kaliningrad enclave)
<b>Total border between both areas</b>	227 km
<b>Physical barriers (distances)</b>	Length: 44.6 km (8) Height: 2 m (3)(9)
<b>Starting year</b>	2017 (5) (6) (8)
<b>Year of completion</b>	2017 (3) (6) (7)
<b>Reasons for its construction</b>	Security, territorial tension, immigration (1) (3) (5) (8) (9)
<b>Intended geographical delimitation</b>	EU-Russia, NATO-Russia, borders outside the EU, entry into Schengen area
<b>State of militarisation</b>	Wire fence, video surveillance (109 km from the border) (8)

Compiled by the authors with data from the following sources:

(1) The Economist (2015), (2) UNHCR (2017), (3) Lithuania plans fence on Russian Kaliningrad border (17-6-17), (4) Jones, Reece (2017,78), (5) Obrez, Veliki (24-8-17), (6) Jegelevicius, Linas (12-5-17), (7) Fence on Lithuania-Kaliningrad border to be completed Wednesday (20-12-17), (8) Lithuania starts building fence on border with Russia (6-6-17), (9) Murphy, Francois (5-6-17)

The case of Lithuania is similar to the rest of the Baltic republics. It built a wall in 2017, in this case against Russia, but in the enclave of Kaliningrad.

## Total length of walls

In total, the investigation estimates that the construction of border walls by EU member states and the Schengen area totals 957.4 km. If we also take into account Macedonia, which is not a member of either the EU or Schengen but is a member of the Balkan route, the estimated total of walls and fences to prevent the entry of forcibly displaced and migrated persons is 990.5 kilometres.

In short, the policy of building walls began in the 1990s, boosted in 2012 and sharply accelerated in 2015, marks a trend that seems to be increasing. Member States are responding to the movements of forcibly displaced people who come to the gates of Europe by erecting walls and militarising borders, even between member states. The building of walls is a clear sign that governments prefer to wall themselves in rather than welcome people in desperate circumstances, a clear violation and lack of commitment to human rights. The worst thing is that it will be very complicated and much more difficult to tear down the walls than it has been to build them.

The walls and measures to control migratory movements have not closed the routes, but have redefined them, which means the migratory flows are forced to divert to undertake longer and more dangerous routes. Longer routes lead to higher prices paid to smugglers, which also leads to greater indebtedness of the people making the journey and a greater risk to their lives.

### 3.2.1 CONTROLS IN THE SCHENGEN AREA

The 1985 Schengen Agreement has been successively extended by agreements that have extended or modified aspects of it, such as the 1990 *Schengen Implementing Convention* (SIC), implemented in 1995, which granted the right to free movement among the population of the Schengen area countries, although it would be further extended at a later date. Together with, the successive treaties and regulations of Amsterdam and Dublin (II and III) that regulated the petition of asylum seekers, among others.

In 2006 the *Schengen Borders Code* (SBC) was approved by regulation 562/2006 (European Union, 2006), which was also later revised in 2016. The *Schengen Borders Code* established a common standard and legislation for the Schengen area, and for the temporary introduction of internal controls at the

borders of the Schengen members, at the discretion of each State and under certain conditions and for a limited time period which can be extended. Internal controls can be carried out based on the detection of serious threats to public security or the internal security of the European Union (European Union, 2006). The establishment of these controls must be communicated to the European Commission and may also be established from a proposal of the Commission.

In other words, internal controls in the Schengen area from 2006 onwards must be carried out in accordance with certain parameters and are regarded as extraordinary measures:

"The Schengen standards continue to allow national authorities to reintroduce exceptional and temporary internal border controls in the event of a serious threat to security or serious deficiencies at the external borders which could jeopardise the overall functioning of the Schengen area." (European Union, 2014)

Since the approval of the SBC, internal controls increased (with occasional slight decreases) until 2017. There was a significant increase from 2014, when fewer than 5 controls were triggered to almost 20 in one year.

Migratory movements have been one of the main reasons for the reinforcement of internal borders, followed by political events, which are often summits and international meetings.<sup>9</sup>

9. See table of annexes: Annex 2. Internal controls within the Schengen area (2006-2017).

These controls are linked to virtual walls, as controls are not only reinforced by agents, but also by the expansion of biometric data collection. This in practice means the tracking, recording, monitoring, control and storage of the data of all our movements across the borders of the Schengen area.


Several controls have been questioned, for example, the case of France and the controls reintroduced at its border with Italy in 2011. What prompted the French government's control of the border was the Italian government's decision to grant a six-month permit to thousands of people from North Africa (Chiara, 2014: 20), which also allowed these people to travel between Schengen countries. The response of the French government was the reintroduction of border controls with Italy. As set out by Chiara (2014: 21), the control violated the principles of non-discrimination and freedom of movement between Schengen countries in accordance with European and national laws.

In conclusion, the construction of walls is not the only policy deployed to control movement and intercept migratory flows, internal controls in the Schengen area have also been used at an increasing rate. Although in theory these controls are exceptional, (Chiara, 2014: 19) since 2006, and especially from 2014, they have become the norm.

### 3.3 MARITIME WALLS

The study includes the main maritime operations carried out to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean based on their duration in time and deployment.

**Graph 3. Evolution of controls in Schengen area countries (2006-2017)**



Fuente: Elaboración propia a partir de fuentes del Parlamento Europeo (Parlamento Europeo, 2016)

**Table 4. Main maritime operations to control migratory flows**

THE TRANSACTION	DATE	CARRIED OUT BY:	OPERATIONS AREA	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATION
MARE NOSTRUM	October 2013 - October 2014	Italian State	Strait of Sicily	<p>The operation Mare Nostrum launched in October 2013 by the Italian government lasted one year; it was managed from the Ministry of Defence with a budget of about 110 million euros (1). The operation included the army, carabinieri, Red Cross personnel, Ministry of the Interior technicians and volunteer staff (2). Its mandate was mainly humanitarian, and it managed to save around 115,000 lives in the Mediterranean (3).</p> <p>It was replaced by Operation Triton, coordinated by the Frontex Agency, but with a budgetary allocation that was a third less than Italy had allocated, despite being under the umbrella of the European Union, and had a mandate that was much less humanitarian and more for security and in pursuing smugglers.</p> <p>Operation Mare Nostrum marks the beginning of the turn towards even more militarised operations. Human rights organisations have become critical of the escalating militarisation of operations to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, as denounced by Amnesty International in 2014:</p> <p>"Frontex's operation Triton has a clear border management remit, which means that it will neither now nor ever be geared towards search and rescue of lives, but will focus on patrolling the coasts and investigating asylum seekers who disembark. Moreover, its staff will not go as far into international waters as those of Mare Nostrum, where so many people perish, but will stay close to the European coastline. In addition, Triton's budget is EUR 3 million per month, compared with EUR 9 million per month allocated by Italy to Mare Nostrum." (4).</p> <p>The joint operation Poseidon was introduced due to the large migratory movements that reach the gates of Europe via the Balkan route and via North Africa and that will continue to increase. The operation started in 2006 in the framework of the European Patrols Network (EPN)(a), together with other joint patrol operations: Hera, Indalo, Minerva, Triton....</p> <p>More than 5,000 people, mainly from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, attempted to cross European borders in the first quarter of 2010 (5). At this point it was reinforced to also replace operation RABIT 2010 in Greece(6), and to establish a broader operational framework, covering Greece's borders with Turkey, Albania and Bulgaria. 26 member states became part of the operation, in border control by land, sea and air.</p> <p>Its main objective was to intercept migrant entry, register and identify them and assist the Greek authorities in deportation and re-admissions at the points with the highest volume of people. However, its objectives increasingly expanded to include among its functions those of crimes related to smuggling, illegal fishing and other activities in the border area.</p> <p>Both Poseidon and Triton were strengthened when their budget tripled in 2015(7) €18 million for half a year for operation Poseidon and €38 million for one year for Triton (8). Even so, they did not match the Italian Mare Nostrum operation, which had a budget of 9 million per month (9). This reinforcement included a rapid deployment of staff, including experts in filtering arrivals, questioning them and in fingerprint analysis from several Schengen member countries.</p> <p>It should be borne in mind that the operation's wide geographical area of action considerably reduced the possibility of rescuing people at sea.</p> <p>In 2015, the operation was replaced by Poseidon Rapid Intervention (PRI) (10). The PRI was initially created to be carried out at the end of 2015 for a period of three months. Member States contributed a number of experts and technical equipment. The aim of the operation was to speed up the registration and identification of people on the Greek islands.</p> <p>In 2016, collaboration began with NATO patrols (Operation Sophia) operating in the central Mediterranean, completely militarising the issue of migratory flows (11).</p>
POSEIDON	2006 - 2016	Joint Frontex operation	Central Mediterranean maritime (Aegean Sea) and land borders: Greece and Bulgaria	
HERA (11)	2006 - Present (From August to October)	Joint Frontex operation	Western Mediterranean: Canary Islands and West African coast: Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde	<p>This is undertaken in the terrestrial area of the Canary Islands and in Senegalese waters and is financed by Frontex with France's collaboration. Its main objective, like that of operation Indalo is to curb the entry of people into the European Union, although secondarily it also pursues other activities. The Guardia Civil contributes a ship, patrol boat, International Coordination Centre (ICC)(b) in Madrid and the Regional Centre in Las Palmas de Gran Canarias.</p> <p>The first operation Hera was first carried out in 2006 and is always deployed during the summer months, when migratory movements are most frequent. This operation is within the framework of the European Patrols Network (EPN)</p>

THE TRANSACTION	DATE	CARRIED OUT BY:	OPERATIONS AREA	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATION
INDALO (12)	2006 – Present (From July to October)	Joint Frontex operation	Western Mediterranean: south of the Spanish State	<p>This is the first migration flow control operation led by the Spanish Guardia Civil and its main objective is to control the arrival of people at the air and sea borders of southern Spain. It also provides for the fight against cross-border criminal activities. The operation is financed by Frontex, which has also deployed 69 officers in Spain, along with a ship and an air plane to assist with surveillance and smuggling tasks.</p> <p>The operation has been carried out in the waters of Cadiz, Malaga, Granada, Almeria and Murcia, and the States of Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden take part in it.</p> <p>This operation has also been carried out since 2006 in the same months. This operation is within the framework of the European Patrols Network (EPN)</p> <p>This operation takes place in the ports of Algeciras, Tarifa and Ceuta in the Spanish State. Its purpose is to ensure the deportation of immigrants by detecting them through inspections at border points and detecting border related crimes. The operation is led by the National Police and coordinated by FRONTEX.</p> <p>The operation involves troops from twelve member states; France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Denmark, Switzerland and Norway, and a guest third country, Moldova. It has been running since 2006 in the same months of the year. This is also in the framework of the European Patrols Network (EPN).</p> <p>This is a maritime operation for border surveillance and control to support Italy and Malta, led by Italy. One of its main objectives is the identification of people.</p>
MINERVA (13)	2006 – Present:	Joint Frontex operation	Western Mediterranean: south of the Spanish State and North Africa	<p>According to the Agency, another important task will be to provide assistance in organising return operations to the countries of origin: "Next important element of this operation will be to provide assistance at the following stage focusing on organising return operations to the countries of origin." (14).</p> <p>Initially up to 14 Member States committed resources, although two months later only 8 of these remained active. Some of the agents deployed as part of the operation will be assigned to interview migrants in immigration detention centres (15) Experts from Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, Sweden and Spain took part.</p>
HERMES	2008-2016	Italy requests Frontex risk analysis and joint operation is activated	Mediterranean: coasts of Italy and Malta, Pelagian Islands, Sicily and Italy.	<p>Operation Triton replaced Operation Mare Nostrum in 2014, deployed by the Italian government, and the two joint operations Hermes and Aeneas also operating in the area. Triton was coordinated by Frontex to reinforce the Italian coastguards but led by the Italian Ministry of Defence, and covered the territorial waters of Italy and Malta (16). It was much more focused on ending the business of traffickers than saving people. With a much smaller budget than the Italian operation; 3 million per month.</p> <p>At the request of the Italian coastguards, Frontex ships could be redirected when there were large movements of people in areas outside the area of operations.</p>
TRITON	November 2013-2015 (2016 Expanded Triton)	Italy asked for help from the EU to reinforce operation Mare Nostrum, for which Frontex launches operation Triton	Territorial waters of Italy and Malta	<p>Triton was strengthened in 2015 (becoming Expanded Triton), along with operation Poseidon, in budget and equipment: ships, patrol boats, helicopters and teams of people specialised in filtering people, among others (17).</p> <p>A total of 26 European countries participated in operation Triton with the deployment of technicians and equipment: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.</p> <p>This operation was replaced in 2015 by Operation EUNAVFOR Med (renamed Operation Sophia), in which the collaboration of NATO operatives deployed in the Mediterranean was sought. This ended up completely militarising operations to control migratory flows.</p> <p>Operation Triton is also within the framework of the European Patrols Network (EPN).</p>



THE TRANSACTION	DATE	CARRIED OUT BY:	OPERATIONS AREA	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATION
SOPHIA (EUNAVFOR MED)	May 2015- 2018 (planned)	Frontex, collaboration with NATO, Greek, Turkish and Libyan coastguard	Central Mediterranean; between Italy and Libya	<p>At the request of Germany, Greece and Turkey, the Ministries of Defence of 28 European Union member states, in May 2015, approved a joint operation with NATO patrols. Patrols had already been deployed in the Mediterranean since the attacks of 11 September as part of operation Sea Guardian, to control terrorism (18). NATO is thus extending the mandate of its operation in which it will provide logistical support and share information on the movement of vessels with the EU.</p> <p>The operation involves Frontex and the Greek and Turkish coastguards. Its mission was to dissuade the mafias that control migratory movements and to gather information about them, monitor the movements of vessels in the Aegean Sea and the destruction of vessels used by the mafias to transport migrants, and consequently the mafias now increasingly use cheaper and less secure means. In no case does the operation include rescue, beyond the obligation stipulated under international law. Later on, it would include the training of the Libyan coastguards (19) in its mandate and the control of the arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN, a mission carried out by NATO patrols.</p> <p>In the case of NATO vessels, it is not one of their functions to rescue immigrants unless their lives are in danger, in which case they must be returned to Turkey with the human rights violations this may entail. There is a substantial difference with the European Union protocols which state that rescued persons should be returned to the nearest European country.</p> <p>The operation was extended in the summer of 2017 until December 2018 (21) as well as its mandate, it is now envisaged that the training of the Libyan Coast Guard, new surveillance operations, illegal oil export trafficking over Libya and an increase in the exchange of information on trafficking in human beings be monitored with various law enforcement agencies, Member States, Frontex and Europol.</p> <p>Collaboration with NATO to deal with migratory flows sets a dangerous precedent, since a military organisation intervenes to deal with social issues and, moreover, this is not included among its functions. This is a major militarisation of the issue of migrants, which NATO also sees as a threat to global security.</p>

Compiled by the authors based on data from Frontex, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, and the Italian Ministry of Defence (Ministerio della Difesa (n.d))

(1) 9 million per month in one year, Human Rights Watch (17-09-14), (2) Ministerio della Difesa (n. d.), (3) European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (24-10-14), (4) Amnesty International (31-10-14), (5) Frontex (26-3-11), (6) Frontex (3-3-11), (7) Frontex (23-4-15), (8) Frontex (26-5-15), (9) Taylor Adam (20-4-15), (10) Frontex (17-12-15), (11) (12) Guardia Civil, (1-8-16) (13) Ministerio del Interior de España (27-7-17), (14) Frontex (22-2-11), (15) Frontex (25-2-11), (16) Frontex (10-10-16), (17) Frontex (23-4-15), (18) Ministerio del Interior español (2018), (19) Frontex (13-12-16) (20) Departamento de Seguridad Nacional del Estado Español (2018 )

#### Notes:

(a) Framework of European Patrols Network (EPN): this is a permanent regional border security concept allowing synchronisation of Member States' national measures and their integration into joint European activities and with Frontex. This brings together existing State activities with EU reinforcement and coordination. This is the first time that an EU maritime border surveillance system has been deployed. The first stage takes place in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic. In a second stage, a more organisational part is deployed where the National Coordination Centres of each State are key, they will share information and will in turn coordinate with Frontex.

(b) National Coordination Centres (NCCs): the coordination hub of the European border surveillance programme, Eurosur, are the network of National Coordination Centres (NCCs). Each Member State establishes an NCC, which brings together the authorities responsible for border control in a given Member State. Its functions are to coordinate border surveillance activities at national level and to serve as an exchange for information, which they gather at national and local level. All this information is shared with the other Member States and with Frontex.



The Italian state carried out one: *Mare Nostrum*, while the rest were operations coordinated by Frontex or carried out in coordination with NATO (Operation Sophia).

To conclude, of the main operations carried out in the Mediterranean, none has had a single and specific mandate to rescue people, but rather to prosecute border-related crimes.

The operations analysed put the EU security narrative into practice. The fact that a military organisation such as NATO participates in a coordinated way (*Operation Sophia*) with Frontex also marks a step towards the militarisation of the management of migratory flows. It is clearly the case that the assistance and rescue of people can be carried out by a civilian fleet with the means to assist people, separating them from the operations carried out against criminals, but this is not being done. The securitization and militarisation of operations in the Mediterranean is therefore evident.

In addition, one of the objectives of the military interventions is to intercept the boats used by the mafias to carry refugees and migrants and destroy them (EUNAVFORMED Sophia, 2015). As a result, the smugglers have started to use cheaper and cheaper means, replacing large boats with zodiac-type boats, which make the journey more dangerous.

## 4. VIRTUAL WALLS

### 4.1 VIRTUAL WALLS AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

The expansion of control, surveillance, analysis and data collection systems is a fundamental part of border management policies and is part of the model for the construction of Fortress Europe. When we speak of virtual borders, we refer to the surveillance systems that are deployed and that normally accompany and reinforce the physical barriers and functions of border guards.

These systems are part of the expansion of technological systems to treat and manage migratory flows and the movement of people. They represent the so-called *technologicalization* of immigration, which is also an essential part of securitization policies. We can also speak of a *technologicalization* of security, which is subordinating our security to technology. The detection of biometric data is a common characteristic of some of these systems.

On 7 March 2017, the European Council adopted a new regulation amending the Schengen Borders Code to strengthen border controls (European Union, 2016). It also obliges member states to carry out and apply systematic checks at their borders and to verify data in databases developed by the European Union.

### EU-LISA (European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security And Justice)

The EU-LISA Agency became operational in 2012 and is a key agency for virtual border management, as it is responsible for the management of some of the main IT systems related to the border and movement controls discussed below: Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the EURODAC data storage system. The EU-LISA Agency implements large-scale data processing, accumulation, monitoring and control.

According to the Agency itself, the movement of people is now also a risk factor and a security threat that must be tracked and monitored. We can speak not only of the securitization of migratory movements, but also of the securitization of all people's movements. As set out in the Agency's description:

"EU-LISA helps to ensure that Europeans can move freely within the EU without affecting Europe's security." (European Union, 2017)

### 4.2 SYSTEMS FOR THE CONTROL AND STORAGE OF DATA ON MOVEMENTS ACROSS BORDERS

This is a brief analysis of the main technological movement control systems, which make up the virtual borders, promoted by the European Union and implemented by the Member states. These systems are based on the control of the movement of people, and the storage of data to analyse them according to algorithms, so as to be able to assess the risk that a person entails for the European Union.

Systems are also implemented so that the transit of certain people considered "safe" can be carried out more easily and quickly.

■ **EURODAC:** EURODAC is a centralised identity document control system, introduced in the European Union in 1993. It was the first system within the EU to store fingerprints and other biometric data in a bank. It serves to identify asylum seekers and persons intercepted without documentation at external borders, but also to identify if a person who

has entered and asked for asylum, has entered in manner considered “irregular”.

■ **VIS (Visa Information System):** The Visa Information System approved in 2008 records all visa requests to enter the Schengen area of the European Union, and these are made available to law enforcement bodies. It also works with biometric data. The idea of VIS is to detect possible threats, again within a framework of global securitization where threats to states are extended, and where the origin in many cases determines the threat. It also allows visas to be refused to people who do not meet the requirements requested by the Member States.

■ **SIS II (Schengen Information System):** The second generation of SIS is SIS II, which was implemented in 2013. This is the Schengen Information System, which is responsible for controlling access for all people who want to enter the Schengen area. Initially created as a tool for the security of Member States to control the movement of people across borders, it has since been enhanced with investigative functions added which enables a border security official to trigger an alarm according to the profile of the person entering the Schengen area.

■ **SMART BORDERS SYSTEM:** In February 2013 the European Commission proposed a package of measures for border control called *Smart Borders* that proposed to establish an *Entry/Exit System* (EES), and a *Registered Traveller Programme* (RTP). This system was intended to make border control procedures faster, coordinated and to be able to integrate new technologies such as biometric data throughout the Schengen area.

■ **EES (Entry/Exit scheme):** The system controls the time and place of entry and exit of all nationals and third country nationals. It also serves to control the duration and compliance of the authorised short entries. If there is a breach it will trigger alarms to all the Member States. It replaces the passport stamp with biometric data such as fingerprints and facial records, which will then be stored by the EU-LISA Agency.

■ **RTP (Registered Traveller Programme):** This system fine tunes the control and establishes typologies of people travelling and moving across the borders of the Schengen area. One category is that of frequent travellers who are facilitated the control of their movement across borders, but after a prior screening of their background and profile. In this way there are travellers who can move faster between checkpoints, establishing categories and hierarchies in the movement of people.

■ **ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorisation System):** This is an electronic system for visitors from countries that do not require a visa to enter the Schengen area. The programme subjects the applicant to a detailed check, which will be managed by Frontex. The system was proposed by the European Commission in 2016 and approved by the European Council in 2017 (European Parliament, 2016), in the words of President Jean-Claude Juncker: “*This way we will know who is travelling to Europe before they even get here*” (European Commission, 2016). Control systems are expanded beyond and before crossing the borders. The system is expected to be ready by 2020. Once again, the mobility of persons appears as a threat to the security of the European Union: “ETIAS ensures that these people do not pose a security risk” (Schengen Visa Info, 2017).

■ **SLTD (Stolen Lost Travel Documents):** It is INTERPOL's database system for lost and stolen travel documents, created in 2002 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks (same as the *I-Check* system).

■ **I-Checkit system:** the system was developed in 2002 by Interpol after the 9/11 attacks to improve air safety. It involves other social sectors such as airlines or the maritime industry who act as border security agents. Security officers may use the database to detect stolen or lost documents available in the Interpol database. States delegate part of their security to external agents, which is typical of policies of the securitization paradigm (Aziz Z, 2013).

As a conclusion, we can state that there is a clear securitization of the movement of people, which is considered a suspicious activity and a threat. In order to carry out this control, surveillance and control, systems are expanded in border areas. But these systems are not only implemented to control refugees and migrants, they also have an impact on society in general. We are all monitored and controlled at our border crossing, and our movements are shared among various agents, archived and analysed in a database. There is a development of technology that allows the collection of biometric data, which allows our personality to be identifiable through our physical features and characteristics. Surveillance-based security expands.

These systems establish hierarchies in the movement of people, from the level of control to the speed with which people are allowed to move between territories. Therefore, it is not only the movement that is controlled, it is also how easy people are able to move based on the risks that the person may pose

to the system (due to aspects such as place of origin, countries previously visited, political militancy and activism, among others).

#### 4.3 SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FOR BORDER AREAS: EUROSUR

In addition to developing systems for the control, recording and monitoring of movements across borders, surveillance systems are also established whose main objective is to monitor external borders in order to intercept border-related activities, including intercepting people trying to reach European soil.

##### EUROSUR (European Surveillance System of Borders)

EUROSUR is a comprehensive control and surveillance programme for the external maritime borders of southern Europe, which was inaugurated in Warsaw at the Frontex headquarters at the end of 2013, and which had been earlier been implemented in Spain. It is a real-time control, surveillance and information sharing system focused on migration. The SIVE (Integrated External Surveillance System) of the Spanish State and the SBInet programme for the United States border with Mexico (Duez, 2014), have served as a reference to create EUROSUR.

It is mainly based on coordinated surveillance for the south-eastern European border, for which Member States have to set up coordination centres in their territory, something that is not easy for all States to achieve, although the European Union helps with funding. These national coordination centres will be connected to each other and to Frontex, which also incorporates information from other programmes developed in other States, such as the Spanish SIVE surveillance system. EUROSUR, for example, in the Spanish state, is carried out by the Guardia Civil, where other agents such as the army and the national police participate in secondary roles (Andersson, 2016).

In practice it also means extending migration controls to African territory, in order to intercept immigration before it reaches Europe. EUROSUR has been extended with the approval of the European Commission to other external land borders.

The creation of the EUROSUR programme by the European Commission also comes with the contradictory rhetoric it has developed on migration, a humanitarian but also security discourse, where immigration is established as a threat that must be intercepted before reaching the territory of a Member State, and where immigration is equated with other traditional threats and crimes (European Parliament, 2013).

In short, at the beginning of the 21st century, a movement control system in the border area is increasingly being developed. The EUROSUR programme reflects the political will to expand these surveillance and control systems.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### CONCLUSIONS

The countries of the European Union are dealing with the movements of forcibly displaced persons and migratory flows by constructing walls, locking down borders, securitization, militarism, and by outsourcing the surveillance and monitoring of people's movements.

All these policies are legitimized and reinforced by xenophobic and racist policies which expand in size and scope, consolidating the structural violence which establishes the illegality of people, migratory flows and the movement of people as big threat to our security. Ultimately, by establishing the social, political, and physical walls as a necessity, based on the idea that the more closed in among ourselves we are, the less room there will be for insecurity and terror in our territories.

The narrative of threats and fear has permeated throughout the European Union. Member States and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) have reinforced, in discourse and practice, security policies that address people's movement as a threat and migration as a crime. Its purpose is to stop people before they reach European borders rather than rescue them.

The European Agency for the Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) develops an active role in the deportations that often violate the rights of asylum-seeking persons. Through agreements with third countries, asylum-seekers end up in a variety of states that violate human rights, have weak democracies, or have a low human development index. All of this rejects humanitarian methods of dealing with large flows of migrants, or studying or addressing structural problems of global violence and economic inequality.

The possible option that assisting and rescuing people could be done by a civil fleet with means to assist people, and thus separate them from the actions carried out against crimes associated with the border areas.

The analysis of the influence and political propagation of xenophobic discourse in the different countries,

and in particular in Germany, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, shows great similarities, indicating how terribly easy it can be to reach an amplification of the racist thesis in certain scenarios. The analysis shows that certain non-xenophobic parties, upon seeing an increase in votes for racist competitors, opportunistically seize part of the xenophobic discourse in hopes of capturing a sector of the voters. They choose to do so instead of daring to consolidate their own discourse that would move them away from xenophobic ideas and that could demonstrate a true commitment to the sullied human rights that the European Union claims to defend.

Thus, the most racist parties get to see their proposals amplified without hardly any effort. This is how they implement a discourse about the "other" as an enemy, as well as they build a narrative about a civilized interior and a barbarous exterior, for which it's necessary to build walls of all kinds to feel safe and protected. The perversion of many governments is to use fear to launch racist messages and encourage xenophobia.

In addition, programs and tools expand to create virtual borders which surveil our movements. But the methods established by virtual borders go beyond creating systems for movement control and analysis. They also create conceptual barriers that reproduce dynamics of territorial power. Countries that can choose who enters and who does not and for what reasons wind up generating hierarchies in terms of freedom of movement. Country of birth determines the freedom or lack thereof for people to move. Those aspects are not entirely new, but modern systems of border control being developed, record all our movements in a much more thorough way.

Another purpose of the expansion of virtual borders, such as the system EUROSUR, is to intercept refugees and migrants before they reach the borders of the European Union to avoid even having to deal with them.

In short, the European Union and its member states are rallying behind erecting of mental walls and granting space to xenophobic discourses that criminalize the movement of people. In this way, they legitimize the construction of the "Fortress Europe" that is expanding with the creation of new agencies such as Frontex, the reinforcement of external borders and the construction of physical and virtual walls across the European space. As a result, European border policy moves towards the construction of structures based on racism and inequality, where our movements are a suspicious activity and where the "other" constitutes a threat.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Governments should reverse the policies that lead us to walling ourselves in and defending a fortress in which the privileged and secure live. This is not a solution to global security problems.
- Political parties and governments must open a debate that includes civil society on the security model we want, and abandon the security doctrines that lead us to address social issues with instruments of the police, military and social control. It is necessary to open a new social debate on security that treats social and humanitarian issues within the framework of human security.
- The European Union and the Member States should make the border area a place of meeting and mutual knowledge. This should also be applied to the Schengen area.
- The use of a militarised agency such as Frontex to manage the migration issue in the Mediterranean increases the risk and suffering of migrants. The European Union should reduce the role of Frontex and create a non-militarised European humanitarian agency, focusing on the rescue of people, with resources and civilian staff specialised in humanitarian aid for refugees and migrants, or entrust such tasks to specialised humanitarian agencies and organisations.
- Civil society and political parties should rigorously study the structural causes of 68.5 million people having to flee their homes by force, in order to implement prevention policies based on global economic justice and to prevent war and armed conflict.
- Public institutions should reinforce and implement campaigns to prevent racism and xenophobia, involving the education system at all levels, promoting an education based on human rights. To advance a practice of coexistence and mutual respect in all areas of society.
- Governments should facilitate and provide resources and expand the possibility of making asylum claims in the place of origin, in order to save costs and human lives. However this is not a solution applicable to countries with conflicts in which their state structures have been destroyed, for which other avenues of asylum should be found.
- Political parties should demonstrate and exercise programmatic coherence within the framework of the fundamental and foundational rights that the



European Union claims to defend, without falling into the trap of electoralism.

- Political parties, public institutions and governments should not allow the racist discourse of the extreme right to influence migration policies that violate people's basic rights.
- Civil society and social movements must continue to promote actions that confront the conservative and ultra-conservative narrative, building alternatives based on encounter, coexistence and the culture of peace. A great tool for this can be the management of real data on immigration by civil society to precisely deny xenophobic discourses and prejudices that are always held about the migrant population.

In short, militarised systems of "security" that are imposed, create mental and physical walls, divert attention and fail to confront the real problems, violence and inequality of people, and fostering the business

of an industrial security complex that is granted more areas of influence than to organisations that defend human rights.

If we want to advance as a society towards respect, acceptance, coexistence and the protection of human rights, we must welcome the people who knock at our door, because there is no other viable alternative. We need messengers to speak of the international policies that are generating more violence, insecurity and economic inequality, so that they can explain the impact of these policies on society and share their in depth analysis of what needs to change.

The more walls we build, the harder it will be to tear them down, the further we shall move away from each other. Do we feel safer in a fortress? Do we want to live in a world surrounded by walls? Now more than ever, displaced people bring a heart-breaking message: more and more people are fleeing violence and global economic inequality. By walling ourselves means we do not allow the message to reach us and therefore we cannot mobilise ourselves to change the situation.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ACNUR (2017) Border fences and internal border controls in Europe [El línea] Available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/55249>
- ACNUR (2017) *Tendencias Globales 2017*. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/>
- ACNUR (2018) *Los datos de refugiados en 2017 continúan una tendencia de 5 años de aumento en el desplazamiento en el mundo*. [Online] Available at: <https://eacnur.org/es/actualidad/noticias/emergencias/datos-de-refugiados-2017-685-millones-de-personas-forzadas-huir>.
- AFP (15-10-15) *Refugee crisis: Hungary completes fence with Croatia border to stem daily influx of migrants*. The Telegraph, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/11934232/Refugee-crisis-Hungary-completes-fence-with-Croatia-border-to-stem-daily-influx-of-migrants.html>
- Agencia Europea de la Guardia de Fronteras y Costas (Frontex) (2017) Página oficial [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/>
- Akkerman, Mark (2018) *Expanding the Fortress*. Transnational Institute [Online] Available at: [https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/expanding\\_the\\_fortress\\_-\\_1.6\\_may\\_11.pdf](https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_may_11.pdf)
- Alscher, Stefan. (2005) *Knocking at the Doors of "Fortress Europe": Migration and Border Control in Southern Spain and Eastern Poland*. Working Papers, 126. The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies University of California, San Diego
- Amnistía Internacional (14-6-18) *España: declaraciones sobre las concertinas en Ceuta y Melilla* [Online] Available at: <https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/noticias/noticia/articulo/espana-declaraciones-sobre-las-concertinas-en-ceuta-y-melilla/>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (31-10-14) *Tritón no sustituye a Mare Nostrum a la hora de salvar vidas* [Online] Available at: <https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/noticias/noticia/articulo/triton-no-sustituye-a-mare-nostrum-a-la-hora-de-salvar-vidas/>
- Andersson, R. (2016) *Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology in Europe's "fight against illegal migration"*. Security Dialogue, 47(1), 22–39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615606044>
- AP (11-11-15) *Refugee crisis: Slovenia begins erecting razor-wire fence on Croatian border to keep out migrants*. The Telegraph, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/slovenia/11988291/Refugee-crisis-Slovenia-begins-erecting-razor-wire-fence-on-Croatian-border-to-keep-out-migrants.html>
- AsktheEU, Frontex, *Annual Brief 2015*, [Online] Available at: <https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/2541/response/9192/attach/3/Annual%20Brief%202016%20With%20Top10%20v2%20A4.pdf>
- Associated Press (6-1-12) *Greece to Build Border Fence to Deter Illegal Immigrants*. The New York Times, [Online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/world/europe/greece-to-build-fence-on-turkish-border-to-curb-illegal-immigrants.html>
- Austria streamlines Slovenia border to process refugees (22-1-16) DW , Sección World [Online] Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/austria-streamlines-slovenia-border-to-process-refugees/a-18999606>
- Aziz Z. Huq (2013) *The Social Production of National Security*, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 637. p.639. [Online] [Available at] <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol98/iss3/3>
- Bauman, Zygmunt (2016) *Extraños llamando a la puerta*, Ed. Paidós

- *Calais migrants: Work to start on UK-funded wall* (7-9-16) BBC, Sección Politics [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37294187>
- Belarús, gobierno de. (2017) *Belarus comments on Latvia's plans to build fence along common border*. [Online] Available at: [http://www.belarus.by/en/government/events/belarus-comments-on-latvias-plans-to-build-fence-along-common-border\\_i\\_0000054065.html](http://www.belarus.by/en/government/events/belarus-comments-on-latvias-plans-to-build-fence-along-common-border_i_0000054065.html)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2015) *Belarus government told to respond to export barriers*[Online] Available at: [http://www.belarus.by/en/government/events/belarus-government-told-to-respond-to-export-barriers\\_i\\_0000023154.html](http://www.belarus.by/en/government/events/belarus-government-told-to-respond-to-export-barriers_i_0000023154.html)
- Boztas, Senay (23-1-2017) *Dutch prime minister warns migrants to 'be normal or be gone', as he fends off populist Geert Wilders in bitter election fight*. *The Telegraph* [Online] Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/23/dutch-prime-minister-warns-migrants-normal-gone-fends-populist/>
- *Calais migrants: How is the UK-France border policed?* (3-3-16). BBC, Sección UK, Politics [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33267137>
- *Calais migrants: Work to start on UK-funded wall* (7-9-16) BBC, Sección [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37294187>
- Calais Research (n.d.) *Funding the Border* [En línea] Available at: <https://calaisresearch.noblogs.org/finances/>
- Comisión Europea (2015) *Agreement establishing the 'European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, and its internal rules*. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/annexe-1-c-2015-7293-20151020\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/annexe-1-c-2015-7293-20151020_en.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) *Security Union: Commission proposes a European Travel Information and Authorisation System*[Online] Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-16-3674\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3674_en.htm)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) *Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo, al Consejo Europeo, al Consejo y al Banco Europeo de Inversiones sobre la creación de un Nuevo Marco de Asociación con Terceros Países en el contexto de la Agenda Europea de Migración*. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0385&from=EN>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) *Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo, al Consejo, al Comité Económico y Social Europeo y al Comité de las Regiones. Una Agenda Europea de Migración*. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/es/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:52015dc0240&from=en>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2017) *Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the European Security, Borders and Migration Conference by Forum Europe* [Online] Consultado en: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/20142019/avramopoulos/announcements/remarks-commissioner-avramopoulos-european-security-borders-and-migration-conference-forum-europe\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/20142019/avramopoulos/announcements/remarks-commissioner-avramopoulos-european-security-borders-and-migration-conference-forum-europe_en)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2017) *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Fourth progress Report on the Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration*. Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4th\\_progress\\_report\\_partnership\\_framework\\_with\\_third\\_countries\\_under\\_european\\_agenda\\_on\\_migration.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4th_progress_report_partnership_framework_with_third_countries_under_european_agenda_on_migration.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (n.d.) *Security: Horizon 2020* [En línea] Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/area/security>

- \_\_\_\_\_ (n.d) *The European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) - Public-Private Dialogue in Security Research* [Online] Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-07-346\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-346_en.htm)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) sobre la creación de un nuevo Marco de Asociación con terceros países en el contexto de la Agenda Europea de Migración [Online] Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0385&from=EN>
- \_\_\_\_\_ *Member States' notifications of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders pursuant to Article 25 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code* [Online] Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms\\_notifications\\_-\\_reintroduction\\_of\\_border\\_control\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ *Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control* [Online] Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en)
- Consejo Europeo (2004) *Reglamento (CE) N.º 2007/2004 del Consejo Artículo 3 punto, Artículo 4, Artículo 29* [Online] Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2004R2007:20070820:ES:PDF>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* [Online] Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs\\_implementation\\_plan\\_st14392.en16\\_0.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2018) *Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia* [Online] Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/enlargement/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia/>
- *Construction of fence at Bulgaria-Turkey border completed: Tsvetan Tsvetanov* (6-11-17) BNG, Sección News [Online] Available at: <http://bnr.bg/en/post/100840990/construction-of-fence-at-bulgaria-turkey-border-completed-tsvetan-tsvetanov>
- Dearden, Lizzie (17-4-2017) *French elections: Marine Le Pen vows to suspend immigration to 'protect France'*. *The Independent*, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-elections-latest-marine-le-pen-immigration-suspend-protect-france-borders-front-national-fn-a7689326.html>
- Dede, Orhan (2011) *EU's Test with Racism and Xenophobia*. *BiLGESAM* [En línea] Available at: <http://www.bilgesam.org/en/incele/974/-eu%E2%80%99s-test-with-racism-and-xenophobia/#.WwMZlsguBsM>
- Departamento de Seguridad Nacional del Estado Español (2018) *La Unión Europea amplía la Operación EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2018* [Online] Disponible: <http://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/sala-prensa/uni%C3%B3n-europea-ampl%C3%ADa-operaci%C3%B3n-eunavfor-med-sophia-hasta-31-diciembre-2018>
- Dunai, Marton (2-2-17) *Hungary builds new high-tech border fence - with few migrants in sight* Reuters, Sección World News [Online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-fence/hungary-builds-new-high-tech-border-fence-with-few-migrants-in-sight-idUSKBN1692MH>
- Economist, The (2015) *Boundary walls and fences worldwide* [Online] Available at: <http://infographics.economist.com/2015/fences/>
- Estonia 'plans Russia border fence' amid Ukraine tensions (28-8-16) BBC, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34085926>



- *Estonia mulls applying for EU co-financing of border fence construction* (16.02.2018) Financial Observer, Sección Recent News [Online] Available at: <https://financialobserver.eu/recent-news/estonia-mulls-applying-for-eu-co-financing-of-border-fence-construction/>
- EUNAVFORMED Sophia (2015) *Mandato* [Online] Available at: [http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en\\_exterior/actuales/listado/eunavformed.html](http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/eunavformed.html)
- Eurobarometer ,Special 113 (1997) *Racism and Xenophobia : Human rights and immigration in the European Union* [Online] Available at: [https://www.europeandataportal.eu/data/en/dataset/http-ec-europa-eu-public\\_opinion-archives-eb\\_special\\_120\\_100\\_en-htm113](https://www.europeandataportal.eu/data/en/dataset/http-ec-europa-eu-public_opinion-archives-eb_special_120_100_en-htm113)
- Eurobarometer, Special 437 (2015) *Discrimination in the EU in 2015* [Online] Available at: [https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/S2077\\_83\\_4\\_437\\_ENG](https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/S2077_83_4_437_ENG)
- European Concil on Refugees and Exilies (ECRE) (24-10-14) *ECRE & UNHCR concerned over ending of Mare Nostrum without European rescue initiative to replace it* [Online] Available at: <https://www.ecre.org/ecre-a-unhcr-concerned-over-ending-of-mare-nostrum-without-european-rescue-initiative-to-replace-it/>
- European Union, Official Journal (2005) *Establishing the European Security Research Advisory Board* [Online] Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32005D0516>
- *Fence on Lithuania-Kaliningrad border to be completed Wednesday* (20-12-17). DELFI [Online] Available at: <https://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/defence/fence-on-lithuania-kaliningrad-border-to-be-completed-wednesday.d?id=76695505>
- Forès, Laia (3-7-2018 ) *Àustria amenaça amb tancar la frontera sud per frenar els refugiats* [Online] Available at: [https://www.ara.cat/internacional/Austria-segellar-Italia-Alemanya-controlar\\_0\\_2044595710.html](https://www.ara.cat/internacional/Austria-segellar-Italia-Alemanya-controlar_0_2044595710.html)
- Frontex (2017) *Migratory Routes* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/eastern-borders-route/>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (3-2-2009) *Working Arrangement with the FYR of Macedonia Concluded* [En línia] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/working-arrangement-with-the-fyr-of-macedonia-concluded-10iaEG>
- \_\_\_\_\_ Budget (2005-2017) [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/key-documents/?category=budget>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (26-3-11) *Update to Joint Operation Poseidon 2011* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/update-to-joint-operation-poseidon-2011-jzZfWV>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (3-3-11) *RABIT Operation 2010 Ends, Replaced By JO Poseidon 2011* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/rabit-operation-2010-ends-replaced-by-jo-poseidon-2011-ia6Kaq>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (23-4-15) *Frontex welcomes pledges to boost operations Triton and Poseidon* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-welcomes-pledges-to-boost-operations-triton-and-poseidon-U6vDFW>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (26-5-15) *Frontex expands its Joint Operation Triton* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-expands-its-joint-operation-triton-udpbHP>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (17-12-15) *Frontex and Greece agree on operational plan for Poseidon Rapid Intervention* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-and-greece-agree-on-operational-plan-for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga>

- \_\_\_\_\_ (22-2-11) *Hermes 2011 running* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/hermes-2011-running-T7bJgL>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (25-2-11) *Frontex Guest Officers Sent to Work in Italy* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-guest-officers-sent-to-work-in-italy-URXwEO>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (10-10-16) *Joint Operation Triton (Italy)* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/focus/joint-operation-triton-italy--ekKaes>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (23-4-15) *Frontex welcomes pledges to boost operations Triton and Poseidon* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-welcomes-pledges-to-boost-operations-triton-and-poseidon-U6vDFW>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (13-12-16) *Frontex helps train Libyan Coast Guard* [Online] Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-helps-train-libyan-coast-guard-zxRCnE>
- Galpin, Richard (12-2-16) *Second fence under construction at Macedonia-Greece border*. BBC, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-35564444/second-fence-under-construction-at-macedonia-greece-border>
- 'Great Estonian Wall.' *Country decides to cut itself off from Russia ... with 2.5-meter fence* (17-3-16) RT, Sección World News [Online] Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/336000-estonia-russia-border-wall/>
- Gobierno de Bulgaria (21-9-13) *Angel Naydenov: We are toughening the border regime* [Online] Available at: <http://old.government.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0137&n=19&g=>
- Gobierno de España *Página oficial* [En línea] Available at: [http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en\\_exterior/](http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/)
- Gobierno de Estonia, *Página oficial* (2-6-16) *News in picture: The members of the Government visited the south-eastern border* [Online] Available at: <https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/news-picture-members-government-visited-south-eastern-border>
- Gobierno de Hungría, *Página oficial* (4-10-17) *We would rather help Romania protect its eastern border than build a fence along the Hungarian-Romanian border* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/we-would-rather-help-romania-protect-its-eastern-border-than-build-a-fence-along-the-hungarian-romanian-border>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (7-6-16) *Austria's procedure on the Austrian-Hungarian border is unnecessary* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/austria-s-procedure-on-the-austrian-hungarian-border-is-unnecessary>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (12-11-15) *We are ready to protect Hungarian-Romanian border* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/we-are-ready-to-protect-hungarian-romanian-border>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (4-9-17) *We continue to expect Brussels to pay* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/cabinet-office-of-the-prime-minister/news/we-continue-to-expect-brussels-to-pay>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (9-11-15) *There are already 3,800 soldiers at the southern border* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/there-are-already-3-800-soldiers-at-the-southern-border>

- \_\_\_\_\_ (17-10-15) *Hungarian-Croatian green border has been closed* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/hungarian-croatian-green-border-has-been-closed>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (20-9-17) *There can be no successful border security without the technical border system* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/news/there-can-be-no-successful-border-security-without-the-technical-border-system>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (22-7-15) *Two types of border fence to be built on Serbian-Hungarian border* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/two-types-of-border-fence-to-be-built-on-serbian-hungarian-border>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (8-1-17) *Border protection base of Hungarian Defence Forces completed in Kelebia* [Online] Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/border-protection-base-of-hungarian-defence-forces-completed-in-kelebia>
- Gobierno del Reino Unido, Página oficial (31-7-15) *Calais COBR meeting 31 July 2015: statement* [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/calais-cobr-meeting-31-july-2015-statement>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (3-3-16) *Further joint action between UK and France in Calais region* [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/further-joint-action-between-uk-and-france-in-calais-region>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (31-7-15) *PM call with President Hollande on Calais: statement* [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-hollande-on-calais-statement>
- Gobierno de Macedonia, Página oficial (23-11-15) *Prime Minsiter Gruevski and Preident Tusk discussed the refugee crisis* [Online] Available at: <http://vlada.mk/node/11465?ln=en-gb>
- Gobierno de Noruega (n.d) Página oficial *proporcionar medidas de seguridad en la estación fronteriza Storskog-Nytt sikkerhetstiltak ved Storskog grensestasjon* [Online] Available at: Usar traductor: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nytt-sikkerhetstiltak-ved-storskog-grensestasjon/id2498661/>
- *Greece plans Turkey border fence to tackle migration* (4-1-11) BBC, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12109595>
- Guardia Civil (1-8-16) *El Director General de la Guardia Civil presenta las operaciones EPN-INDALO y EPN-HERA 2016* [Online] Available at: <http://www.guardiacivil.es/ga/prensa/noticias/5887.html>
- Hall, Melanie (13-12-15) *Austria's border fence could have 800-yard gap as local winemakers make a stand*. The Telegraph, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/austria/12048224/Austrias-border-fence-could-have-800-yard-gap-as-local-winemakers-make-a-stand.html>
- Herrera, Manuel (9-2-2017) *Eslovaquia: un muro para apartar a los gitanos*. 5W, Sección Europa [Online] Available at: <https://www.revista5w.com/why/eslovaquia-un-muro-apartar-los-gitanos>
- Heyman, J. (2012). *Capitalism and US policy at the Mexican border*. Dialectical Anthropology, 36(3), 263–277. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-012-9274-x>
- Holly Ellyatt (6-6-2018) *'Pack your bags,' Italy's new leaders tell 500,000 illegal migrants — but it'll cost them*, CNBC, [Online] Available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/pack-your-bags-italys-new-leaders-tell-500000-illegal-migrants--but-itll-cost-them.html>

- Human Rights Watch (17-09-14) *The EU Must Take More Responsibility for the Migrants Risking Their Lives to Reach Italy* [Online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/17/eu-must-take-more-responsibility-migrants-risking-their-lives-reach-italy>
- Institute for Security Studies, European Unión (2016), *Report of the Group of Personalities on the Preparatory Action for CSDP-related research* [Online] Available at: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/report-group-personalities-preparatory-action-csdp-related-research>
- *Italy ran an operation that saved thousand of migrants* (20-4-15) The Washington Post [Online] Available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2fnews%2fworldviews%2fwp%2f2015%2f04%2f20%2fitaly-ran-an-operation-that-save-thousands-of-migrants-from-drowning-in-the-mediterranean-why-did-it-stop%2&utm\\_term=c00b76905b3a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2fnews%2fworldviews%2fwp%2f2015%2f04%2f20%2fitaly-ran-an-operation-that-save-thousands-of-migrants-from-drowning-in-the-mediterranean-why-did-it-stop%2&utm_term=c00b76905b3a)
- JAKEŠEVIĆ, R., & TATALOVIĆ, S. (2016). *Securitization (and De-securitisation) of the European Refugee Crisis: Croatia in the Regional Context*. *Teorija in Praksa*, 53(5), 1246–1278.
- Jegelevicius, Linas (12-5-17) *Irking Russia: Lithuania is also to start building its fence with Russia*. Baltic New Network, Sección Social [Online] Available at: <http://bnn-news.com/irking-russia-lithuania-is-also-to-start-building-its-fence-with-russia-165282>
- Johns Hopkins School of Education, International Scientific Conference (2017 *Contemporary Concepts of crisis management* [En línia] Available at: <http://eprints.ugd.edu.mk/18123/1/CMC%20Conferenc%20ok.pdf>
- Johnson, Howard (7-10-16) *Norwegians laugh at new fence on Russian border*. BBC, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37577547>
- \_\_\_\_\_ ( 6-10-16) *Norway's short but controversial fence on Russia's border*. BBC, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-37572671/norway-s-short-but-controversial-fence-on-russia-s-border>
- Jones, R., & Johnson, C. (2016) *Border militarisation and the re-articulation of sovereignty*. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 41(2), 187–200. <https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12115>
- Jones, Reece (2016) *Violent Borders*. Ed. Verso, Londres.
- Kakissis, Joanna (7-1-11) *Greek Border Fence to Keep Out Illegal Immigrants?* Time [Online] Available at: <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2040821,00.html>
- Kingsley, Patrick (22-6-15) *Migrants on Hungary's border fence: 'This wall, we will not accept it'*
- TGuardian, The, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/migrants-hungary-border-fence-wall-serbia>
- *Latvia completes 23km of 'anti-migrant wall' on Russian border* (5-1-17) RT, Sección World News [Online] Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/376347-latvia-migrant-fence-russia/>
- *Latvia completes 23km of 'anti-migrant wall' on Russian border* (5-2-17) RT, Sección World News [Online] Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/376347-latvia-migrant-fence-russia/>
- Lemberg-Pedersen, M. (2013) *Private security companies and the european borderscapes. The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration*, 152–172. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203082737>
- Léonard, S. (2010) *EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices*. *European Security*, 19(2), 231–254. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.526937>



- *Letonia comenzó a construir una cerca en la frontera con Rusia - Латвія почала будувати паркан на кордоні з Росією* (14-12-15) BBC [Online] Available at: Usar traductor: [https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news\\_in\\_brief/2015/12/151214\\_vs\\_latvia\\_russia\\_border](https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news_in_brief/2015/12/151214_vs_latvia_russia_border)
- *Lithuania plans fence on Russian Kaliningrad border* (17-6-17) BBC, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38635737>
- *Lithuania starts building fence on border with Russia* (6-6-17) The Baltic Times [Online] Available at: [https://www.baltictimes.com/lithuania\\_starts\\_building\\_fence\\_on\\_border\\_with\\_russia/](https://www.baltictimes.com/lithuania_starts_building_fence_on_border_with_russia/)
- London School of Economics (26-10-2017) *Explaining the popularity of Poland's Law and Justice government* (University of Sussex), [En línea] Available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/10/26/explaining-the-popularity-of-polands-law-and-justice-government/>
- Luque, Alejandro (31-8-16) *"Muchos políticos hablan con conceptos estereotipados que no llevan a nada"*. El Viejo Topo, Sección Entrevistas [Online] Available at: <http://www.elviejotopo.com/topoexpress/emilio-lledo-parte-ii/>
- *Macedonia finishes fence at Greek border to stem flow of asylum seekers* (29-11-15) ABC News [Online] Available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-30/macedonia-finishes-fence-at-greek-border-to-stop-migrants/6984826>
- Malešič, M. (2017) *The securitisation of migrations in Europe: The case of Slovenia*. Teorija in Praksa, 54(6), 947–968.
- Menjívar, C. (2014) *Immigration Law Beyond Borders: Externalizing and Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization*. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 10(1), 353–369. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110413-030842>
- Meret, Susi (2010) *The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support*. Tesis doctoral, Aalborg University (2010, ISSN: 1903-7783) [Online] Available at: [http://vbn.aau.dk/en/publications/the-danish-peoples-party-the-italian-northern-league-and-the-austrian-freedom-party-in-a-comparative-perspective-party-ideology-and-electoral-support\(0a7918a0-583a-11df-9ad7-000ea68e967b\).html](http://vbn.aau.dk/en/publications/the-danish-peoples-party-the-italian-northern-league-and-the-austrian-freedom-party-in-a-comparative-perspective-party-ideology-and-electoral-support(0a7918a0-583a-11df-9ad7-000ea68e967b).html)
- Ministerio della Difesa (n.d) *Mare Nostrum Operation* [Online] Available at: <http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx>
- Ministerio del Interior de España (27-7-17) *La Policía Nacional inicia junto a FRONTEX la operación Minerva'16 en los puertos de Algeciras, Tarifa y Ceuta* [Online] Available at: [http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/noticias/-/asset\\_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/content/id/6214809](http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/noticias/-/asset_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/content/id/6214809)
- Ministerio del Interior de España (2018) *Misiones en el exterior* [Online] Available at: [http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en\\_exterior/](http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/)
- Mortimer, Caroline (4-8-15) *Bulgaria builds final part of razor wire fence to keep out refugees*. The Independent, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bulgaria-builds-final-part-of-razor-wire-fence-to-keep-out-refugees-10437962.html>
- Muller, B. J. (2009) *Borders , Risks , Exclusions*, 3(1), 67–78.
- Murphy, Francois (5-6-17) *Bracing for Russian military exercise, Lithuania puts up a border fence*. Reuters, Sección World News [Online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-russia-fence/bracing-for-russian-military-exercise-lithuania-puts-up-a-border-fence-idUSKBN18W237>

- Nenov, Stoyan (17-7-14) *Bulgaria's fence to stop migrants on Turkey border nears completion*. Reuters [Online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-refugees-fence/bulgarias-fence-to-stop-migrants-on-turkey-border-nears-completion-idUSKBN0FM1ZF20140717>
- Nielsen, Nikolaj (22-1-2016) *EU rejects Hungary's demand to finance border fence*. EUObserver, Sección Migration [Online] Available at: <https://euobserver.com/migration/138857>
- Nordsieck Wolfram (n.d) *Parties and Elections in Europe. Results of legislative elections from more than 100 countries and regions in Europe from 2000 to 2018* [Online] Available at: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/>
- Nuruzzaman, M. (2006) *Paradigms in conflict: The contested claims of human security, critical theory and feminism*. Cooperation and Conflict, 41(3), 285–303. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836706066560>
- Obrez, Veliki (24-8-17) *'We know how to live next to Russia': Lithuania builds border fence with Kaliningrad*. The Guardian, Sección Europe [Online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/24/russia-lithuania-border-fence-kaliningrad-estonia-eston-kohver>
- Parlamento Europeo (2007) *Informe anual de Frontex* [Online] Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200810/20081029ATT40977/20081029ATT40977EN.pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2011) *Informe anual de Frontex* [Online] Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201207/20120725ATT49372/20120725ATT49372EN.pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2013) *Informe anual de Frontex* [Online] Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/59177/att\\_20140818ATT87670-6654011261055466919.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/59177/att_20140818ATT87670-6654011261055466919.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2014) *Informe anual de Frontex* [Online] Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/84687/FRONTEX%20AAR%202014\\_13.05.2015.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/84687/FRONTEX%20AAR%202014_13.05.2015.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2013) *Reglamento (UE) n.º 1052/2013 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo de 22 de octubre de 2013 por el que se crea un Sistema Europeo de Vigilancia de Fronteras (Eurosur)* [Online] Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=ES>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) *Policy Department, Internal border controls in the Schengen area, Is Schengen crisis-proof?* [Online] Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL\\_STU%282016%29571356\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU%282016%29571356_EN.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Propuesta de reglamento del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo por el que se crea un Sistema Europeo de Información y Autorización de Viajes (SEIAV) y por el que se modifican los Reglamentos (UE) n.º 515/2014, (UE) 2016/399, (UE) 2016/794 y (UE) 2016/1624* [Online] Diponible en: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/ALL/?uri=COM:2016:0731:FIN>
- *Parties and elections, Legislative elections in European countries and autonomous regions since 1945. Political parties and governments. Past election results are stored in the archive.* [Online] Available at: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html>
- Picazo, Belén (20-11-13) *Frontera en Mellila el drama humanitario*. Diario.es, Sección Desalambre [Online] Available at: [https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/valla\\_de\\_melilla/](https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/valla_de_melilla/)
- Racaj, M., & Janev, S. (2017) *Migrant crisis, a security challenge for the Republic of Macedonia and ARM contribution in handling the migrant crisis*. Available at: <http://eprints.ugd.edu.mk/18123/>
- Reuters (13-11-15) *Austria plans border fence to manage migrant flow* [Online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-austria/austria-plans-border-fence-to-manage-migrant-flow-idUSKCN0T213620151113#veCtTRrGBIYyCphe.99>

- \_\_\_\_\_ (24-8-16) *The Norway Will Build a Fence at Its Arctic Border With Russia* New York Times, Sección *Europe* [Online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/russia-norway-border-fence-refugees.html>
- \_\_\_\_\_, Sección *World News* [Online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-refugees-fence/bulgarias-fence-to-stop-migrants-on-turkey-border-nears-completion-idUSKBN0FM1ZF20140717>
- Reynolds , James (11-12-15) *Slovenia builds razor-wire fence to control migrant numbers*. BBC, Sección *World* [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-34790151/slovenia-builds-razor-wire-fence-to-control-migrant-numbers>
- *Rightwing populists reshape Denmark's political landscape* (16-6-2015) *Financial Times* [Online] Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/d9c90e48-1113-11e5-8413-00144feabdc0>
- Rooduijn , Matthijs (2015) *The Rise of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe*. *European View*, Vol. 14, pp. 3-14, 2015 [Online] Available at: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1007/s12290-015-0347-5>
- Salazar P., Robinson, Yenissey Rojas, Ivonne (2011) *La securitización de la seguridad pública: una reflexión necesaria*. El Cotidiano.
- Sanahuja, J. A. C. N.-C.-1024 L. B.-513312 (2005) *Seguridad, desarrollo y lucha contra la pobreza tras el 11-S: Los Objetivos del Milenio y la «securitización» de la ayuda*, *Documentación Social*, pp. 25–41.
- Schengen Visa (2017) *Info ETIAS – Sistema Europeo de Información y Autorización de Viajes* [Online] Available at: <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/es/etias/>
- Shamir, Ronen (2016) *Without Borders ? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime* *American Sociological Association Stable*, 23(2), 197–217.
- Smagare, Silvija (1-11-17) *Latvia to build €10.5m fence on border with Belarus*. *LSM.LV* [Online] Available at: <https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/latvia-to-build-10.5m-fence-on-border-with-belarus.a255741/>
- Sparke, M. B. (2006) *A neoliberal nexus: Economy, security and the biopolitics of citizenship on the border*. *Political Geography*, 25(2), 151–180 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.10.002>
- Statewatch (2005) *Informe anual de actividad de Frontex* [Online] Available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jun/frontex-report-2005.pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2008) *Informe anual de actividad de Frontex* [Online] Available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/jul/eu-frontex-annual-report-2008.pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2009) *Informe anual de actividad de Frontex* [Online] Available at: [http://www.statewatch.org/observatories\\_files/frontex\\_observatory/gen\\_rep\\_2009\\_en.pdf](http://www.statewatch.org/observatories_files/frontex_observatory/gen_rep_2009_en.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2012) *Informe anual de actividad de Frontex* [Online] Available at: [http://www.statewatch.org/observatories\\_files/frontex\\_observatory/2013-09-frontex-annual-report-2012.pdf](http://www.statewatch.org/observatories_files/frontex_observatory/2013-09-frontex-annual-report-2012.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2015) *Informe anual de actividad de Frontex* [Online] Available at: <http://statewatch.org/news/2016/jul/eu-frontex-2015-activity-report.pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2017) *Informe anual de actividad de Frontex* [Online] Available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/aug/eu-frontex-activity-report-2016.pdf>

- *Stroobants y Perrier (11-1-11) Plans for a wall on Greece's border with Turkey embarrass Brussels. The Guardian* [Online] Disponible: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/11/greece-turkey-wall-immigration-stroobants>
- *Stroobats (11-1-11) Plans for a wall on Greece's border with Turkey embarrass Brussels. The Guardian* [Online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/11/greece-turkey-wall-immigration-stroobants>
- *Stroobants y Perrier (11-11-15) Slovenia starts building fence to control flow of refugees. The Guardian, Sección Europe* [Online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/11/slovenia-fence-refugees-veliki-obrez>
- *Sweden's Moderates open to Sweden Democrats immigration deal (7-5-2018) The Local* [Online] Available at: <https://www.thelocal.se/20180507/swedens-moderates-open-to-sweden-democrats-immigration-deal>
- *Sytas y Mardiste(8-3-16) Worried over refugees, Baltics begin to erect border fences. Reuters, Sección World News* [Online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-baltics/worried-over-refugees-baltics-begin-to-erect-border-fences-idUSKCN0WA1JN>
- *Tartar, Andre (11-12-17) How the Populist Right is Redrawing the Map of Europe, [Online]* Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-europe-populist-right/>
- *Taylor, Alan (2-3-16) Stranded on the Macedonian Border. The Atlantic* [Online] Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/03/stranded-on-the-macedonian-border/471933/>
- *Taylor, Adam (20-4-15) Italy ran an operation that saved thousandf of migrants for drowning in the mediterranean sea. The Washington Post* [Online] Available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/20/italy-ran-an-operation-that-save-thousands-of-migrants-from-drowning-in-the-mediterranean-why-did-it-stop/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.80b16dc60f2a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/20/italy-ran-an-operation-that-save-thousands-of-migrants-from-drowning-in-the-mediterranean-why-did-it-stop/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.80b16dc60f2a)
- *The Interior Minister Declared the Fence on the Bulgaria-Turkey Border is 100% Finished (29-10-17) Novite.com , Sección Defensa* [Online] Available at: <https://www.novinite.com/articles/184460/The+Interior+Minister+Declared+the+Fence+on+the+Bulgaria-Turkey+Border+is+100+Finished>
- *Trading places on the Hungarian right (16-8-2017) Politico.eu* [Online] Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/hugary-right-wing-trading-places-fidesz-jobbik/>
- *Unión Europea (2003) European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World* [Online] Available at: <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2006) REGULATION (EC) No 562/2006 Establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [Online] Available at: <https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0001:0032:EN:PDF>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007) REGLAMENTO (CE) N.º 2007/2004 DEL CONSEJO (2004) por el que se crea una Agencia Europea para la gestión de la cooperación operativa en las fronteras exteriores de los estados miembros de la Unión Europea [Online] Available at: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2004R2007:20070820:ES:PDF>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2014) *La Europa sin Fronteras: El espacio Schengen (2014-2019)* [Online] Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen\\_brochure/schengen\\_brochure\\_dr3111126\\_es.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/schengen_brochure_dr3111126_es.pdf)



- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) REGLAMENTO (UE) 2016/1624 (2016), sobre la Guardia Europea de Fronteras y Costas, por el que se modifica el Reglamento (UE) 2016/399 [Online] Available at: <https://www.boe.es/doue/2016/251/L00001-00076.pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) Reglamento del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo por el que se modifica el Reglamento (UE) 2016/399 en lo relativo al refuerzo de los controles mediante la comprobación en las bases de datos pertinentes en las fronteras exteriores [Online] Available at: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-55-2016-INIT/es/pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2016) Una visión común, una actuación conjunta: una Europa más fuerte [Online] Available at: [https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs\\_es\\_version.pdf](https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_es_version.pdf)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2017) Agencia Europea de la Guardia de Fronteras y Costas (Frontex) [Online] Available at: [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex\\_es](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_es)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2017) Agencia Europea para la Gestión Operativa de Sistemas Informáticos de Gran Magnitud en el Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia (eu-LISA) [Online] Available at: [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/eu-lisa\\_es](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/eu-lisa_es)
- \_\_\_\_\_, Diario Oficial (2016) Reglamento (UE) 2016/1624 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo [Online] Available at: <https://www.boe.es/doue/2016/251/L00001-00076.pdf>
- United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2006) *Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 68th and 69th session* [Online] Available at: <http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/167150>
- Vallet, Elisabeth (2014) *Borders, Fences and Walls*. Ed. Routledge.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Duez, Denis (2014) *A Community of Borders, Borders of the Community: The EU's Integrated Border Management Strategy*. En Vallet, 2014. 51-66
- \_\_\_\_\_ Chiara, Maria (2014) *The Mediterranean Sea as a European Border: Trans-Mediterranean Migration, Forced Return and Violation of Fundamental Rights*. En Vallet 2014, 11-16.
- Walters, W. (2002) *Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the border*. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 20(5), 561-580. <https://doi.org/10.1068/d274t>
- Waugh, Rob (2017) *Map showing the most racist countries in Europe (and how Britain ranks)* [Online] Available at: <https://metro.co.uk/2017/05/03/this-map-shows-the-most-racist-countries-in-europe-and-how-britain-ranks-6612608/>
- Williams, J. M. (2016) *The safety/security nexus and the humanitarianisation of border enforcement*. *Geographical Journal*, 182(1), 27-37. <https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12119>
- Worrall, Patrick (2017) *The rise of right-wing populism in Europe* Channel [Online] Available at: <https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-the-rise-of-right-wing-populism-in-europe>
- Zacher, M. W. (2001) *The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force*. *International Organization*, 55(2), 215-250. <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140568>

## ANNEX 1

### FRONTEX BUDGET 2005-2017

	BUDGET
2005	6,280,202
2006	19,166,300
2007	41,980,000
2008	70,432,000
2009	83,250,000
2010	92,846,928
2011	118,187,000
2012	89,578,000
2013	93,950,000
2014	97,945,077
2015	143,300,000
2016	232,757,000
2017	302,029,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,391,701,507</b>

Compiled by the authors from Frontex's annual budgets (Frontex, 2005-2017)

## ANNEX 2

### INTERNAL CONTROLS WITHIN THE SCHENGEN AREA (2006-2017)

Year	Country of implementation	No. Controls	Reasons
2006	France	1	Event
	Finland	2	Political event
2007	France	1	Political event
	Finland	1	Political event
	Iceland	1	Event
2008	Austria	1	Sports event [Eurocup 2008]
	France	1	Social mobilisation
	Finland	1	Political event
2009	Iceland	1	Event
	Germany	1	Political event
	France	3	2 due to Political Event Social mobilisation
	Italy	1	Political event
	Spain	1	Social mobilisation
	Norway	1	Event
	Denmark	1	Political event
2010	Malta	1	Event
	Estonia	1	Political event
	France	1	Political event
	Latvia	1	Political event
	Portugal	1	Political event
2011	Austria	1	Political event
	Norway	1	Terrorist attack
	Sweden	1	Terrorist attack
	France	1	Political event

Year	Country of implementation	No. Controls	Reasons
2012	Spain	1	Political event
	Poland	1	Sports event [Eurocup 2012]
	Norway	1	Event
2013	Poland	1	Political event
2014	The Netherlands	1	Event
	Belgium	1	Political event
	Norway	1	Terrorist threat
	Estonia	1	Political event
2015	Germany	6	Political event 5 due to migratory movements
	Austria	5	Migratory movements
	Slovenia	2	Migratory movements
	Hungary	1	Migratory movements
	Malta	1	Political event/terrorist threat/Fight against human trafficking
	Sweden	1	Migratory movements
	France	2	Political event State of emergency [Paris Attacks 13/10/2015]
	Norway	1	Migratory movements
2016	Denmark	4	Migratory movements
			Migratory movements
			Council Recommendation of 12 May 2016 under Article 29 (1). Criterion [a]
			Migratory movements
	Sweden	3	Council Recommendation of 11 November 2016. Criterion [a]
			Migratory movements
			Migratory movements
	Norway	3	Migratory movements
			Council Recommendation of 07 February 2017.(3) Criterion [b]
			Migratory movements
	Belgium	1	Council Recommendation of 11 November 2016.(2) Criterion [a]
			Migratory movements
			Migratory movements
	France	2	Migratory movements
			Sports event [Tour de France]
	Germany	2	State of emergency [Nice Attacks, 14/7/2016]State of emergency [Nice Attacks, 14/7/2016]
	Austria	2	Council Recommendation of 12 May 2016 under Article 29 (1). Criterion [a]
			Migratory movements
	Poland	1	Council Recommendation of 11 November 2016. Criterion [a]
			Migratory movements
	Poland	1	Migratory movements
			Political events

Year	Country of implementation	No. Controls	Reasons
2017	Malta	1	Political events
	France	2	Terrorist threat
	Austria	3	Council Recommendation of 07 February 2017.(3) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Council Recommendation of 11 May 2017.(4) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Secondary movements: Security situation in Europe and threats arising from continuing significant secondary movements
	Germany	3	Council Recommendation of 07 February 2017.(3) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Council Recommendation of 11 May 2017.(4) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Secondary movements: Security situation in Europe and threats arising from continuing significant secondary movements
	Denmark	3	Council Recommendation of 07 February 2017.(3) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Council Recommendation of 11 May 2017.(4) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Secondary movements: Security situation in Europe and threats arising from continuing significant secondary movements
	Sweden	4	Council Recommendation of 07 February 2017.(3) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Council Recommendation of 11 May 2017.(4) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Secondary movements: Security situation in Europe and threats arising from continuing significant secondary movements
			Social mobilisation
	Norway	4	Council Recommendation of 07 February 2017.(3) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Council Recommendation of 11 May 2017.(4) Criterion [b] Migratory movements
			Sports Event [World Road Cycling Championship]
			Secondary movements: Security situation in Europe and threats arising from continuing significant secondary movements

Compiled by the authors from European Parliament sources (European Parliament, 2016)

#### Notes:

The duration of the controls is usually approved for a period of a few months, those with a long duration in time have been extended beyond the stipulated time.

(1) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?qid=1530782148173&uri=CELEX:32016D0894>

This refers to "Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/894 of the Council, of 12 May 2016 establishing a Recommendation to carry out temporary checks at internal borders in exceptional circumstances which jeopardise the overall functioning of the Schengen area".

(2) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016D1989&qid=1530785018389>

This refers to "Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1989 of the Council, of 11 November 2016 establishing a Recommendation to extend temporary controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances which jeopardise the overall functioning of the Schengen area".

(3) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?qid=1530785165136&uri=CELEX:32017D0246>

This refers to "Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/818 of the Council, of 11 May 2017 establishing a Recommendation to extend carrying out temporary checks at internal borders in exceptional circumstances which jeopardise the overall functioning of the Schengen area".

(4) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?qid=1530785261170&uri=CELEX:32017D0818>

This refers to "Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/818 of the Council, of 11 May 2017 establishing a Recommendation to extend temporary controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances which jeopardise the overall functioning of the Schengen area".

#### Notes on the criteria:

Event: large-scale social events or affairs

Political event: meetings or summits at international level such as a climate change or NATO summit.

"Significant secondary movements": migratory movements within the Schengen area. As defined by the European Council "Movement of refugees or asylum seekers from countries where they already enjoy or could enjoy protection, for the purpose of seeking asylum or permanent resettlement in another country, without the prior consent of the latter's national authorities, without an entry visa or sufficient travel documentation" Source: <http://iate.europa.eu/FindTermsByLilId.do?lilId=911515&langId=en>

Social mobilisation: demonstration that implies a high level of displacement of people on public roads.

Migratory movements: movements of migrants at the external or internal borders of the Schengen area

#### Notes on the criteria with a recommendation from the European Council:

a) "serious problems in ensuring efficient control of the external border, in accordance with the Schengen acquis, and the reception and treatment of arriving migrants [...]"

[b] "[...] to extend the carrying out of temporary checks at internal borders in exceptional circumstances which jeopardise the overall functioning of the Schengen area [...]" "Exceptional circumstances" can be described as "[...] the serious threat to public order and internal security looming over these States due to the combination of shortcomings in the control of external borders in Greece and by the secondary movements of irregular migrants entering through Greece with the possible intention of moving to other Schengen States[...]"



## ANNEX 3

### FRONTEX JOINT OPERATIONS BY YEAR (2005-2017)

OPERATION	GEOGRAPHICAL ZONE	YEARS	FREQUENCY	TYPE
FOCAL POINTS	Western and southern borders: Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Expanded to 11 airports in 2008. In 2009 was extended to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and maritime and air are added. In 2011 the whole year instead of a few months In 2012 the States are enlarged, including third countries: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine. And an extended version is included	2005-2016	Yearly	Land, sea, air
First joint operation	Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	2005		Land
"Illegal workers."	Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	2006		Land
TURIN	Turin airport	2006		Land
POSEIDON	Greece: ports and borders, in 2008 it is increased to Bulgaria. In 2009, the operation was extended to the sea. In 2011 it was carried out over the whole year (and not for a few months) In 2015 it was replaced by Poseidon Rapid Intervention (PRI)	2006-2016	Yearly	Land, sea
BORDER DELEGATES	External borders (both sides)	2006-2007		Land
COORDINATION POINTS	EU member states and Schengen area and later expanded to third countries. In 2006 it was a pilot project. In 2011 it was carried out on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border	2006-2016 -?	Yearly	Land
AGIOS	Mediterranean Spanish Ports	2006-2007		Land
HERA I	West Africa. From 2008 it has been a joint operation with Hera II	2006-2008		Land
HERA II	West Africa to Canary Islands (Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde). From 2008 it has been merged with Hera I and called 'HERA'. In 2011 it became permanent and year round	2006-2016	Yearly	Sea
JASON I	Central Mediterranean	2006 (under preparation)-?		Sea
NIRIS	Baltic Sea and North Sea	2006 (under preparation)-?		Land and sea
ZEUS	Ports of Member States	2006 (under preparation), 2009		Sea, air
AGELAU	EU Airports	2006 (under preparation)-?		Land
HYDRA	Not specified	2006 (under preparation)-?		Not specified
AMAZON	Not specified	2006 (under preparation)-?		Not specified
ARGONAUTS (Pilot project)	Member States of the EU and Schengen area	2006 (under preparation), 2008 and 2009		Air
OC IN MALTA	Malta	2006		Land and sea
MINERVA	Western Mediterranean: Spain	2006-2016	Yearly	Sea
INDALO	Western Mediterranean: Spain	2006-2016	Yearly	Sea
25 joint operations were carried out/ initiated in 2007	Not specified	2007-?	Not specified	Not specified

OPERATION	GEOGRAPHICAL ZONE	YEARS	FREQUENCY	TYPE
HAMMER	115 airports. The operation had several stages that were implemented in different airports depending on the year	2008-2009		Air
EPN (EUROPEAN PATROLS NETWORK) INCLUDES: Aeneas Hermes Indalo Hera Minerva	Mediterranean Sea	2008-2016	Yearly	Sea
NAUTILUS	Central Mediterranean Italy and Malta	2008-2009		Sea
ATLAS	Poland's border with Ukraine	2008-?		
HERMES	Central Mediterranean Italy and Spain	2008-2016	Yearly	Sea
EUXINE	Black Sea: Romania	2008		Sea
ARIADNE	Eastern borders: Poland	2008		Land
FIVE BORDERS: ATLAS I, ATLAS II, ATLAS III	Eastern borders: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania	2008		Land
HERAKLES	South eastern borders: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria	2008		Land
EUROCUP	Austria and Switzerland. In 2012 it was extended to Poland, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands	2008, 2012, 2016	Every four years	Air
DRIVE IN	Southern borders: Slovenia	2008		Land
GORDIUS	Eastern borders: Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland	2008		Land
KRAS	Southern borders Slovenia	2008		Land
LYNX	Eastern borders: Slovakia	2008		Land
LONGSTOP	22 airports	2008		Air
ZARATHUSTRA	38 airports	2008		Air
ZORBA	51 airports	2008		Air
SILENCE	13 airports	2008		Air
JUPITER	Eastern borders: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania. In 2012 it was carried out in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania	2009-2013	Yearly	Land
NEPTUNE	Eastern and southern borders: Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. In 2011 it was carried out in Greece and Slovenia In 2012 it was carried out in Slovenia	2009-2013	Yearly	Land
SATURN (Part of the Poseidon programme)	Greece, Bulgaria	2009		Land
URANUS	Eastern and southern borders: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece	2009		Land
MERCURY	Western and southern borders: Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia,	2009		Land
GOOD WILL	Eastern borders: Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland	2009		Land
LONG OVERSTAYERS	Eastern and southern borders: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece	2009		Land
ALPHA REINFORCEMENT	Atlantic Ocean, mainly south coast: Latvia, Portugal, Spain	2009		Sea
HUBBLE	10 airports	2009		Air
RABIT 2011	Greece's border with Turkey	2011		Land
AENEAS	Central Mediterranean	2011-2014	Yearly	Sea
RABIT	Greece	2011		Land

OPERATION	GEOGRAPHICAL ZONE	YEARS	FREQUENCY	TYPE
FLEXI FORCE: -HUBBLE -EUROCUP -VISA INTEGRITY	Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain	2010-2013	Yearly	Air
METEOR	Lisbon airport	2013		Air
TRITON	Central Mediterranean Italy	2014-2017	Yearly	Sea
ATTICA	Greece	2009-2016	Yearly	Land, sea and air
MOS MAIORUM	Member States of the EU and Schengen area	2014, 2015, ?		
REX	Not specified	2014-2015		Land
RABIT 2015	Maritime border between Greece and Turkey	2015		Maritime
PEGASUS	Member States of the EU and Schengen area	2014-2016	Yearly	Air
ALEXIS	Not specified	2014-2016	Yearly	Air
VEGA CHILDREN	Member States of the EU and Schengen area	2014-2016	Yearly	Air
DRAGON	Member States of the EU and Schengen area	2017		
DEPORTATION OPERATIONS	EU member states and Schengen area with third countries	2006-2017	Yearly	Land, sea and air

Compiled by the authors based on the activity reports of the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2007, 2013, 2014) and Statewatch (2005, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2017) the Ministry of the Interior of the Spanish State (Spanish Ministry of the Interior (27-7-17)

**REPORT no. 20**

**Evolución de la banca armada en España (Spanish)**

Jordi Calvo Rufanges

October 2013

**REPORT no. 21**

**El militarismo en el Norte de África (Spanish)**

Blanca Camps-Febrer and Pere Ortega

January 2014

**REPORT no. 22**

**Rajoy's military policy**

Tomàs Gisbert, Maria de Lluç Bagur

and Gemma Amorós

February 2014

**REPORT no. 23**

**Military Drones. The Videogame War With Real Victims**

Jordi Calvo, Anna Escoda, Carles Blanco

and Gabriela Serra

March 2014

**REPORT no. 24**

**Spanish Arms Exports 2004-2013. Does the Government Promote Illegal Arms Exports?**

Tica Font, Eduardo Melero, Camino Simarro

July 2014

**REPORT no. 25**

**Inertia, waste and fraud in the military expenditure.**

**Spanish Defense Budget Analysis in 2015**

Pere Ortega and Jordi Calvo Rufanges

December 2014

**REPORT no. 26**

**Fraud and improvisation in Spanish military expenditure. An analysis of the Spanish Defence budget for 2016**

Pere Ortega and Xavier Bohigas

October 2015

**REPORT no. 27**

**Spanish arms exports 2005-2014.**

**Fueling conflicts in the Middle East**

Tica Font, Eduardo Melero and Camino Simarro

December 2015

**REPORT no. 28**

**Banks that invest in arms. Actualization of the funding of nuclear weapons, cluster bombs and of the main Spanish military industries (2011-2016)**

Jordi Calvo Rufanges

June 2016

**REPORT no. 29**

**Spanish arms exports 2006-2015. Spanish weapons used in Middle East conflicts**

Tica Font and Eduardo Melero

November 2016

**REPORT no. 30**

**Gender and military culture**

Nora Miralles Crespo

Novembre 2016

**REPORT no. 31**

**The incorporation of women into the Spanish army.**

**Opacity, sexism and violence**

María de Lluç Bagur

November 2016

**REPORT no. 32**

**European arms that foster armed conflicts.**

**Conflicts that cause refugees to flee**

Jordi Calvo Rufanges (Coord.), Ainhoa Ruiz

Benedicto and Edgard Vega Vargas

June 2016

**REPORT no. 33**

**The weapons bubble and the military industry in Spain**

Pere Ortega

June 2017

**REPORT no. 34**

**The absurdity of military spending. Analysis of the budget of defence in Spain, 2017**

Pere Ortega, Xavier Bohigas, Xavier Mojal

June 2017





**Stop  
Wapenhandel**



With the support of:

